Migration and Development:
Future Directions for Research and Policy

SSRC Migration & Development Conference Papers

28 February – 1 March 2008 | New York, NY

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Preface

This conference, which convened on February 28-March 1, 2008 in New York City, brought together researchers and practitioners from different disciplinary and experiential perspectives within the fields of migration and development. Researchers from each field were paired to address a series of eight issues, which had been identified in consultation with the project’s International Committee for Migration and Development Research as being of central future concern for public policy.

The subsequently-revised conference presentations reflect the different perspectives of the participants and roles in each of the conference panels.

Authors of papers were asked to discuss questions they found most pressing, assess current research knowledge and methodologies available to address them, and pose priority questions for future research. At the conference researchers and practitioners who are expert on each issue area were asked introduce and compare the points of view of each paper, and assess how these and perhaps additional approaches might together inform future research.

The revised versions of these introductions and papers of each panel complement one another in bringing different perspectives to similar and interrelated aspects of migration and development and they collectively demonstrate the value and need for interdisciplinary synthesis in identifying issues of central importance, designing future investigations, and enhancing understandings for public policy debates.
PANEL 1

Reframing Migration and Development Studies

This panel focused on different theoretical approaches that have evolved within the fields of migration and development studies and how their conceptual, theoretical, and methodological differences might be made complementary in advancing understandings of how the transformative processes of migration and development are interrelated.
Recent research on relations between migration and development has focused largely on international migration and its impact on economic growth, poverty, and inequality in sending countries. The Social Science Research Council invited Stephen Castles (International Migration Institute, Oxford University) and Gustave Ranis (Economic Growth Center, Yale University) to assess what is known generally about relations between migration and development and what issues ought to orient future research to improve understandings of those relationships. They approached the question from quite different perspectives: that of a sociologist who has specialized in the study of international migration and of an economist with a specialization in development studies. While each sees migration and development as “part of the same process and therefore constantly interactive” – rather than as one predominantly causing the other – their analytic approaches to building theoretical understandings of the process are distinct.

Taken together their papers raise fundamental questions about the conceptual boundaries and theoretical approaches that ought to frame future study of migration and development particularly if it is to be of use to policy makers and practitioners:

- What redefinitions of the conceptual boundaries guiding current research of migration and development are suggested by bringing together different perspectives from the fields of migration and development studies?
- How do the two field's theoretical approaches differ and how might each inform and improve the approach and expand understandings offered by the other?
- How might interdisciplinary research be designed to take both approaches into account to guide future research and better inform policy makers and practitioners?

Related to these questions, both papers provide useful histories of the different theories of migration and development that have predominated in their separate fields and they build upon current theoretical perspectives to offer relatively inductive and deductive approaches to guide future research.
Comparison of their different perspectives suggests that understandings of migration and development could be improved by broadening the scope of research to consider both internal and international migration and to examine economic development in relation to other aspects of social transformation.

Ranis’ approach begins with a the rural-urban, dual economy models of national development, which were proposed by the 18th century physiocrats and 19th century classical school of economics and then amended toward the end of the 20th century by developmental economists. Ranis elaborates these closed economy models by differentiating between productive sectors and labour markets (agricultural and non-agricultural rural sectors; informal services and sub-contracting and formal urban sectors) between which laborers migrate in search of employment to improve their circumstances for work and well-being. This model predicts that, through economic growth, internal migration, and migrants’ inter-sectoral transferring of resources a national economy will eventually evolve into a “one-sector, relatively full employment, neo-classical world” as exemplified by the development processes of Japan, Korea, and Taiwan in the 1960s to 1980s and by contemporary development in China, Vietnam, and Thailand in the present.

To take globalization into account, Ranis opens the closed development model internationally in order to identify from which sectors international migrants depart as unskilled and skilled workers and to analyze the contributions that the resources they transfer back home, particularly remittances, can have on development.

In focusing on the migrants’ transfer of resources between international and national productive sectors Ranis identifies a series of questions for future research that can illuminate not only the impact of migration on national economic growth but also its contribution to reducing poverty and enabling the realization human development and capabilities more broadly. Considering how to address these research questions, Ranis recognizes that “the migration and development nexus truly represents an interdisciplinary and exciting ball of wax which is, however difficult to disentangle by means of an ambitious general equilibrium approach.” He concludes his paper by posing a challenge to future researchers: “How can we manage to embed the economics-focused analysis of migration and development within a broader socio-political framework which recognizes the important interdisciplinary dimensions of the issue?”

If Ranis’ approach is deductive – to elaborate upon a relatively simple economic principles in order to gain insight into admittedly complex causes, processes, and outcomes of both internal and international migration in relation to development – then Castles’ approach moves in an opposite, more
inductive direction to seek synthesis from diverse theories developed in multiple social science disciplines. Whereas Ranis’ approach reflects confidence in the universality of a basic economic model whose elaboration is expected to yield explanatory insights into the complex relations between migration and development, that of Castles reflects his dissatisfaction with the interdisciplinary fragmentation of theory within the field of migration studies and the resulting inability of researchers to persuade policy makers of a relatively simple research finding: that “a higher level of development brings more mobility.”

The narrowness and fragmentation of theory within migration studies that trouble Castles the most derive from disciplinary separations that “disembed” economy from society as if these spheres were not integrated. The antidote, he proposes, is a broad, interdisciplinary, and synthetic approach that would bring together theories of economic development and social change under the rubric of “social transformation.” The methodology to accomplish such a synthesis would be to link various levels of socio-spatial life ranging from the local to the global, thus not only reflecting the micro-to-macro nature of relations between migration and development but also taking advantage of the tendency for disciplines such as geography, anthropology, sociology, politics, and economics to focus on different aspects of social organization. Castles cites a number of recently formulated theoretical approaches within migration studies that he believes can contribute to the more holistic synthesis he seeks, including theories of demographic transition, new economics of labor migration, segmented labor markets, and transnational migration.

Elaborating on economic models to incorporate broader, global social processes, as Ranis proposes, or synthesizing theories of social change in order to connect with models of economic development as Castle proposes, pose rather than resolve the challenges facing migration and development studies. As Castle concludes, “starting from simplicity versus starting from complexity cannot be simply resolved by meeting in the middle.” Rather he suggests, the challenge of bridging disciplinary differences of conceptual and analytic approaches and linking different socio-spatial level of analysis might be accomplished through the design of “a more embracing and comprehensive model that goes across disciplines and at least permits middle range-theories.” Whether or not a unified interdisciplinary theory is in the end feasible, the approaches of both authors suggest that interdisciplinary collaboration between researchers is a necessary in analyzing of issues related to remittances, “brain drain” and “brain gain”, circular migration, diaspora investments that have become central to migration and development research and the elaboration of public policies to enhance the contributions of migration to development.
Development and Migration – Migration and Development: What comes first?

Stephen Castles | International Migration Institute, Oxford University

SSRC Migration & Development Conference Paper No. 2

Introduction
One feels embarrassed to put the question in the title of this paper to colleagues well-versed in social scientific research:

*Development and migration – migration and development: what comes first?*

The answer is obvious, and I am sure we all agree on it:

*The two are part of the same process and therefore constantly interactive.*

The question is thus both redundant and nonsensical. And yet I believe that we need to engage seriously with it, for three reasons.

The first became clear to me quite recently when speaking to a former very senior European Union functionary (whom I will not name). I was putting the argument that development policies cannot reduce international migration, because a higher level of development brings more mobility, not less – at least for a considerable period. This point was argued back in 1990 by the late Georges Tapinos (Tapinos 1990), and is now one of the few things that virtually all migration scholars agree with. But the ex-official in question (who had been involved in the EU’s external affairs policies) looked quite shocked, and said that I had undermined one of his most strongly held beliefs.

What does this anecdote tell us? That politicians, officials and the public still believe that if we can only work out and tackle the so-called ‘root causes’ of international migration, we can *drastically reduce it*. This also carries the unspoken, common sense message that international migration (especially from South to North) is a *bad thing* that ought to be stopped.

The second reason, which is closely linked, is that our research findings are not being listened to and understood. If decision-makers still do not understand one of the most basic facts about the migration/development relationship, then either there is something wrong with the research carried out by migration scholars, or we have failed to bridge the gap with decision-makers – or both. In fact I believe that it is both. The fragmentation and
narrowness of migration studies that many of us have written about (Castles 2007; Massey, et al. 1998; Portes 1999; Portes and DeWind 2004; Zolberg 1989); (Brettell and Hollifield 2007) means that our research does not build on shared concepts and questions, and does not, on the whole lead, lead to an accumulation of knowledge. And even when we do agree on something important, we have not been very good at getting it over to non-specialists.

The third reason is that there has recently been a change in the conventional wisdom about international migration and development. I use the term ‘conventional wisdom’ in the sense put forward by John Kenneth Galbraith (Galbraith 1958) to refer to something that is so obvious that it does not even need arguing (e.g. the belief held in 1960 that smoking was not harmful to health). One could also use the term ‘common sense’ as applied by Gramsci (Gramsci, et al. 1971). The conventional wisdom about migration and development until recently was a predominantly pessimistic view: as an ILO official interviewed in the 1990s commented: ‘migration and development – nobody believes that anymore’ (Massey, et al. 1998, 260). In the last ten years there has been a major conceptual shift. As Kathleen Newland has written, there been a ‘new surge of interest’ (Newland 2007) in migration and development. Many academic studies now show how migration can have positive results for countries of origin. A series of reports and policy statements has shown that international agencies and the governments of both migrant-sending and receiving countries believe that migration can make an important contribution to the development of poorer countries.

This last point actually raises two sets of questions:

- If, as Galbraith wrote, ‘the enemy of the conventional wisdom is not ideas but the march of events’, what events or crucial changes in economic and social conditions have led to the paradigm shift?
- If, on the other hand, the world has not changed that much, our questions must be led by the sociology of knowledge: in what ways have economic and political interests changed so that perceptions or desires concerning the development/migration relationship have been fundamentally transformed?

In this paper I will reflect on these problems by,

1. Giving a brief history of academic debates on international migration and development;
2. Examining the politics of migration and development, using EU policy approaches as examples;
3. Discussing an alternative approach to migration and development based on a conceptual framework and methodology derived from the analysis of social transformation processes;
4. Re-assessing some key aspects of the migration/development relationship in the light of a social transformation approach; and
5. Finally asking whether economic development is in fact likely to reduce emigration from poor countries?

One aim of this initial debate between a development economist (Gustav Ranis) and a migration specialist (myself) was to see how development studies and migration studies differ and how they can intersect. In this particular case, the dialogue was complicated by the fact that Prof. Ranis built his theoretical approach on the analysis of internal migration, extending it only later to international migration, while I start from international migration and see internal rural-urban migration as part of the social transformation processes that forms my central analytical category. My paper does address the distinctions between analyses of migration starting from development economics and those deriving from the political economy and sociology of international migration (which I call 'historical-institutional approaches' below). I will come back to differences and similarities at the end of the paper.

A short history of the academic debate on migration / development linkages

It is impossible to provide an adequate history of intellectual trends in this area in a brief paper. The aim here is simply to provide a rough overview to contextualise contemporary debates.

During the 1950s and 1960s development economists stressed that labour migration was an integral part of modernization. They were looking first and foremost at the effects of development on migration, but also at reciprocal effects of migration on development, namely that the reduction of labour surpluses (and hence unemployment) in areas of origin and the inflow of capital through migrant remittances could improve productivity and incomes (Massey, et al. 1998, 223).

The governments of countries like Morocco, Turkey and the Philippines shared this view. In the 1960s and 1970s, they encouraged their nationals to migrate to Western Europe or the USA – and later to Gulf oil economies. Such governments claimed that labour export would facilitate economic development at home. However, the long-term results of labour recruitment schemes were often disappointing, with little economic benefit for the country of origin – as shown in particular by a series of studies on Turkey (Abadan-Unat 1988; Martin 1991; Paine 1974). The result was the predominantly pessimistic view that ‘migration undermines the prospects for local economic development and yields a state of stagnation and dependency’ (Massey, et al. 1998, 272).

In the early 21st century, there has been a remarkable turn-around. After
years of seeing South-North migrants as a problem for national identity and social cohesion, and more recently even as a threat to national security, politicians and officials now emphasize the potential of international migration to bring about economic and social development in the countries of origin. Now, ideas on the positive effects of migration on development are at the centre of policy initiatives. There has been a plethora of official conferences and reports on the theme (e.g. DFID 2007; GCIM 2005; World Bank 2006). In countries of origin like India migrants as being re-defined as ‘heroes of development’ (Khadria 2008).

So what has been happening? In retrospect, there appear to have been two separate (but often intersecting) discourses: an academic and a policy debate. I will briefly review the academic debate in this section and the policy debate in the next.

*The academic debate on migration and development*

The main controversy from the 1950s to the 1980s was between neo-classical economic theory and historical–institutional theory. To some extent this can also be seen as a controversy between development economists on the one hand and political economists and sociologists on the other.

Development economists mainly applied neo-classical theory, which emphasised the individual decision to migrate, based on rational comparison of the relative costs and benefits of remaining at home or moving. Neo-classical theory assumed that potential migrants had excellent knowledge of wage levels and employment opportunities in destination regions, and that their migration decisions were overwhelmingly based on these economic factors. Constraining factors, such as government restrictions, were seen as distortions of the rational market. According to the neo-classical model, the mere existence of economic disparities between various areas should be sufficient to generate migrant flows. In the long run, such flows should help to equalize wages and conditions in underdeveloped and developed regions, leading towards economic equilibrium.

The result was an overwhelmingly positive view in the 1950s and 1960s on the linkages between migration for development – a *virtuous circle*:

> Beginnings of development in poor countries → Migration → Enhanced development → Trend to income equilibrium and elimination of the ‘root causes’ of migration → Less migration.

By contrast, the historical-institutional approach saw migration mainly as a way of mobilising cheap labour for capital. It perpetuated the underdevelopment that was a legacy of European colonialism, exploiting the
resources of poor countries to make the rich ones even richer. The intellectual roots of such analyses lay in Marxist political economy - especially in dependency theory, which was influential in Latin America in the 1960s. A more comprehensive ‘world systems theory’ developed in the 1970s and 1980s. It focused on the way less-developed ‘peripheral’ regions were incorporated into a world economy controlled by ‘core’ capitalist nations. The penetration of multi-national corporations into less-developed economies accelerated rural change, leading to poverty, displacement of workers, rapid urbanization and the growth of informal economies.

In the 1970s and 1980s (perhaps as a reflection of broader intellectual trends) the pessimistic view of the historical-institutional approach was dominant. It conceptualised the linkages between migration and development as a *vicious circle*:

Core-periphery division and dependency → Migration → Increased dependency of poor countries → Impoverishment and income gap get worse → Third world labour freely available for capital in core economies.

However, from the 1970s onwards, alternative theoretical models began to emerge, paving the way for the more positive (but also more differentiated) approach characteristic of the current period. These models are making it possible to bridge the old divides, and to work towards a more comprehensive understanding of the migratory process. But this was not just an advance in social scientific analysis – it also related ‘the march of events’: after the 1973 ‘oil crisis’ there was an important shift in capital investment strategies. Instead of investing in Fordist-type industries in the old industrial areas of Western Europe, North America and Japan, corporations became multi-nationals, and moved labour-intensive production process to low-wages areas of the South (Froebel, et al. 1980). This set the stage of a re-assessment of ideas on the costs and benefits of labour migration epitomised in the title of an economic study of the time: *Trade in place of migration* (Hiemenz and Schatz 1979).

The new approaches have been characterised as *transitional theories* by my colleague Hein de Haas (de Haas 2008), because they set out to link mobility to processes of development and economic integration. According to (Zelinsky 1971), at the beginning of a process of modernisation and industrialisation, there is frequently an increase in emigration, due to population growth, a decline in rural employment and low wage levels. As industrialisation proceeds, labour supply declines and domestic wage levels rise; as a result emigration falls and labour immigration begins to take its place. This ‘mobility transition’ parallels the ‘fertility transition’ through which populations grow fast as public health and hygiene improves, and then
stabilise as fertility falls in industrial countries. A more recent concept used to describe this pattern is the ‘migration hump’: a chart of emigration shows a rising line as economic growth takes off, then a flattening curve, followed in the long run by a decline, as a mature industrial economy emerges (Martin and Taylor 2001). Another theory that links migration with broader social changes is to be found in the work of geographer Ronald Skeldon, who suggests a spatial typology of migratory situations (Skeldon 1997).

Without going further into these complex debates, it is important to see that advances in migration theory are making it possible to move towards more holistic understandings of the migratory process. The key ideas of some of new migration theories come from different disciplines, but they seem highly compatible with each other. Apart from the transitional theories already mentioned, the newer approaches include:

- The new economics of labour migration (NELM), which remains within the neo-classical paradigm of income maximisation and trends towards equilibrium, yet questions neo-classical theory’s methodological individualism, by emphasising the role of families and communities in migration decisions. NELM uses methods such as qualitative interviews and household survey that are similar to those used by anthropologists and sociologists. (The ‘migration hump’ idea, of course, was linked to the NELM approach).
- Dual or segmented labour market theory, which analyses the differentiated labour demand of employers as a key factor in causing and structuring migration.
- Migration networks theory, which shows the collective agency of migrants and their communities in organising processes of migration and incorporation.
- Transnational theory: as a result of new transport and communications technologies it becomes increasingly easy for migrants to maintain long-term economic, social, cultural and political links across borders. Transnational communities (or diasporas) are becoming increasingly important as social actors.

Such approaches also correspond with tendencies in mainstream social theory to overcome the old structure/agency dichotomy, and to re-theorise the links between human action (individually and in groups) and broader processes of change in social structures (de Haas 2008). These innovations in migration theory could therefore help change the marginal position of migration studies within the social sciences – which, as I have argued elsewhere, is a result of the way it has been dominated by national assumptions and driven by policy considerations in the past, (Castles 2007).
The politics of migration and development; the EU for example

In migration studies, the topics of investigation, the research questions and even the findings of migration studies have frequently been driven by policy considerations. This is an important problem as it can undermine the scientific nature of investigation in this area, and isolate migration studies from broader social inquiry. Here I will just mention one example: the links between migration control policies and understandings of migration/development linkages in the European Union and its member states. As background it is important to know that free movement of labour within the then European Community (EC) was always a central principle, laid down by the 1957 Treaty of Rome, and implemented in 1968. However, the common policy did not apply to ‘third country nationals’ – conditions for their entry, residence and employment remained an important aspect of national sovereignty for member states. This changed with the 1997 Treaty of Amsterdam, which provided for common rules on asylum and integration, to be implemented by 2004. However, the 2004 agreements (at the time of the extension of the EU to 25 members) only partially lay down common polices, and many issues connected with immigration remain national prerogatives.

A very brief history of the migration history of the EU and its predecessor until 1993, the European Community (EC) needs to emphasise the following milestones. The industrial core of the EC (Germany, France, Belgium, Netherlands) recruited Italian labour in the 1950s and early 1960s, but the very success of the EC in equalising economic and social conditions led to a decline in intra-community mobility by the mid-1960s. More and more migrant workers came from outside the EC, especially from Turkey and North Africa. After the 1973 oil crisis, governments tried to stop labour entries, and were amazed to find these transformed into family reunion and settlement (see Castles 1986). After the end of the Cold War, the EU experienced an upsurge in both labour migration and asylum seekers from the East and South. Migration became highly politicised. The EU and the member states worked together on strategies to cut asylum seeker entries, reduce irregular migration and enhance border control.

However, the early 2000s saw a new debate on Europe’s ‘demographic decline’ and the long-term need for both highly-skilled and less-skilled workers. The European Commission argued that a system to recruit labour at all skilled levels was essential (CEC 2005b). The member states were unwilling to grasp the nettle of legal recruitment of low-skilled workers, due to a very hostile public climate. The result was an EU Policy Plan (CEC 2005a) that concentrated on attracting the highly skilled from the rest of the world. The plan paid lip-service to the need to link migration to development of countries of origin while essentially leaving low-skilled migration to market forces – that is to irregularity (see Castles 2006).
What has all this got to do with research on migration and development? It is important to look at the interplay between political and economic interests and migration research. The sudden discovery in the mid-1970s (referred to above) that trade was better than migration for developing countries came just when the government of Europe had decided to stop recruitment, and the corporations had decided to increase investment in new industrial areas. When asylum became a key political issue in Europe, government sought to restrict it partly through strict border control, partly through ideas for ‘off-shore processing’, but also partly through addressing the ‘root causes’ of flight – defined as impoverishment and violence.

Conflict resolution strategies and developmental approaches became highly fashionable around 2001 (Castles and Van Hear 2005; Oxfam 2005). The UK Government suggested that the UN Refugee Convention of 1951 was no longer appropriate, because in a situation of enhanced global migration flows, it was creating the conditions for misuse of the asylum system by economic migrants. To save the Convention, then UN Refugee Commissioner Rudd Lubbers suggested ‘Convention Plus’, a set of measures to safeguard asylum while also addressing the issue of ‘mixed flows’ and the causes of forced migration. Similar objectives are to be found in the French approach (also later adopted by Italy) of co-developpement, which means linking development measures for African countries to measures to encourage return migration. At the 2001 Seville European Council, the British and Spanish governments tried to get the EU to agree to make development aid dependent on the signing of re-admission agreement for deported migrants by poor countries (Castles, et al. 2003).

The point is that social science research was always readily available to support such initiatives – whether building walls, off-shore processing, root causes measures, co-developpement or broader ‘developmental approaches’. This does not necessarily imply that social scientists were unduly influenced by those in power – although the strategic use of research funding and consultancy contracts by governments can certainly push researchers in certain directions. It is equally possible that the controversies within migration studies and our inability to agree a common body of theory and knowledge makes it possible for policy makers to choose from a menu of products or findings, to suit the policy fashion of the day. There are also scholars who show the fallacies of wall-building, co-developpement and so on – but they can be ignored in favour of those who are ‘on message’.

We should therefore ask ourselves: does the recent turn to more positive views of the migration/development relationship really reflect a scientific revolution (in Kuhn’s sense Kuhn 1996), or is it just that policy makers have given the nod to this approach because it fits current political needs? It is hard to come to a conclusion on this, but one would like to believe the former.
Recent approaches could imply a trend towards a new synthesis that goes across old disciplinary and paradigmatic boundaries, and that could allow real advances in theory and knowledge in this field. But that is not automatically the case. It is really up to social scientists working on migration and development to develop these new approaches further, and to make sure that we are not pushed to adopt research topics and questions that feed into short-term policy needs. That requires a much more concerted attempt to theorise the migration/development relationship, and to link it with the most advanced ideas of contemporary social research concerned with broader processes of societal development across a range of disciplines.

**Understanding the relationship between global change, social transformation and human mobility**

This section explores in a very preliminary way some ideas for taking forward the analysis of the migration/development relationship. It falls into a sub-section on the theoretical basis and another on the methodological consequences.

**Conceptual framework**

A key reason for the shortcomings of migration and development research lies in its isolation from broader trends in contemporary social theory. In the epoch of the rise of the nation-state, international migration was seen as peripheral, because the national industrial society was understood as the 'container' for all aspects of social being (Faist 2000; Wieviorka 1994). Crossing borders was the exception and a deviation from the nation-state model. Specific national assumptions on ways of excluding or assimilating migrants became the unquestioned conventional wisdom of social sciences based on 'methodological nationalism'. (Beck 2007; Wimmer and Glick Schiller 2003). Migration thus played little part in classical social science, which was primarily concerned with social order in bounded societies; however, this did include strategies for controlling internal 'dangerous classes' or colonised 'dangerous peoples' (Connell 1997). The result has been that research on migration has mainly been done by migration specialists, while research on development has been the preserve of development specialists. Both groups have tended to be isolated from each other and from mainstream social theory.

In the past, research on migration and development has had little impact on core theories of social order and differentiation. However, in recent times, globalisation has challenged national models in the social sciences and drawn attention to cross-border flows as key instruments of change. There are signs of a new emphasis on human mobility in social theory, and some key works on global change (such as (Bauman 1998; Beck 2007; Cohen and Kennedy 2000; Held, et al. 1999) now stress the centrality of migration in
contemporary social relations. This shift is not surprising: if the principle of the ‘container society’ is no longer sustainable (even as a myth), then flows across borders become a crucial area of investigation for the social sciences. Economics recognised this for commodity and capital flows before political science and sociology learnt the lesson for governance, cultural and social relations, but now this priority is inescapable for all social scientists.

A central concept for analysing the links between human mobility and global change is to be found in the process of social transformation. A useful point of departure is Polanyi’s (Polanyi 2001) work on the ‘great transformation’ of European societies through industrialisation and the ideology of self-regulating markets. According to Polanyi, the market liberalism of the 19th century ignored the embeddedness of the economy in society (i.e. its role in achieving social goals laid down by politics, religion and social custom). The liberal attempt to disembed the market was a ‘stark utopia’ leading to a double movement – a protective countermovement to re-subordinate the economy to society. Unfortunately, in the early 20th century, the countermovement lead inexorably to fascism and world war (Block and Polanyi 2003; Polanyi 2001).

Globalisation (especially since the end of the Cold War) represents a new fundamental shift in economic, political and military affairs. The resulting social transformation in developed countries can be seen in the closure of older industries, the restructuring of labour forces, the erosion of welfare states and the decline of communities. In less-developed countries, forms of social transformation include intensification of agriculture, destruction of rural livelihoods, erosion of local social orders, rural-urban migration and formation of vast shanty-towns within new mega-cities. The recent upsurge in South-North migration can best be understood through examination of these complementary changes and their complex linkages.

It is possible to draw on emerging ideas from a range of disciplines to develop a new approach to understanding transformation-mobility relationships. In economics, Stiglitz has provided a critique of neo-liberal economic globalisation, derived from Polanyi’s concept of transformation (Stiglitz 1998; Stiglitz 2002). For him, the ‘double movement’ is represented by anti-globalisation activism (see Stiglitz’s Foreword to (Polanyi 2001). Milanovic shows that the neo-liberal claim of improving economic outcomes for poor countries has masked a vast increase in inequality (Milanovic 2007). In political economy, the neo-liberal model is criticised as a new utopia of a self-regulating world economy (Freeman and Kagarlitsky 2004; Petras and Veltmayer 2000; Weiss 1998). Such ideas echo Polanyi’s critique of attempts to disembed the economy from society, but they are essentially top-down critiques, which fail to analyse the local effects of global economic and political forces. In order to overcome this disjuncture, it is necessary to apply
concepts and methodologies suggested by social anthropologists, development sociologists and other social scientists studying local dimensions of global change (see methodology below).

These trends in mainstream social theory have already influenced migration studies. As outlined above, economists working on migration have become increasingly critical of the emphasis on individual rational choice within neoclassical theory, and are investigating the role of families, communities, and other social actors in migratory processes (Massey, et al. 1998). An important advance is the development of network theories, which focus on the collective agency of migrants and communities in organising processes of migration and incorporation (Boyd 1989). A linked trend is towards investigation of transnational affiliations among migrants (Guarnizo, et al. 2003; Portes, et al. 2007; Vertovec 2004). Critical analyses of the relationship between migration and security emphasise the important role of demographic trends, institutional change, and the decline of multilateralism (Bigo and Guild 2005; Humphrey 2005; Weiner and Russell 2001).

The key principle at the conceptual level, therefore, is to embed the study of migration/development relationships in a much broader inter-disciplinary analysis of the development of social structures and relationships in the context of globalisation. As the brief review above shows, this is not a new idea, and important trends in both broader social theory point in that direction.

Methodology
A revised conceptual framework implies rethinking the methodology of migration and development research. We need to find ways of understanding the relationships between macro- meso- and micro factors of change. This is based on the idea that global factors have different effects at the local and national level, due to the presence of mediating historical experiences and cultural patterns. Put differently, it is crucial to find ways of understanding the relationships between the various socio-spatial levels: global, local, national and regional (Pries 2007). This principle also underpins the need for interdisciplinarity, since the various disciplines often address different socio-spatial levels.

A primary concern is to overcome methodological nationalism by developing a truly transnational research process based on international and interdisciplinary teams. At the same time, we need to develop instruments for linking analysis of global forces to national and local experiences, drawing on methodological innovations from several disciplines. The ‘new economics of labour migration’ uses household surveys to understand the complexity of migration decisions and their relationship with other factors (Stark 1991;
Taylor 1999). Collinson (Collinson 2003) has pioneered ‘micro-political economy’ research on livelihoods and commodity chains in conflict areas. Social geographers have developed new ways of understanding the changing meaning of ‘territory’ and the relationships between spatial levels (Lussault 2007; Sassen 2006).

The International Sociological Association (ISA) Research Committee on ‘Social Transformation and Sociology of Development’ (Schuerkens 2004) use the concept of ‘glocalisation’ to analyse links between global forces and local life-worlds, and has applied this approach to the study of migration and ethnicity (Berking 2003; Binder and Tosic 2005; Schuerkens 2005). Other sociologists show how identity movements arise in reaction to globalisation (Castells 1997). Social anthropology has moved away from older ideals of authenticity and singularity to study individual and group reactions to globalising forces (Levitt and Glick Schiller 2004). This implies analysing ‘a simultaneous dialectic of indigenisation ... and cosmopolitanisation’ (Friedman 2004). Concepts and methods for ethnographic work on globally-dispersed communities are discussed by Hage (Hage 2005), while recent examples of studies on local mediation of global change include (Hogan 2004; Wise and Velayutham 2008).

This is in no way an exhaustive summary of the interesting methodological approaches that are already being tried out in the social sciences. Some are already being applied in migration research and others could and should be.

**Re-examining the migration and development mantra**

What would a conceptual framework and methodology based on the analysis of social transformation contribute to our understanding of current issues in the migration/development relationship? It could serve as an analytical lens to re-examine some of the main elements of the new conventional wisdom on migration and development. I use the term ‘migration and development mantra’ here, based on Devesh Kapur’s idea that remittances have become a new ‘development mantra’: governments and officials believe that money sent home by migrants can be a recipe for local, regional and national development (Kapur 2004). I think it is useful to extend this notion of a ‘new mantra’ to include the whole range of benefits that migration is said to bring for development.

- Migrant remittances can have a major positive impact on the economic development of countries of origin
- Migrants also transfer home skills and attitudes – known as ‘social remittances’- which support development
- ‘Brain drain’ is being replaced by ‘brain circulation’, which benefits both sending and receiving countries

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• Temporary (or circular) labour migration can stimulate development
• Migrant diasporas can be a powerful force for development, through transfer of resources and ideas
• Economic development will reduce out-migration.

At present ‘the evidence base for the links between migration and development is still very weak’ (Newland 2007). A World Bank study found that the relationship is ‘unsettled and unresolved’ (Ellerman 2003), while Massey et al. point to deficiencies in both theoretical understanding and gathering of data on the relationship between migration and development (Massey, et al. 1998, 272). Thus the evidence on all aspects of the mantra is uneven and contested. It would take far too long to discuss each one in turn here – and in any case this will be covered in other sessions. I simply want to suggest some research questions that could be applied to some or all of them.

1. **What do we mean by development and who decides?** The concept was first coined to refer to postwar reconstruction after 1945 in Europe, and then applied in a top-down way to the post-colonial Third World. It has become a commonsense term, but the original simple definition of development as growth in GDP (absolute or per capita) has been questioned by ideas of human development, human security, development as capability or freedom or autonomy. When the International Migration Institute (IMI) at Oxford University and the Doctoral Programme in Development Studies of the University of Zacatecas recently brought together scholars, government officials and members of migrant associations from some major emigration countries, they questioned the idea that some of the world’s most exploited workers should provide the capital for economic growth, where official aid programmes have failed. They argued that a strategy based on exporting workers to richer countries was a sign of the failure to achieve development in the interests of the majority of the population. The implication is that migrants and the communities they come from and go to should have a voice in defining development (Castles and Delgado Wise 2007; Castles and Delgado Wise 2008).

2. **Under what conditions can migration contribute to development?** Comparisons of various countries present conflicting evidence. For instance the Philippines has one of the largest and longest-standing emigration programmes – the government’s ambition is to be ‘the provider of workers for the world’ (Asis 2008) – yet there is little evidence that it has led to improvements in the economic and social conditions of the people, nor indeed in the quality of public life. Korea by contrast has moved quickly from being an emigration to an immigration country, yet it is not clear whether labour export in the 1970s and 1980s played much part in this (Delgado Wise and Invernizzi 2005). Turkey had large-scale emigration until the 1980s, which at the same was assessed as having
little development benefit, but has now experienced rapid growth and a migration transition (Avci and Kirisci 2008). Mexico has had very large-scale migration to the USA, but this appears to have led to greater economic dependency and to economic distortions which are not conducive to growth (Delgado Wise and Guarnizo 2007). There are clearly some major knowledge gaps here, which call for rigorous examination and cross-national comparisons.

3. **Is development an issue of transferring the ‘right attitudes’ to poorer countries?** The idea that the transfer of western attitudes and forms of behaviour from developed to less-developed countries would bring about positive change goes back to the 19th century idea of the ‘civilizing mission’ of Europe in Africa, Asia and Latin America. It was also central to the modernization theories of the 1950s and 1960s (Rostow 1960), according to which: ‘[d]evelopment was a question of instilling the “right” orientations – values and norms – in the cultures of the non-Western world so as to enable its people to partake in the modern wealth-creating economic and political institutions of the advanced West’ (Portes 1997, 230). Such policies failed to stimulate development and to improve the living standards of the poor. More recently, neo-liberal globalisation theory has argued that western models of privatisation and entrepreneurship are crucial to development, yet such approaches have so far led to greater inequality (Milanovic 2007). Now strategies designed to encourage ‘social remittances’ and ‘diaspora mobilisation for development’ are being advocated (see DFID 2007). We need to examine the relationship between such apparently bottom-up development approaches and macro-level relationships of unequal economic and political power.

4. **Is the ‘brain drain’ being replaced by ‘brain circulation’ or a ‘brain bank’?** Skilled migration often represents a transfer of human capital from poor to rich countries, but current initiatives by development agencies and international organizations aim to find ways in which skilled migration could be transformed into a global circulation of talents, which might benefit receiving countries, migrants and source countries. Whether this will happen depends on the willingness of the states concerned to cooperate for development. The very strong emphasis on recruiting the highly skilled and excluding the low skilled in the current policies of the EU, UK, France, Germany, USA, Canada, Australia, Japan, Korea and, most recently, China cast doubt on such willingness. Another indication is the continuing rise in recruitment of medical personnel from less-developed countries by Western Europe and the USA (OECD 2007, 162-82). So the task here is to analyse the interest coalitions that determine such policies, and whether there are levers for change.
5. *Is temporary or ‘circular’ migration a real possibility, and can it serve the interests of poor countries?* The ambivalence of migration and development policies is perhaps clearest with regard to the renewed enthusiasm for temporary migration – now under the more positive label of circular migration. This is said to benefit the countries of origin, but in reality these would have an interest in permanent emigration of surplus low-skilled workers and temporary emigration of the highly skilled. The interests of labour-importing countries are the opposite, and these have so far prevailed in international debates: lower-skilled migrants are welcome in Europe, North America and the new industrial countries only as temporary ‘guestworkers’. Where this proves politically difficult, employers rely on undocumented workers. The ready availability of low-skilled labour in a situation of global surplus gives all the market power to the demand side.

This list of questions is far from exhaustive, and my brief discussion of each indicates how controversial they remain. Clearly, there is a need for much more systematic research, and above all for comparative studies of differing experiences to work out the factors involved, and how they interact. My basic aim here is to indicate the impossibility of making clear statements by looking at migration on its own. Only by analysing it in a framework that links global relationships of economic and political power with national and local experiences of coping with social transformation can we begin to understand the factors that lead to differentiated outcomes.

**Will economic development reduce emigration from poor countries?**

As I mentioned at the beginning of the paper, powerful decision makers still believe that development can reduce emigration from poor countries to rich – the last point of the migration and development mantra. This is based on two assumptions. The first, which goes back to colonial ideas on the dangers or rural-urban migration, is that migration of poor people to rich areas is intrinsically bad (Bakewell 2007). The second assumption is that tackling the poverty and violence that force people to move will lead to a decline in migration. The belief in the ‘virtuous circle’ described earlier is still strong.

In fact there is considerable evidence that improvements in living standards and reductions in violence actually create the conditions for more migration. The citizens of rich countries are highly mobile – although this is often not referred to as migration. Sociologist Zygmunt Bauman has argued that the right to be mobile is the badge of the global elite, while the poor are meant to stay at home (Bauman 1998). The policy consequences of recognising that ‘development instead of migration’ policies are bound to fail (de Haas 2006) were spelled out convincingly in the 2005 Report of the Global Commission on International Migration. The GCIM underlined that migration policies could
not be a substitute for much broader policies designed to address underdevelopment and inequality. The world’s most prosperous states needed to acknowledge the impact of their own policies on the dynamics of international migration – for instance through trade reform to give developing countries fairer access to global markets (GCIM 2005, section 1, paragraph 49). One might add the need to stop arms exports to conflict regions, as well as for measures to build human rights standards into aid and trade agreements.

As for countries of origin, reliance on migrant remittances to fund development can be misguided. Migration alone cannot bring about development. Where political and economic reform is absent, remittances are more likely to lead to inflation and greater inequality than to positive change. On the other hand, where migration takes place at the same time as improvements in governance, creation of effective institutions, construction of infrastructure and the emergence of an investment-friendly climate, then it can be part of the solution. Policies to maximize the benefits of migration for countries of origin must thus be part of much broader strategies designed to reduce poverty and achieve development (DFID 2007, 37-40).

Such analyses in policy reports show that some government officials have got the message that the virtuous circle of migration and development is not so simple – even if key decision makers have not. This is important for social scientists, because it shows that our messages do not always fall on deaf ears. It should reinforce our determination to continue to elaborate a critical, interdisciplinary perspective for the analysis of the migration/development relationship. This means working to overcome the barriers that have led to the fragmentation of migration studies and its isolation from innovative trends in social theory.

The key idea is that it is mistaken to see migration and development in isolation from wider issues of global power, wealth and inequality. Mobility of people is an integral part of the major changes currently affecting all regions of world. Studying migration separately from this context is likely to lead to mistaken ideas on its potential for enhancing economic, political and social change. By contrast, conceptualising migration as a key aspect of the social transformations that affect all parts of the world today can enrich both migration studies and the social sciences as a whole.

Re-linking development economics and critical migration theory
The two papers presented at the initial session of the SSRC conference on migration and development approached the issue in very different ways: Ranis started from a theoretical model of the economics of internal migration, and then tested it against some historical cases to show a wide range of
modifying factors. He also argued that the basic model could be extended to international migration, albeit with even more constraints, not least the role of states and their uneven power. He stated that the model suggested a long-term transition to ‘a one-sector, relatively full-employment neo-classical world’, and argued that this is ‘currently happening in such countries as China, Vietnam and Thailand’. However, he also shows the limitations of this model, not least the fact that it cannot explain trends in much of Latin America and Sub-Saharan Africa.

By contrast I started from a model of complexity and contradictions. My approach was a political economy and sociology of international migration, built around the central concept of social transformation and the way this is brought about simultaneously in South and North by neo-liberal globalisation. Far from a trend towards a ‘one-sector neo-classical world’, I would argue that globalisation and social transformation means the re-birth of archaic economic patterns in the North: the resurgence of the garment sweatshop, domestic service and the informal sectors in post-industrial economies. The developmental benefits of migration for sending countries are not absent from this model, but are seen as highly uneven, and contingent on a wide range of factors.

Can these very different approaches intersect? That is clearly both an intellectual and a practical problem. On the intellectual level there needs to be a debate about the similarities and difference in the determinants and consequences of internal versus international migration. International migration is not simply an extension of internal migration, but neither can internal migration be treated as essentially a contextual factor for international migration. More fundamentally, starting from simplicity versus starting from complexity cannot be simply resolved by meeting in the middle. Treating half the world as deviations from the model does not verify the model, but too much complexity can lead to resignation. Perhaps both approaches can meet in the search for a more embracing and comprehensive model that goes across disciplines and at least permits middle-range theories.

On the political level, an intersection could be found in the search for developmental approaches that maximise the benefits to be derived from migration while seeking to minimise abuses and negative effects. Ranis’ carefully-formulated research questions can help us to reflect on what works and what does not, and that in turn could enhance the search for explanations that might lead to solutions.
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Our purpose in this paper is to examine the various impacts of migration on development, but restricting ourselves mainly to a focus on unskilled migrants and their impact on the rural economy from which they have departed. We pay special attention to the somewhat neglected area of domestic migration and remittances but also include consideration of such more heavily traveled subjects as external migration and remittances, the migration of skilled migrants and the broader interdisciplinary dimension of the associated transformation of a society. After briefly introducing the substance of each of our subjects, we present what we consider priority topics for productive research in each area.

We define development in its contemporary broader context, i.e. extending beyond income growth into its distribution and the reduction of income poverty, as well as moving beyond welfare gains measured in income terms, to progress in human development and capabilities. Migration encompasses both the internal as well as the external variety and is viewed as a family rather than an individual decision. Finally, our focus is exclusively on the impact of various types of migration on development in the developing countries.

To date most of the relevant literature has focused on migration from poor to rich countries and the resulting impact on poor country performance. Various types of internal migrations within poor countries and their impact on domestic development have been relatively neglected, even though they are quantitatively significant and are likely to have a qualitatively important influence on outcomes of interest.

In our view, dual economy models and their extensions, provide a helpful framework, in particular for analyzing the latter set of issues and for generating suggestions for useful research. Specifically, such models, from the Physiocrats\(^1\) to the Classical School,\(^2\) revisited by Arthur Lewis\(^3\) and

amended by Fei-Ranis, Harris-Todaro, Fields, and Ranis-Stewart, all have the migration of unskilled labor as their basic motive engine. While these are essentially closed economy models, they need to be extended to accommodate critical dimensions of globalization, including external migration and its feedbacks on the domestic economy.

In all these models migration from food-producing agriculture to non-agriculture receives pride of place, and what facilitates migration from agricultural to non-agricultural activities is the generation of an agricultural surplus. For the physiocrats, not concerned with population pressures on scarce land, the movement of labor out of agriculture was towards generating "unproductive" services for the elite, including wars, temples, luxuries, etc. In the classical school of Ricardo et al and its resuscitation by Arthur Lewis, with population pressure on scarce land becoming important, it was migration, accompanied by surpluses, mainly towards urban industrial activities which was featured prominently. Fei-Ranis, in distinction to Lewis, emphasized the importance of the possible absence of a sufficiently ample agricultural surplus, i.e., contemplating possible food shortages and resulting inter-sectoral terms of trade problems impeding the smooth rural-urban migration of labor, long before the initial labor surplus is exhausted. Migration to urban areas unaccompanied by the savings out of agricultural surpluses would likely result in urban unemployment or underemployment.

Fei-Ranis also emphasized that, while the agricultural wage was institutionally determined, i.e., resulting from a bargaining process, subject to adjustment over time as agricultural productivity rises, the gap relative to the urban formal sector unskilled wage, inducing migration, was also affected by institutional interventions in the latter sector, including public sector wage-setting, minimum wage legislation, union activity, etc.

One issue that needs to be addressed is whether the departure of the unskilled from food producing agriculture reduces output on the farm and raises agricultural wages or, as at least East Asian historical evidence indicates, in the presence of labor surplus it leaves output and wages unaffected and may even be accompanied by a reorganizational type of technical change in agriculture.

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Fei-Ranis, moreover, stressed that migration in the most successful development cases included a pronounced shift towards rural non-agricultural activities (RNA), at least by some members of the rural families, often not requiring the abandonment of the agriculture-based household. Such non-agricultural components of rural household incomes in historical Japan and, more recently, Korea, Taiwan, etc., typically rose from 10% to 60% over time. Even in less successful cases, such as Mexico, as much as 60% of rural family incomes is generated by RNA activities.

Harris-Todaro abandoned the labor surplus assumption, i.e., their agricultural wage was competitively determined, while their urban formal sector wage was once again subject to institutional interventions. However, their main contribution was to emphasize that migrant families were concerned not only with the agricultural/urban wage gap but also with the probability (less than 1) of obtaining an urban formal sector job. Open urban unemployment -- or, more likely, underemployment -- can thus result when, e.g., as a result of agricultural failure or excess migration relative to the generation of savings, more workers migrate than can be absorbed by the urban formal sector.

Fields subsequently emphasized the existence of an urban informal sector where such migrants could be parked, doing something useful and partially supported by earlier-arrived relatives, while waiting for formal sector jobs to open up. Ranis-Stewart, finally, focused on what induces rural-urban migration in this situation. Entry costs are low in the urban informal sector, and being marginally productive there is much preferable to open unemployment since such activities provide for some income without preventing the continuation of the search for a formal sector job. Rural/urban migration is then determined by the gap between the expected rural income and the expected urban income anticipated from the two possible types of urban employment. Migration will continue until incomes (i.e., wage and employment probabilities) in the two urban sectors are in equilibrium with the two types of rural incomes.

Under these circumstances, migration into the urban informal sector will be substantial when average rural income growth is low relative to an urban formal sector experiencing substantial wage growth but limited employment possibilities, as, for example, in Mexico in the 1970s and 1980s. But even when rural income growth is high and urban formal sector income is expanding pari passu, migrants may be attracted in excess of formal sector absorption opportunities, as in post-reform China, which initially tried to stem this flow administratively. In contrast, when urban formal sector employment is stagnant or even contracting, as in some Sub-Saharan African countries, rural-urban migration will slow or even reverse itself.
Ranis-Stewart have gone one step further and decomposed the often very large and heterogeneous urban informal sector into two sub-sectors, one a relatively low income, traditional “sponge-like” sub-sector (reminiscent of a rural surplus labor-shared income situation, with incomes possibly even below rural levels); the other, a more dynamic modernizing sub-sector, with subcontracting (or “putting out”) ties to the urban formal sector, and possibly even generating specialty exports. The dividing line between these two informal sub-sectors and the formal sector is the small size of units (less than 10 workers), their lack of access to formal credit, and their not being subject to minimum wage and other government regulations. The new migration equilibrium thus needs to be modified to allow for the possibility of migrants landing in each of these three urban locations, with open entry mainly restricted to the traditional urban informal sub-sector.

The size of the modernizing urban informal sub-sector over time depends on its own entrepreneurial capabilities as well as on the rate of growth of the urban formal sector and on the latter’s interest in enhancing its competitiveness via subcontracting linkages of the “putting out” variety. Over time, the modernizing urban informal sub-sector is likely to merge into the medium and small-scale industry component of the urban formal sector, while the traditional “sponge” sub-sector will disappear once the rural-urban migration rate has been high enough, relative to the population growth-fed rural labor force, to put an end to the labor surplus condition. At that point the entire economy has completed its transition into a one-sector, relatively full employment neo-classical world. This is essentially what happened in historical Japan, in Korea and in Taiwan in the 60s to 80s period, and such countries as China, Vietnam and Thailand are currently en route. Once again, such open economy dimensions as unskilled labor migration, one-way or circular, and the impact of external remittances, need to be taken into account.

As far as I can tell, relatively little work has gone into analyzing the domestic inter-sectoral financial flow implications for the developmental outcomes we care about with respect to the various types of agricultural/non-agricultural migrations of unskilled workers discussed above. Turning, first, to the implications for development of the migration from agricultural to non-agricultural activities generally, according to both Simon Kuznets and Arthur Lewis, this is most likely to worsen the overall distribution of income since the movement is usually from a more equally distributed sector to a less equally distributed sector. However, as the Taiwan experience has shown, this does not necessarily follow, especially if the movement is to more labor-intensive rural rather than less labor-intensive urban activities.

With respect to all migrations, not only the expected family income gains need to be assessed but also who has the financial ability to move – less of a
problem with respect to the migration to RNA. We need to know what are the family expenditures required in support of migration to any of the aforementioned destinations and what are the factors affecting the size of the future reverse flow of internal as well as external remittances. Moreover, we need to understand the impact of various types of migration and associated remittances on the distribution of income, poverty levels, human development and various capability indicators as well as on the dynamics of overall domestic growth, rural and urban.

Turning to the empirical side of the above domestic rural/urban unskilled labor migration story and the several questions it raises, the following generalizations for each of the major developing regions of the world seem to hold:

1. The migration of agricultural labor into RNA activities, reflected in their rapidly rising share of total rural family incomes, has been most pronounced in East Asia, China and Vietnam, less pronounced in Latin America, and least pronounced in Sub-Saharan Africa where minerals and cash crop exports usually dominate and even displace RNA, i.e., Z-good, activities.

   **Research Questions:**
   a. What features of the landscape, such as population density, agricultural output composition (food versus cash crops), education levels, existing infrastructure and government policy interventions play a role here?
   b. What are the pluses in terms of the avoidance of urban capital and social costs associated with the relative expansion of rural industry and services?
   c. How does the migration from agriculture to RNA versus urban activities affect fertility levels, overhead and capital requirements?

2. The rate of migration of rural unskilled workers to urban formal sector jobs has been substantially faster than rural population growth in the East Asian “success” countries, leading to their relatively early emergence out of a labor surplus condition and creating only relatively small urban informal sectors en route. The ability to absorb agricultural migrants not only in RNA but also in urban formal and modernizing informal activities meant that the pressure for external migration by unskilled workers was reduced. The absence of a similar pattern can be recorded for Sub-Saharan Africa and for Latin America (with some exceptions, like Costa Rica and Chile).
Research Question:
a. What elements, e.g., domestic R&D, technology choice and rural/urban capital flows have facilitated the rapid absorption of unskilled rural workers by the urban formal sector and the linked modernizing urban informal sub-sector?

3. Migration into the modernizing urban informal sub-sector clearly depends on the size and growth of the system's urban formal sector and the strength of its complementary linkages or competitiveness with the former. Once again, the same regional country line-up is relevant.

Research Question:
a. What factors determine the strength of the complementary relationships or linkages between the urban formal sector and the modernizing urban informal sub-sector, or, alternatively, what causes them to compete with each other? This inquiry should include production for domestic as well as international markets.

4. The impact of internal migration on development is clearly directly related to the configuration of a system's non-agricultural (or demand-side) elements. The overall urban informal sector is usually fairly well defined in terms of its small establishment size, the avoidance of government regulations and income-sharing arrangements. But very little analysis has been devoted to distinguishing between these two informal urban sub-sectors in differing typological or regional contexts.

Research Questions:
a. Typically, for each major region of the developing world, what are the relevant wage or income gaps in the aforementioned three urban sectors, relative to the two rural sectors?

b. What differences are there in educational attainment, capital per head, labor productivity and, if possible, total factor productivity (TFP) between RNA and the two urban informal sector activities?

The extent to which the output mix of the urban informal sector favors manufacturing, construction, metal working and transportation activities it is likely to belong to the modernizing component, while the “sponge” component is more likely to focus on the distributive trades and personal services. Footwear production
in Brazil is clearly part of the modernizing informal sub-sector, linked to the formal sector via sub-contracts. There is, again, much less evidence of such linkages in Africa, where an estimated 60% of informal sector migrants have located.

To cite one instructive contrasting example, the Philippines (a Latin America-like country) and Thailand grew at somewhat similar, respectable rates in both agricultural and non-agricultural output and labor productivity during the ’65–’80 period, accompanied by equally respectable migration rates into the urban formal sector. However, in the ’80–’90 period, a large differential in growth rates and in rural-urban migration rates, i.e., 2.6% of the urban population in Thailand versus 1.5% in the Philippines, developed. Thailand’s lower urban-rural unskilled wage gap, due to less government interventions, was compensated for by much larger urban formal sector employment opportunities, as well as via a complementary modernizing urban informal sub-sector. Meanwhile, in the slower growing Philippines, the “sponge” urban informal sub-sector grew much faster, while the size of the modernizing sub-sector declined. One supporting statistic is that in ’86–’87 the percentage of informal sector manufacturing establishments employing non-family workers was 75% in Bangkok and 35% in Manila.

5. An important dimension of these various internal migration impulses is the size and nature of the two-way flows: initially, the support by the rural families of those migrating to the various possible urban destinations and, subsequently, the remittances sent back home.

**Research Questions:**

a. What is the impact of the net financial flows on the initial ability to migrate?

b. What is the subsequent impact of internal remittances on poverty, income distribution, such human development and capability indicators as infant mortality, educational enrollment, economic stability as well as consumption patterns, investment patterns and growth?

6. Thus far, our discussion has focused mainly on how the internal migration of unskilled labor impacts development and raised some priority researchable questions. Turning now to the external migration of unskilled workers, these are most likely to exit from the two rural sectors and the urban traditional informal sub-sector. We need to ascertain what determines the relative desire and
ability to migrate abroad. As long as the labor surplus condition persists, we may once again assume that the departure of these unskilled workers does not materially affect domestic output. An important critical question, of course, here again focuses on the two-way flows between those left behind and those who have migrated abroad, and how the net source inflows affect domestic development.

In assessing the impact of international migration on the sending country, one actually has to begin by examining the impact of net international remittance flows on domestic income distribution, poverty levels, consumption, investment levels, and growth. It should also proceed to assess the impact of such additional net resource flows on such critical dimensions of human development as infant mortality, education enrollment and levels of nutrition.

Indeed we need to also enter the Amartya Sen world of capabilities. For example, are net external remittances likely to fluctuate less or more than other forms of capital inflows; do they behave counter-cyclically and thus contribute to economic stability as a welfare indicator? Are they likely to encourage the greater use of the internet and information technology generally, with spillover effects for entrepreneurship, attracting complementary credit flows? Although this may seem a bit far-fetched, it is conceivable that external migration and remittances also carry a special impact on a population’s overall “happiness” as a consequence of the perception of greater opportunities, the acquisition of new ideas and entrepreneurial possibilities.

**Research Questions:**

a. What determines the relative desire and ability to migrate domestically or externally and from which sector are the flows likely to emanate?

b. What role do family support payments or government contributions play in enhancing unskilled workers’ ability to migrate abroad, and are subsequent migrant remittances encouraged by government matching grants, e.g., for housing or machinery purchases?

c. What is the impact, over time, of net flows, i.e. remittances over support payments, on poverty, income distribution, human development and capability indices, consumption, investment and growth, mainly in the rural but also the urban sectors of the sending country; and is any of this clearly differentiable across various geographic regions of the developing world?
d. Are net external remittances cyclical, i.e. profit-oriented, or counter-cyclical, i.e. support-oriented?

e. Is there a possible reverse flow of resources adversely affecting origin country development when migrants abroad lose jobs during destination country recessions or anti-migrant episodes?

f. There is some evidence that since initially relatively higher income families have greater ability to migrate, this causes an initial worsening of the distribution of income back home as the result of remittances but that, with experience and the growth of migrant corridors abroad, this becomes less true over time.

g. Does the same phenomenon hold for the education levels of early versus later external migrant/remittance issues?

7. Finally, we need to turn our attention to the migration of skilled workers and their impact on the various dimensions of development. The issues here are quite different. Skilled labor migrants are more likely to move abroad rather than relocate at home; they can be expected to be departing from the urban organized sector or the modernizing urban informal sub-sector. Unlike the case of unskilled migrants, their departure will negatively affect output and productivity in the origin country as a consequence of the so-called “brain drain” or “skill drain.” Proposals have been made to tax such out-going migrants in order to recover education costs, but these ideas have never gotten very far politically or administratively. Moreover, they have lost some of their economic impact for two reasons: one, remittances from such skilled migrants can be quite substantial; indeed some countries, e.g., the Philippines, actually have programs to generate skilled labor (doctors and nurses, in this case) for the express purpose of export. Secondly, evidence indicates that, over time, the human capital itself is likely to return once conditions improve sufficiently in the home country (e.g., Silicon Valley entrepreneurs and scientists returning to India, Taiwan, and Korea).

**Research Questions:**

a. What is the impact of the human resources lost in the initial act of migration, pitted against the gains from remittances and the later “brain gain” phenomenon in the aforementioned, relatively successful country cases during the 1960-2000 period. The calculation would be very different for many countries in Latin America, and certainly for African countries which face a much longer period of net human resource losses, compensated only to some extent by
remittances, before they can count on the eventual return of human capital.

b. As an example, did the Philippine program of supporting skilled migrants, financially and in terms of the provision of information and contractual arrangements abroad, yield an acceptable rate of return when the resulting remittances are taken into account? What are the likely net developmental impacts of the proliferation of such programs?

c. Does the successful migration of skilled workers induce a greater demand for education in the country of origin, generating additional supplies of needed skills and contributing to development?

8. A relatively neglected issue in the overall literature seems to be the rapidly growing importance of South-South migration and South-South remittance flows. Two out of five migrations globally are now from one poor or middle income country to another. As development proceeds unevenly across the various geographic regions of the world, migration of the unskilled, e.g., from Guatemala to Mexico and from Bangladesh to India as well as, if to a lesser extent, of the skilled, e.g., from Zimbabwe to South Africa and from Indonesia to Malaysia, have become an increasingly important phenomenon.

Research Question:

a. Virtually all of the issues raised above with respect to the developmental impact of South-North migration, unskilled and skilled, are crying out for additional analysis in the South-South context. This appears to be a relatively neglected research area.

9. Finally, there are more general issues relating migration to development and to other dimensions of globalization which need to be more fully explored. These issues are especially relevant since migration is admittedly the most constrained of international flows and therefore offers the largest potential for global welfare gains.

Taking a broader view, admittedly the above analysis of migrations, internal and external, and their impact on development, represents a partial equilibrium approach to what is a broader, interdisciplinary process. This requires not only taking on board other economic dimensions of globalization, whether substitutes or complements to migration, such as trade, capital movements and technology, but also the differential impact of colonial history, and of cultural, institutional and power relations subject to change in both origin and destination countries. For example, global Pareto
optimality would call for the permanent North-South migration of the unskilled and the “circular migration” of the skilled, but the North prefers to cherry-pick in precisely the opposite direction. Migration constitutes one important element within a global social transformation process whose pace is accelerating and whose destination is still shrouded in mystery. But we know, from country experience, that rural-urban migration does not have to lead to the creation of urban shanty-towns, and international migration does not have to lead to exploitation and alienation; globalization generally creates the opportunity to enhance people’s capabilities, as well as admittedly carrying the risk of increased dependency and cultural atrophy. Admittedly, the migration and development nexus truly represents an interdisciplinary and exciting ball of wax which it is, however, difficult to disentangle by means of an ambitious general equilibrium approach.

**Research Questions:**

a. Under what circumstances do external migration and associated remittance flows act as complements or substitutes to international trade, and also with respect to other capital flows from the same destination countries?

b. More specifically, do domestic and external remittances serve to release domestic credit constraints or do they act as substitutes for domestic credit availability?

c. Migration and development are embedded within a broader social transformation, ranging from initial institutional/historical constraints and cultural dynamics to the expanding consideration of human capabilities and their distribution. While difficult, discrete pieces of this large mosaic can be subject to useful analysis.

d. Taking a longer term view, with populations aging and fertility rates falling, almost everywhere – with the exception of some parts of Sub-Saharan Africa – and with pre-existing labor surpluses gradually disappearing and yielding to labor shortages, can we expect even unskilled migration to increase in importance and political acceptability?

e. How can we manage to embed the economics-focused analysis of migration and development within a broader socio-political framework which recognizes important interdisciplinary dimensions of the issue?
PANEL 2

State Policies toward Migration and Development

These papers separately address the motivations and difficulties of states, particularly India and China, in designing policies to manage unskilled, internal migration and skilled, international migration in order to promote economic development.
I will try to do my best in presenting, discussing and critiquing the papers of David Zweig, titled “Returnees, Diasporas, and Failure: Can Governments Benefit from Skilled Out Migration?,” and Amitabh Kundu, titled “State Policies towards Internal Migration and Development with Special Reference to Developing Countries.” As the papers were intended to focus on research about state policies toward migration and development, I will emphasize issues that could both improve our understanding of policy making and have an impact on policies designed to enhance migration’s contributions to development.

The two papers are complementary in their differences. While David Zweig’s paper addresses international migration of skilled people, that of Amitabh Kundu takes up internal migration of the unskilled. But we will see from the two papers that there are similarities between international migration policies and those toward internal or domestic migration.

Academic and policy discussions tend to focus more on international migration than on internal migration. Data on internal migration tends to be scarce compared to that on international migration, in part because there is more scrutiny of international border crossings than interstate or rural-urban movements. International migration also raises complex issues of sovereignty and national identity. Internal migration is primarily a large-country phenomenon, while international migration is relatively more widespread. That said, policy challenges posed by internal migration are not that different from those by international migration.

Let me first consider David Zweig’s paper “Returnees, Diasporas, and Failure: Can Governments Benefit from Skilled Outmigration?” It asks two questions: First, how can we encourage the return of skilled international migrants to their countries of origin? The paper focuses explicitly on South-North migration of doctors and nurses and scientists, particularly scientists who have migrated to the richer countries in the North. Second, how can governments mobilize members of the overseas diasporas without asking them to come back physically?

The paper seeks to answer these questions using the experiences of China, Colombia, Bangladesh, and Silicon Valley. I was particularly happy to see a discussion of China’s Hundred Talents Program which rewards returnees
who have technological skills and patents by giving them higher salaries, housing allowances, greater access to equipment and laboratories, and, very importantly, a greater ability to travel internationally than is given to Chinese workers who have remained at home.

World-class, marketable and mobile professionals cannot easily be attracted back to a country that has restrictive policies. Also, sometimes governments make promises but do not keep them. The other day I heard the story of an overseas Chinese professional who faced incredible difficulties in obtaining a driving license in China. I have also heard of cases where successful Wall Street executives have gone back to India and were mistreated by uncooperative customs and city officials. An important lesson from China’s Hundred Talents Program is that governments should try to understand why people emigrate in the first place and design measures that may reverse the process.

The expectation of a higher salary is an obvious driver of migration. There is a view in the literature — and this point goes beyond this session — that until living standards, wages and incomes equalize between the sending and the receiving country, migration flows would continue. That may not be entirely correct, however. The relationship between migration and income differences is likely to be nonlinear, perhaps inverse-U-shaped. The literature has alluded to this aspect, but I have not seen any significant empirical work yet.

Imagine if I were to say that relaxing border controls between the United States and Mexico might lead to less migration, not more. I would not be surprised if we could actually come up with such empirical findings, that net migration from Mexico to the US might peak before the income differences between the two countries are eliminated. A reversal of migration patterns has happened before, in the case of Portugal and Spain when they joined the EU in the mid-1980s and in the case of Thailand more recently. Thailand was a net emigration country in the 1980s and became a net immigration country in the 1990s; and the reversal of migration happened at a per capita income level of around $2,500.

So incomes do not have to equalize before migration pressures are reduced. This is a very important point. We can learn a lot from the experiences of China, Thailand, Portugal, Spain, Greece and India.

Zweig’s paper also points out that the prevalence of a “glass ceiling” may limit career progression abroad and encourage return migration of talented professionals. The prospect of an improved social status back home can encourage return even if the returnee gets a lower income back home. In addition, good working conditions, good living conditions – especially an
absence of crime and schools for children – are important considerations for return migration. Also a freedom of expression: talented people tend to be vocal, and they need to express themselves. Giving them the freedom to speak their mind is an important incentive for encouraging return of skilled migrants.

As Zweig’s paper says, government policies matter in all these respects. But a large part of what governments can do is simply to get out of the way of the market.

Despite the importance of such policies, there is a dearth of research evaluating the impacts of government policies, not only those encouraging return, but migration policies in general.

An important topic that I found missing in the paper is the discussion of policies relating to skilled migrants in the destination countries in the South, for example, in Russia, South Africa, Malaysia, Morocco or India.

One kind of policy response to skilled migration from developing countries, I expect you all know, is the so-called ethical recruitment policies that some receiving countries are implementing to mitigate the so-called “brain drain”. The idea behind these policies is that—to use the example of Ghana—since there are more Ghanaian doctors outside than inside of Ghana, recruiting them would exacerbate the shortage of doctors in Ghana, so these doctors should not be actively recruited by, say, hospitals in the UK.

I never quite liked the term “brain drain”. By simply using the term “brain drain” one is already condoning ethical recruitment policies. The literature and (especially) policy discussions are often confusing about the meaning of the so-called “brain drain”. Does it refer to a lack of medical services to the poor in Ghana? Or does it refer to a loss of fiscal revenue that would have been generated if the doctors had stayed home and paid taxes? Ghana may have educated these doctors and nurses using public money. Are we concerned that an investment has been drained away? Or are we simply jealous of the doctors who are earning 6 or 7 figure salaries overseas?

Policy makers in destination countries (such as the UK) have been concerned about restricting recruitment of doctors from developing countries for a long time. They first said, “We are taking away doctors from Ghana at a time when malaria, tuberculosis, and HIV/AIDS are raging in Ghana. We should not allow our public hospitals to employ doctors from Ghana.” And then public hospitals in the UK reportedly outsourced many services to private hospitals who could hire these people. When the policies were expanded to include private hospitals, recruitment agents began to bring Ghanaian doctors to Heathrow and let them seek employment in the UK hospitals of
their own accord.

As a result of these policies, has there been an increase in the number of doctors who have stayed in Ghana? Has there been any research on this question? The World Bank has begun to look into this issue, but I don’t think we have come to closure yet. We are yet to show that the number of doctors in Ghana has gone up.

Suppose such policies were successful in stopping Ghanaian doctors from emigrating. What would be the implications for the supply of doctors in Ghana ten years down the road? Would there be more or fewer doctors in Ghana? Also, even if the doctors actually stayed in Ghana, would they serve the poor? Is that what we want? It is unlikely that doctors would serve patients who can’t pay. A doctor friend of mine, after spending decades working in a rural hospital in India, decided to leave his government job; because whenever a patient died — many do in that part of the world — he faced threats of physical violence from the patients’ family members. Inhospitable working conditions, lack of medical equipment and medicine can be very discouraging for doctors and nurses, and indeed for every one.

This brings me to an important point: migration is a personal decision. We must recognize that and formulate policies that are compatible with individual incentives.

In talking about people, there is often a tension between economics and politics, between an economic right and a political right. I am not certain about the economics of this argument, but politically it may appear practical, for example, to give higher salaries to return migrants than to the native workers in the country of origin. Zweig’s paper discusses such measures intended to encourage the return of Chinese scientists to China. The flip side of this argument is that destination countries might consider granting fewer rights to migrant workers than to native workers to encourage return. In his admirable and eponymously titled book “Let Their People Come” even Lant Pritchett concedes that a more practical plan B might involve drawing a distinction between guest workers and native workers.

I see the spirit of this position, but should we recommend such policies? Can governments treat migrants on a different scale — a lower or a higher scale — than natives? That is a great question for research.

Every time a government enacts such discrimination, all sorts of distortions result. Zweig’s paper alludes to the concept of “round-tripping.” If a government gives tax benefits to migrants, residents might try to take money out of the country and bring it back as overseas nonresident investments. Research shows, for example, that out of $40 billion or more of foreign direct
investment into China in the late 1990s, as much as 40 percent came from overseas Chinese who were allowed tax incentives and other preferential treatment, presumably a result of round-tripping.

If there is a shortage of doctors, in the end, the only solution is to produce more doctors. To do so, can rich-country medical institutions create training facilities for doctors and nurses in Ghana, Jamaica, Lesotho or the Philippines? A feasibility study of this question was commissioned by the Commonwealth Secretariat a few years ago, but I have not seen the final report. There is not much research on this question.

Another research question relates to South-South movement of skilled migrants. There are many doctors from Sub-Saharan African countries in South Africa. There are a large number of Nepalese migrants in India, and Central Asian migrants in Russia. How should research and policy discussion approach South-South migration of skilled workers?

How can countries tap the diaspora even if the migrants did not return? This is the second question discussed in Zweig’s paper. I will be brief on this point. The most important issue in this context is that many countries do not know much about their overseas populations: who, where, and how many they are. For governments thinking about mobilizing their overseas populations, they need basic data.

I will now move on to the second paper by Amitabh Kundu on government policies toward internal migrant workers in India. Kundu’s paper focuses on internal migration and emphasizes how internal migration contributes to balanced regional development. He has presented his work in three categories: trends, impacts, and differences in the impacts on separate regions, towns, and migrants themselves.

It is hard to get a clear sense from the paper of what the general trends are. This is understandable. Reliable data on internal migration are not easily available. We hear that China has nearly 300 million internal migrants. That is much larger than the total international migrant stock (estimated to be around 200 million). In India the number of internal migrants is probably 100-200 million. I recently visited Nepal. Publicly available data suggest that about 1 million Nepalese are abroad. After several days of meetings, I learnt that there are around 1.5 million Nepalese in the Gulf region alone and somewhere between 2 million and 5 million Nepalese in India. That would amount to nearly 30 percent of Nepal’s population. This scale of internal migration is likely to exist in many large countries. Lack of data on internal migration is a huge problem.

Kundu’s paper suggests that rural-urban migration may not be as high as
one might think because of barriers of caste, family ties, language and cultural differences, and by people’s attachment to land or a lack of skills suitable for manufacturing or services. Nonetheless rural-urban migration has been increasing in India as the urban economy has grown. It appears, however, that the growth of rural-urban migration in India is decelerating. Some hypotheses provided in Kundu’s paper include:

- The changing nature of the cities, especially the fact that the development model of the city is moving from state-led to private sector-led growth.
- The fact that regulations governing land occupation and land use patterns have been tightened.
- Free public services in urban areas have been cut. Because many internal and unskilled migrants are poor, they rely on public provision of health care, water, and housing. A cut in such services would slow rural-urban migration in the Indian context.

Kundu’s paper poses a question about what policy measures might be taken in the medium- and small-sized cities. The big cities have the necessary services. Sometimes they even have access to institutional capital. But in small cities it is not clear what can be done and this is an open area for research.

Kundu’s paper also points out the sheer lack of data on internal migration. Before evaluating impacts, we have to create better data on rural-urban migration. International migration data are hard to collect anyway, but in collecting data on internal migration, it is often very hard to know who is a migrant. What do you do when territorial boundaries are redrawn and people become migrants without moving? How might governments go about gathering regionally comparable data over time?

What are the impacts of internal migration? I don’t think we know enough about the impact of rural-urban migration in the destination cities. One that is highlighted a lot is the growth of slums and poverty. Positive impacts of rural-urban migration on destination cities are not highlighted enough in the literature. That would be worth investigating further.

Do migrants themselves benefit when they move to cities with high unemployment rates? That’s not very clear. What seems clearer is that the families left behind benefit through remittances and an increase in wages resulting from migration-induced labor shortage.

A policy question that I did not find addressed in either Zweig’s or Kundu’s papers is how remittances and other financial resources can be mobilized from migrant diasporas for the benefit of the communities of origin. International remittances are large. They are beneficial to the families and
communities left behind. I recently spent a week in my village in a poor part of India. The village has developed significantly in the last few years, to a great extent because of migration to Mumbai and other large cities and the resultant remittances.

Discussion of remittances and of financial resources that can be mobilized from both internal migrants and the diaspora is something that would be worth including in our thinking on state policies. This is related to the point that was brought up before, that although migration and remittances overlap a great deal, there are policies that governments might explore regarding remittances that need not be directly associated with the complexities of making migration policy.

As I have already taken too much time, rather than elaborate on these questions further, let me stop here and, perhaps, return to them in future discussions. Thank you.
Returnees, Diasporas, and Failure: Can governments benefit from skilled outmigration?

David Zweig | Hong Kong University of Science and Technology

SSRC Migration & Development Conference Paper No. 5

Introduction
The conveners of this conference gave me three tasks: (1) determine what policies have proven to help encourage reverse flow of talented migrants;” (2) determine what policies successfully encourage overseas nationals who choose not to return home to contribute to national development in their home country; and (3) address problems and challenges in carrying out research on these two issues.

1. Policy Options: What’s a government to do? ¹
Countries seeking to attract returnees must have suffered a significant outflow of skilled talent; otherwise, there would not be a plethora of home country nationals living abroad. So if governments want to increase the reverse flow of skilled country nationals living abroad, they must first overcome the original problems and the “drivers” that led people to migrate in the first place. These often include improving aspects such as the education system, the research environment, salaries, freedom of expression, and/or quality of life and work. Since relative, not just absolute, salaries trigger migration, resolving income discrepancies between host and home countries should form a core of the effort to reverse the outflow.

Second, if countries confronting a significant outflow of talent are highly regulated economies, liberalizing the market and creating a climate of opportunity may be needed to attract overseas talent back home, as many migrants are by nature risk takers and often seek to engage in activities that will advance their own and their family’s income. Third, weak scientific infrastructure drives out talented students and scientists, so investment in research institutes is a sine qua non of reversing the outflow of talent.

Overall, government policies geared at attracting overseas nationals to return to their country of origin fall into three categories: financial incentives, non-financial incentives, and infrastructure development. The targets of

¹ Governments that have been relatively successful in attracting overseas nationals to return include: Taiwan, South Korea, India, Israel, Hong Kong and the PRC.
those policies are academics, scientists, professionals and entrepreneurs, and different policies may be necessary to attract different types of people.

Since better relative salaries often trigger the initial skilled migration to better paying economies, salary enhancement may be key. It is worth recalling that population flows need not be solely from the developing to the developed world. A great deal of North-North population movement occurs, including migration from advanced regions such as Canada, Britain, or Israel to the U.S., which is largely driven by improved incomes. Governments may subsidize universities or research laboratories, allowing them to pay higher salaries to returnees, or give government fellowships directly to those who return. Thus, despite Canada’s better quality of life, it loses many talented people to the U.S., where salaries are higher. So the Canadian federal government established the Canada Research Chair program, which combined salaries higher than those of most Canadian academics with generous research support, to attract talented Canadians living abroad to return. This policy is also targeted at talented academics who might be drawn away to the U.S. by higher salaries, thereby stemming the outflow.

Wealthy overseas co-ethnics, or wealthy nationals living at home, can provide fellowships to reward returnees financially, provide subsidies to their incomes, or engage them in research projects. Governments can encourage wealthy citizens living, at home or in host societies, or international donors to support such projects. Scientists may receive higher salaries and research grants, allowing them to set up laboratories, purchase equipment and hire research assistants. Housing allowances and pension schemes, which include a returnees’ time spent in universities abroad, may comprise such packages. Because returnees worry about losing links with overseas developments, policies that enhance libraries, facilitate academic exchanges, or support travel abroad for reverse migrants is important.

China’s “Hundred Talent’s Program,” controlled by the Chinese Academy of Sciences, requires applicants to show that they possess some new technology, for which they are rewarded with a 2 million RMB (US$250,000) grant, of which 20% can be used for salary enhancement. The Changjiang Scholars program, funded by Hong Kong billionaire Li Kai-hsing, supports university academics of exceptional talent who want to return, even for one or two years. For example, in China, international aid agencies created special research institutes that paid higher salaries and functioned under international principles that differed from domestic institutions.

Governments can establish programs that bring home country nationals living abroad to visit the country and experience first hand changes that have taken place since they left. Lecture or study tours can establish links with local scholars out of which collaboration may emerge; and data suggest that
overseas nationals who establish ties back home are more likely eventually to move home. Thus in 1997, China set up the “Spring Light Program,” which has funded thousands of overseas mainland academics to visit China (Zweig, et al. 2008). The goal is in part to encourage them to return.

Business entrepreneurs have their own needs, such as tax or tariff relief or cheap loans, which help them start new enterprises. Governments must construct a conducive “soft” environment for businesses by liberalizing the foreign trade regime and the domestic market, constraining predatory government officials from confiscating or interfering with the private economy, creating a freer labour market, or privatizing state-owned businesses. Only open markets can provide opportunities for large numbers of people to return and start up private businesses. Highly regulated markets will only attract a small number of people with government ties who earn profits through arbitrage or “rent-seeking,” but will not promote the widespread development of a vibrant, globalized market economy.

A modern “hard” environment is equally important. Telecommunications, roads, harbors, electricity—infrastructure—promote market expansions, improve the quality of life, facilitate international contacts, and enhance business opportunities. Governments with limited resources may establish scientific, industrial, or export processing parks which provide companies with better facilities and preferential taxation treatment, compared to companies outside the parks. However, Saxenian argues that “policy makers in developing countries should devote their efforts to facilitating a bottom-up process of entrepreneurship”—that is, introduce policies that help returnees become entrepreneurs—rather than over-invest in infrastructure in an effort to create the next Silicon Valley (Saxenian, 2006: 8).

These polices do not differ greatly from policies that attract non-national foreign investors. Both overseas nationals and non-nationals are drawn by economic incentives. However, to attract overseas home country nationals, governments can employ non-economic factors, such as honorific positions, faster academic promotions, or other indicators of higher status, particularly because Chinese often say that one reason they do, or would, return is to enhance their social status (Zweig and Chen, 1995).

Unlike most foreign investors, returnees have important social and familial issues that need resolving, such as education of children who may have spent their formative years overseas and therefore face academic challenges in their parents’ home country. Other issues include freedom of movement in and out of their home country, and residency in their home country if they acquired citizenship in their host society.
Migrants may lack concrete information about conditions and job opportunities in their original home country. Thus Chinese consulates set up education or investment promotion agencies, and provide consultancy services for job searching, to spread career and investment information (Chen and Liu, 2003). Agencies can arrange or finance visits for people interested in returning to home countries, but visits are useful only if there is something to really show. Delegations from the home country can tour the developed world to recruit returnees, though many Chinese living abroad see these delegations as opportunities for tourism for the delegation members rather than as serious employment opportunities.

Residency issues need to be addressed. Returnees may not want to give up newly gained citizenship from their host country. They may have invested much time and money in getting foreign citizenship; and foreign citizenship may play an important calculation in their decision to go home, as it affords political and social security should problems emerge in the home country. After all, political insecurity is a key factor driving the skilled overseas. Taking away that security may force them to reconsider the decision to return.

Similarly, governments must avoid punishing returnees for taking foreign citizenship and allow them to compete for grants and fellowships that are available to locals who have not gone abroad. Thus many countries offer dual citizenship schemes for returnees and their family members, while China recently offered permanent residence status to returnees with foreign passports.

Finally, developing states must consider whether some degree of political liberalization is a worthwhile price to pay for attracting returnees. While full-fledged democracy may not be necessary for returnees; political stability and a more open society, allowing free expression of views, may be necessary. This situation is particularly likely if politics drove people out in the first place and if they have grown accustomed to the freedoms in the West. Thus the flow of returnees to Taiwan, South Korea and the People’s Republic of China have all preceded the blooming of full-scale democracy; yet in all three cases, some liberalization preceded a flow of reverse migrants. Open societies also foster freer flows of information, necessary for widespread business entrepreneurship, while “crony capitalism” benefits only those with government or military ties. Thus, one reason mainland Chinese living abroad do not establish companies in China is the perception that the business playing field is “not level” (table 4).

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2 One returned scientist in China who took up Canadian citizenship resented that he was not allowed to renew his membership in the Chinese Communist Party. Interview by the author.
2. How Important are Government Policies?
Governments play only a limited direct role in attracting returnees. Their role is indirect: emphasizing and improving the broad environment for science, technology and business development; deregulating markets which allow for greater entrepreneurship; insuring political stability, thereby mitigating fears that drive much of the outflow of talent. Thus, a report from UK stated that,

> in the absence of improvements in the economic and political conditions in migrants’ home countries, any scheme to facilitate sustainable return is likely to fail”. If developing countries are to benefit from the sustainable return of their migrations, they need to pursue polices---better governance, less bureaucracy, and economic growth---which will make migrants want to return, and which will ensure that those migrants who have returned have a sense that they and their country are moving toward a brighter future (IDC, 2004).

In fact, incentives offered to people overseas to encourage them to return— increase the quality, but not the quantity of returnees. Thus, granting special privileges to those who return can create an outflow, not just an inflow, as people realize that the benefits of returning are available only to those who have gone abroad. But once they go overseas, the home country must introduce strategies to get them to return. What may emerge then is a vicious circle created in part by the special privileges granted to reverse migrants.

In 2002, a survey conducted by Zweig and Chen among returned academics, scientists and entrepreneurs allowed people to select only three reasons why they thought other people had returned. The responses suggest that the government’s role is not so important (table 1).

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3 They were asked this question, rather than one which asked their own views, because the authors believed that informants might admit the importance of “self-interest” over patriotism, if they felt that no one could accuse them personally of selfish motivations for returning.
Table 1. Why People Return?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reasons Others Returned</th>
<th>Shares of Respondents’ Choices</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>“Changes in the domestic environment”</td>
<td>2nd choice of 22%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| “Freedom to come and go”: | 1st choice of 3%  
| | 2nd choice of 10%  
| | 3rd choice of 10% |
| Political stability: | 2nd choice for 7%  
| | 3rd choice for 3.4% |
| Changes in how the government utilizes returnees | 3rd choice of 9% |


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Yet when the question is worded differently, government policies become the second most important explanation for the increase of returnees in China (table 2). Political stability is rated as important as well.

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Table 2. Why has the number of returnees increased?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Selected Reasons</th>
<th>Percentage**</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>China’s rapid economic development</td>
<td>58%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Good government policy</td>
<td>47%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Good opportunity to develop new technology in China</td>
<td>42%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hard to find good opportunities overseas</td>
<td>32%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Glass ceiling overseas for Chinese</td>
<td>31%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political stability in China</td>
<td>19%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Note: people could choose more than one response.  
Source: Zweig 2006.

Another survey carried out in China in 2000 indicates that government policies do attract reverse migrants, as nearly 30% of 278 respondents selected “favorable government policies” as their primary reason for returning (table 3).
Table 3. Major Reasons for Returning

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reason</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Favorable government policies</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>29.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Better job opportunities</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>20.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To be close to family members</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>13.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To be close to friends</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>11.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Better business opportunities</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>11.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other reasons</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>12.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>278</td>
<td><strong>100</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

_Source_: Luo, Fei and Huang, 2003.

Failure abroad may spur some reverse migration, particularly in societies which do not recognize academic or professional credentials from developing country institutions. Thus Canada’s migration program to encourage mainlanders who already have graduated from college and are working in China as professionals has met with great difficulties (Li, 2008). The failure rate (and therefore the rate of reverse migration) is reportedly quite high. Still, Chinese people who do not go abroad do find comfort in explaining the strong reverse migration wave on migrants’ failure overseas, rather than increased opportunities at home. Nevertheless, failure is not an insignificant factor. Gow and Iredale (2003) found that people returned to Bangladesh, albeit reluctantly, because they had not accomplished what they had set out to achieve. Similarly, in table 2 above, “Hard to find good opportunities overseas,” and the “glass ceiling overseas for Chinese,” both of which reflect less than stellar performances overseas, were selected by 32% and 31% respectively as key reasons leading people to return.

Governments play a more important role in attracting academics and scientists, as compared to entrepreneurs, because the first two groups work in universities or laboratories, organizations that depend almost entirely on state funding. So, state policies that expand tertiary educational institutions or research funding directly influence the number of returnees to these organizations. Entrepreneurs, on the other hand, need to “negotiate the marketplace,” so the broader environment affecting profit-making, such as deregulation, privatization, limited bureaucratic interference, less corruption, legal enforcement and good governance, are of greater importance to them.

Governments can help returned entrepreneurs who need funding or assistance to commercialize their technology, often by granting start-up loans. Ironically, one study comparing attitudes among 100 local and 100 returned entrepreneurs in Beijing, Shanghai, and Guangzhou towards local governments, found that while returned entrepreneurs relied on government assistance more than local entrepreneurs, returnees were more likely to
resent the government and see it as intrusive. These people had received very little funding from the government or local banks, relying primarily on funds they had saved while abroad and the support of relatives and friends. Hence, they resented having to turn to the government for assistance in navigating the domestic environment (Vanhonacker, et al, 2006).

We can also discern possible roles for the government by looking at why expatriate entrepreneurs would NOT set up a company or move back. Saxenian’s survey of Chinese entrepreneurs in Silicon Valley showed that government bureaucracy and regulations were the most important reasons why mainlanders living abroad would not start a business in China (table 4). This meshes with Vanhanocker, et. al., who found that among the 100 returned entrepreneurs, many resented government interference. Saxenian’s data also show that China’s inadequate legal system ranked second and political instability third.

Table 4. Top 3 Reasons Why Not to Set up a Business in China

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reason</th>
<th>Percent</th>
<th>Reason</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Government bureaucracy/regulation</td>
<td>57.5</td>
<td>Lack of access to capital</td>
<td>18.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inadequate legal system</td>
<td>50.0</td>
<td>Poor business services</td>
<td>16.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political or economic uncertainty</td>
<td>38.3</td>
<td>Inferior quality of life</td>
<td>13.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unfair competition</td>
<td>37.0</td>
<td>Poor quality of labour</td>
<td>5.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immature market conditions</td>
<td>32.9</td>
<td>Rising cost of labour</td>
<td>1.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unreliable infrastructure</td>
<td>19.9</td>
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To summarize, while government policy can encourage returnees, a lack of business opportunities and the socio-political environment can dissuade migrants from returning. So, the government’s job in some measure is simply to get out of the way of the market. Saxenian (2006), noting that Silicon Valley has gone “global,” sees successful entrepreneurs there serving as matchmakers, linking their own companies in Silicon Valley with markets in their home country, creating new start-ups, financing investment, and transferring new technology. To this extent, independent entrepreneurs encourage overseas students to return home by creating new start-ups. Nevertheless, as suggested by the UK’s International Development Committee (IDC, 2004), governments can call on people overseas to return, but unless the situation within the country has changed, returnees will face the same issues of poor governance,
bureaucracy and corruption which led to their initial departure. Under such conditions, they may choose not to return.

3. Diaspora Option

It is approximately 10 years since the concept of the “diaspora option” focused on how developing countries could turn human capital, lost through migration, into a positive force for national development by encouraging overseas citizens or educated migrants to help their home country (Meyer et. al., 1997). The “diaspora option” re-conceptualizes the migration of educational, scientific or medical personnel, seeing it less as a permanent exodus or loss to the home country but more as “brain circulation,” where talent goes abroad but information circulates back to the individual’s country of origin (Saxenian, 2003). Through scholarly, business, and educational exchanges, skilled migrants can stay in their host country yet still participate in the economic and scientific development of their home country.

In 2001, the Chinese government decided to mobilize overseas talent to help national development. Chinese citizens who remain overseas and their organizations were encouraged to engage in seven types of activities: (1) employ their professional advantages or the advantages of their professional bodies; (2) concurrently hold positions in China and overseas; (3) accept commissions to engage in cooperative research in China and abroad; (4) return to China to teach and conduct academic and technical exchanges; (5) set up enterprises in China; (6) conduct inspections and consultations; and (7) engage in intermediary services, such as running conferences, importing technology or foreign funds, or helping Chinese firms find export markets. China called on professional, academic and technical associations of overseas students to “give full play to their collective advantages in developing various activities in the service of China.”

This way, scientific collaboration ensues without people in the diaspora uprooting their lives and moving back home (Zweig et. al., 2008).

Associations of overseas entrepreneurs are critical if information, funds and technology are to be transferred back to the home country. Approximately 100 academics in southern Ontario, outside Toronto, set up an organization that helps one city in Sichuan Province develop—some of those people return for six months each year. Similarly, a group of former students living in Osaka assisted three factories and established over 100 projects in a small city outside Shanghai. By Chinese calculations, these import substitution technologies saved China over 100 million RMB (US$12 million) (Chen and Liu, 2003). Statistical

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4 This is known as the “dumbbell” model because individuals have a foot in two worlds.
5 Numerous ministries worked together to draft these guidelines. See “A Number of Opinions on Encouraging Overseas Students to Provide China with Many Different Forms of Service,” in Chinese Education and Society, vol. 36, no. 2 (March/April 2003): 6-11.
6 “A Number of Opinions,” p. 9.
analysis of Saxenian’s data on mainland Chinese in Silicon Valley shows that an important predictor of whether a person there collaborated with a company in China—becoming a “server”—is whether they have a friend who has returned to the mainland (Zweig, et al, 2008). Similarly, Taiwanese in the U.S. formed strong associations among themselves and they have also been increasingly building professional and social networks that span national boundaries and facilitate flows of capital, skill and technology back to Taiwan.

The Chinese government encourages such projects by offering grants to local researchers who partner with an overseas mainlander. Such international scientific networks have grown rapidly, and the number of papers by co-ethnics, that is, Chinese in the U.S. and China, has increased enormously over the past 10 years (Jin, et. al., 2007). Chinese institutes are keen to establish these linkages, in part because universities compete for ranking based on publications in international journals and part-time overseas faculty increase those numbers.

Also, China’s government encourages mainlanders overseas to establish businesses in China. No doubt, business activities are motivated by profit rather than the ideology of “serving the country.” But overseas mainlanders are much more likely than non-Chinese to transfer technology to China. Some mainlanders working overseas design new technology, but resent the fact that their host country employers maintain ownership over technology which they helped create. So, they bring the new technology to a partner in China to reap the benefits of their own creativity.

Corresponding with the diaspora option, a recent survey of 49 countries showed that for many of them, getting overseas students to physically return was not the priority, either because they preferred other types of programs that were targeted at “virtual returnees,” or because of the costs to them of such permanent return programs was simply too high. Local Chinese officials told a group of mainland researchers that smaller communities could not afford to support the work of overseas researchers, but could benefit greatly from the work that they did overseas (Chen and Liu, 2003: 173).

There are many reasons to believe that the “diaspora model” will succeed in China. Compared to African and Latin American countries, China’s large indigenous and relatively developed scientific community allows for very fruitful interactions for people abroad. Interviews cite the benefits of working with high quality scholars and excellent graduate students as major reasons for working with people on the mainland. Second, China’s booming economy creates incentives for overseas mainlanders to transfer a new technology; it need not be world class, but if it is in short supply in China, it can be quite profitable in the short run. At the same time, it fills a gap in China’s economy or scientific honeycomb. In fact, many Chinese who go abroad to study at a
more advanced level search for such “shortage” technologies which they bring back to China, either by moving home or engaging in a project in the PRC (Zweig, et al, 2006). Third, the globalization of scientific techniques and the positioning of many Chinese in leading research centers in the West mean that they have much to share with China. Finally, China is no longer poor; it can pay salaries and research costs incurred by scientists or academics who return for short periods. Thus, although many of the mainland’s top researchers and entrepreneurs currently living in the diaspora are not prepared to return, the diaspora option of building a transnational scientific community becomes one an important way Western technology can flow into China.

As for Colombia’s diaspora, apart from physical organizations or associations based in different countries, overseas students and academics interact through the internet. Many joint projects were carried out between overseas and domestic researchers. The first, the “Bio-2000 Project,” was launched in 1993 when European and North American-based Colombian researchers tried to launch an R&D project in biomedical applications of physics in Colombia (Meyer, et.al., 1997).

As for the impact of the diaspora option, Meyer et. al. (1997) argued that it contributed to scientific development in several ways. For example, policy design and implementation: Colombia’s National System of Science and Technology called on specialists abroad to participate in their 11 disciplinary councils that designed policies in each of these 11 fields. The diaspora also provided experts for peer review to assess the quality of projects on behalf of the councils. Some research projects linked overseas academics with people in Colombia. These projects were often of one to several years in duration or established a permanent structure, such as an academic centre with a doctoral program in a provincial university.

Drawing on Colombia’s experience, Meyer et. al. suggested that the “diaspora option” should be complementary to, rather than replace, the “return option.” Successful reintegration of returnees is more likely if the expatriates had maintained and developed working relationships with their national professional community before they returned. Also, the diaspora option’s advantage resides in its flexible network; it does not require massive infrastructural investment beyond the reach of developing countries. But it does require a firm commitment with regard to implementing policies that result from strategic thinking. Lists must be built and regular communication with overseas academics must be maintained. Yet interviews in several Canadian cities show that even China has had only limited success in getting its educational and scientific consular officials to establish systematic lists.
Research Dilemmas: Finding Servers and Losers

Surveys of returnees or people in the diaspora who work with their home country depend on the creation of lists from which researchers can draw randomly. Fortunately, one can pinpoint Chinese mainland academics at Western universities because of the “pinyin” or Romanization system they use for their names. Thus, in a 1993 survey of mainlanders in the U.S., Zweig and Chen went through department lists on various campuses, drawing a total population before choosing a sample. University web-sites offer similar opportunities, if one is patient enough to work through department lists on the web. Several such studies have been done relating to mainland scholars in the US, Canada and Hong Kong (Han, et. al., 2005). However, web-based surveys have low response rates, usually not much more than 15%, so after such lists are drawn up, it may be preferable to carry out a mailed survey, if not send out researchers for face to face interviews.

What percentage of overseas sojourners actually help their home country? We cannot answer that question, as the total population of people overseas who could help is not available. Saxenian built her data set from members within professional associations in Silicon Valley, but members of these groups are more likely than non-members to work with China. Therefore, we can only say things about the nature of the “servers,” rather than compare them to the overall population of country nationals residing abroad.

Still, web based surveys of mainlander in the U.S. and Hong Kong found significant differences in the share of respondents who were engaged in some way in academic exchanges with the mainland and found that the returnees in the two territories emphasized different reasons for engaging with the mainland. Thus, while the data may have limits, it does highlight important characteristics of the different diaspora populations.

Finding people who have returned to their home country should be much easier. Returnee associations abound, so even entrepreneurs can be found. Universities, too, have lists of faculty who returned from overseas, although, university offices may be unwilling to give out such lists. Still, department web sites are useful if they list where the faculty member got their Ph.D., though not all universities do this. High tech zones are home to many returnees, so working with directors of such zones may yield an acceptable population. Surprisingly, however, officials in Nanjing responsible for managing the returnees had no real idea of how many returnees were working in the city.

But the big problem is to find the “failures,” because only by comparing their experiences with the experiences of those who succeed can one really explain the forces that trigger success. But returned entrepreneurs whose businesses go under, migrants who give up and return home, or people who move onto a
third country, are difficult to locate. One can ask people in the diaspora who have chosen not to return why they have taken that decision—much as we asked people who had not set up a firm in China—but these remain hypothetical situations.

REFERENCES


A Discussion Paper on State Policies towards Internal Migration and Development with Special Reference to Developing Countries

Amitabh Kundu | Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi

SSRC Migration & Development Conference Paper No. 6

Background: Purpose and Objective
Migration is the direct manifestation of the process and pattern of socio-economic development and the resultant demand and supply of labour and their remuneration including social pay-offs, at different locations. Understandably, any interventions by state and para-statal organizations to influence the dynamics of growth and distribution of economic activities in space would impact on spatial distribution of population. Identifying the policies and programmes of development having an impact of migration in any comprehensive manner would, therefore, be difficult as any sectoral intervention would have its implications for labour mobility. One has to be selective in approach and focus only on those interventions that have a direct and substantive impact on labour mobility. It would be important to analyse the spatial impact of the polices and programmes geared to different development goals like growth, poverty alleviation, reduction of regional disparity, social transformation, capacity development in backward regions etc. in order to identify the key issues for migration research in developing countries. The present paper begins by providing a short overview of the policy perspectives of the state interventions, having significant impact on population mobility in the developing countries. The major thrust of the paper is at stocktaking on the impact of current development policies and programmes on population mobility, in order to develop a research agenda on the subject, building upon and synthesizing different geographical and disciplinary perspectives. It concludes by reflecting on how research can contribute to effective policy making for balanced regional development.

Current Policy Perspectives for Migration Linked State Interventions
Migration in many of the less developed countries has been considered as a negative manifestation of development, reflecting regional inequality. This has been attributed to economic and social deprivation in the outmigrating regions and resulting in enormous pressure on basic amenities in inmigrating regions, particularly large cities. It is also seen as a process of brain drain
from less developed regions. Rarely, internal migration is seen as a manifestation of people trying to improve their socio-economic conditions by moving from less to more remuneration jobs by changing their locations.

Understandably, the major focus in migration related policies has been to create a livelihood support system in chronically out-migrating regions through employment generation and other welfare programmes. Upliftment of the socio-economic conditions of the people in these regions, provision of basic civic amenities and encouraging commutation through improvement of transport system are the key concerns, the objective being deceleration of migration into large cities. With globalisation leading to greater inequality in space, these policies and related programmes have assumed considerable importance in recent years.

Environmental lobby within the State has often taken the stand that the slum dwellers occupying lands that are hazardous for the city population like on river banks and rain water channels, in proximity of railway tracks or pollutant industries, and that reserved for proposed roads, housing schemes and other public purposes should not be allowed to remain there since that is detrimental to the convenience of other members of the society and larger public interest. Direct evictions of migrants by government authorities have thus become common under the relevant laws, such as, Municipal Corporation Acts of the cities, Town Planning and Urban Development Act of the State and Slum Areas (Clearance and Improvement). The recent judgements from the Courts have reasserted the rights of the legal citizens to access the public spaces that are often encroached upon by the migrants.

It is important to note that the avowed reactionary attitude of the state does not always result in direct actions against the migrants. Reduction of public sector intervention, ensuring appropriate prices for infrastructural services and urban amenities through elimination or reduction of subsidies, development of capital market for resource mobilisation, facilitating private and joint sector projects, simplification of legislative system to bring about ‘efficiency induced’ land use changes and location of economic activities etc. are being advocated as a package, heralding a new system of urban governance in the era of globalisation. Withdrawal of the state actors from some of the support systems, a large share of whose benefits were going to migrants, has resulted in deceleration in the rate of migration. Further, the functioning of the market for land and basic services, combined with an emerging sense of ‘otherness’ among the local population become the major barrier. State also has tried to improve transport, communication and commutation facilities, thereby alleviating the need to shift residence from rural to neighbouring urban centres.
Under the global agenda of good urban governance, pursued vigorously particularly by UN Habitat, many of the national governments have tried to empower their lower levels of governance as also encourage participation of civil society organisations. The regional and local governments in turn have launched special measures to attract investments from national and global corporate sector by facilitating their land acquisition as also sanitising the cities by pushing out the slum and squatter settlements. Further, civil society organisations like resident welfare associations, local management groups etc. have often invited state and judicial intervention in eviction of encroachers and demolition of slums. All these have resulted in deceleration of migration flows, particularly in the fast globalising cities.

The attitude of the state to leave the migrants on their own has resulted in indifference with regard to collection of reliable information at national, regional and sub-regional levels. The scope and coverage of migration data are noted as extremely inadequate for addressing emergent policy issues and yet no systematic effort is made to remedy the problems. In some countries, reliable urbanization and migration data are available in case of a few mega cities that are getting linked to global capital market. The state policies have, thus, tended to ignore the smaller towns, although the migrants in the latter report higher levels of poverty and deprivation in terms of quality of life.

**Issues for migration linked Research and their Context**

a. *Analysing the Trends and Pattern of Internal Migration in Developing Countries in the Context of Regionally Differentiated Growth*

Migration in many traditional societies has been observed as low. Researchers have attributed this to prevalence of caste system, joint families, traditional values, diversity of language and culture, lack of education and predominance of agriculture and semi-feudal land relations. By this logic, improvement in the levels of education and that of transport and communication facilities, shift of workforce from agriculture to industry and tertiary activities etc. would increase mobility. Following this line of reasoning, international agencies like United Nations and World Bank have projected the percentage of urban to total population for different countries using a logistic curve. The curve being symmetrical around the value of 0.5 (i.e. 50 per cent level of urbanisation), one would stipulate that the growth rate of urban population would accelerate till the share of urban to rural population reaches fifty per cent level. The growth impetus would understandably come also from the rapid growth of globally linked industrial and tertiary activities.

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1 Davis (1951) and Racine (1997)
A part of migration in these less developed countries has been attributed to stagnation and volatility of agriculture and lack of sectoral diversification within agrarian economy. Low growth in agricultural production, unstable and disparate across regions, results in lack of livelihood opportunities in rural areas. Many of the developing countries, currently on the path of globalization and opening up their economies to international market have not been able to make substantial infrastructural investment as they are being ‘mandated’ to keep their budgetary deficits low. This in turn has affected agriculture adversely, resulting in out-migration from backward rural areas\(^2\) to rapidly growing urban centres that are attracting global investment.

Neo-classical models of growth and labour mobility stipulate that spatial disparity in development, \textit{ceteris paribus}, would result in migration, bringing about optimality in the spatial distribution of labourforce. The mobility pattern observed in developing countries, in a way, fits well in these models. An analysis of interregional migration reveals that the less developed regions have a high percentage of net out-migrants. The developed regions, on the other hand, are in-migrating in character\(^3\). Given this macro scenario, the primary concern of migration related policies has been stabilizing the economy of the chronically out-migrating regions through creation of livelihood opportunities\(^4\). Poor must not be forced to shift as “forced migration and transferring encompass more poignant vulnerabilities”. Enabling rural people avail urban amenities and strengthening rural urban linkages and commutation through a network of urban centres, have been an important goal of policy intervention for addressing the problem of exodus from rural areas. \textit{Globalisation resulting in greater inequality in space and concentration of poverty in a few pockets would underline the importance region specific studies for more effective intervention in stalling poverty induced migration.}

The migration pattern, however, seems to be undergoing a change in recent years, reflecting certain kind of immobility among the population\(^5\). A few scholars have explained the decline in internal migration in terms of developmental programmes, launched by central and regional governments in the post Independence period, promoting a spatially balanced development. Others have attributed it to growing assertion of regional and language identity, adoption of Master Plans and land use restrictions at the city level etc., that have been considered fallouts of the process of globalization. It is important to note that it is no longer the avowed reactionary policies of the state that are restricting migration. It is the

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\(^2\) American India Foundation (2006)
\(^3\) Kundu (2006)
\(^4\) United Nations (1995) talks of attacking the “root cause of migration especially those related to poverty”.
functioning of the market for land and basic services, combined with an emerging sense of ‘otherness’ which is the major barrier. Furthermore, better transport, communication and commutation facilities are also alleviating the need to shift residence for employment or education, since people can now commute to neighbouring cities and towns. Importantly, there has been some sort of stepping up of outmigration from poor states and of immigration in to developed states in a few developing countries, due to policies of globalization resulting in accentuation of regional imbalance. Still, scholars believe there is nothing alarming regarding this hike in internal mobility.

Given this conflicting perspectives, one would ask “Is indeed the scale of migration and urbanization very high and alarming in developing countries?” The rates of urbanization have started to decline in many parts of the world, much more than what can be attributed to decline in natural growth in population\(^6\). Despite deceleration in natural growth of population, its share in incremental urban population has not declined much due to a similar trend in RU migration\(^7\). Most of the mega cities have grown at a rate much below what was projected by UN organizations\(^8\). These trends in urbanization and migration indeed question the validity and the basic premise of the UN models postulating phenomenal urban growth. Also, these discount the proposition that the mobility of labour, operationalised through market, would ensure optimal distribution of economic activities in space. The declining trend of urbanisation in several countries, despite growing information flows, accentuation of regional inequality etc. would be an important subject of research.

**b. Comparability of Data over time and Across Regions**

A major problem in migration research is inadequacy of temporally and cross sectionally comparable data. The national data gathering agencies limit the scope and coverage of their data collection to a few parameters. Even the limited information collected by the agencies are often not strictly comparable. Migrants are classified, besides rural urban identification of their place of residence, based on their nature of movement - within the district, across the districts within the state and beyond the state. Interestingly, these three have been used as proxy for short, medium and long distance mobility. Temporal comparability of the data has,

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6 Urban rural differential in population growth has gone down in most countries and regions of the world.
7 Several international organizations have built in an “unprecedented scale of urban growth” in their development perspective and support it by indicating that Africa and Asia would double their urban population in the next three decades. Indeed, the increase in absolute terms appears massive and alarming but one may note that urban population in the two continents had trebled during the past three decades and that urban growth has unmistakably decelerated, both due to slowing down of natural growth as also migration.
8 UNFPA (2007)
unfortunately, been rendered extremely difficult due to not-too-infrequent reorganization of state and district boundaries. Besides, one would note even more serious problems of comparability of migrants with different durations of stay at the place of enumeration. This is due to growing uneasiness on the part of recent migrants to admit their arrival date due to the apprehension that this may disqualify them from certain benefits in the context of tenurial rights and publicly provided amenities. Furthermore, the agencies often change the format for data collection, tabulation etc. and add new questions, phrases, clarifications etc. that affect temporal and cross-sectional comparability. All these come in the way of making generalizations with regards to trends and patterns of migration at national or regional levels.

In order to bring in migration issues within the framework of development planning and programme formulation, it is important that national level data gathering organizations consider expanding the scope and coverage so that the data can be used for addressing emergent policy issues. More importantly, it would be necessary to take steps to improve temporal comparability and reliability of these data. It is only through collection, dissemination and utilisation of comprehensive data and enhancement of their reliability/comparability that one can expect evidence based formulation of policy and interventions in the field of migration and development.

c. Impact of Migration on Receiving Regions and Large Cities
Withdrawal or displacement of labour from rural economy and their absorption in urban sectors have created serious stress in receiving regions, particularly the large cities. The capacity of the cities and towns to assimilate the migrants by providing employment, access to land, basic amenities etc. are limited. The problem have acquired severity as migrants have shown high selectivity in choosing their destinations (understandably linked with availability of employment and other opportunities), leading to regionally unbalanced urbanization as also distortions in urban hierarchy. It is argued that there has been concentration of poverty, growth of slums and social deprivation in cities, posing a challenge to the development dynamics in less developed countries9.

The MDG target 11 which stipulates significant improvement in the conditions of 100 million slum dwellers assumes importance in the context noted above. The Report of UN Secretary General of 2000 entitled We the Peoples makes it explicit that there should be no attempt to prevent formation of new slums in order to make the cities more attractive for globalization through “sanitisation” or by pushing out the slum population. The Taskforce for Improving the Lives of Slum Dwellers therefore

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9 UNFPA (2007)
reformulates the target 11 to suggest improving “substantially the lives of at least 100 million slum dwellers while providing adequate alternatives to new slum formation by 2020”. The Taskforce further specifies that the challenge of target 11 will be two-fold. It would be (a) to improve the lives of existing slum dwellers and simultaneously (b) to plan for adequate alternatives for future urban growth. The message comes loud and clear that the national and urban governments, civil society organizations must come forward with policies to mitigate the problems of these large cities, not only through micro level initiatives of improving slum conditions and access to basic amenities but also by adopting macro strategy of balanced regional development. **This would imply that substantial research needs to be done into the changing economic base of the large cities and the process of absorption of the migrants into their economic sectors.**

It has been pointed out that the technological shift from cheap labour based modes of mass production to knowledge based system is a factor bringing down the demand for migrant workers, particularly of unskilled labour force and decelerating urbanization, as discussed above. Migrants are often noted to be better off and relatively skilled than those left behind, implying that the displaced small peasants and agricultural labour are finding it increasingly difficult to put a foothold in the urban centres, in the present globalising environment. Migration to the large cities that have global linkages has become relatively more difficult for them as they do not have access to information, market friendly skills and “some sort of bank roll”. The implications of the deceleration in the rates of migration of the rural poor need to be analysed in the context of both sending and receiving regions.

It would be important to look at migration not always as a negative phenomenon - reflecting misery and lack of livelihood opportunities in the outmigrating regions and absence of basic amenities and health hazards in inmigrating cities. It should be seen also as an opportunity being taken up by people to improve their socio-economic conditions. There are evidences that a segment of skilled and better off population has succeeded in availing these opportunities. A large number of science and technology personnel from backward regions are locating themselves in a handful of cities and developed regions, analogous to the trends and pattern in international migration.

While a section of the elite and highly skilled persons are increasingly enjoying the “benefits of migration, barriers to poorer migrants are increasing.” It should be possible to “use urban dynamics to help reduce poverty” and make migration an instrument in the strategy of poverty alleviation, the first and the most important target under MDG. It is important to harness the potential of migration in the context of development.

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10 “While an elite of highly skilled individuals increasingly enjoy the benefits of migration, barriers to poor migrants are increasing.” UNFPA (2006)
and poverty alleviation and work out measures to promote ‘orderly migration’, instead of considering proposals to discourage mobility of population.

d. Regional Pattern and Growth Dynamics of the States
Migration and urban growth (or urban rural growth differential) across regions exhibit, in general, negative relationship with their levels of economic development articulated through income, consumption expenditure etc., suggesting presence of push factors behind RU migration. In a few countries, however, migration exhibits positive correlation with indicators of economic and infrastructural development and negative relation with poverty. Here, the urban centres in developed states have experienced rapid demographic growth. Understandably, these cities and towns are not getting their migrants driven out of agrarian economy by natural, social or economic calamities but those who have higher levels of skill or economic assets. The latter find it easier to establish linkages with the economy of the large cities through socio-cultural channels and avail the “opportunity” offered through migration, many of them traveling beyond their states. The negative perspective which characterizes and dictates large part of the contemporary literature on migration, therefore, needs to be urgently revisited through micro level surveys.

e. Migration to Different Size Class of Settlements with Focus on Small and Medium Towns
It would be erroneous to restrict the analysis of urbanization and migration to a few mega cities and ignore the smaller towns as the latter report even higher levels of poverty and deprivation in terms of quality of life 11. Furthermore, globalisation strategies have opened up possibilities of resource mobilisation for large cities by strengthening their internal resource base and empowering them to attract funds from global capital market and institutional sources. Unfortunately, these have not been available to smaller towns as their economic base is very low, offering little possibility to local government for internal resource mobilization. Given this somewhat disturbing scenario, it would be a challenge to divert “bulk of population growth towards smaller cities and towns” that are seriously “underserved in housing, transportation, piped water, waste disposal and other services” 12. These have “fewer human, financial and technical resources at their disposal” and their “capabilities for planning and implementation can be exceedingly weak”. Migration towards small and medium towns indeed is an area of policy intervention in case the government is serious about its commitment to

11 See Dubey, Gangopadhaya and Wadhwa (2001) and Kundu and Sarangi (2005)
12 UNFPA (2007)
promote balanced settlement structure and alleviate poverty, ensuring equity and sustainability in development process.

Empirical evidence suggests that large cities in developing countries grow at a distinctly higher rate than the lower order towns, as noted above. The edge that the class I cities have over smaller towns seems to have gone up in recent years. Urban growth has become more unbalanced as million plus cities, with strong economic base, raising resources through institutional borrowing and innovative credit instruments, have successfully attracted population as also economic activities. The modest decline in their population growth in recent years can be attributed largely to fertility decline. Slowing down in the rates of RU migration and urbanization and concentration of demographic and economic growth in and around a few global centres seems to be the logical outcome of the new economic policy. Many among the larger cities have been able to corner much of the resources, available for infrastructural and industrial development both from private and public sector, as noted above. The small and medium towns located away from these "global centres of growth", particularly those in backward regions, have failed in this which explains their low demographic growth. All these need to be studied with a temporal and cross sectional framework.

f. Poverty and Vulnerability as Correlates of Migration

The share of the poor is reported to be declining in urban growth in several developing countries. In many of the million plus cities, there has been significant decline in the level of poverty, much more than in small towns. This is because of the exclusionary urban growth based on slum eviction and restrictions on migration in these fast globalizing cities where land is required for accommodating local elites and global enterprises. This is in spite of a proactive vision of inclusive development and launching of pro-poor land and basic service related programmes. The possibilities of supporting economic opportunities to the poor migrants by providing them access to infrastructure and basic services, besides removing discriminatory regulations that deny migrants equal access to these, needs to be examined with empirical rigour.

One must look at urban employment scenario in order to understand the dynamics of urbanization and migration. Indeed, the large cities have successfully attracted infrastructural and industrial investment during the past decades of structural adjustment and thereby recorded reasonably high growth in employment. Consequently, the poverty levels work out to be very low. The low migration absorptive capacity of small and medium towns can be attributed to high poverty and absence of livelihood related activities. The new employment opportunities coming up in the large cities require certain level of education and skills. The benefits of new employment opportunities,
thus, seem to have gone to the weaker segment within the workforce like the illiterates and women. The questions that researchers must address urgently are: Does the percentage of migrants declining over time and their economic and social status being better than that of non-migrants and even improving over time, reflect barriers to mobility for the poor? With service provision being based on market affordability and changes in skill requirements in urban labour market, has the emerging institutional structure become hostile to poor newcomers? Is the migration process very selective wherein unskilled labourers are finding it difficult to access the livelihood opportunities coming up in developed regions and large cities?

g. Livelihood for Women and Children
The age and gender composition of migrants in urban areas has altered significantly in recent years, with an increase in the share of women and youth. An assessment of the trends in labour market for women during the last decade and a half gives complex and mixed signals. Growth of women workers has often been noted as high – higher than that of men. One has reasons to be optimistic in terms of its impact on poverty reduction, as it is observed that a larger proportion of women’s earning goes into household for essential consumption. Also, employment growth for women among illiterates and semi educated, daily status workers etc. has been relatively faster. This too may be a positive sign since employment among them would provide livelihood support to the poorest rung of households. The developments in agrarian economy and economic displacement have prompted family migration while the urban informal sector has opened up possibilities for women and children. The unfortunate development, however, is that there has been no simultaneous improvement in their real wages. Vulnerability of these groups to socio-economic exploitation is a matter of policy concern for the governments of the developing countries and must be analysed and assessed with clarity.

h. Changing Programmes and Institutional Structure for Urban Governance
The policy perspective and strategy of urban development have undergone major changes in recent years in most developing countries, resulting in alteration in the nature and content of the programmes/schemes as also transformation of the supporting organisational structure and financing system. Reduction of public sector intervention, ensuring appropriate prices for infrastructural services and urban amenities through elimination or reduction of subsidies, development of capital market for resource mobilisation, facilitating private and joint sector projects, simplification of legislative system to bring about ‘efficiency induced’ land use changes and location of economic activities etc. are being advocated as a package,
heralding a new system of urban governance. Some kind of "financial discipline" has been imposed by the Central Banking institutions on the government departments and urban local bodies to ensure that their programmes and projects rely increasingly on internal resource mobilization, loans from development cum banking institutions and capital market at non-subsidised interest rates. The para statal agencies that had taken over many of the functions of local bodies, have particularly come in for sharp criticism on grounds of inefficiency, lack of cost effectiveness and continued dependence on grants for sustenance. Projects for the provision of sanitation facilities, improving slum colonies etc., that have a substantial component of subsidy, too have received low priority in this changed policy perspective.

Decentralised governance has been hailed as a panacea for the problems of urban management in recent years. Constitutional assignment of the responsibility of planning to city level agencies, however, often prompted the latter to adopt migration restrictive policies. Also, they have sought greater engagement of financial intermediaries, credit rating agencies etc. in resource mobilization as also designing of projects. A large number of such agencies have come up in recent years in the private sector with assistance from international organisations. Projects are being prepared or identified in formal or informal consultation with interested companies or the “stakeholders” through the intermediation of the financial institutions. Given the resource crunch in the government agencies, privatisation, partnership arrangements and promotion of community-based projects have become the only options for undertaking such investments. All these have been responsible for launching of commercially viable projects that have resulted in the poor being evicted or relocated in the peripheries of the cities. Even the public sector projects have increasingly been made to depend on institutional or capital market borrowings resulting in “sanitization of the cities” through clearing up the slum areas and discouraging the inflow of new migrants needs to be assessed.

Decentralisation in many countries has meant empowerment of civil society organizations and local level committees. The institutional vacuum created by the withdrawal of the state and hesitation in the entry of private sector agencies has been sought to be filled up by these organizations. This unfortunately has led to elite capture since better-off localities have been able attract private entrepreneurs and subsidised government programmes for improving the quality of services, based on their political connections and the capacity to pay higher user charges. These local institutions that have come up mainly in the planned colonies have been effective in policing their localities against any encroachment and prevention of squatting by the migrants. Many of these associations have filed petitions against

13 Dutta(1999)
14 Rao (1999)
encroachment by vendors, squatters etc. Courts have taken a sympathetic view of the Public Interest Litigations filed by them. All these have led to deceleration in the inflow of migrants into the large cities where they have assumed importance.

i. Administrative and Legal System concerning Migrants
An overview of the Constitutional and legal provisions along with the Court judgments and administrative orders in several developing countries suggests that the State has often taken the stand that the hutment dwellers occupying lands that are hazardous for the city population like on river banks and rain water channels, in proximity of railway tracks or pollutant industries, and that reserved for proposed roads, housing schemes and other public purposes cannot be allowed to remain there since that is detrimental to the convenience of other members of the society and larger public interest. The evictions of migrants by government authorities have thus become common under the relevant laws, such as, Municipal Corporation Acts of the cities, Town Planning and Urban Development Act of the State and Slum Areas (Clearance and Improvement). It may be noted that the City level Master Plans have been given the status of law that also have discouraged encroachment on public or private land by the poor. The perspective of streamlining the functioning of urban land market through effective legislation and their implementation, as put forward by Hernando de Soto has failed to guarantee the right to shelter\textsuperscript{15}. On the contrary, this has facilitated evictions on a large scale and acted as a deterrent to future migration of the poor and displaced rural population into the city. It is important that the implications of the recent changes in legal and administrative framework are analysed within a human right framework.

Conclusions
It is important that the basis of the prejudices and the vested interests supporting the present development policies of the state, having bearing on migration, are examined empirically with some rigour. Comprehensive data analysis on livelihood pattern of the migrants would help in determining the large contribution they make in economic development of the regions, receiving them. The remittances and the social capital that they bring back to their regions of origin help the policy makers in recognising their role as ‘catalysts of development’ and leaving space for them in future development strategy. All these should help in altering the negative attitude still predominant against the migrants in the policy making circles in developing countries. Analysis of the different streams of migrants in different regions and identification of the socioeconomic factors behind them would help the

\textsuperscript{15} Payne (2002)
states design informed and differentiated interventions. This could mean restricting the outflow of people from some regions or groups but the opposite in other cases. The state could then facilitate migration into smaller settlements that are experiencing economic and demographic decline, decelerate the flow in and around a few mega cities and thereby address the problems of distortions in settlement hierarchy. Similar analysis should help in designing a better support system for the migrant population in the regions or cities receiving them.

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PANEL 3

Migration, Development and Environment

These papers address the relationships among migration, the environment and development. The first considers the impact that internal migration has on the environment, while the second focuses on the role of environmental factors in causing migration.
The subject of this panel is an area of research that has already attracted a good deal of interest, and one that is likely to grow in the future. The International Organization for Migration was told two years ago by its Member States, “Don’t touch the environment. It’s got nothing to do with migration. It’s not your concern.” That has certainly changed today. In fact in early February 2008 the International Organization for Migration organized a one-day awareness-raising event on migration and the environment with the World Meteorological Organization. It seems that everybody wants to work on this topic, with numerous meetings and conferences being organized on migration and climate change, migration and environment.

But I would argue that we need to think more clearly how we can really advance the knowledge base on this topic. The reason why the relationship between migration and the environment has attracted so much public attention, particularly in the media, is because some amazing figures have been floated. Some people talk about up to a billion people being affected by climate change and environmental degradation up to the year 2050. But there are some key questions we need to consider. Conceptually, is it meaningful to talk about the existence of environmental migrants or climate refugees? And if such people exist, is there any way in which we can grasp the possible extent of such movement in the future? If such people are going to move, where are they likely to move to, what kind of people might move, and what would be the policy implications of their moving?

This is not a completely new area of research. If you read through the literature, you see many references to papers from the 1990s, 1980s. IOM organized a number of conferences in the early 1990s on this subject. But it seems that we are still quite early on the process. One of the questions that I want to raise is why have we not made more progress in advancing the evidence base? Why are the numbers so shaky? Why do we still seem to find it very difficult to get our minds around this whole notion of environmental migration, climate migrants, or whatever we want to call them?

One of the two papers in this session, by Michael White, looks specifically at
the impact of migration on the environment, and the other paper, by Graeme Hugo, looks at the reverse. But I think it is important to recognize from the outset that you can’t make a straightforward distinction. Often migration impacts on the environment and the environment then impacts on population movement; it’s a circular effect to some extent.

The other thing that we need to flag right at the beginning is that this is clearly a development issue, but the relationship between environmental change and migration is something which has not yet been addressed within the context of the Global Forum on Migration and Development or the High Level Dialogue on Migration and Development. It is not on the radar screen of people who are talking about migration and development. But it is very clearly the case that environmental migration is likely to affect the movement of people in poorer parts of the world most. Graeme Hugo says that “migration as both the cause and consequence of environmental change occurs predominantly in poorer, less-developed countries.” The IPCC has also made similar points about less-developed regions being most likely to be affected by environmental migration or environmentally-induced forced migration.

I was particularly struck by a sentence in Graeme Hugo’s paper, where he says “our knowledge of the complex two-way relationship involving environmental change as both the cause and consequence of migration remains limited.” Then I looked up his previous work and found that he first said that in 1996. So the question is why are we still saying that today? Why is research in this area apparently so limited? As neither of the papers really try and respond to that, I will try to do so in this introduction.

Perhaps part of the answer has something to do with the fact that, as Graeme points out in his paper, movement in response to environmental factors is most likely to occur are likely to occur within borders rather than beyond borders, and internal migration is not usually included in most research on migration and development.

We also have to recognize that the consequences of environmental change are likely to be very diverse and it is difficult to grasp the impact of the environmental variable. If you look at the literature, a distinction is generally made between the impact of gradual climate processes or gradual environmental degradation, desertification, sea level rise, etc., and extreme climate events, natural disasters, which seem to be occurring more frequently. Whilst we know quite a lot about natural disasters and their implications for population movement, we know much less about the impact of gradual changes in the environment. And yet those gradual changes, according to a number of experts, are potentially likely to affect many more people in the future.
There are also a lot of problems in deciding how important the environmental variable is. There is a lot of disagreement in the literature about the extent to which the environment is really a key driver of migration. Most people seem to agree that migration decisions are very complex. It is very difficult to isolate the environment as a factor, and we have to look at a range of social, political, and economic factors to really understand the impact of changes in the environment.

Another complication is that perhaps that migration may have both positive and negative consequences for the environment and development, and it is often quite challenging to sift through those. The good news is that there will be some positive effects of climate change, with some currently chilly regions becoming desirable places to live and the possibility of growing crops in areas they would not survive before – grapes in Scotland, for example. But I think the tone in the debate has essentially been that the movement of people has a negative impact on the environment rather than potentially having some positive impacts, and also that environmental change has a negative impact on migration, producing forced migrants, rather than being a potential coping strategy or having the potential to improve livelihoods.

And then, there is really very little agreement on how to conceptualize all of this. There is a lot of disagreement about terminology, and there seems to be a chronic lack of data, as is illustrated by the huge numbers. The term “environmental refugee” was coined in the 1970s and then promoted by UNEP in the 1980s. But it is not a term recognized by national governments and international agencies. The bulk of migration which is said to be caused by environmental change, and vice versa, occurs within national borders, and hence to use the term “refugee” is perhaps potentially a misuse of the term, certainly according to the 1951 Convention.

Some scholars, including Steven Castles and Richard Black have even dismissed the whole idea of talking about environmental refugees, or even environmentally-induced migration. Castles has said that this whole notion of environmental refugees is “simplistic, one-sided, and misleading, and implies a mono-causality, which very rarely exists in practice.” But Graeme Hugo in his paper argues that perhaps we need to move away from thinking about voluntary and forced migration as a dichotomy and instead see population mobility as being arranged along a continuum ranging from totally voluntary migration to totally forced migration, with environmental migration towards the forced end.

There are numerous typologies around. My favorite is by Bilsborrow, who distinguishes between three categories: the first is environmental refugees, forced migrants who move across borders; the second is displaced persons who move within borders; and the third, and largest category is “others,”
people who migrate from rural areas within their own country at least partly for reasons of environmental deterioration. This ‘other’ category is obviously huge.

We in IOM have come up with our own working definition, which we first presented to our Member States in November 2007 in a concept paper. There is no international definition of “environmental migrants,” but we felt that it would be useful to at least try and develop a working definition. So we call environmental migrants “persons or groups of person who, for compelling reasons of sudden or progressive change in the environment that adversely affects their lives or living conditions, are obliged to leave their habitual homes, or choose to do so, either temporarily or permanently, and who move either within their country or abroad.” This definition tries to encompass population movement or displacement, and both temporary and permanent forms of migration, internal and cross-border migration. It also includes both voluntary and involuntary movements, and movements which may be due to sudden or gradual environmental changes. We will probably want to come back to this whole notion of definitions, because it is obviously important in terms of collection of data, and also in terms of policy responses.

There is a lot of discussion in the papers about conceptualizing environmental migration and, particularly in Graeme Hugo’s paper, a lot of discussion about the extent to which environmental factors are a cause of migration. Without dwelling on this to any great extent, I think the consensus view is that when environmental degradation leads to migration it is generally as a proximate cause linked to questions of economic growth, poverty, population pressure, conflict, etc. A number of examples are given from different case studies in the literature to show that often what may seem at first sight a movement that has been produced as a result of environmental change is also linked to a number of other factors, and these have to be borne in mind in the analysis and in the responses that we make.

In terms of extreme events, it is obviously much easier to identify the environmental push factor. We certainly have better numbers. There seem to be growing numbers of people, according to Graeme Hugo’s statistics, being affected by natural disasters: he gives a figure of something like 200 million people per annum. However, what we don’t know is the extent of displacement resulting from disasters and the extent to which that displacement is either internal or international.

However, in this context it is useful to think not only about the people who are displaced who are the natives of those countries, but also about international migrants who are often caught up in these disasters. The literature mentions, for example, a case close to home, Hurricane Katrina, where 1.5 million people were temporarily displaced, of which 100,000 were
migrants, and many of them undocumented migrants. There are also cases during the tsunami of Burmese workers in Thailand who were in the main undocumented and not able to access some of the services which were provided by international agencies. So migrants can be a vulnerable group in these situations.

Michael White’s paper talks more about the impact of migration on the environment. This seems to be where the bulk of research has been carried out in the past, which actually surprised me, given the amount of attention that is currently being given to the impact of environmental change on migration. It seems that much of the research interest in the past has actually been looking at the impact of migration, and particularly refugee movements, on the environment. And a lot of that discussion, again, is fairly negative. It is about refugees putting pressure on the environment, causing deforestation, etc.. But there are also some examples in the literature of some positive effects that even refugee movements may have on the environment, leading to perhaps better services being provided for the local community in some examples given.

Both of the papers towards the end try to draw out some policy implications and discuss some of the potential impacts and effects of environmental change on migration and development. Again, most of these effects are regarded as being essentially negative. There is a lot of attention to the risk of conflict and the impact on security. There is a lot of talk about worsening health and education and social indicators for migrants, increasing pressure on urban infrastructure.

But as I said at the beginning, there seems to be less attention, or less often do we pose the question: Will climate change boost development by actually making some places better able to sustain larger populations; and will migration linked to environmental change bring its own benefits for places of origin, destination, and the migrants themselves, particularly in cases where environmental degradation may not be particularly advanced and migration or temporary migration is seen as a coping strategy that may bring some benefits to the place of origin or relieve population pressures in the place of origin? There seems to be much less attention to those sorts of issues.

In terms of policy issues and the policy framework, there is a fair amount of discussion in the literature about whether or not we need some kind of a new international convention where we identify and recognize environmental refugees or climate refugees, or whatever we wish to call them, as a special vulnerable group in need of protection. This is advocated in a number of recent reports, although not so much in the papers of the two authors.

What we at IOM have tried to do recently in developing a policy paper is not
simply to come up with a set of recommendations, because I think it is difficult to come up with recommendations when you don’t really understand what the impacts are. Instead it may be more helpful to come up with a framework for thinking about these issues and about policies which relate to different types and degrees of environmental change, for example less-advanced stages of gradual environmental change, advanced stages of gradual environmental change, and extreme environmental events. We also need to think about how migration impacts on the environment in both areas of destination and of origin, and to consider more comprehensively whether there is such a thing as environmental migration. If there is, and if it is going to increase in the future, we need to think about how we are going to best manage environmental migration in order to ensure that it does not impact negatively on development.

By way of conclusion, I learned a great deal from the papers in terms of the wide range of studies that are being carried out on this topic. But what I would really like the authors to address in the discussion is the question of where do we go next with this issue, because this has now become a high priority for a number of policymakers. How do we advance the knowledge base in this area?

If we want to sum up research in this area, we could probably say that most research has been on the impact of migration on the environment, rather than the environment as a cause of migration. The extent to which environment is a primary driver of migration is still rather contested. Most of the research has been focused on movements within countries, and there is an assumption that most of the impact will be on internal migration, although Graeme in his paper alludes to the fact that we need to pay more attention to this issue because it is going to have more of an impact on international migration in the future.

In policy terms, there are very few migration policies directly targeted at environmental migrants, although sometimes, for example in the case of natural disasters, governments in OECD countries do modify their policies. For example, they don’t send people back to disaster-affected areas, or they encourage diasporas to support people who have been forced to move in those areas. Even within the South, I think Malaysia for a while changed its policies towards undocumented migrant workers after the tsunami. That is an interesting set of questions.

The final point which I wanted to stress is that in the literature migration is too often seen as a failure of adaptation and not a form of it. I think there is too much emphasis on the negative impact of migration, or the negative consequences for migration, and there is a real danger that migrants could be scapegoated in the future in some of this discussion.
Introduction
Migration is movement, and movement means disruption. Along with the reality of migration comes much concern in policy circles and elsewhere about its consequences, both environmental and social. I suggest we can rethink some of the ways in which migration is related to environmental change and economic development.

In this paper I have four objectives. First, in order to better understand environmental links, I will encourage us to reorient “migration” per se as “population distribution and redistribution.” This rather workaday alternative will allow us to subsume migration and get more directly to some matters bearing on environmental consequences. It will also allow us to incorporate urbanization, a development phenomenon linked both to migration and often-times to environmental deterioration.

Second, I concentrate here on how human population location and relocation induces environmental consequences, rather than the other way around. The effect of environmental change on human geographic mobility is a crucial topic (and a growing phenomenon) but for the moment it is beyond my orbit. Third, I want to give some examples of how research can help us understand relationships in this policy arena. I’ll draw on my own research findings but refrain – in keeping with what I was told of the conference’s purpose and orientation – from offering a research paper. Fourth, I conclude with thoughts about policy.

1. Orientation
The topic for this segment of the conference is “Migration, Development, and Environment.” As I see it, the topic sees the causal or predictive arrow points in both directions:

$\text{\Delta ENV} \rightarrow \text{\Delta MIG}$

$\text{\Delta MIG} \rightarrow \text{\Delta ENV}$

My own emphasis will be on the $\text{M} \rightarrow \text{E}$ direction, and I hope that our conversations will take us to a look in the other direction as well.

Consider this statement in the publication, People on the Move, released in fall 2007 and jointly sponsored by WWF and Conservation International:

Human migration poses huge challenges to conserving the
Earth’s rich biodiversity, yet conservationists are often unsure about what steps, if any, they can take to reduce its negative impacts. Conservation International (CI) and World Wildlife Fund-US (WWF) undertook this review to explore the scope of negative impacts and possible interventions (Oglethorpe et al., 2007).

The implicit assumption here – perhaps justified – is that migration is detrimental to the environment, or perhaps more modestly, that migration must be managed to avoid environmental deterioration. Some anecdotal evidence certainly supports the view: urban sprawl of apparent newcomers, indigenous populations moving into or extracting resources from forest reserves, over-fishing in water bodies experiencing population and economic growth, settlers new cutting down rainforest, etc.

As seemingly and comfortably self-evident as the $\Delta \text{MIG} \rightarrow \Delta \text{ENV}$, I want to suggest that we look more systematically at the relationship.

2. Models and Myths
Some myths are worth telling, and like much in mythology the narrative often originates in or retains an element of truth. Below I review a few myths and models that relate to migration and the environment. I then offer a few comments on them.

IPAT. Perhaps the most basic place to start the discussion is with the IPAT “equation.” Avoiding for the moment the tired argument of whether IPAT is a mathematical identity or a convenient conceptual device, consider how the components relate. In the formulation, Population is seen as one of the “drivers,” or highly linked components, of environmental change.

• $I = PAT$
• Impact = (Population)(Affluence)(Technology)

If one believes that the IPAT relationship carries some meaning, to predict or decompose effects, one could rewrite the relationship in a form that could be estimated in a regression-style analysis:

• $\log(I) = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \log P + \beta_2 \log A + \beta_3 \log T$

We can ask, “What about the $\beta$’s?” How about $\beta_1$ especially, the coefficient on Population? Might it be close to zero? Does it change with circumstances? In the now-nearly-abandoned early use of IPAT, each increment in population was seen to produce large and almost uniformly negative impacts on the natural environment.
Note that in this interpretation, it is aggregate population that is the driver. As evidence and thinking began to accumulate about IPAT, the conversation surely moved away from simple aggregate drivers with large impact coefficients. What is more, this population “driver” has had its ups and downs in policy discussions. After some years of centrality in various policy debates, the population bomb diminished as a clear and present danger. But it was not entirely defused, and as recently as 2007, we have seen the *Return of the Population Growth Factor*. This was the title of the All Party Parliamentary Group on Population, Development, and Reproductive Health (UK Parliament) report. A *Science* article by several notable population analysts offered the same title (Campbell et al, 2007). Both groups linked the population factor to the Millennium Development Goals (MDG’s), and notably, one of these (MDG7) is to “Ensure Environmental Sustainability.”

*The Migration Driver.* Now move from P to M (or D, for distribution). If you like, write \[\log(I) = \gamma_0 + \gamma_1 \log M + \ldots\]. What might be the value of some \(\gamma\), a presumed impact coefficient for migration and population distribution: 0, <0, >0? The presumption, it would seem is that migration is negatively related to environmental outcomes. We see this not only in the WWF-CI report, but also in other commentary. Some of the key views seem to be that:

- migration generates the bulk of population growth in regional ecosystems
- migration is predominantly rural-to-urban
- migration disperses of population across the landscape
- migration weakens social norms that favor the environment

My response to these assertions is *Yes, but.*

*Yes,* migration is responsible for large shares of human population growth in some regions and their ecosystems, *but* often ignored, however, is the role of *natural increase.* In many developing countries, natural increase still plays a large role in population growth, including urban growth (NAS, 2003). The WWF-CI document wisely took cognizance of the continuing role of natural increase, and discussed policy regarding fertility as well as migration.

*Yes,* much migration is rural-urban, *but* in many settings this is not the predominant flow. As most analysts who work in developing settings know a very substantial portion of human migration (depending on one’s geographic frame) is *rural-rural* (R-R) migration. Moreover, a large fraction of such R-R migration is related to marriage or is for seasonal economic livelihood. In any case it is sometimes R-R flows that are most directly implicated in threats to ecosystem reserves or other fragile territory (Liu et al, 2001;
Oglethorpe et al., 2007). A better understanding of these flows would help enormously to inform policy.

Yes, migration is often associated with the population dispersal, but we need to more closely consider land consumption. To be sure migration along with natural increase produce larger cities, towns, and other aggregates, and these larger aggregates tend to take up more acreage. At the same time, consumption patterns matter much, and with rising incomes greater per capita land consumption is almost sure to follow. Urban sprawl may have as much to do with standards of living and land use regulatory policies as it does with migration of newcomers to the city.

Yes, migration challenges the application of social controls, both in origin and destination communities, but social science is also replete with examples of resilient social structures. Social ties may be maintained between origin and destination or reformed in destination communities. One does not doubt that incentives to act without social control or social approbation (with respect to environmental resources) exist; only that such characterizations are often incomplete.

Migration and Urbanization. Urbanization (P, M, D) is commonly thought to be linked to air and water pollution, loss of habitat, and other environmental threats (Cincotta and Engelman, 2000), with mega-cities even more problematically affected (Ash et al., 2008). How timely is the subject of urbanization and environment? Very. Consider that the AAAS publication Science devoted its 8 Feb 2008 issue to a special section on “Reimagining Cities.” Environmental concerns are prominently featured. The section is introduced by a few paragraphs that include the statement, “Without careful investment and planning, mega-cities (those with more than 10 million inhabitants) will be overwhelmed with burgeoning slums and environmental problems.” (Ash et al., 2008). More specifically, on the topic of the ecology of cities, Grimm and her co-authors invoke the role of migration:

It is also at the regional scale that land-use changes driven by and resulting from population movement are most apparent. Perceived opportunities in growing urban centers and lack of opportunities in rural settings, resulting from degraded landscapes and imbalanced economic systems, have made the migrations since the second half of the 20th century the greatest human-environmental experiment of all time. In China alone, 300 million more people likely will move to cities, transforming their home landscapes and continuing an already unbelievable juggernaut of urban construction. [Grimm, et al., 2008].
Added to this is concern for how migrants and urbanites relate to their natural surroundings. Consider the view expressed in the following background paper to the World Summit on Sustainable Development: “Urbanization and many aspects of globalization tend to distance people from their relation to ecosystem support….People become alienated from their dependence on access to resources and ecosystem functions outside the boundaries of their own jurisdiction” (Folke, et al., 2002, p. 39). Whether this perception is borne out by actual behavior remains to be seen. This is not to deny that urbanization is accompanied by a host of challenges; rather it is to argue that the connection between urban growth and environmental outcomes needs to be better understood.

Assessment. I would argue that one can find many additional expressions of concern along these lines, views that are consistent with mechanisms outlined above. For instance a few years ago the strong negative view of immigration held by some contesting for the US Sierra Club board of director was linked to presumed population growth (P through M) IPAT reasoning (Barringer, 2004). Similarly, in the run-up to some of the international population conferences advanced arguments about migration are sometimes quite negative. Certainly both population distribution and migration are implicated in discussion about managing urban growth and its environmental impact (Montgomery, 1988).

There is a further twist. Many policy makers, government officials, and the like have a negative view of urbanization. In a recent UN report, the majority of developing country national policymakers advocated policies to decelerate or reverse migration to metropolitan areas, and 80 percent of African country respondents felt the same way (United Nations, 2003). Another UN report argued that development agencies maintained an anti-urban stance in their programs (United Nations 2001). While one might not want to put too much stock in such solicitations of policy, it does suggest the rather negative light in which urban growth is often viewed.

Overall, I would argue, that despite the extensive writing now done on human impacts on environmental change, and the more balanced tone that such writing now takes, our knowledge about regarding coupled human-natural systems still falls woefully short of understanding the interaction. Consider that in 2001 a UN report stated:

... how population size and growth, environmental change and development interact on each other is not well established. [UN, Population, Environment, and Development: The Concise Report (2001) emphasis added]
The conclusions of this report still ring true, and all the more so for migration and population distribution.

3. Some illustrative Results
Although the intention here is to avoid a research paper, I take the liberty of drawing on a few empirical findings from my fieldwork in coastal Ghana to illustrate a few of these items. That project [see http://www.pstc.brown.edu/ghanai/index.htm] was conceptualized to look at the relationship between urbanization (including migration and population density) and the environment. Coastal areas are of interest, because they are generally increasing in population and economic activity, potentially threatening sensitive ecosystems (Hunter, 2000). Internal rural-urban migration is implicated in these changes, and a better understanding of its determinants, both economic and social could help with the development of policies of coastal resource management (Bilsborrow and DeLargy, 1991; Curran et al., 2002).

The key environmental variable of interest to our multidisciplinary international research team was water, both coastal lagoon water bodies and household drinking water. Of course we were interested in any contamination of water bodies. The coastal lagoons represent a very important economic and natural resource. One expectation our project could test was whether urbanization was associated with deteriorating water quality. While the initial expectation might be a simple and obvious positive association with urbanization (watershed population density) and pollution, the argument made above suggests that such tight and automatic relationships between overall population and environmental outcomes might be questioned.

What did we find? In fact our group did find an association between population density in the watershed and nutrient loading (Nixon et al., 2007). The solid circles of Figure 1 below and the fitted line shows the relationship.
Figure 1: Mean annual concentrations of dissolved inorganic nitrogen in the coastal lagoons of Ghana (solid circles) and some coastal lagoons on the Atlantic coast of the US (open symbols, X, and +) as a function of population density in the watershed. Source: Nixon et al., 2007.

There is more, however. If we add to the chart some data for US Atlantic Coast lagoons (background data available to my colleagues), the relationship weakens visually and disappears statistically. Our unsurprising interpretation is that high income societies can put more resources into various kinds of pollution control (in this case treatment of human waste figures prominently), and therefore, the density-pollution relationship begins to weaken. But there is even more than this. The identified Muni point indicates a Ghanaian lagoon that was set aside as a protected wetland under the international Ramsar treaty. This level of impact, lower than predicted by population density in the watershed, points to something about institutions, regulation, and capacity, something to which I will return in my final section. Before leaving this study, let me note that we examined many other parameters, and while the full picture has more detail, our overall conclusion is as I have represented it here.

Permit me to take another example from this same project. This one focuses more directly on migration and local environmental attitudes. Our project conducted a household based survey in the study region. In a random sample of adults, we gathered information about demographic traits, household behaviors, knowledge about health, and environmental attitudes. This last included a question about the trade-off between environmental preservation and economic growth. We used a regression analysis to predict the likelihood...
the respondent expressed a preference for environmental preservation. Figure 2 below presents a graphical summary of these results, with the height of bars above 1.0 indicating more environmental sentiment, and the shortfall beneath 1.0 indicating economic growth sentiment.

Figure 2: Logit regression model; Response “yes” to “environment is a priority” over economic growth; N=2209 persons >=18yrs; white bars indicate statistically significant at p<0.05; SES effect is 3units*coeff.; Age effect 10*coeff; others 1 unit. Standard Errors adjusted for household clustering. Source: White & Hunter, 2005.

Omitting some of the analytical detail, one noteworthy finding is that migrants (the complementary fraction to “lifetime” residents depicted in Figure 1) are, if anything, more likely to express the view that environment is a priority. The argument that migrants are “detached” or alienated from the local natural environment does not find much support here. Our own assessment is that local long-term residents may, in fact, be keener to see local resource exploitation for their own livelihoods. (We are now trying to understand more about these views from a companion textual analysis of in-depth interviews.) Whatever the ultimate explanation, these results again show us that initial assumptions and predictions might not always hold.

4. Conclusions: Migration, Environment, and Policy
Policy is crucial, problematic, and accessible in the case of Migration (or Population Distribution) and the Environment. To be sure, policy intervention at several scales is necessary for environmental protection and amelioration. The global-to-local discussions underway now all suggest various policy interventions: carbon tax, eliminating or reducing release of certain noxious compounds into the atmosphere, regulating the fleet of vehicles on the road, stepping up land use regulations.
Migration (again more broadly population distribution and redistribution) is both intriguing and problematic in the policy arena. Catherine Marquette sets out the issue rather well across multiple scales:

Policy makers often reflect a sedentary bias towards migration from rural areas in developing countries. They see these flows as an exceptional response, a ‘last resort,’ or a ‘survival strategy’ for individuals or households in the face of no alternative. In receiving countries in Europe and North America, this negative view of rural migration drives evermore restrictive migration policies and, ultimately, the irregular migration, which goes with it. In developing countries from where migrants originate, this sedentary view of migration results in an emphasis on stay-at-home or rural growth-linkage policies, which see development as an important deterrent to migration. [Marquette, 2007]

Plenty of policy-makers, in both developed and developing countries, see migration as something to be reduced, slowed, or even stopped. Yet, that is not likely to be a productive strategy. In most settings there is limited opportunity or capacity to slow migration. The relatively unfettered irregular migration of the “floating population” of China offers just the single largest and most visible example of the challenge of regulating migration when growth is desirable in a globalizing economy. Many other such streams of human movement exist, within and across national borders.

Migration and more generally population redistribution is linked to economic growth and development. There is really very little question about that. Despite policy concerns migrants are most often acting in their own best interests, and the redistribution of population comes alongside economic growth (National Research Council, 2003; White and Lindstrom, 2005). Ironically, the bigger problem might occur when migration and urbanization are not linked to economic growth. Such a view was raised a few years ago in the *World Bank Development Report*: “Cities in Africa are not serving as engines of growth and structural transformation” (World Bank, 2000a).

With respect to urbanization policy, such a view may align with that of Bloom and coauthors (2008). They acknowledge the concomitancy of urbanization and economic growth, but they are quite reserved about any claim that urbanization is a causal agent, and they do not see a pro- or anti-urbanization (read also migration) policy as influencing economic development. The further effects of such policies on environmental issues
associated with population redistribution (and economic growth) remains to be seen. Thus,

From a policy point of view it may be best to be relatively neutral to population movement per se, and work harder at responding to it, both socially and environmentally

Migration brings population redistribution, and here taps a more productive and perhaps more crucial arena for addressing the consequences of human-ecosystem interaction. My suggestion for analysts and policymakers is to work much harder at unpacking the population-environment link: understand the components and their individual effects. Above I expressed some skepticism about the universality and size of the P\(\rightarrow\)E relationship: How large is \(\beta\) after all? Might it be close to zero? Does it change with circumstances? The same goes for migration. Since migration and population redistribution are associated with economic growth, the more productive policy route might be to understand (a) more specific links between population distribution and the environment; and (b) how best to respond to migration, urbanization, and settlement patterns so as to minimize impact on the environment.

The Environmental Kuznets Curve (EKC) might be offered as a \textit{deus ex machina} for environmental problems. Under the EKC scenario, economic growth can eventually lead to environmentally beneficial behaviors, because the environment is a superior good. Whether time is sufficient for the EKC to play out as contemporary LDC’s catch up to MDC’s is a difficult and extraordinarily consequential issue. Even more, as the research stock about the EKC builds, there are attendant questions about how universally applicable it might be. That is, some pollution trajectories might not follow the EKC scenario at all. Thus,

\textit{Scholars must do the work to help policy-makers know what paths to environmental amelioration require the most intervention and what paths are relatively self-correcting.}

If people are going to move anyway, what might policy-makers do, and how might research help? For example, one claim is that migrants are less engaged in the local community and less protective of natural resources. This deserves direct and systematic examination. Institutional factors need to be addressed when one takes up issues of the commons (Dietz et al, 2003; Ostrom et al 1999). I suggest that thinking about institutional forces that promote, restrain, redirect, and organize population distribution and redistribution would pay significant dividends. While much migration is economic rational and market driven, there may also be externalities in the consequences of choices in redistribution and land settlement.
Finally, migration does bring with it alterations in the settlement system. Urbanization is quickly invoked for a host of ills (Cincotta et al, 2002), and patterns of human settlement figure prominently in considerations environmental impact. Within the environmental realm, it is Land Use Land Cover (LULC) that stands to be most directly affected by migration and urban development. Thus,

*Research on the relationship between urbanization and environmental outcomes – at multiple scales – would do much to advance the state of knowledge about PÆE relationships.*

Here I am required to genuflect to the researcher’s concern for more and better data. Often such commentary is self-serving, even gratuitous. To be sure, here in the case of migration, population distribution and the environment, such a criticism may be again advanced. I would like to suggest, however, that scholars and analysts do have a fairly good handle on major research questions and component analytical tools. We need to unite environmental and demographic data at multiple and detailed temporal and geographic scales to make progress. That is a big challenge. I hope the day arrives soon. Progress will follow for science and policy.

Where do we end up? My overall argument is that the consequences of migration – and more generally urbanization and population distribution – are crucial to environmental health of the 21st century. There is much cause for optimism: social and natural scientists of many sub-disciplines are speaking to one another; better data are being collected, and research is beginning to emerge. Migration and population re-settlement in a world of over six billion humans present enormous challenges, but challenges that can be met, as long as policy keeps up with knowledge.

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Migration, Development and Environment

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**SSRC Migration & Development Conference Paper No. 9**

**Introduction**

Environment and international migration and their relationship with development are among the most pressing issues on the contemporary global agenda. They have been the focus of major international attention in the last year with the release of the Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC 2007) and the holding of the first Global Forum on Migration and Development in Belgium in July. Despite the enhanced profile of environment and migration and their relationship with development, little of this increased attention has been concerned with the complex and multidirectional relationships between them.

In both research and policy, environment and international migration’s linkages with economic development have evolved separately. Yet it is apparent that their interrelationships are of considerable significance for understanding social, economic and environmental change and for developing effective interventions to reduce poverty and move toward sustainability.

Migration on a permanent or temporary basis has always been one of the most important survival strategies adopted by people in the face of natural or human caused disasters. However, our knowledge of the complex two-way relationship involving environmental change as both a cause and consequence of migration remains limited. Moreover, how migration and environmental concerns interact and impinge upon economic development, social change, and conflict is little understood. In a context where global environmental stress and degradation have accelerated and unprecedented numbers of the world’s population are seeing migration as an option, the need for research in this area is considerable.

Historically, the vast bulk of migration caused by environmental change has occurred within national boundaries, as have the environmental effects resulting from population movements. The international dimensions of this relationship have been neglected until recently. Moreover, it is argued here that this dimension is of increasing scale and significance in concert with the accelerating pace of globalization processes. Accordingly, the present paper focuses upon international migration occurring as a result of environmental changes and processes and the implications of increasing levels of population movement between countries for the environment and development. We
begin with a brief review of some attempts to conceptualise environment-related migration and then consider the extent to which environmental factors have been, and are likely to be, significant in initiating international migration. This is attempted through a consideration of the environment as both a direct and contributory factor in causing such migration, especially south-north international migration. Four types of ‘environmental migration’ are identified – migration induced by environmental disasters, that caused by environmental degradation, migration and climate change and movement forced by environmental change caused by large scale projects. Attention is then focused on migration as an independent variable in the migration-environment relationship, and the environmental consequences of international population movements are discussed. The implications of these relationships for economic development and poverty reduction are then discussed. Finally, some of the ethical and policy dimensions of emerging international migration-environment-development trends and processes are addressed.

The lack of research on the migration-environment-development interface is undoubtedly partly due to the fact that migration and environmental scholars work separately, rarely working in genuinely interdisciplinary teams on cross-disciplinary projects. As a result there is a neglect of environmental issues in such important documents as the report of the Global Commission on International Migration (GCIM 2005) and of migration issues in documents like the Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (2007). In the absence of serious interdisciplinary research efforts there are unsubstantiated claims by interest groups and the popular media of the scale of the impacts of environment population interactions.

Conceptualising the Relationship between Migration, Environment and Development

It is an underlying premise of this paper that there are not only complex two way interrelationships between migration and development on the one hand and environment and development on the other but also, as the starting point for discussions of relationship between migration and the environment is usually the formulations that link population processes generally (of which migration is one) with environmental change. Here the simple equation developed by Erlich and Erlich (1990):

\[
\text{Environment Impact (I)} = \text{Population Size (P)} \times \text{Affluence (A)} \times \text{Technology (T)}
\]

where (P) = the number of people or population size
(A) = the affluence of each individual or per capita consumption of goods and services
(T) = technology or quality of resources consumed and pollution generated during production and consumption of goods and resources (Green, Rinehart and Goldstein 1992, 3)

Figure 1 shows, significant interlinkages between migration and development.

**Figure 1: A Complex Interrelationship: Migration, Environment, Resources and Development**

While this is a highly simplified expression of a complex relationship, migration clearly fits in as one of the key processes influencing changing population size and distribution within and between countries. Migration has been explicitly included in the elaboration of the basic I = PAT equation in. This is an attempt ‘to identify or speculate on how population variables affect and are affected by the environment and how intervening factors or polices and measures could be introduced to cope with environmental as well as population problems’ (United Nations ESCAP 1989). Moreover it also explicitly links population and environmental processes to development levels and wellbeing.
Nevertheless, in the population literature on linkages with the environment (e.g. Green, Richard and Goldstein 1992; UNFPA 1991) most attention focuses on population per se and if the processes which influence population size and growth are explicitly taken into account at all, it is fertility which is considered. One of the few frameworks which explicitly mentions the role of migration is reproduced in Figure 3 and was developed by the UNFPA (1991). Here two types of migration are seen as being significant. Firstly migration is seen as being both a cause and consequence of environmental pressure although the example given is of environmentally induced migration reflecting the much greater concentration in the literature on environmental change causing migration while migration impact on the environment is little considered. It is interesting though that Figure 2 sees migration as being an important external influence on the environment and development through ‘brain drain’. This is referring to the fact that the loss of skilled people from any area can have detrimental effect on both development and the environment.
Another common starting point for examining the population and environment relationship is the carrying capacity concept which was originally developed to apply to animal populations. Stated most simply it is the ‘maximum number of individuals in a particular species that can be indefinitely supported by the resources in a particular area’ (Meagher 1991, p. 55). In most animal contexts the carrying capacity will be determined by the amount of food available, the number of predators and the rate at which the environment can replace the resources which are used by the population. Figure 4 presents a simple model whereby the numbers of animals in a particular area increases initially slowly, but then quickly, as it approaches the carrying capacity, and thereafter will fluctuate above and below that carrying capacity. However, if the resources cannot be replaced or renewed by the environment at a sufficient rate there will be environmental deterioration and the carrying capacity of that environment will decline. Accordingly, there is outmigration and increased mortality and the population will begin to fall as Figure 2 indicates. Hence a population cannot increase its size ad infinitum and finite environmental resources place an upper limit on the growth of population. Moreover, there is an implication that if the resources are over-exploited their capacity to renew will be reduced and the carrying capacity will fall. A fall in carrying capacity will be accompanied by a decline in the population due mainly to environmentally induced outmigration.
There have been attempts to extend this concept to apply to humans as well as other species. A region’s human carrying capacity has been defined as ‘the estimated maximum number of people who can live there indefinitely and be given the opportunity to live long, healthy, self-fulfilling lives’ (Cocks and Foran 1995, 67). However, there are at least two ways in which people differ from other species when considering the carrying capacity concept. Firstly, human beings have the capacity to innovate and use technology which animals do not so they have the capacity to redefine upward the limits imposed by carrying capacity (Boserup 1965). On the other hand, the actions of animals can only maintain or diminish a resource (e.g. in the case of overgrazing). Hence as Figure 6 indicates, population growth may be associated with an upward redefinition of the carrying capacity because population pressure may be a stimulus for, or be associated with, a redefinition of the resource base due to innovation. Of course people too, like animals, can be the cause of a downward change in the carrying capacity if they ‘overgraze’ and human actions can lead to deterioration in the resource base.
A second important difference about including humans in the carrying capacity concept is that whereas for animals it is possible to determine an upper limit on numbers by the area’s capacity to provide sufficient food and water to sustain that number of animals this is not the case for people. Human populations need and use a much wider range of resources from the environment than food and water.

A great deal of difficulty has been experienced in operationalising the carrying capacity concept for human populations in particular areas. For example, the development of transportation systems allows resources to be sent from areas of ‘surplus’ to areas of ‘deficit’, innovations are constantly making resources out of new elements in the environment and it is clearly a value judgement as to what levels of consumption are to be used in fixing the carrying capacity. Accordingly it seems unlikely that a quantitative definition of the human carrying capacity which is agreed upon by a majority of analysts or commentators can be produced for the human population of a region. Nevertheless, the human carrying capacity is a device which has been of considerable usefulness in drawing attention to the finite limits of the environment in regions, the pressures placed upon resources by population growth and unsustainable use of the environment and drawing out important implications for resource use and environment policy.
Where does migration fit into this framework?
- Countries and regions with abundant and valued environmental attributes and resources will attract immigration (and immigration).
- Immigration (and immigration) into an area can potentially increase the pressure placed by population on regional environments.
- Deterioration of environments can cause outmigration (and emigration) from an area.

Before we examine in some detail environment:migration interrelationships and their implications for development there are a number of generalisations which can be drawn from the limited literature on migration and environment (Hugo 1996):
- Whereas in the past the migration destination options for environmental migrants have overwhelmingly been to move within their country of origin, international destinations are of increasing significance.
- Most migration which is environmentally induced occurs within nations as internal rather than international migration.
- Migration as both a cause and consequence of environmental change occurs predominantly in poorer, less developed countries.
- The scale and pace of environmental change has accelerated so environmentally influenced migration is also increasing.

Environment as a Cause of Migration

In the literature on migration and environment the focus of research has clearly been an environmental change as a cause of migration rather than a consequence. Yet the concept of environmental induced migration remains a contested one (Black 2001; Castles 2002). Castles (2002) suggests that there are three major elements in the debate on environmentally induced migration:

- A debate over the terminology and definition of ‘environmental refugee’ (Hinnawi 1995; Jacobsen 1988).
- Can environmental factors be recognised as a root cause of migration?
- Who will provide protection for environmentally displaced people?

Fundamental to the consideration of environment as a cause of migration is the distinction which is conventionally recognised in migration study between forced and unforced migration (Fairchild 1925; Peterson 1958). However, the
distinction between voluntary and involuntary migration is not as clear cut as it would appear at first glance. As Speare (1974, 89) points out:

‘In the strictest sense migration can be considered to be involuntary only when a person is physically transported from a country and has no opportunity to escape from those transporting him. Movement under threat, even the immediate threat to life, contains a voluntary element, as long as there is an option to escape to another part of the country, go into hiding or to remain and hope to avoid persecution.’

On the other hand some scholars of migration argue that much of the population mobility which is conventionally seen as being voluntary occurs in situations which in fact the migrants have little or no choice. Amin (1974, 100), for example, in his discussion of migration in Western Africa states that:

‘A comparative costs and benefits analysis, conducted at the individual level of the migrant, has no significance. In fact it only gives the appearance of objective rationality to a ‘choice’ (that of the migrant) which in reality does not exist because, in a given system, he (sic) has no alternatives.’

Indeed the early typology developed by Peterson recognised this degree of overlap between voluntary and involuntary movement and distinguished an intermediate category. He differentiated between ‘... impelled migration when the migrants retain some power to decide whether or not to leave and forced migration when they do not have this power’ (Peterson 1958, 261). These, in turn, are separated from free migration in which the will of the migrants is the decisive element initiating movement.

Population mobility is probably best viewed as being arranged along a continuum ranging from totally voluntary migration, in which the choice and will of the migrants is the overwhelmingly decisive element encouraging people to move, to totally forced migration, where the migrants are faced with death if they remain in their present place of residence. The extremes in fact rarely occur, and most mobility is located along the continuum. Environmentally induced migration is concerned with moves toward the forced end of this continuum.

There is also some diversity in the literature with respect to the particular types of involuntary migration which can be identified. Much of this centres around the issue of defining the term ‘refugee’: While the term refugee migration in some cases is used as a synonym for involuntary migration, others apply it only to a very restricted subset of all such movements. The
1967 United Nations Protocol on Refugees considers a refugee as ‘every person who, owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country’ (Keely 1981, 6). However, this has been modified and extended in practice by both the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) and individual Third World countries and regions. Nobel (1985, 44), after an exhaustive discussion of contemporary refugee determination in Third World countries concludes that the common elements can be listed as follows:

(1) Cases of well-founded fear of being persecuted for any of the reasons mentioned in the Geneva Convention and/or the Statute for the Office of UNHCR.
(2) Cases where lives, safety and freedom are threatened by events seriously disturbing public orders like external aggression, occupation, foreign domination, massive violations of human rights or generalised violence in the whole or part of the country of origin.

This definition, however, still only recognises migrants who are forced to move because of political pressures or conflicts. Other commentators have adopted wider definitions of refugee and forced migrations. A good example of such a definition is that provided by Olson (1979, 130).

‘Refugees differ from other, spontaneous or sponsored migrants, largely in the circumstances of their movement out of one area to another, and the effects these have on them in the settlement and adjustment phases of their relocation. Refugees are forced to leave their homes because of a change in their environment which makes it impossible to continue life as they have known it. They are coerced by an external force to leave their homes and go elsewhere.’

This definition stresses the involuntary, forced nature of the move, the ‘uprooting’ suddenness of most refugee moves and the externality to the mover of the force or forces impelling the move. It also implies a substantial degree of powerlessness among the movers in the decision to move and selection of destination. There is no consideration in this definition of the distance the refugees move or whether or not they cross an international boundary, although Olson points out ‘these spatial factors do affect refugees’ adjustment after flight.’ This definition is clearly more holistic and sees refugee moves as a subset of all population mobility rather than of international migration.
Olson’s definition is also broader than that of the UNHCR with respect to the nature of the external force or forces, the threat or presence of which impels refugee movements. Again the UNHCR definition is somewhat restrictive in that it refers only to persecution or fear of persecution, as initiating refugee movement. She identifies a number of ‘external compulsions’ which can alone or in concert create refugees and these include ‘physical dangers’.

There would seem to be a case for identifying environmentally displaced migrants as a meaningful and relevant category from both academic and policy perspectives despite its conceptual fuzziness (Castles 2002). This is for at least two reasons:

- Manifestly environmental factors are an important trigger for migration and the reality of its widespread occurrence cannot be questioned.
- The people displaced often are drawn from the poor and they are in urgent need of support and assistance.

However although the term ‘environmental refugee’ has gained wide currency, given the specific legal connotations of the term refugee in international and national discourse it would seem more appropriate to refer to them as environmental migrants.

We will now consider some of the major trends and issues with respect to environmentally induced migration. There are four major types of such migration. Most obvious are those sudden flows of people responding to an environmental disaster. However environmental degradation, while more gradual, forms an important second type of environment migration. Thirdly climate change which creates changes in environmental conditions in particular areas is increasingly being recognised as a significant cause of environmental migration. The final type of environmental migration also is a response to change in local and regional environments but in this case the cause of displacement is the construction of a ‘mega project’. While each of these types of environmentally induced migration is quite distinct there are instances where they are interrelated. This is an area where many estimates of the numbers of environmentally displaced migrants are made without substantiation and must be approached carefully.

1. Environmental Disaster and Migration
   The most dramatic environmentally induced migrations occur in response to the onset (or fear) of a natural calamity or disaster – floods, earthquakes, volcanic eruptions, tsunami etc. While the cause of such migration would seem obviously environmental there can be very important social dimensions to such movement. Poorer countries and groups can be at a disadvantage
because they do not have the resources to put in place sophisticated warning systems or to fund a rapid, planned, well provisioned flight from the disaster and to subsequently assist the victims to recover. Moreover some natural disasters may have their root causes in long term political, social, economic or agricultural policies which have disturbed environmental balance. The UNHCR (2006, 27) quotes the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies as estimating that:

‘... the total number of people affected by natural disasters has tripled over the past decade to 2 billion people, with the accumulated impact of national disasters resulting in an average of 211 million people directly affected each year. This is approximately five times the number of people thought to have been affected by conflict over the past decade.’

Hence the scale of the impact of environmental disasters is massive, although how far this translates to displacement migration is not known as is what proportion of that movement crosses international boundaries.

Naik, Stigter and Laczko (2007) have pointed out that the nexus between migration, development and natural disasters remains uncharted territory among policy makers and researchers and Table 1 presents their typology of how these issues interact. This shows how (Naik, Stigter and Laczko 2007, 14-15):

- Migration can be both positive and negative in its effects on development; it can foster disaster preparedness through improved resilience and help support recovery once a disaster has occurred.

- Development can both inhibit or encourage migration, lack of economic opportunities can foster migration but some resources are required because the poorest of a society generally don’t move.

- Natural disasters may lead to increased outmigration if areas become economically and socially moribund in the aftermath of the crises but they can also draw inmigrants to provide support and new migrants in search of work in the reconstruction effort.
Table 1: Overview of Linkages Between Migration, Development and Natural Disasters

Source: Naik, Stigter and Laczko 2007, pp. 13-14

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Migration</th>
<th>Development</th>
<th>Natural Disasters</th>
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| - Migration can support development, e.g. through remittances, in-kind support, return of qualified nationals.
- Migration can undermine development, e.g. brain drain. | - Migration, by promoting or undermining development, can lessen or exacerbate the effect of natural disasters.
- Migration, through remittances and support from migrants abroad, can aid recovery and re-development after natural disasters. | |

Development
- Under-development can increase the prospects of migration as people leave in search of economic and other opportunities.
- A certain level of development is required to enable migration to occur, as some minimum assets are needed to migrate and often the poorest in society are not able to leave.
- Development can decrease the impact of natural disasters on affected areas/communities by enabling greater resilience and protection.

Natural Disasters
- Natural disasters can undermine economic/social prospects of the affected area and lead to emigration.
- Natural disasters may also lead to migration into the affected area by relatives/families of those affected or migrants in search of work in reconstruction.
- Natural disasters undermine development, at least of individuals and communities affected, and sometimes at the national level if the disasters are particularly large in scale and/or recurrent in nature making it difficult for countries to continually absorb shocks successfully.

In recent times there has been no natural disaster that has had as great an impact as the Asian Tsunami of December 2004 which killed 298,055 people in 12 Asian and African countries surrounding the Indian Ocean (Asia Monitor, 16, 3 March 2005) and left some 5 million people in immediate need for assistance (UNHCR 2006, 21). Estimates of the numbers of persons displaced vary between over 1 million (UNHCR 2006, 21) to over 2 million (AidWatch 2006). In Sri Lanka 450,000 were forced to move in the aftermath of the Tsunami (Yin 2006). In Indonesia, in the province of Aceh, there were
533,000 IDPs (Internally Displaced Persons) at the end of 2004 (Yin 2006) and in the Aceh census of 2005 there were still 203,817 IDPs. Overwhelmingly the people forced to move by the Tsunami moved to other locations within the region they previously lived in although some travelled longer distances to stay with relatives. The connections with international migration have been explored by Laczko and Collett (2005) who concluded that:

- Diaspora of migrants from the areas hit by the Tsunami quickly mobilised to send money and supplies back and lobbied destination governments to provide support.
- In some cases (e.g. Thailand) migrant workers were among the victims of the Tsunami.
- Deportations of undocumented migrants back to the affected areas were delayed.
- Displacement may result in people being more likely to migrate in the future.

Naik, Stigter and Laczko (2007) have examined in some detail the migration dimensions of the Tsunami including:

- Migrants in Tsunami Effected Countries. They show that the Tsunami further aggravated the precarious legal and socioeconomic position of Myanmarese (Burmese) migrants in Thailand.
- Migrants from Tsunami Affected Countries. Migrants from origins affected by the Tsunami can be placed in a vulnerable position by the disaster.
- Migration Out of Affected Areas. This is an expected response and in the Tsunami affected areas the only evidence of increased emigration abroad was in Sri Lanka.
- Migration Into Affected Areas. Relatives moved in to assist families, some moved in to assist with reconstruction.
- Trafficking. Natural disasters increase the risk of trafficking or economic opportunities and social support mechanisms become stretched or completely disintegrate.
- Diaspora Response to Natural Disaster. Remittances were an important form of assistance to victims of the Tsunami. Diaspora also sent skilled labour and in-kind support and assisted in mobilising external support.

The massive scale of displacement, not to mention the tragedy of loss of life and prosperity ‘sparked an extraordinary mobilisation of resources. Governments, private citizens and corporations, NGOs in the effected countries and beyond were quick to respond with offers of money, supplies
and manpower’ (UNHCR 2006, 21). However it also bought into sharp relief the need for an international agency to respond to environmental migration. The UNHCR (2006, 21) found that a range of protection concerns were identified in the aftermath of the Tsunami including access to assistance, enforced relocation, sexual gender based violence, safe and voluntary return, loss of documentation and restitution of property. In addition problems of camp management and providing shelter, water sanitation to IDPs and problems of coordination between agencies were identified. Many of these issues are similar to those which the UNHCR confronts in dealing with forced displacement caused by conflict and persecution. However there would seem to be a case for a separate organisation to cope in a timely and effective way with the growing problem of environmentally displaced persons.

There is a consensus that the number of environmental disasters are increasing in incidence and that the extent of resultant environmental displacement is also increasing. Lackzo and Collett (2005) quote the International Red Cross and Red Crescent’s *World Disasters Report 2002* as saying that the number of people affected by weather related disasters rose from 275,000 in the 1970s to 1.2 million in the 1980s and 18 million in the 1990s. The UNHCR (2006, 28) agrees that there has been an escalation in the numbers affected by environmental disasters but argues that this is due more to rising vulnerability to hazards than to an increase in the frequency of hazards *per se*.

### 2. Environmental Degradation and Migration

While the occurrence of a disastrous environmental event is a significant and increasingly important cause of environmentally induced migration, more migration occurs due to less dramatic, gradual, deterioration of environments. It is not sufficient to consider the migration-environment relationship only in terms of migration induced as a response to the occurrence of particular environmental events. As Suhrke (1992, 5) points out:

‘From a broader development perspective, environmental degradation appears as a proximate cause of migration. The underlying causes are found in increasing population pressures on land and the patterns of resource use. Demography and political economy, in other words, are most salient causal factors. Yet these obviously interact in critical ways with specific environmental variables. Sometimes the result is stress of a kind that leads to massive outmigration. But to understand why, it is necessary to focus on the broader development process.’

Similarly, Richmond (1993, 8) argues:
‘... when environmental degradation leads to migration it is generally as a proximate cause linked to questions of economic growth, poverty, population pressure, and political conflict.’

Bilsborrow (1991), in his case studies of Indonesia, Guatemala, and Sudan, depicts environmental degradation as one of a cluster of causes of outmigration. He suggests that environmental changes induced migration through their ‘social’ effects by:

1. reducing income;
2. increasing the risk of income reduction in the future;
3. making the environment less healthy.

Environmental degradation occurs when population growth exceeds the land’s carrying capacity such that there is deterioration in natural resources. Population pressure, especially in LDCs, can lead to extension of settlement into ecologically fragile areas which are particularly vulnerable to degradation. Since the environmental change is not as sudden as a catastrophic environmental disaster, its impacts often go unnoticed. Spitz (1978) characterises the impact of drought, famine and the progressive onset of food shortage associated with the gradual degradation of environments as ‘silent violence’.

The process of desertification whereby deserts are extending into arable areas especially in Africa, Asia and Latin America has been a major cause of outmigration. These environmentally induced migrations are especially marked in Africa. As Jacobsen (1988, 11) has pointed out ...

‘Of all the continents, Africa, a land where poor soils and variable rainfall pose a harsh climate for agriculture, has spawned the most environmental refugees. Most came from the Sahel, a belt that spans several agro-ecological zones and stretches west to east across some nine countries from Mauritania and Senegal on into the Sudan. Desertification is accelerating in the Sahel, the world’s largest area threatened by the wholesale loss of arable land.’

The droughts of 1968-1973 and 1982-1984 led to millions of environmental refugees. In the first of these, there were a million environmental refugees in Burkina Faso alone. In a review of migration resulting from desertification and droughts in LDCs, Leighton (2006) showed that remittances from migrants are an important coping mechanism for communities under environmental pressure.

There are however some critics such as Black (2001, 5) who have questioned
the impact of desertification on environmental migration in the Sahel. He claims ... ‘the evidence for desertification causing migration in any straightforward way is somewhat limited. First, it is important to note that the concept of desertification itself has come under fire in recent years, particularly as availability of satellite images of the region has improved. Thus the work of Dregne and Tucker (1988) has shown a highly elastic response of vegetation cover to growing season rainfall with the desert margin of the Sahel fluctuating from year to year as a result’.

Some of the most substantial migrations induced by environmental deterioration have occurred in China. Figure 7 shows that extensive areas of China have been classified as ‘Ecologically Fragile Zones’ (EFZs) which are environments with little resistance to external disturbance, are unstable and sensitive to population pressure and have a low capacity to support human settlement (Tan 2008a). West China in particular is experiencing severe environmental degradation associated with soil erosion desertification, deforestation, water shortage, degradation of grasslands, overgrazing and the impact of mining activity. Bao (2006) estimates that in 2004, 2.94 million km² of West China was suffering from social erosion – 82.6 percent of the entire eroded area in China.

**Figure 7: Distribution of the Ecologically Fragile Zones in China**

Source: Modified from Zhao (1999, 24), Tan 2008a

![Map of China with Ecologically Fragile Zones](image)

Yan (2008a) has explained that the Chinese government has encouraged environmental migration out of the EFZ in West China as a strategy to relieve pressure on the environment, rehabilitate the deteriorating ecosystem and eradicating poverty in that region. She explains that some early attempts at resettling environmental migrants occurred in the provinces of Ningxia, Yunnan, Guizhou and Inner Mongolia but up to 2002 no direct compensation was given to the people who move. In 2002 environment related migration and resettlement became an official policy of the Central Government. There was a plan to displace some 7 million environmental refugees over the next decade. It is estimated that 1.02 million environmental migrants were displaced from the fragile environments in West China between 2000 and 2005.

Richmond (1993) recognises that certain contexts are more susceptible to environmental disruptions likely to force outmigration than others. These, for example, would include: ecologically fragile ecosystems which, when subject to excessive cropping, forest removal or other human use impacts, become less productive areas at high risk of natural disaster – earthquake zones, low lying areas subject to inundation etc.; marginal agricultural or pastoral areas subject to frequent drought; and areas of poverty where the residents do not have the accumulated reserves to prevent, ameliorate, or cope with the onset of a natural disaster. Hence, the predisposing factors for environmental migration can be environmental but also are related to population pressure upon natural resources, the way in which the environment is being exploited by people, and the wealth of the occupants of the area. In general, these predisposing conditions are more likely to occur in less developed than in more developed countries.

Environmentally induced migration is likely to be precipitated by a particular environment-related event which effectively forces people to move. Table 1 is a list of factors identified by Richmond (1993) as being likely to precipitate reactive migration which has direct or indirect environmental implications. He stresses that these factors are not independent of one another. Whether or not an event-producing disruption to the environment actually produces migration, however, is partly influenced by the predisposing conditions mentioned earlier. It also will be shaped by a range of constraints and facilitators to migration which exert in the area affected. These include the existence or lack of escape routes not only in the form of transport networks but also kinship and social networks which mean that some environmental migrants can move to an area where they have relatives and friends who can support them. The presence of such networks undoubtedly acts as a facilitator to such movement while their absence would constrain movement.
Table 2: Topology of Environmentally Related Disasters Likely to Precipitate Migration
Source: Richmond 1993

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Naturally Induced Disasters (NIDs)</th>
<th>Technologically Induced Disasters (TIDs)</th>
<th>Economically Induced Disasters (EIDs)</th>
<th>Politically Induced Disasters (PIDs)</th>
<th>Socially Induced Disasters (SIDs)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hurricanes</td>
<td>Tornados</td>
<td>Whirlwinds</td>
<td></td>
<td>Animal Rights Activism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Earthquakes</td>
<td>Volcanic Eruptions</td>
<td>Avalanches</td>
<td></td>
<td>Green Crusaders</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Floods (freshwater)</td>
<td>Floods (saltwater)</td>
<td>Hail and Snow Storms</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fires</td>
<td>Electric Storms</td>
<td>Lightening</td>
<td></td>
<td>Excommunication</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Droughts</td>
<td>Faminies</td>
<td>Plagues</td>
<td></td>
<td>Jihad</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Class War</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Richmond (1993) stresses the importance of feedback effects in consideration of environmentally induced migration. The migration itself may have positive effects on the origin area through reduction of pressure of population on the local environment and hence reduce the likelihood of the occurrence of an environmental disaster. Similarly, environmental policies introduced as a result of those disasters may influence migration. Hence, in Indonesia the erosion of uplands causing flooding and salutation in lowlands has resulted in a policy of sedentarisation whereby people who have practiced a type of slash and burn, shifting cultivation in the upland areas have been resettled in

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sedentary agricultural communities in lowland areas. This has affected some 4 million people (Hugo 1988).

There are a number of developments in contemporary less developed countries (LDCs) which have exacerbated the predisposing conditions and increased the incidence of precipitating events for environmentally induced migration (Hugo 1996, 115-117).

- Population growth has continued to increase pressure on agricultural land although significant fertility declines have occurred in Asia and Latin America and in limited parts of Africa. This has forced more people to settle in and cultivate marginal areas, making them more subject to flooding, erosion, desertification and other environmental degradation.
- Fornos (1993, 6) argues that farmers in LDCs ... ‘were once able to grow crops in marginal lands by employing such methods as crop rotation, fallowing and terracing ... Population and economic pressures, however, have driven farmers throughout the developing world to use short cut methods that almost inevitably lead to long term land degradation’.
- Continuation of high incidence of poverty has meant that both individuals and nations have not the resources to initiate environmentally sustainable practices. For many there is a total preoccupation with survival which makes it difficult to produce environmental stewardship.
- Concerted efforts to increase food production through the green revolution have seen some spectacular increases in output, but often at the expense of environmental concerns. Hence, clearing practices, heavy use of fertilisers, herbicides and pesticides have all often had undesirable environmental outcomes.
- Many LDCs have liberalised their economies to encourage foreign investment, especially in manufacturing, and multinational companies have taken advantage of cheap labor to establish factories. In many cases environmental controls on such developments are less comprehensive than in more developed countries (MDCs) and certainly the policing of existing regulations is usually weaker so that environmental pollution from such activity can be considerable.
- In many LDCs the ability to enact legislation for environmental sustainability and to policy existing legislation is restricted by limited infrastructure and corruption. Accordingly, it is difficult to control deforestation, air pollution, water pollution, land degradation etc., in the face of increasing pressures on exploitation of the environment created by growing population, increasing involvement of foreign enterprises etc.
• Fragile ecological zones in many LDCs are often occupied by ethnic minorities who frequently are neglected by central governments so that ecological conditions can worsen because of a lack of resources from government to adopt more sustainable patterns of land use.

Most environmentally induced migration occurs within countries but there is increasing evidence that environmental degradation is influencing international migration. Togola (2006), for example, explains that people from Mali have been forced to migrate to other West African countries as well as overseas because of persistent droughts and desertification. It is estimated that two out of every three families in the Kayes region of Mali have a member of their household who has emigrated.

It is apparent that particular ecosystems, especially in LDCs, are particularly vulnerable to environmental degradation and subsequent environmentally induced outmigration. The Millennium Ecosystem Assessment (2005), for example, identifies the 2 billion people living in arid, semi-arid and sub-humid regions as being especially vulnerable to environmental degradation. In dry regions, Renaud et al. (2007, 24) note:

• Between 10 and 20 percent are already degraded.
• There is increasing pressure on dry land ecosystems.
• Climate change is increasing water scarcity which is already under water stress because the zone has only 8 percent of global renewable freshwater resources but a third of the global population.
• Droughts are becoming more frequent placing great stress on communities’ coping mechanisms.

Nepal is a country which has a long history of environmentally induced migration (KC 2003, Myers 1986). Shrestha and Bhandari (2005) examine changes in environmental security resulting from declining access to forestry resources due to deforestation as a major factor shaping labour migration. Their multinomial logistic regression analysis showed that, net of other factors, a decrease in access to forest resources increased the likelihood of migration for work of individuals regardless of destination, domestic and international.

With respect to environmental impacts on international migration Afifi and Warner (2007) develop a gravity model that assesses the impact of global migration factors on migration flows across 172 countries. Some 13 of the 26 independent variables employed are environmental. All of the environmental variables (except for floods which are suspected to cause internal displacements rather than international migration) were found to have a significant positive impact on migration flows. This would suggest that environmental degradation does have an impact on international migration.
In the examination of the impact of environmental degradation on population it is important to remember that migration is only one of the ways in which populations effected respond. It can be argued that there needs to be more attention paid to other responses, in particular in situ adaptations to the effects of environmental processes. This is of particular significance when considering the provision of assistance to population impacted by environmental degradation.

**Climate Change and Migration**

The release of the Stern Review (2006) and the report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (2007) has focused global attention on the issue of climate change and reflects the scientific consensus regarding the reality, urgency and significance of global climate change. The IPCC report makes frequent reference to the fact that climate change will have an influence on migration such as:

‘Stresses such as increased drought, water shortages and riverine and coastal flooding will attract many local and regional populations. This will lead in some cases to relocation within and between countries, exacerbating conflicts and imposing migration pressures’.

The report indicates that by 2080 between 1.1 and 3.2 billion people will be experiencing water scarcity, 200-600 million hunger and 2-7 million people per year coastal flooding. While no estimates are made of the number of likely numbers of environmentally displaced migrants the implication is clear that substantial movements will result. The Christian Aid Agency (2007) has estimated that there will be one billion people displaced by global warming by 2050. Myers (2002, 2005) estimated that 25 million people in 1995 had migrated with a possible doubling by 2010 and a potential of 200 million environmental migrants due to global warming later in the twenty-first century. There has been an estimate that the number of people displaced by climate change in China was 30 million (Lambert, 2002) but all of these estimates have little empirical basis. Indeed in the dramatic advance in understanding of climate change and its potential impact over the last decade a glaring gap has been analysis of the potential scale and impact of environmental migration (Christian Aid 2007).

There are a number of environmental changes associated with climate change and global warming which would be likely to induce environmental migration. These include rising sea levels, increased frequency of extreme weather events, decreased rainfall in some areas, increased rainfall in other areas, shifts in disease patterns due to changes in weather regimes and
temperature change. Most attention however has been focused on global warming and its inevitable effects (Hugo 1996):

- As high altitude tundra melts, CH4 would be released, increasing greenhouse warming which is already significant from greenhouse gas emissions.
- Increased freshwater runoff in high latitudes and reduced differentials in temperature between poles and equator could radically change ocean currents, leading to altered weather patterns.
- There could be a significant melting of the West Antarctic Ice Sheet, resulting in a sea level several metres higher than it is today.

While there is some debate it is anticipated that sea level may rise one metre by the year 2100\(^1\), affecting 360,000 km of coastline (Suhrke 1992). Since almost two-thirds of the world's population lives within 100 km of the coast and 30 of the world's 50 largest cities are located on the coast, the potential for population displacement from a significant rise in sea level is considerable. Indeed, some commentators have painted future scenarios of millions of people being forced to move by sea level changes (Gleick 1989; Kaplan 1994). A recent Australian report by CSIRO (Committee Scientific and Industrial Research Organisation) on climate change in the Asia-Pacific region concluded that ... ‘inundation of populated areas by rising seas may ultimately displace millions of individuals forcing intra- and interstate migration (Preston, Suppiah, Macadam and Bathols 2006, 4).

Particular attention has been focused on low lying islands in the Pacific and Indian oceans in discussions of the impact of rising sea levels. In particular there has been concern in the media as well as the scientific community for the future of coral atolls. Connell (2003, 91) summarises the impact as follows:

“The greenhouse effect thus has the potential to lead to reduced agricultural potential, a possible decline in marine biodiversity and stock, and a loss of important water, timber and firewood resources, thus reducing the potential of the few areas where coral atolls have some degree of self reliance’.

\(^1\) A more recent prediction (Houghton et al. 2001) projects the rise to be between 9 and 88 cm depending on emissions control.
Table 3: Potential Impacts of Climate Change on Atoll Countries
Source: Nurse and Sem 2001

- Potential loss of land area due to rising sea levels
- Shifts in species competition and composition
- Coral reefs, mangroves and seagrass adversely affected, with negative affect on reef fish populations
- Increased salinisation of soils in coastal margins
- Increasingly variable rainfall, with more intense drought events
- Increase in cyclone intensity with larger storm waves and more intense flooding events
- Adverse effects on staple crops due to changes in soil moisture, salinity and rainfall
- Decline in food security due to adverse effects on crops on declining reef fish populations
- Coastal erosion and changing climatic conditions may adversely affect tourism
- Adverse economic impacts through infrastructure damage from increased intensity of extreme events, coastal protection measures, and decline in tourism income
- Decline in human health through vector-borne diseases and enhanced food insecurity

The IPCC has concluded that ‘climate change induced sea level rise, sea surface warming, and increased frequency and intensity of extreme weather events puts at risk the long-term ability of humans to inhabit low lying atolls (Barnett and Adger 2003, 321).

Table 3 summarises the potential impacts of climate change on atoll countries. It is not just sea level rise which is the problem but projected increases in sea surface temperatures which threaten coral reefs ability to live and grow. Coral reef mortality prevents the reefs to grow to combat sea level rise (Barnett and Adger 2003, 325). Moreover atoll countries, because of their small size, isolation, low levels of income and poor physical infrastructure make atoll countries vulnerable to global economic forces as well as to climate change (Barnett and Adger 2003, 322).

It must be borne in mind that there is a great deal of uncertainty about historical and projected sea levels for islands in the Pacific and Indians oceans because of volatility and the shortness of historical records. However a recent review concludes there is a general consensus the sea levels in the region are rising and that its direct and indirect (e.g. increased frequency of extreme events) effects will cause serious problems for the inhabitants of some of the islands during the twenty-first century (Church, White and Hunter 2006, 166). The issue thus becomes what should the response to this
be? The atoll of Tuvalu in the Pacific Ocean has become a focus of the global discourse on this issue and a 'cause celebre' in the international media. Connell (2003, 102) has discussed how the international media have accentuated concerns over global warming and its impact on Tuvalu:

‘... their message is consistent and in accord with the worst fears of Tuvaluans. Moreover they have built upon each other in an almost continuous feedback loop; local fears and distant media perceptions accentuate and emphasise each other. There is no room for doubt’.

The Tuvaluan government has been very active in seeking compensation from and immigration opportunities in countries like Australia. Yet there are some who believe that (Connell 2003, 105):

‘Emotion, environmental degradation and politics have overwhelmed science. Crucially the emphasis that Tuvalu and others have given to the present impacts of sea level rise, and the need for imminent relocation, have diverted attention from the real need both to transform those policies in metropolitan states that continue to contribute to global warming and to develop appropriate environmental management policies within atoll states’.

Others too have pointed to how this ‘doomsday scenario’ has diverted attention away from the adaptation and mitigation strategies that are required to deal with the problems being faced by atoll countries (Farbotko 2005; Adger et al. 2003; Barnett 2001).

Some attention has been paid to the LECZ (Low Elevation Coastal Zone) – the continuous area along coasts that is less than 10 metres above sea level and is hence vulnerable to the effects of SLR (sea level rise). This impact of course is not only inundation but also increased intensity of storms, flooding salinisation of aquifers etc. Balk (2008) has estimated that over 10 percent of the world population lives in the LECZ.

Table 4 shows that 73.5 percent of the population of the LECZ is in Asia and another 8.8 percent is in Africa – well above their share of the global population. Hence while it is the situation of tiny countries like Tuvalu that have alerted the world to the potential disaster of SLR it is in Asia and Africa that the largest populations are at risk of being impacted. It is noticeable also in that the world’s urban population is disproportionately concentrate in the LECZ with 13 percent of global urban inhabitants living in the zone.
Table 4: Population in the Low Elevation Coastal Zone (LECZ), 2005
Source: Balk 2008

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Total Population No. (m)</th>
<th>Percent</th>
<th>Urban Population No. (m)</th>
<th>Percent</th>
<th>Percent of Land Total</th>
<th>Urban</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Africa</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asia</td>
<td>466</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>238</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europe</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latin America</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia-NZ</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North America</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SIS</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>World</td>
<td>634</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>360</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The USA, Egypt and the Netherlands are also in this group. Island countries\(^2\) are predominant among those countries with the high percentages of their population at risk. The important point is that many of the megacities of Asia lie within the LECZ and their ability to plan for a likely future effect of SLR and resource mitigation measures is less than their counterparts in Europe and North America. Moreover weaker planning controls may be exacerbating the effects of climate change.

Figure 8 shows the countries which have the largest numbers of urban dwellers at risk are in the Asian nations of China, India, Japan, Indonesia, Bangladesh, Vietnam and Thailand.

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\(^2\) The analysis included only countries with a population of at least 100,000 persons and a land area of at least 1,000 square km. Hence it excludes many of the Pacific atoll countries discussed earlier.
Meeting the challenge of SLR for the LECZ, Balk (2008) argues that there are three ‘Ms’ required:

- Mitigation – investment and infrastructure should be diverted beyond the zone.
- Migration of persons and industry within and beyond the zone to other areas within countries and to other countries.
- Modification (and other adaptation mechanisms), technological solutions.

As is the case with environmental disasters, climate change is likely to have
a more devastating impact on less developed countries. As Baird (2003, 11) points out:

‘Climate change ultimately affects us all, but our capacity to withstand its consequences can come down to economics.’

There is a real problem in considering the effects of climate change since we are dealing largely with the future. There are estimates of environmental refugees caused by climate change which confuse the numbers of people likely to be affected by such change with the number of potential migrants. As was mentioned earlier, adaptation will be an important response to climate change and must be factored in to all considerations regarding it. Undoubtedly there will be population displacement but it will be one of a number of responses.

One issue which applies not only to climate change induced migration but also other environmentally related movements is that it is not a gender neutral process. Brown (2008, 74), for example, has correctly pointed out:

‘Far from being gender neutral, climate change and the use of migration as a coping mechanism, will have specific gendered impacts given that there is a strong relationship between poverty and vulnerability to environmental change, and the stark fact that women as a group are poorer and less powerful than men’.

There is a clear need to examine contemporary and likely potential future environmental impacts on migration with gender sensitivity. It is likely to have gender specific impacts and gender is one of the elements shaping responses to environmental change which must be considered.

**Displacement by Large Projects**

One important way in which environmental change induces significant forced migration is through large infrastructure development projects. Such ‘mega projects’, especially data construction, have become common, especially in less developed countries where there are escalating demands for electricity and water associated with rapid urbanisation (Cernea 1990; Cernea and McDowell 2000). In each case there are people displaced and forced to move elsewhere so there is another dimension of the development – migration inter-relationship (Cernea 1990, 300). One of the largest cases is the Three Gorges Dam Project located in the lower reaches of Yangtze River in China. The seventeen years of construction will be completed by 2009 and has involved a displacement of more than 1.2 million people. The Chinese government has had a range of approaches over the years for the
resettlement of those displaced (Tan 2008b) involving settlement both near
the dam and at more distant locations. However Tan (2008b) has shown that
many of those forcibly relocated have suffered significant losses despite
government assistance.

Fernandes (1991), drawing on Indian examples argues that the people
displaced by large dam projects are often the poor and powerless who do not
participate in any way in decision making concerning the projects. Moreover
they are often not compensated fairly for their losses. As Baker (2001, 6)
points out:

‘governments or powerful agencies make these decisions without
consulting the people of the designated area and reap the
benefits without distributing them to the people who lost their
lands and livelihood.’

The displacement migration associated with environmental change initiated
by large scale projects can be differentiated from that induced by other
changes in that the timing of displacement is fixed ahead of time by
governments or other agencies and there is usually a degree of planning of
displacement and compensation planned in advance. While this is not always
the case and the planning is often not consultative, it does at least promote
the potential to cushion the impact of displacement. The migration
associated with displacement from large infrastructure projects can take
many forms. Tan (2008b) notes several kinds of movement associated with
the displacement from the vast area inundated by the Three Gorges Dam in
China. These include ...

- Resettlement in nearby areas which was often unsatisfactory
  because of the poor quality of the land, often on steep upland
  slopes and already significant population pressure.
- Resettlement in more distant areas where population pressure
  is less but where there are problems of clashes with local people,
  lack of local agricultural knowledge and limited support networks.
- Migration off farms and into cities.

It is not always however that there is a planned displacement of population
by infrastructure projects. In some cases there may be unintended
environmental consequences of such projects which force environmental
migration. A case in point occurred in East Java in Indonesia in 2006.
Drilling of a wildcat well by a company owned by a prominent Indonesian
tycoon and politician and foreign interests opened a fissure in the ground
from where mud has flowed ever since (Montlake 2008, 16). Despite efforts to
dam or redirect it, the flow has continued and now covers an area of 6.5 km²
engulfing 11 towns and displacing 16,000 people. Yet as Montlake (2008)
explains this is only one example in Indonesia where such instances are frequent. He cites the deliberately lit fires in Sumatra and Kalimantan to clear vast areas to make them available for plantations or another situation where small farmers are forcibly displaced by the acts of government or large scale entrepreneurs.

Impacts of Migration on Destination Environments

The complexity of the environment-migration relationship needs to be recognised and the causality can also be in the other direction. As Lohrmann (1996, 838) points out ... ‘environmental degradation leads to mass migrations which further accelerate environment overloads elsewhere and can lead to further, subsequent migration. Lohrmann (1996) reports on a conference which discussed links between mass migration and environmental impacts and focused considerable evidence of impact on water pollution and deforestation.

Suhrke (1992, 2) points out that the body of research on the impact of migration on the environment is considerably greater than that on the environment as a cause of migration. Again, however, the bulk of the evidence relates to internal migration, with little examination of the ecological and environmental consequences of international migration. There are many case studies where expanding land settlement into marginal and fragile ecosystems in LDCs have led to desertification, deforestation and other environmental degradation (Suhrke 1993; Bilsborrow 1991, 1992; Allen and Barnes 1985; Bilsborrow 1987; Bilsborrow and DeLargy 1991; Blaikie and Brookfield 1987; Cruz, Zosa-Feranil and Goce 1988; Georges and Bilsborrow 1991; Hafner and Apichatvullop 1990; Pichon and Bilsborrow 1992). The expansion of agricultural settlement into hitherto untilled areas in some LDC contexts has led to severe environmental deterioration. This occurs both in government organised and sponsored land settlement programs and especially where the settlement occurs outside of government controls and involves squatters. In Indonesia, for example, the ecological impact of the government’s Transmigration Program has been substantial (Secrett 1986).

One type of international migration which has attracted attention because of its environmental impacts is refugee movement. The sudden unplanned influx of large numbers of people into a generally spatially restricted area, often already vulnerable to environmental degradation, can have devastating environmental impacts (Stevens 1993). Ghimire (1994, 661) has recently summarised the situation:

Deforestation is one of many environmental problems facing refugees in developing countries. Others include the depletion
and contamination of water, overcrowding, poor sanitation, soil erosion and pasture degradation. In some cases, forest coverage and other environmental problems existed prior to the arrival of refugees; in others the problems have been exacerbated by the refugees. Dwindling resource base has also led to increasing conflict with local populations and much hardship for refugees. There are a number of studies which depict situations in Africa, and to a lesser extent Asia, where refugee settlement has resulted in environmental degradation (Ek and Kuradavi, 1991; Simmance 1987; Christensen and Scott 1988; Utting 1992; Aguayo et al. 1987; Hugo 1987).

Sudden mass migrations can often have a severe environmental impact on destinations and refugee flows are frequently of this nature. The unpredictable nature of refugee moves and their suddenness can mean there is no time for environmental assessment of refugee settlement sites or for putting in place appropriate environmental safeguards. Moreover such settlements often have very high densities which put pressure on local environments through production of wastes, clearing of forest and vegetation, etc. Hence, mass migrations can both exacerbate existing environmental problems and create new degradation issues.

However, all the impacts of mass influxes of groups like refugees are not negative. Stevens (1993, 3), for example, points out:

‘some environments have benefited from the pressure of refugees. Improved water supply and sanitation schemes have benefited both refugees and local population and contributed to rural development in many developing countries. Refugee labour has also been employed in reforestation, rangeland management and land cleaning schemes.’

In the traditional immigration nations such as Canada, the United States and Australia, debates about immigration have generally raged around the issues of ethnic composition of the intake and the economic consequences of the immigration. However, there are some indications of the environmental effects of immigration becoming an increasingly important element in that debate. To take the case of Australia, in the 1980s there were a few commentators who argued that Australia should dramatically reduce immigration levels because of environmental concerns that an expanding population will have detrimental effects upon the native environment, flora and fauna and upon the capacity of the nation’s resource base to accommodate that expansion (Birrell, Hill and Nevill 1984; Day and Rowland 1988). However, in more recent times, concern about the environmental consequences of immigration has seen this issue emerge as one of the
dominant arguments against expanding immigration levels.

While it is apparent that international migration can and does have negative environmental consequences, in some contexts there are considerable dangers that the migrants involved can become scapegoats for a general failure to adopt sustainable policies of land and other resource use in the destination areas. In Australia, a review (Clarke et al. 1990) of literature concerned with immigration, population growth and the environment, concluded that Australians will be better off in general using resource management policies targeted to deal with specific resource and environmental concerns, rather than using immigration policies. This should not be taken to mean that population growth and immigration are not of relevance in discussion about Australia moving toward a sustainable development strategy but rather as Toyne (1990) has pointed out:

'It is vital the immigration debate is moved directly into the broader debate over ecological sustainability in Australia. No long-term resolution to the question of appropriate net immigration levels can be found until the broader questions are settled.'

There have been a number of studies which have looked at ways migrants, beyond contributing to population increase have impacted upon environments. These studies look at the ways in which migrants use the environment (Begosi 1998; Curran 2002; Curran and Agardy 2002; Naylor et al. 2002). As Cassells, Curran and Kramer (n.d., 3) point out ... evaluating migrant impacts on the environment requires comparing their knowledge and technical skills, wealth and access to resources with those of non-migrants. Several studies have focused on how migrants differ from non-migrants in behaviour which is destructive of environments (e.g. Sierra 1999). A recent interesting strategy of migrant – non-migrant differences in fishing behaviour in coastal villages in North Sulawesi, Indonesia has been made by Cassells, Curran and Kramer (n.d.). They make the important conclusion that the connection between migration and environment is not a linear one and that other factors besides migrant status influence resource extraction and use. The ecological and social context may matter more than migration. They found a clear association between migration and lower environmental quality but that the context and timing of migrant assimilation seems to be a more important explanation than simply being a migrant. They argue that studies of migration need to focus more on how migrants are incorporated into destination societies and on their social relations especially in relation to how the environment is used. The call for a more nuanced understanding of how migrants impact on the environment would seem very timely and appropriate.
As was indicated earlier, migrants are often scapegoated as being the cause of problems – environmental degradation, crime, health and disease problems, etc. and their environmental impact in the Senegal River Valley. Black and Sessay (1997) compared wood fuel use by refugees and local populations. There was concern in the area not only because of the increase in local population that the refugee movement created but also the common notion that they were ‘exceptional resource degraders’. Since their stay in the area was perceived by them as temporary they had no incentive to use resources in a sustainable way. However, Black and Sessay (1997) using a household survey and direct measurement of wood fuel use, found little or no evidence that refugees used more wood than non-migrants now that they are more destructive in their collection of wood.

**Conclusions and Policy Implications**
The causes and effects of environmental deterioration in LDCs cannot be quarantined within the national boundaries of individual nations. It is clear that much contemporary environmental degradation in LDCs has its real roots in historical processes such as colonial exploitation which produced different modes of agricultural and pastoral activity to meet the needs of the colonial power and different patterns of population growth and distribution from those which prevailed in precolonial times. Similarly, international inequalities in power, access to resources, unequal terms of trade, etc. have all been influential in shaping patterns of land use and settlement in LDCs, as have the interventions of international companies and agencies. Moreover, the consequences of deforestation, pollution, etc. are not confined to single nations. The rapid depletion of rainforests in a few countries like Brazil and Indonesia, for example, has climate change and loss of biodiversity implications which are global. The clear message, not only from the IPCC but from as far back as the 1972 Stockholm Conference on the Human Environment and the 1987 publication of the World Commission on Environment and Development report, *Our Common Future*, is that achieving ecologically sustainable development demands action at the global level as well as the national and individual levels. Successfully tackling many of the environment problems of LDCs and MDCs will require a global approach, and central to this is the pressing need to eradicate poverty so that people can have access to the resources to live sustainably. This will demand several redistributions from MDCs to LDCs through changes in international power, trade and aid relationships. In short, the environmental pressures which are increasingly the cause and consequence of population movements in LDCs should not be seen as exclusively the problems of the individual countries involved since those pressures have been caused partly by forces outside the country and they have consequences which extend beyond the borders of those countries.
Migration is a logical and common immediate response to environmental degradation and disaster, but it is rarely a medium or long-term solution to environmental problems. This will only be attained via lower levels of population growth through substantial and sustained fertility decline and adopting ecologically sustainable ways of using the environment. Both of these goals are only going to be achieved through overcoming the poverty and powerlessness among the people living in regions subject to environmental disaster and degradation. Only through improving employment opportunities for men and women, health, education, human rights and enhancing the status and roles of women within such societies can long-term sustainability be achieved. Just as international processes have contributed to the creation of environmental problems in LDCs, long-term solutions will only be possible with significant involvement of the international community.

Environmental pressures are undoubtedly an increasing element initiating outmigration from many rural areas in LDCs. However, environmental factors are more significant as contributory and proximate causes of such migration, although ‘environmental refugee’ migration is significant. The bulk of such movement is intra-national, but just as other forms of migration in LDCs are increasingly involving crossing international borders, it is likely that a larger proportion of environmentally displaced persons will move to other countries. However, such migration cannot be generally seen as a solution to environmental problems in LDCs because:

- The vast scale of such movement is such that the sheer logistics of moving and establishing such refugees in other nations is many times larger than any previous global migration (Keyfitz 1991).
- It does not represent a real and lasting solution to environmental problems, which can only come through eradicating poverty, reducing fertility, and adopting environmentally sustainable practices.

International relocation may provide an enduring solution only in very specific circumstances such as in small island nations influenced by a significant rise in sea levels or in small regions devastated by an environmental disaster.

The fact remains, however, that there are significant displacements of population occurring in LDCs as a result of environmental disasters or deterioration. Most of this displacement occurs within the boundaries of nations and there is certainly no indication of a lessening of the numbers of environmental migrants in LDCs. Hence, it is imperative that the international community look to short-term measures as well as the longer-term solutions discussed above. As was indicated earlier, the people involved are certainly not covered by international refugee protocols, and there is a
pressing need for this group of forced migrants to be systematically incorporated into an expanded international regime to assist people who are uprooted involuntarily from their home areas (Rogers and Copeland 1993, 132). Lonergan and Swain (1999) argue that:

‘although the estimates and projections of environmental refugees are based almost entirely on anecdotal evidence and intuitive judgment, it is important not to trivialise the role environmental change and resource depletion may play in population movements.’

This differs from the view of Black (2001, 1) who, in also recognising the weaknesses of the concept of ‘environmental refugees’ maintains that:

‘although environmental degradation and catastrophe may be important factors in the decision to migrate, and issues of concern in their own right, their conceptualisation as a primary cause of forced displacement is unhelpful and unsound intellectually and unnecessary in practical terms.’

It is clear regardless of conceptual fuzziness and the fact that the concept of environmental migrants remains a contested one in academic circles, that:

(a) environment is an important cause and effect of migration
(b) that environment factors are increasingly significant in both inducing migration and in the assessment of the impact of migration. In such a context it is difficult to disagree with Renaud et al. 2007 that there is a need to consider environment and migration from a policy perspective. They make five policy suggestions:

• There is a need to put in place programs to achieve a better understanding of the cause-effect mechanisms between environmental degradation and forced migration.
• It is important to raise world wide knowledge based public and political awareness of issues surrounding environment and migration. In particular they argue that the issue of migration and environment should be included in the work of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change.
• There is a need to put in place a framework for recognition of environmental migrants as in a separate Convention or as part of Intergovernmental Treaties on Environment. They recommend that the 1951 Convention
on Refugees not be extended to include environmentally forced migrants.

- There is a need to empower the relevant entities of the UN and other relevant agencies to provide assistance to environmental refugees/migrants.
- Strengthening institutions at all levels to provide assistance to environmental migrants.

(c) This area is replete with unsubstantiated exaggerations on the numbers of environmental migrants. It is clear that there needs to be a quantum improvement in the knowledge base on the interrelationships between environment and migration. This means better conceptualisation and measurement as well as more detailed cross-disciplinary research.

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PANEL 4

Migration and Economic Globalization

The papers written for this panel take distinct neo-classical and historical-structural approaches to assess how globalization affects the relationship between migration and development; the introduction summarizes these perspectives briefly and provides an alternative political-economy perspective.
The topics of migration and economic globalization play a crucial role in the analysis and contextualization of the nexus between migration and development; they also extend to policymaking and its implications, and the many questions that arise when addressing all these issues: What impact does increasingly globalized market integration have on international migration? To what extent are labor markets themselves becoming internationalized? Under what conditions could trade and migration become complementary forces or even substitute one another? To what extent can neoclassical economic equilibrium models predict the consequences of factor mobility and trade for wage differentials? Why do societies that have opened up to world markets exhibit different degrees of growth or reduction of international migration? Can diasporas’ home country investments counter the effects of current export-led development strategies, which foster emigration because of their reliance on low-wage labor, and lead to economic activities that would retain native workers or even attract the return of emigrants? Might this process be different for skilled versus unskilled laborers?

The way in which these and other crucial questions could be addressed and analyzed depends on the choice of theoretical perspective. The following text provides a brief introduction to Alan Winters’ and Bruno Losch’s papers and, using the framework of political economy, outlines some of the key factors present in the relationship between migration and economic globalization.

Migration and economic globalization:
Is the labor market becoming globalized?
Alan Winters’ paper, “Migration and Economic Globalization: Is the Labor Market Globalizing?” focuses on the relations of international trade and migration with labor markets in developing/migrant-sending and developed/migrant-receiving countries. At the center of his analysis is the reduction of international commerce barriers and opening of markets that began during the early 1990s. Winters begins his argument by expressing concern with the effects of the boom of manufactured goods produced in developing countries and the recent, associated trends of out-sourcing and
off-shoring in OECD countries, which threaten to displace domestic unskilled workers even while increasing the real incomes of consumers. His goal is to disentangle the vital link between the globalization of trade and labor markets and to summarize the ongoing debate among economists—more precisely, neoclassical economists—about the impact of international migration on both trade and wages.

Regarding the threat posed by imports from less developed countries and their interference with real wages and unskilled employment in developed countries, Winters argues that, although both trade and migration affect wages materially, they tend to move in the direction of a win-win proposition by improving economic efficiency. He is of the opinion that the relationship between migration and trade cannot theoretically be reduced to either equivalence or substitutability, and argues that migration can stimulate trade and investment under several circumstances.

The architects of NAFTA and the European Union (particularly those in the Mediterranean and central regions of Europe) envisioned that free trade would become a means of reducing migration pressures. However, as Winters points out, these hopes were, at the very least, unrealistic: one of the main reasons for the current and unwelcome continuation of international migration flows lies in the huge economic asymmetries between countries of origin and destination (e.g., differences in the per capita income in Mexico and the United States). Following James R. Markusen’s and Maurice Schiff’s findings, Winters concludes that trade and migration can function as either substitutes or complements, depending on different factors and situations. Because the easing of several theoretical assumptions could easily upset the expected outcomes, Winters concludes that the search for a general law on the relationship between trade and migration is fruitless.

When speaking about the impact migration has on trade and wages, Winters argues that migration implies downward pressure on wages, particularly those of unskilled laborers (immigrant and native), where remuneration moves from unskilled to skilled workers and thus contributes to an increase in wage inequalities. This trend is related to selectivity in migration processes and the concomitant mobility of skilled labor. Following Adrian Woods’ argument, Winters also comments that, through trade of unskilled-labor-intensive goods from the South, Northern countries were virtually importing labor. Therefore, in the globalization era, labor from the South is provided to the North via both migration and trade on a complementary basis.

Winters concludes his paper by asserting that migration and trade are positively related and that migration plays a significant role in international trade. And yet, he doesn’t see a significant qualitative change in terms of
labor markets, although empirical evidence (e.g. the Mexico-U.S. case) has shown a strong correlation between economic globalization and the emergence of trends like transnationalization, differentiation, and increasing precariousness in the labor market (Delgado Wise and Márquez, 2007).

Migration and the challenge of demographic and economic transitions in the era of globalization.
Bruno Losch’s paper approaches migration and globalization from a historical perspective because, according to the author, discussions of the economic aspects of globalization are often limited to trade liberalization and underestimate the importance of broad structural processes. He posits that current world trends are fueling asymmetries between countries, income inequalities, and disparities in processes of economic transformation. These have different implications depending on the level of economic diversification in a given Third World country and are especially disadvantageous for “agriculture-based” nations, particularly in Africa. More specifically, Losch analyzes the profound restructuring process taking place in the global agro-food markets. In his view, this has led to a progressive differentiation and exclusion, segmentation and marginalization of low efficiency agricultural producers—that is, the inclusion of a few and the increasing exclusion of the majority, to the extent that regional or international migration appears to be the only remaining option in those countries.

Focusing on Sub-Saharan Africa, the author emphasizes the momentous challenge posed by delayed economic and demographic transition in a globalized world, which accordingly has resulted in strong migration pressures that will soon challenge the continental political order.

An approach from the perspective of political economy.
The contributions made by neoclassical economy and geographical-demographic approaches to the analysis of the relationship between globalization and migration—here exemplified by Winters’ and Losch’s papers—have greatly influenced our current understanding of these issues. However, these approaches fall short of addressing many of the subtleties and complexities of the migration-globalization dialectic. Political economy provides an alternative and comprehensive analytical framework for this subject, one that allows us to simultaneously consider, among other things:

1) The ample range of interactions inscribed within the North-South (or development-underdevelopment) dynamic without losing sight of the levels of differentiation present in each pole of the relationship;

2) The interactions between several spatial levels (local, national, regional, and global) and social dimensions (economic, sociological, political, cultural, environmental);
3) A transdisciplinary perspective that, contrary to the “economicist” and “structuralist” stereotypes frequently applied to this area, enables the theoretical articulation of several fields of study;

4) A concept of development that surpasses limited, normative, and decontextualised concepts by acknowledging the need for a type of social transformation that is based on the structural, strategic, and institutional changes required to advance the living standards of the underlying population. This process must comprise a variety of actors, movements, agents, and social institutions operating on several planes and levels.

According to this approach, in order to disentangle migration’s cause-and-effect relationship with globalization and examine specific moments in the dialectic interaction between development and migration, two critical interrelated aspects must be addressed:

- **Strategic practices.** This involves the confrontation between different projects that espouse diverging interests, which in turn underlie the structures of contemporary capitalism and its inherent development problems. There are currently two major projects. The hegemonic one is promoted by the large transnational corporations, the governments of developed countries led by the United States, and allied elites in underdeveloped nations, all under the umbrella of international organizations such as the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. The project’s loss of legitimacy under the aegis of neoliberal globalization means that, nowadays, rather than speak of hegemony we can use the term “domination”: the implementation of this plan is not the result of joint agreements but, rather, military action and the financial imposition of the Washington and Post-Washington Consensuses. The second project, the alternative one, consists of the socio-political actions of a range of social classes and movements, as well as collective subjects and agents, who endorse a political venture designed to transform the current structural dynamics and political and institutional environments that otherwise bar the implementation of alternative development strategies on the global, regional, national, and local levels.

- **Structural dynamics.** This refers to the asymmetric articulation of contemporary capitalism on several planes and levels. It includes the financial, commercial, productive, and labor market spheres, as well as technological innovation (a strategic form of control) and the use and allotment of natural resources and environmental impacts. These factors condition the ways in which i) developed, ii) developed and underdeveloped, and iii) underdeveloped countries relate to each other. They also determine the fields in which interactions between sectors,
groups, movements, and social classes take place. All of this is expressed differently on the global, regional, national, and local levels.

Since the 1970s, analysis of contemporary capitalism has been subject to the belief that the best way to promote human well-being is through free market practices. As David Harvey (2007: 22) clearly points out:

Neoliberalism has become a hegemonic discourse with pervasive effects on ways of thought and political-economic practices, to the point where it is now part of the commonsense way we interpret, live in, and understand the world.

This discourse has led to the implementation of structural adjustment policies based on three basic principles—liberalization, privatization, and deregulation—and the promise of reducing North-South economic and social asymmetries.

The term “globalization” has been used in economics, politics, and international trade discourse to designate the complex and profound restructuring process of the economic, political, and social world order led by neoliberal political-economic practices. And yet, “globalization” remains an elusive concept often used vaguely and arbitrarily. More than an objective characterization of a process, it is frequently used as a normative or ideological term (Petras and Veltmeyer, 2000; Bello, 2006). Therefore, instead of seeking a single definition of globalization, I believe it is more important to unravel its content, particularly with regard to the contradictory relationship between migration and development that characterizes our current world order.

The discourse of globalization has been largely disseminated by northern governments and the international financial agencies they dominate (Castles and Delgado Wise, 2008). Southern governments have adopted—with some differences and varying degrees of commitment—the dominant doctrine that requires social and economic aperture to international markets. However, rather than diminish, worldwide social inequalities have increased substantially. Three decades of globalization have done little to reduce the crushing poverty of much of the world’s population. In fact, in 1970, the 31 countries classified as developed or advanced by the IMF received 68 percent of the world’s income, while the “rest of the world” got the remaining 32 percent. By 2000, the first group of countries received 81 percent of the world income, which left the second group with only 19 percent. In the same period, the population share of the advanced countries fell from 20 percent to 16 percent (Freeman, 2004). Undeniably, poverty has become more extreme in some regions, especially sub-Saharan Africa (as Losch’s paper underlines) and parts of Southern Asia. And yet,
...such general trends also hide some important variations. Certain areas do not fit this dichotomy: both the “transitional economies” of former Soviet bloc countries and the “new industrial economies” of some regions of Asia and Latin America have an intermediate position. Second, growing inequality is also to be found within the main regions, with new elites in the South gaining from their role in the transnational circuits of capital accumulation, while workers in some former northern industrial centers experience fundamental losses in income, social status and security. (Castles and Delgado Wise, 2008: 5)

Globalization has therefore not only led to a growing gulf between North and South, but also to increased disparities within each region. In short, the neoclassical and monetarist-based dominant discourse on globalization has failed as a scientific paradigm: it has neither explained nor been able to predict current global changes. As J.E. Stiglitz points out, it is clearly more of an ideology about how the world should be reshaped, and its premises are summed up by the Washington Consensus' emphasis on the importance of market liberalization, privatization, and deregulation (2002: 67). Two of globalization's basic premises are “the leadership of civilization by economics” (Saul, 2006 xi) and, perhaps more specifically, the belief that, unlike state-led development, free trade will automatically open the path to wealth and prosperity for countries and societies across the globe. This has been linked to the idea that this process is inevitable and that resistance is futile and even reactionary. Some critics use the term “globalism” rather than globalization to emphasize this ideological character (Petras and Veltmayer, 2000; Saul, 2006).

It is important to distinguish between globalization as a political project and as an economic restructuring process. Politically speaking, the ideological dominance of globalization as a way of understanding the contemporary world seems to be over. Growing inequalities, conflicts, and the failure to achieve fairer trade rules for poorer countries state the obvious: globalization has broken its promise. States and regional associations in Europe, Latin America, and Asia are less willing to accept neoliberal orthodoxies now than in the 1980s and 1990s. The world seems to be entering a new period where the importance of nation-states as political actors and social regulators is being reasserted. However, on an economic level, the dominance of the increasingly integrated capital world market that became possible with the end of the Cold War shows no sign of receding, even if optimistic notions of a new, inclusive global economic order are increasingly being replaced by an understanding of the continued dominance of core industrial economies. Privatization, deregulation, and liberalization continue unabated. Local and national economies are pulled into the international production and trade
circuits and suffer profound changes, often leading to regressive trends in their development processes. The remittance-based development model is a clear example of such trends.

These issues raise many questions regarding the meaning and scope of the integration processes underlying the discourse of globalization and go beyond the queries posed at the beginning of these introductory remarks. To what extent is globalization an inclusive process for all nations and societies? Is it a process that will promote long-term development in the South and thus reduce North-South asymmetries? How is labor mobility incorporated into the internationalization of trade, finance, and production, which is itself the main economic motor of globalization?

Labor migration has been diversely incorporated as part of this process. On the one hand, global capital drives migration and reshapes its patterns, directions, and forms. Migration, in turn, brings about fundamental social transformations in both sending and receiving areas: it plays an integral role in globalization and social transformation processes at the same time that it constitutes a major force within communities and societies.

From a critical development studies perspective, the dialectic relationship between development and migration is a consequence of the implementation of structural adjustment programs in the South, which in turn have operated as a crucial detonator of the current upsurge of South-North labor migration, and can be analyzed through three major interrelated movements: the dismantling and re-articulation of the productive apparatus in southern countries; the creation of vast amounts of surplus population, well beyond the conventional formulation of the reserve army of the unemployed, and the acceleration of migration flows. If we take into consideration the experience of some of the major migrant-sending countries (Castles and Delgado Wise, 2008), an examination of the above issues leads to four important conclusions regarding the migration-development dialectic in the context of neoliberal globalization.

In the first place, capitalist restructuring has resulted in forced South-North migration. Our current world order is characterized by the increase of international trade and financial flows, but also—and very importantly—by the internationalization of production and the transnationalization, differentiation, and increasing precariousness of labor markets—a fundamental factor that is not properly considered in Winters’ paper. This has deepened North-South asymmetries and generated unsustainable social conditions (e.g., increased inequalities and precariousness of labor markets) that lead to forced migration; that is, a population flow caused by the lack of adequate living and working conditions, or political and/or social conflicts that threaten the population’s life. The exacerbation of forced migration can
result in relative or sometimes absolute depopulation in places of origin (e.g., 50 percent of all Mexican municipalities currently show negative population growth rates). The loss of qualified and unqualified labor also leads to the abandonment of productive activities and the loss of potential wealth in migrant-sending countries.

Secondly, immigrants contribute to capital accumulation in labor-receiving countries. Developed countries require large amounts of cheap, qualified and unqualified labor. This demand responds to i) an increased accumulation capacity brought about by the transfer of resources and surpluses from underdeveloped countries, and ii) processes of demographic transition and an ageing population. Immigrants contribute to the general depreciation of the labor force: they participate in sectors that are work-intensive, generate income-goods, or are in the process of being rescued; they also supplant workers who receive higher rates and receive better benefits, including low-skilled and highly-skilled labor. This provides receiving nations with comparative advantages derived from the reduction of production costs and immigrants’ participation in the acceleration of innovation processes.

Thirdly, migrants help sustain fragile socioeconomic stability in their country of origin. A fraction of migrants’ wages is allocated to remittances that ensure the subsistence of family members in places of origin. On a macroeconomic level, remittances benefit neoliberal governments that use them as a source of foreign currency in order to sustain the fragile “macroeconomic stability” rather than promote genuine development alternatives. In the absence of real development projects, migrants are now lauded as the “heroes of development”—which means they are held accountable for promoting progress in a situation where the state, claiming minimal interference, declines to take responsibility. Ultimately, underdeveloped countries continue to function as labor reserves. Bona fide development possibilities are deliberately obstructed in order to benefit increasingly small national elites, which in turn are associated with more powerful elites in developed countries.

Finally, if used as a tool of social transformation, development can curtail forced migration. Even though neoliberal and pro-globalization discourses maintain their economic system’s inevitability, we must theoretically and practically assert the viability of alternative processes of development and do this on a variety of levels. We must begin by redefining the terms under which developed countries subject underdeveloped ones to an asymmetric set of relationships based on a series of principles that have been turned into fetishes—e.g., democracy, freedom, and free trade. This requires examining dominant or hegemonic practices that increase inequality, marginalization, poverty, social exclusion, and unregulated migration. Neoliberal governments assume that migration is an inevitable process and are content
to make use of remittances until they finally reach a breaking point. A project of real social transformation must include the participation of migrants and non-migrants alike, and go beyond the curtailing of forced migration: it must also revert the processes of social degradation that characterize North-South asymmetries and are increasing social inequalities around the world.

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Migration and Economic Globalisation: Is the Labor Market Globalising?

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SSRC Migration & Development Conference Paper No. 11

Introduction
This paper seeks to offer an accessible discussion of the ways in which economists think about the question of globalisation and the labour market and the conclusions they reach. Globalisation is a grand term and can clearly include many aspects of the increased interconnection that we now observe between different parts of the world economy. Here, however, I restrict myself largely to how international trade and migration affect wages, how they are mutually related, and a small digression into capital flows.

The current resurgence of interest in globalisation dates from the early 1990s when people started to observe that, as barriers in international commerce had come down, openness to trade had increased sufficiently to exceed the levels seen in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries and that its consequences were not necessarily uniformly benign. Concern started to arise as to whether the boom in imports of manufactures from developing countries was displacing unskilled workers as well as boosting the real incomes of consumers in OECD countries. And these concerns became magnified as out-sourcing and off-shoring became more common and as capital flows increased. In this phase migration hardly figured at all, except to note a little defensively that if trade seemed more open than a century previously migration was certainly not so. This relative ranking has not changed, but partly from autonomous developments such as the decline in communication costs and partly as a result of conscious policy decisions, migration has accelerated over last decade and a half and, considering its consequences, has become part of the globalisation discourse.

The huge expansion of international trade generated a number of concerns or reservations, such as that it harmed the environment, eroded national and regional cultures, and rendered expensive investments obsolete, but the most consistently voiced objections hinged around labour markets – see Hoekman and Winters (2007) for a survey. Changes in trade were said to disrupt job patterns, making the traditional ideal of doing the same job for life infeasible and obliging people to move and retrain more frequently. Imports were held to be destroying jobs and, if not that, to be increasing work hours and reducing wages. In particular, imports from developing countries were seen as a potentially major cause of the decline in real wages and/or employment
of unskilled workers in developed countries and the consequent increase in inequality. One famous article was entitled ‘Are your wages being set in Beijing?’ (Freeman 1995) with the implication that labour markets were globalising and that the national dimensions, which were often implicitly held to be so desirable, were under threat.

In fact the economic science suggested a much less apocalyptic situation than did popular opinion, reminding us also of the huge increases in wages permitted by exporting and by importing cheap consumer goods from abroad. The debate was vigorous and involved serious disagreements about exactly how to characterise and model the economies in question – for example, whether wages were highly sensitive to goods prices (and hence to trade) and whether technical progress explained the decline in demand for unskilled labour. Eventually, however, the economics profession did largely accept that international trade was constraining unskilled wages in the rich countries to some extent (and possibly reducing them absolutely in the USA) and it also observed that the expected quid pro quo – an increase in relative unskilled wages in developing countries - did not seem to be coming about. Indeed over the 1990s, skills premia seemed to be increasing and inequality widening in the majority of both rich and poor countries.

Adding migration into this mix – as both the real world and the economics profession did over this period – gave the debate renewed urgency. Any view of the world in which trade influences wages significantly is likely to forecast even stronger effects from migration: much stronger downward pressure on wages in developed countries – on the unskilled if migration was biased this way – and increasing wages in developing countries, especially for the groups that provide the most emigrants. Moreover, once we considered migration as well as trade there was a wider menu of possible ways in which economies interacted and so a wider possible range of outcomes.

This paper offers an account of the debate and a summary of the current state of thinking. I shall argue that trade and migration do affect wages materially, although by offering significant improvements in economic efficiency they permit outcomes in which more or less everyone could be made better off, even if by differing amounts. I shall show, however, that the simple equivalence (substitutability) between trade and migration does not hold, and that migration can stimulate trade and investment in several circumstances.

Are Migration and Trade Substitutes or Complements?
Economists use abstraction and simplification as routes to comprehension – the process of stripping a process down to its simplest form in order to lay bare its operation and open it up to formal modelling. We seek the minimal
conditions under which a particular outcome might or must be observed and then ask whether these conditions offer us insight into the real world. The positivist tradition asks not whether the assumptions are realistic but whether they are useful in predicting the world, and if they are not we, eventually, change them. Wise economists (of which I hope I am one) do not claim that simplification and refutation are the only way of creating knowledge, but we certainly see them as very powerful tools. Hence this is where I start.

The fundamental premise of the neo-classical theory of international trade is that the incentive to trade arises from differences in countries’ relative costs of producing different goods, which, in turn, arise from differences in the countries’ endowments of various factors of production, such as labour, natural resources and capital. These endowments are assumed to be given exogenously (i.e. not influenced by anything in the theory) and immobile between countries, but mobile between sectors within any country. In its purest form, the theory generates the remarkable prediction that free (and costless) trade in goods between countries whose endowments are ‘not too different’ is sufficient to ensure that their factor prices are equalised – the so-called Factor Price Equalisation (FPE) Theorem of Paul Samuelson (1949). If FPE were true, trade in goods and the movement of factors of production would be perfect substitutes in the sense that as trade was freed, the incentives for factor movements, including, labour migration, would evaporate.

Intuitively, one can see this by thinking of goods as bundles of their constituent factors: trade in goods and the migration of factors of production are then two means to the same end. They both allow people in one country to consume the fruits of factors located (initially) in another, the former indirectly by importing the goods they produce and the latter directly. More technically, the result arises because under suitable assumptions factor prices (wages, returns to capital etc.) are uniquely determined by goods prices; free costless trade equalises goods prices across countries and, through that mechanism, factor prices.1

The formal statement of the equivalence of factor mobility and trade is due to another Nobel Laureate, Robert Mundell, who observed (1957) that restrictions on one of the pair would stimulate the other.2 In fact, a tariff would eliminate trade if perfect factor mobility were an option: for so long as trade continued the tariff would cause goods prices to differ between the two countries, which would in turn cause factor prices to vary, which would generate factor movement. The process would stop only when factor prices

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1 Winters (1991), for example, gives an elementary text-book treatment of FPE and Bowen, Hollander and Viaene (1998) a more advanced one.
2 Mundell used capital mobility as his example of factor mobility, by the way, not migration.
were equalised, at which point the costs of goods production would be equalised in the two countries and trade would cease.

Factor price equalisation is not a characteristic of the real world and nor, in fact, are any of the other extreme predictions of the pure neo-classical model. But the theory is not wholly discredited: clearly much more is going on than the theory supposes but the tendencies that it identifies seem fairly evident to one degree or another. Thus, for example, with some relaxation of the assumptions, especially those on technology, economists now think that the theory offers reasonable insight into trade patterns – e.g. Trefler (1995), Davis and Weinstein (2002) - and have more or less agreed that trade goes some way towards explaining the evolution of wages around the world (e.g., Wood 1995 – see below).

Moreover, the migration/trade link is a powerful motivator of trade policies in the real world. The NAFTA, the EU-Mediterranean and the EU-Central Europe Agreements were all promoted partly as solutions to migration pressures. President Salinas of Mexico promised the US Congress that NAFTA would help Mexico to export goods not people, and German Foreign Minister Kinkel urged the opening of EU goods markets to Eastern Europe as a substitute for migratory flows [both cited by Schiff, 2006]. While the basic idea may be correct, such hopes seem unrealistic over most politicians’ time-horizons. First, suppose that a trade agreement raised the developing country partner’s growth rate by 1% p.a. (well above what most people would expect over the long run). The income per head differential between, say, Mexico and the USA is over 600%, so it will be a very long time before the additional growth reduces it far enough to have significant effect on migration. Second, if migration is costly and capital market imperfections prevent potential migrants from borrowing to finance it (as they certainly do), an increase in income is likely to increase migration initially as people start to be able to afford it; Lopez and Schiff (1998) offer some evidence.

The essential logic of the equivalence between migration and trade is that it makes no difference where factors of production are combined to create the goods that are demanded. Thus sectors’ efficiency and techniques of production must be independent of location – hence scale, local conditions, agglomeration, etc. must all be irrelevant – and likewise for factors – e.g. no productivity differences according to climate, the extent of team working (agglomeration), social circumstances or networks and political conditions. Assuming this to be true requires a great deal of faith, and once one ceases to do so, it matters where activities are located and simple substitutability is eroded or even reversed. Wage differences can now persist indefinitely in the absence of factor movements and thus trade and migration can co-exist. An early formal exploration of this relaxation is by Markusen (1983).
Markusen assumed two identical countries linked by free trade but no migration, and asked if relaxing five of the assumptions made by Mundell (see below) changed trade and migration in the same direction (complementarity) or in opposite directions (substitutability). Mundell had shown substitutability in the case where the only thing that differed was factor endowments. Markusen restored identical factor endowments and in turn relaxed Mundell's assumptions to allow:

- Differences in technology
- Increasing returns to scale
- Imperfect competition in goods markets
- The presence of domestic distortions (e.g. production externalities)
- Non-homothetic preferences (preferences in which the demand for some goods goes up more than proportionally with income while demand for others goes up less than proportionally.)

He found that each relaxation was sufficient to permit complementarity. To illustrate the first case, recall that identical countries would have identical prices and hence no cause for migration or trade. Now suppose country A gets a technological advantage in industry X, which we assume without loss of generality is labour-intensive. A will now be competitive in X (have excess supply) and hence international trade will occur. But A will also have higher wages than B and so labour will flow from B to A, and this, in turn, will further increase supplies of X and boost A's exports of them. Thus trade and migration have increased together - complementarity.

Schiff (2006) has shown, however, that complementarity does not rule everywhere in this world. If country B raised its tariff on X, it would raise its own wages. Allowing the tariff to increase gradually from zero, trade would decline and, because wages were rising, so would emmigration. This would continue as the tariff rose until eventually wages were equal across countries and migration was zero. Trade, however, would still exist. If the tariff were then raised further, trade would fall, but migration would resume, this time flowing from A to B, and as B’s labour force increased it would produce more X and thus cut trade further. We hence have substitutability over this range.

The moral of this elementary theorising is that it takes very little to upset simple categorical results: the search for a general result on substitutability/complementarity is fruitless: all we can hope to do is to define the forces which push in different directions, to identify when one or other may be dominant, and to derive predictions for particular sets of circumstances in which the substitute/complements issue may be pertinent for policy.
Migration and outputs
Embedded in the discussion above is the assertion that as factor mobility changes factor supplies, it is not factor prices that will change but the composition of output – i.e. the mix of goods that is produced. This depends on the assumptions that markets are competitive, that both countries produce all tradable goods, that there are at least as many tradable goods as factors and that the only interference with trade is via tariffs and similar cost-changing policies\(^3\). The chain of reasoning is that trade determines goods prices (equalises them if trade is unimpeded) and that \(N\) goods prices will determine \(N\) factor prices uniquely – i.e. only one set of factor prices will exist that generates costs equal to the given goods prices, and with competition costs and prices are immutably locked together. Factor endowments do not enter this chain, so that provided they do not result in violations of the assumptions, migratory flows can not affect factor prices. Hence if suddenly a country gets more labour and cannot change the price of labour to increase its employment to the new level, it must increase the output of the labour intensive goods and reduce that of (some) other goods if it is to maintain full employment. Box 1 gives a simple numerical example. This analysis may seem rather unrealistic, but reflection might persuade the reader that agriculture in the US South or in the UK’s East Anglia depends so heavily on migrant labour that it would contract severely or even shut down without it; similarly for clothing production in Los Angeles.

\(^3\) Specifically, there should be no quantitative restrictions on trade.
The Effect of Migration on Wages

In fact the story of the previous paragraph is pretty unrealistic for a variety of reasons. Prominent among them is the argument that goods are not perfectly homogeneous, so that domestic X and imported X are slightly different. If this is the case, their prices are not rigidly tied together, so goods prices can respond to supply shocks even in the presence of international trade, and consequently migration can change goods and factor prices. [For example, an inflow of labour increases A’s supply of X and so drives down the price of its variety relative to those of other varieties as A’s suppliers seek additional buyers for their increased supply.] This is the assumption that underlies the various Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) simulation exercises in the literature – e.g Walmsley and Winters (2005) and World Bank (2006) – and is frequently resorted to. Once one has made some such assumption, it makes sense to ask whether migration affects wages in the economies, either receiving or sending, that it affects, and the answer is generally ‘yes’.

Two powerful examples help to illustrate the power of migration to equilibrate wages between economies. Both show far larger effects than we can imagine from international migration today. Table 1, extracted from O’Rourke and Williamson (1999), estimates the effects of the late nineteenth

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Box 1  How migration might affect outputs but not wages: The Rybczynski Theorem

Consider the following example. Country A has 20 units of capital (K) and 30 of labour (L). It produces X using 1K and 1L per unit and Y using 1K and 2L, and it exhausts its supply of factors by producing 10X and 10Y. Now let it receive an additional 6 units of labour. With fixed factor prices, each country continues to use factor inputs in the same ratio, so to absorb the labour it needs to raise Y output to 16 and cut X to 4. Numerically, 10X requires 10L and 10K while 10Y requires 20L and 10K; together they just exhaust the supply of labour (30) and capital (20). As the labour supply rises to 36, output switches to 4X (which requires 4L and 4K) and 16Y (which requires 32L and 16K). A little experimentation will convince you that there is no other equilibrium.*

If A received 10 units of labour, it would need to switch entirely into Y production (20 units) and beyond this point, since it produced no X it would no longer matter if its production cost of X at local factor prices exceeded world prices. Thus the unique link between goods and factor prices would be broken and wages would be driven down by immigration.

* Suppose we opted for 3X and 17Y, demand for L would be 37 (=3+34) and demand for K 20 (=3+17); there would not be enough labour; shifting the production mix further towards Y would just make things worse. If, instead, we opted for 5X and 15Y, demand for L would be 35 (=5+30) and there would be surplus labour and further switching towards X would make this worse. Thus with fixed factors prices (the result of fixed goods prices and producing both goods) the only bundle that exhausts factor supplies is 4X+16Y.
century migration to the New World on wages and incomes per head in origin and destination countries.

Table 1 Percentage Changes in Labour Force, Real Wages and Gross Domestic Product (output) per capita, 1870-1910

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Lab Force</th>
<th>Real wage</th>
<th>GDP pc</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Argentina</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>-22</td>
<td>-21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USA</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>-8</td>
<td>-8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>-39</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Wld.</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>-12</td>
<td>-12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Old Wld.</td>
<td>-13</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: O'Rourke and Williamson (1999) Table 8.1

In the cases shown we see dramatic changes in labour force (and population), with Argentina nearly doubling its work force over the period and Italy losing nearly 40% of its workers. But the changes in rewards are equally dramatic, with wages falling by 22% in Argentina and rising by 28% in Italy. [Argentina’s wage decline was mitigated, but not reversed, by large capital inflows.] Even for the Old and New Worlds as a whole the results are notable, with migration relieving labour market pressure in the Old and significantly increasing gross output in the New.

O’Rourke and Williamson (1999) estimate that even though trade between the New and Old Worlds grew strongly over this period, it accounted for only about 30% of the convergence in real wages, with 70% due to migration.

The second example is based on Pritchett (2004, 2006). It is schematically illustrated in Figure 1. For each of the 50 states of the USA – between which there is quite unrestricted migration (I hesitate to say free migration, for there are always costs) – and a sample of nearly one hundred developing countries, which are very roughly of the same sort of physical size as the states, Pritchett calculates the rates of population growth and the rates of growth in income per head. Eliminating some outliers at both ends of each of the variables, he plots the ranges between the highest and lowest values. For the states of the USA, we find a small range of growth rates in incomes per head and a wide range of growth rates of population. This is consistent with population movements in response to economic incentives: as a state suffers
a set-back, say because the price of its principal output falls, people move out (or at least immigrants cease to move in) and real rewards per head revert towards the average. For the sample of developing countries, on the other hand, migration is next to impossible, and the story is exactly the opposite. Population growth rates are fairly similar – basically, natural rates of increase related to income per head and other circumstances – while growth rates in income per head show great dispersion. Here if a country hits hard times, again say because the price its principal export declines, there is nowhere for people to go. They stay and the declining gross product is reflected in declining incomes per head.4

Figure 1  Growth of income vs growth of population, US States and Developing Countries

Among countries of destination there has been considerable debate among economists as to whether recent migration has actually affected wages significantly, albeit by less than the magnitudes in the two examples just given. A series of studies – of which Card (1990) is perhaps the leading example – suggested very little effect. Card initially found that despite the strong inflow of Cuban workers into Miami in the Mariel boatlift Miami’s wages appeared to behave exactly as predicted without the inflow. Others, however, of whom George Borjas is the leading light, have argued the opposite. Borjas has argued that studies that correlate the level of wages

4 Pritchett shows that the ‘flat’ US box is replicated by other large rich countries and that the difference across samples is even more extreme if one plots ‘population increase less natural increase’ on the horizontal axis.
with the share of immigrants across cities, states or districts under-estimate the wage effect for three reasons. First, for technical reasons, errors in observing the proportion of migrants in a city bias the estimates downwards. Second, as migrants move into a city, natives move out, offsetting the downward effect of immigration in those cities and driving down wages in the places they go to. The result is that all cities look pretty similar in their wage evolution. Third, migrants will tend to go to cities where labour demand – and hence wages – is relatively high, giving a positive correlation between wages and migrant numbers which offsets the downward pressure that the inflow causes.

Borjas’ (2003) estimates allowing for some or all of these problems identify the downward pressure on wages due to migration quite convincingly. For example, using data drawn from the 1960-2000 U.S. Censuses, Borjas and colleagues suggest that migration cut the wages of the least skilled by 7% over the period and that the burden fell disproportionately on black natives (Borjas, Grogger and Hanson 2006). Borjas (2003) also suggests that the second hardest hit skills group is the top one, as the USA admits increasing numbers of tertiary educated immigrants. One aspect of these exercises is the assertion that the group hit hardest by new immigration is previous immigrants, especially the relatively recently arrived. That is, the person with whom a migrant competes most vigorously is a previous migrant in the same skills class.

One novel argument which has a ring of plausibility in metropolitan areas but as yet no convincing supporting empirical evidence is that unskilled immigration into the USA reduces the relative wages of skilled, not unskilled, workers! Kremer and Watt (2006) argue that the inflow of workers willing to provide domestic help – especially women offering housekeeping and child care – releases skilled female natives onto the labour market. This increase in the supply of skills reduces skilled wages relative to unskilled wages and increases total output. The key observation is that although the immigrants are unskilled relative to the US workforce, their arrival does not increase the supply of unskilled workers because previously the unskilled jobs they do were being done by skilled women.

In principle one can carry out analysis corresponding to Borjas’ for developing country labour exporters. For most such countries, unfortunately, data are too few or too weak for analysis and the proportionate outflow so small that its effects are easily lost in the general noise of development and change. For Mexico, however, this is not true, as Mishra (2007) demonstrates. The proportionate outflows of High-School Graduates and ‘Some College’ workers between 1970 and 2000 are huge – 47% and 52% of the numbers remaining in Mexico by 2000, compared with 16% for High-School Dropouts and even less for College Graduates. Mishra calculates that emigration
between 1970 and 2000 raised real wages for dropouts by 5%, High-School Graduates by 15%, ‘Some College’ by 13% and Graduates by 2%. With around 80% of the workforce being dropouts, the result is a widening of wage inequality in Mexico5.

There are undoubtedly many people in developing countries who would like to move to the developed world. One should not, however, believe that a tidal wave of people is about to overtake the OECD. Most of the poor in low income countries are so poor, isolated and ill-educated that they can barely move within their own regions or countries, let alone join the international migration game. For developing countries bordering OECD the flows of less-educated people are relatively stronger – e.g. most notably, Mexico and Morocco – but even here, as Mishra (2007) shows, it is not among the least skilled of Mexico that migration has its largest effects. Distance and immigration restrictions serve to keep them at home, and together these two sets of barriers make the skills patterns of emigration very different between countries – see figure 2. Taken from Docquier and Marfouk (2005) these data show the very highly skilled nature of Indian and Chinese emigration to OECD countries and the lower skills for Mexico and Morocco. The Asians are hindered by the high costs of the distance and the skills requirements for getting work visas, with the result that it is feasible or profitable to move mainly only for the highly skilled. For Mexico, on the other hand, undocumented migration into the US unskilled labour market imposes relatively few costs and so is open to the less skilled. It is certainly true that developing country migrants from rural backgrounds turn up in rich countries, but many move in several steps, starting with an internal rural-to-urban step first.

Even at higher skill levels the majority of people in the developing world would probably not be able to move. McKinsey (2005) suggests that just 10% of Chinese and 25% if Indian engineers are suitable for employment by multinational companies seeking to outsource their activities. The proportions suitable for physical mobility from Asia to OECD are probably much smaller, although to be fair, a small proportion of India’s and China’s engineers is still a large number.

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5 One interesting wrinkle is that, because Mexico and the USA have different endowments of skilled and unskilled labour, the same flow can decrease relative supplies of skilled workers in each! Suppose 50% of US workers and 10% of Mexican workers are ‘skilled’. Suppose that migration is split 30:70 skilled to unskilled. For Mexico, the proportion of skilled exits exceeds the base level, so skilled workers become relatively scarcer; for the USA the proportion of skilled immigrants is below the base level, so here too skills become relatively scarcer.
Debates on the effects of migration on wages have parallels in the trade world, especially the question of whether trade is constraining the wages of the less skilled in developed countries. Adrian Wood (1994) postulated a world of labour immobility, free capital mobility and productivity differences between countries in which every sector in country A was more efficient than the corresponding sector in country B by the same percentage. Wood’s critical difference between Northern (rich) and Southern (poor) countries is their relative endowments of skilled and unskilled labor. Declining barriers to the South’s exports of unskilled labor-intensive goods, particularly manufactures, were, he argued, a major explanatory factor in the widening differential between skilled and unskilled wages in the North. He showed that the unskilled labor embodied in a dollar’s worth of Southern exports far exceeded that in a dollar’s worth of Northern exports. Thus (given that exports and imports eventually have to balance), every dollar of trade resulted in a larger inflow of labour services via imports than outflow via exports: the North was essentially importing the services of labor. Wood then postulated that the effective inflow of labour drove down its price because countries produced different varieties of the many goods that existed, so that there was effectively specialization and the factor price equalization theorem failed to apply.

No one denied the increasing skills wage gap and the weakness of unskilled wages and employment in the North, but there were several challenges to Wood’s explanation. Ignoring the unsung impact of migration itself – see above - some argued that non-resource-based imports from developing countries were too small—perhaps 3–4 percent of Northern countries’ GDP—
to have such profound effects, especially given that the increase in labor supply embodied in net imports (i.e., imports less exports) was small. Others argued that in order to influence wages in the North, Southern exports would also have to drive down the relative prices of unskilled labor-intensive goods in the North, and that this had not happened. In fact, however, this turned out to be only because technical progress was driving down the prices of skill-intensive electronic equipment, especially for information technology–related uses. Among “traditional” goods, the relative price decline was evident.

The principal counter to Wood’s thesis was that technical progress had a strong skill bias. Two pieces of evidence were called on to support this view: first, the ratio of unskilled to skilled workers fell in virtually every sector and every Northern country. Under a pure factor abundance theory this ratio should have risen as unskilled labor became cheaper (the declining aggregate demand for unskilled labor arising from the switch in the production bundle away from unskilled-intensive goods). Second, the skills wage gap widened in the South as well as in the North, whereas the factor abundance approach predicted a narrowing.

In fact, however, each piece of evidence admits other explanations and so does not necessarily overturn Wood’s conclusions. The definitions of sectors in empirical work are very broad and almost always include tasks with widely different skilled/unskilled labor ratios. Thus off-shoring the unskilled-intensive activities within a sector would be consistent with both competition from Southern imports and falling relative unskilled labor use in the North. On the other hand, it is possible that by making components cheaper, North-South trade sufficiently increases demand for products that require some unskilled labor in the North (e.g., for delivery services) that demand for Northern unskilled workers increases overall, as Grossman and Rossi-Hansburg (2006) have pointed out.

Several explanations have been advanced for the growing skills wage gap in the South. Feenstra and Hanson (1997) observe that the South houses activities or sectors that have low skilled labor intensity, while the North has high-skill-intensity ones. If Southern costs fell, firms in the North would seek to outsource some activities to take advantage of this, and it is highly plausible (inevitable under Feenstra and Hanson’s assumptions) that the first to go would be its least skill-intensive activity. But given the initial split of activities between North and South, this sector would become the most skilled activity in the South. Thus in both countries, the relative demand for skills would increase! The cost decline driving this could be autonomous or, as in Feenstra and Hanson, driven by flows of capital from North to South, which in turn may be responding to declining trade barriers.
A second group of explanations is that engagement in international trade raises the returns to skilled labour directly – e.g the high quality capital equipment and intermediates that developing countries buy from world markets require high proportions of skilled labour to operate, or that to achieve the quality levels required to sell on world markets requires skilled labour.

By now, most economists accept that both autonomous skill-biased technical progress and North-South trade have played significant roles in the skills gap and most accept that the latter effect is likely to get stronger in the future as trade and communications costs fall, allowing production processes to be even further divided.

This discussion meshes with the ongoing debate among migration theorists about skilled labour mobility – i.e. the brain drain. It suggests a further reason why a brain drain may be harmful – it reduces developing countries’ ability to trade effectively on world markets. Equally, however, it suggests that, if wages can find their own level, the returns to skills may be increasing in the developing world, hence reducing the pressure for emigration. In fact, I suspect that the interaction with trade applies more to mid-level skills than to the high levels that usually motivate brain drain discussions. As such it squares with Borjas’ observation that migration into the USA is greatest at the two ends of the skill spectrum, although I do not believe it could be the only explanation of that phenomenon.

**The Diaspora**
The modern economy relies very heavily on information – both technical information about how to do things and how good products are and ‘social’ information about how reliable and qualified people are. For fairly natural reasons, information flows more freely between people who know each other or share certain characteristics such as language, culture and nationality. By moving people about, migration increases information flows in several important ways.

The role of networks in migration flows is well known and well documented, first by anthropologists and sociologists and subsequently by economists. Indeed, it is perhaps the least contentious of all assertions in the field of migration. It means that migratory flows tend to be self-reinforcing – as one individual moves from A to B she makes it easier for another to move and so the whole process accelerates. Often the flow has been started for more or less extraneous reasons – as, for example, the shadow of the railways in Mexican emigration is still evident even though no-one now migrates by train – McKenzie and Gibson (2007).
Starting from 1994, economists have explored formally whether international trade flows are stimulated by migratory patterns. This is no easy task given the degree of official intervention in both migration and trade, and it is sometimes difficult to say whether migration causes trade or vice versa. Causation does not matter for description – the two variables go up together – but it certainly matters for policy. The general conclusion of this literature is that trade and migration are positively related. The earliest studies – e.g. Gould (1994) - focused on migrants’ demand for goods from home, but subsequently questions were asked about creating markets for exports (migrants know what will sell in their home countries) and exploring the routes through which such international influences operated. The most elegant study is by Rauch and Trindade (2002) from whose results table 2 is derived.

Table 2 Increases in International Trade attributable to the presence of Chinese

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>% change due to:</th>
<th>Type of good</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Homogeneous</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overseas Chinese, both &gt;1%</td>
<td>32.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overseas Chinese, other</td>
<td>1.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colonial ties between partners</td>
<td>5.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Rauch and Trindade used a standard model of bilateral international trade flows – the so-called gravity model, which explains trade between partners in terms of their economic sizes and distance from each other - and added a variable describing the size of the partners’ Chinese ethnic groups. Thus it is not just recent migration that matters, but broad generalised links. This has advantages for identifying the direction of causation because we can reasonably assume the foundation of Chinese communities mostly preceded the recent growth in trade volumes. One powerful way of presenting the results is to separate out flows for which both importer and exporter have Chinese minorities exceeding 1% of their populations (row 1) from the others and also to present the trade enhancing effects of (mostly ex-) colonial ties. Rauch and Trindade experiment with three types of goods: those with recognised international exchanges, those with well-established systems of reference prices and the rest, which are too differentiated for these efficient

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6 See Parsons (2006) for a survey of the field.
market forms\footnote{Reference prices are prices quoted without mentioning a specific brand name or other producer identification.}. I have combined the first two into a single ‘homogeneous’ goods category in table 2.

The results are stark. Small Chinese communities have on average rather little effect on trade. Colonial ties are 3 to 4 times stronger. But where Chinese communities are of significant size their effect on trade volumes is dramatic (row 1). More significant is the difference between homogeneous and differentiated goods. The former can be traded on an anonymous market because their simple formal descriptions tell you all you need to know about them, but social ties still encourage trade by offering information about traders and offering social enforcement mechanisms in the case of contract failure. For differentiated goods there is an additional benefit: if traders know and trust each other information that can not be formalised in simple terms, such as that about quality and design, can be more easily transmitted; the result is that for these goods trade volumes are virtually 60% higher than if there is no social link.

Reinforcement of the diaspora’s role in information transmission comes from Javorcik et al (2006) who find that USA outflows of foreign direct investment to a country are positively related to the presence of its nationals in the US workforce. Correcting for the possibility of reverse causation, a 1% increase in the workforce induces a roughly 0.3% increase in the stock of American FDI in a country. Moreover, the effect is stronger for workers with tertiary education, which one might expect of information-based explanations. The now classic case of the beneficial diaspora is the Indian software sector, in which the connections between Silicon Valley and Bangalore are well documented – e.g. Saxenian (1999). Both people and capital - financial, knowledge and social - flowed between these sites, as a result of which a strong export industry was established in India. Detailed research has suggested that the net benefits of the migration of skilled workers were positive and that the potential for migration encouraged the acquisition of skills in India, especially at the lower end of the skills spectrum – Commander et al (2008). Software is quite special, however, so it is unlikely that such strong and beneficial interconnections will be found in many other cases.

\textbf{Conclusion}

Migration is a significant part of the current round of globalisation. Although it is sometimes argued that it is a substitute for international trade – usually in the context that rich countries should accept more goods from developing countries and thus attenuate the pressure from them to accept labor – there really is no such presumption. The theoretical discussion of Markusen and
the empirics provided by, *inter alia*, Lopez and Schiff (on liquidity constraints) and Rauch and Trindade (on the diaspora’s effect on trade) all suggest that migration frequently increases with, rather than instead of, international trade. An implication of the very pure substitutability view is that, at least within a defined range, changes in neither international trade nor migration should affect wages or other factor prices. The evidence refutes this, which suggests at least that the limited domain referred to has little relevance and more likely that that the strict substitutability view is inappropriate. In fact, I reported studies that suggest that over the long run migration is associated with strong convergence in wage levels and that recent studies which find no relation between them in the short run may well be flawed methodologically.

Lest the connection between migration and wages that I have argued for appear to change the nature of globalisation fundamentally, I also discuss international trade and wages. Here, too, I argue that effects are detectable. My interpretation of the evidence is that in OECD (rich) countries, imports of labour intensive goods from developing countries have reduced the growth in the wages or the employment of the unskilled, possibly below zero. In other words, the connections between labour markets around the world have always been there and, although they may now be stronger than previously, they are not qualitatively different.

Since developing countries are relatively well endowed with unskilled labour, it is unskilled labour in developed countries that has relatively more to fear from globalisation. However, because globalisation raises aggregate incomes – see, for example, Winters (2004) for a discussion of the evidence – it is quite likely that less skilled incomes do not actually fall with globalisation. On the other hand, the increasing inequalities between the skilled and unskilled in rich countries do not seem to me surprising. Concomitantly, international intercourse represents one of the ways that developing countries can hope to raise the (dreadfully low) wages of their unskilled and semi-skilled populations.

While few economists would maintain that migration and trade have *no* effect on wages, plenty have argued that the effects are minor. Thus one priority for future policy research is to try to resolve this issue, or at least determine when effects are large and when small. This is important for migration policy in several directions: in rich countries the wages of the unskilled are a major consideration in determining policy and in poor ones it is useful to know the extent to which emigration is likely to benefit those left behind by raising their wages. A second policy dimension that springs from this paper is the extent to which the returns to migration include increased trade and vice versa. This could be important in countries’ attitudes towards signing regional trading agreements or indeed to entering migration
agreements. The effective use of diasporas as stimulants to development includes much more than just trade – e.g. calling on them to provide medical or teaching expertise\(^8\) – but the trade and investment links they establish are likely to be one of the most effective.

The labour market is the key location of disagreements about globalisation. While I do believe in the rather revisionist view that trade and migration tend to boost the relative wages of skilled workers in the rich countries and unskilled workers in the poor ones, there is still much to be done to confirm this. In addition, not only are there (many) exceptions to understand and explain, and different channels of causation to disentangle, but these distributional issues have to be melded with the absolute increase in average incomes that globalisation generally engenders. Thus the area seems likely to remain one of critical importance for research and policy into the foreseeable future.

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\(^8\) Remittances are also useful to development, but I do not – and nor do most economists or institutions – subscribe to the view that remittances have a major role or that there is a ‘remittance-school’ of development theory.


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Migrations and the Challenge of Demographic and Economic Transitions in the New Globalization Era

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SSRC Migration & Development Conference Paper No. 12

Migrations, particularly international migrations, have received growing attention on the international scene, and from the development community, since the late nineties, especially because its economic importance is both rapidly growing and clearly bigger than all donors’ development aid (Maimbo & Ratha 2005, World Bank 2006, Ratha & Shaw 2007). Migrations will probably have an increasing role in the next years, in both helping poverty reduction and economic growth, even if political barriers are a clear concern.

The objective of this paper is to put migrations and globalization in historical perspective and to stress “big figures” and stylized facts to provoke debate\(^1\). This choice is justified by three main reasons. Firstly, the debate on globalization is relatively often a-historic and does not connect with the deep changes in the world economic and political order along the last century. Secondly, discussions of the economic aspects of globalization are frequently limited to trade liberalization and underestimate more structural processes. Thirdly, a common bias in development studies is to stress analysis on the country level, its factor endowments and its options to sustain economic growth. We will emphasize the analytical challenge of reconnecting the country level processes with an evolving global international context and show that the “moment” of structural changes is not neutral with regard to the range of alternatives.

\(^1\) This paper is based on arguments developed in an on-going study and research program implemented and funded by the World Bank, France, and IFAD. This 3-year program named RuralStruc (Structural dimensions of liberalization on agriculture and rural development) is a comparative study which focuses on the linkages between increasing integration processes in agriculture at the world level and their consequences in terms of differentiation among the productive structures in developing countries, including specialization and diversification, marginalization and migrations.


The interpretations and conclusions expressed in this paper are of course entirely those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the view of the World Bank Group.
We will first underline the role of migrations in the global historical process of economic transformation as they have always been both a core issue and a core concern for governments. Then we will show that globalization increases the need for migration at the national and particularly international levels which is a consequence of a confrontation effect between different competitiveness levels and stages in the economic transition processes. Finally, we will put “big figures” in the global picture and show that the combination of unachieved economic and demographic transitions in a global open economy should propel the pressure for migrations at a new level in the world history.

1. Migrations in the process of economic transformation

If today billions of people mainly spend their life in their birthplace, or in a relative proximity, hundred of millions have been engaged in migrations towards new home places, both at the national and the international level, and their number is increasing as a consequence of an increasingly connected world.

Migration of people from the place they live to other horizons appears clearly as a main characteristic of mankind, from the Neolithic people to the modern boat people or other more sophisticated high skills migrations. Means and pace have changed but the core objective stays the same: improve the living conditions for oneself, family and particularly children (Hatton and Williamson 2005).

In the historical process, economic structural change appears as a main driver. With various paths and paces existing in the world, economies and societies have progressively switched from primary activities (i.e. the first one: agriculture) to industry and services, this evolution being based on innovation, technical change, and their control. The well-known process has been an increasing productivity in agriculture, allowing labor and capital transfers towards new economic activities - a process accompanied by a progressive spatial restructuring with migration of labor and people from country to city, from scattered activities (typically agriculture) to concentrated activities (typically industry). As nicely said by Timmer (2007), challenging this powerful historical pathway is like challenging the tides.

In this process, push and pull effects accelerate the pace of change and have played an increasing role (growing with the efficiency of information systems): push effects caused by labor surplus in agriculture (real or felt), and pull effects created by attraction (mechanical or anticipated) of cities (jobs, level of incomes, way of life linked to service access, and emancipation from social local constraints allowed by the multitude).
Starting with the agricultural and industrial revolutions engaged first in Western Europe at the end of the 18th century, a rapid urbanization (originally associated to increasingly high rural depopulation) became rapidly a growing concern for governments. The pull effect of infant industries’ labor needs was often exceeded by the push effect of rural poverty; and risks associated with massive internal migrations were often feared by states and elites as they could endanger the social and political (urban) equilibrium. The image of uncontrollable masses of unemployed people (the “populace”) was a common vision in the 19th century. The answers were - and still are - multiple: restrictions to internal migrations (which is still the case in China today), specific public policies (typically protection of agriculture like in late 19th France or in Eastern Asia – broad sense – in the 1950-1980’s) and, also and particularly, encouragement to emigrate (or at least laisser-faire and facilitate the spontaneous wave).

This last option is of course of particular interest in the perspective of the economic transition because international migration played a role in the management of the differential between the European 19th century demographic transition and the absorption capacity of the European economies. From the mid-19th century to the early 20th, for many European countries (and with successive historical sequences), international migrations were a clear exit option to the increasing pressure related to rural depopulation and insufficient pace of job creation, despite a strong process of industrialization. Between 1850 and 1930, nearly 60 millions Europeans migrated to the New World(s)\(^2\) of which 35 millions in the United States only. In this later case, the pace of these “white migrations” (Rygiel 2007) was around 1.3 million per year in the decade preceding the WWI (Daniels 2003).

We need to keep in mind that these heavy processes could only occur because of the hegemonic position of Western Europe over the world and its specific relations with settler colonies (or former colonies). The characteristics of the Hobsbawnian “long (European) 19th century”, which culminated with *The Age of Empire* (1875—1914) played a big role both in the process of industrialization itself (Hobsbawn 1987)\(^3\) and in the type of adjustments it required, among migrations.

Today, growth differentials and job opportunities and wages gaps (often in a range of 1 to 10 against 1 to 2-4 in the past) continue to fuel strong push and pull effects and migrations flows– even if often illegal as a consequence of the

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2 USA and Canada, Argentina and Brazil, Australia and New-Zealand, South Africa, Algeria, and also Siberia.

3 Hobsbawn dates the end of this long 19th century with the WWI. One could argue that some features (colonial empires) remained till the end of WWII and the decolonization period and that these features still bear upon some characteristics of the current world order – with of course clear differences between continents.
current political order. These flows are particularly concentrated in “contact” regions between high income and low or middle income countries, where relative proximity and ground routes facilitate access. It is typically the case of the periphery of the United States and the European Union: Mexico, Central America and the Caribbean; Eastern Europe, Turkey, North Africa. In many countries of these regions the share of emigrants often reaches 10% of the total population. Elsewhere, long distance migrations are complicated by the police controls associated with long distance transportation.

2. The “confrontation effects” of globalization and the pressure for migration

One of the main characteristics of the world today is its huge level of asymmetry: income inequalities – probably the most emphasized feature – but also unequal stages in the process of economic transformation, which means different assets and types of capital and capacities, different degrees of economic diversification and of institutional thickness, different factors’ productivity and competitiveness levels.

The last World Bank World Development Report 2008 has clearly emphasized the coexistence of three developing worlds characterized by their level of economic diversification (World Bank 2007): on one side “agriculture-based” countries (where agriculture plays the major role in the contribution to growth and in employment) – mainly Africa; on the other side urbanized countries (where industries and services have the biggest shares and allow higher levels of income) – typically Latin America; and the intermediate situation of the “transforming” countries, still concerned by high levels of rural population – illustrative of South and East Asia – and where diversification of the economic structure is broadly engaged with challenging results for the “Old World”. These three worlds have nevertheless to be interpreted in light of their different modalities and sequences of integration in the world economy.

The current globalization process is too often trivialized as a “second” globalization with reference to a first period between the 1860s and WWI, when increasing flows of goods, labor and capital connected Europe with its immediate periphery (Russia, Ottoman Empire) and, most of all, with the “New World” (Berger 2002). However, whereas the globalization of the early 20th century was mainly a process of convergence in the North Atlantic economy driven by migration flows (O’Rourke and Williamson 1999), with a clearly different geopolitical order, the attributes of globalization today are an increasing “global-world-integration” facilitated by continuous technical progresses in transportation of goods, capital and particularly information,

4 The case of Eastern Europe is of course specific because the Eastward extension of the EU has internalized the migration flows.
with new financial instruments, a greater concentration of assets among global firms and institutional investors, and the development of intra-industry trade. The emerging result is a deeper interconnection of both markets and human societies which bears upon their structure.

This observation is an analytical challenge for the development community (Gore 2003) which broadly adheres to an evolutionist vision of the development process, as if history could repeat itself, with a recurring reference to the canonical path followed by Western Europe, and particularly England, in the 19th century. Today’s situation is original because it confronts different economic patterns referring to different structural change processes which occurred at different period of time. In that perspective, economic transformation at the national or regional/continental level must be articulated with the global world context.

The economic transformation of Western Europe is clearly embedded in its long lasting 19th century political hegemony, which was later and progressively replaced by the United States in a somewhat similar way. This political hegemony was notably marked by colonization, influence zones, and unequal treaties with nominally “independent” countries (Chang 2002). It facilitated international migrations, as previously noted, but it also broadly eliminated competition and allowed attractive situations of both supply and demand within captive markets. This considerably facilitated the specialization of some European countries and then the competitiveness and the profitability of their businesses. The case of England which sacrificed its own agriculture based on its Empire and control of maritime routes is famous. This reminds us that the challenge faced by today’s “agriculture-based” countries, confronted by OECD countries (and China, which is another story).

In Latin America and Asia, structural changes were managed in decisive steps during the period of self-centered development, which characterized the world international regime starting with the 1929 crisis and running till the beginning of the current new globalization era at the end of the 1970s. Everywhere in the world, nation-states adhered to import-substitution and

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5 The colonial regime banned any type of industrialization in the colonies. And Bairoch (1997) reminds us that early stages of industrialization in India and China were blocked by European takeover. He estimates the share of these two countries to be half of the global manufacturing around 1750. Their come back is of course amazing.

6 This regime was the nation-states’ answer to the world economic crisis. It primarily based the growth process on the extension of the domestic markets fuelled by the development of both wage labor and mass consumption. The crisis of this regime – qualified as fordism by the regulationist school (Boyer and Saillard 2002) – occurred when domestic consumption growth went out of steam and encouraged firms (followed by states and donors) to reengage firmly in international trade and competition: the current period (the picture is of course terribly simplified).
protection, strong state intervention, and national development projects\textsuperscript{7}, and Latin America and Asia were able to take advantage of this momentum, even if partially. Latin America countries were – at least formally – independent since the beginning of the 19\textsuperscript{th} century and adopted the new pattern with strong import-substitution policies. The case of Asia is clearly different but we can say that Asian states are nearly all heirs of old national histories – with a lighter European colonial stamp – which gave them the opportunity to take advantage of the self-centered period (from the 1950s, when they became independent, to the late 1970s, beginning of the new regime). One should remember that the specific context of Cold war provided strong supports (and funding) to nation-states of these two regions (Gabas & Losch 2008).

The situation of Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) is unequivocally different not only because its integration in the world economy was delayed but also because this insertion occurred under a clear submission to European powers. Countries in the region only obtained independence - based on the colonial boundaries and nearly without nation-state history - in the early sixties. As a consequence, Sub-Saharan Africa young states were not really able to benefit from these three decisive decades of strong self-centered development (1950s-1970s) and they were quickly caught up by globalization. This rapid confrontation occurred under the constraints of structural adjustment with an economic structure which was and is still characterized by agriculture and primary exports and where today, on average, 65\% of the economically active population (EAP) is still occupied in agriculture.

Chart 1 shows the very slight change in the EAP structure over the last 45 years (around 20-25\% change)\textsuperscript{8}. It tells us that agriculture in Africa has played the major role in the absorption of its growing population (230 millions people in 1960 and 770 millions today). This situation is really challenging because African agriculture is today and will increasingly be in competition with the world markets, both for exports and imports in its domestic markets, and it has to deal with huge productivity and competitiveness gaps\textsuperscript{9}. This competition is increased by a deep restructuring of the global agro-food markets, where heavy processes of vertical and

\textsuperscript{7} This appears as the founding moment of “development” and all the development studies which emerged after WWII are clearly rooted in this development project. See McMichael (1996) who opposes the development project and the “globalization project”. Also Giraud (1996).

\textsuperscript{8} Chart 1 shows that if other Latin American or Asian countries have seen a 60-70\% drop of the share of the agricultural EAP, China and India are in the Sub-Saharan Africa average. This must obviously be discussed in absolute terms because these two countries have seen hundreds millions of workers exiting agriculture.

\textsuperscript{9} The productivity gap in cereals between manual agriculture with no “green revolution package” and heavily intensified and mechanized agriculture (not mentioning subsidized) is a minimum of 1 to 1000 (Mazoyer 2001).
horizontal integration (within commodity chains or through distribution systems) are progressively and sometimes rapidly changing the rules of the game (Reardon and Timmer 2007). The development of contractualization - marked by norms and standards - is one of the main features. This process of change offers huge opportunities for the economic agents who have capital and skills to adapt, but it is also an increasing constraint for those who cannot reach the new requirements. The consequence of this on-going change is a progressive differentiation or segmentation process within the agricultural sector which allows growing insertion and inclusion for the few and possible progressive marginalization and sometimes exclusion for the many.

The genuine question in the context of poorly diversified economies, which is the case of SSA and other low income and some lower-middle income countries, is: what are the alternatives and what are the exit options for the population marginalized by the processes of confrontation which characterize this new globalization era? The World Development Report 2008 (World Bank 2007) stresses three main pathways out of rural poverty which are: specialization in agriculture (for those who have the necessary skills and assets with reference to the period), participation in non-farm activities, and migration. The last two options are historical pathways out of the “agriculture world”, confirmed by the statistical evidence\textsuperscript{10}, but they are also confronted with the sharp reality of the existing constraints at the national and world levels.

With the world population nearly reaching the “tipping point” and 50% of humankind living in cities, many suggest that the growth process will be sustained by the urban dynamics which proved so powerful in the past. However, a major characteristic of the strong urbanization process in Africa (and also in many parts of the developing world today) is urbanization without industrialization (UN-Habitat 2003, Davis 2006). This is a main difference with Europe, the United States, and with some regions of the developing world previously engaged in structural change, typically China and India, where industrialization fuelled internal migrations. This difference clearly indicates the difficulty of finding alternatives and the core issue of employment. Simultaneously, international migration remains difficult due to recurring barriers to international movement of people and appears to be a significant option only for the periphery of the core developed countries.

This context reinforces the possibility of trapped populations who could have no alternatives to sustain their livelihood and it also increases all the associated social and political risks of such situations. This is the scenario

\textsuperscript{10} Timmer (2007) proposes a brilliant demonstration on this issue.
developed by Pritchett (2006) who does not hesitate to refer to “zombie states”.

3. The challenge of delayed transitions in a globalized world
For different regions and countries today, and mainly Sub-Saharan Africa, the challenge is to face delayed transitions in a globalized world.

SSA is the latest continent to have engaged its demographic transition and its high population growth is explained by a timing lag between the fall of mortality and then birth rates. With a population growth of 2.5% per year during four decades and a peak of 3% in the 1980s, the continent is characterized by an extremely strong dependency ratio of around 1 economically active person per 1 inactive in comparison to East Asia, which has had nearly 2.5 active people for 1 inactive – a large demographic dividend which clearly helped East Asia’s growth process (see chart 2).

The consequence of this demographic transition in Sub-Saharan Africa is that the continent will have to deal with increasing population numbers (an increase of 1 billion people is expected by 2050). Specifically, Sub-Saharan Africa will face large yearly cohorts of new EAP beginning with around 10 millions today and peaking near 20 million in 2025 (see chart 3). For a median SSA country of 15 millions inhabitants, such growth means adding 250,000 people to the EAP today and around 400,000 people per year in 20 years (Losch 2006, Giordano & Losch 2007).

This is a huge pressure which offers opportunities in terms of growing domestic markets but in a context of very low diversified economies with few alternatives, confronted by a huge and increasing competition, in a situation of clear asymmetry in terms of competitiveness. This situation is absolutely new and original in the world history. It will drive a big push for migration which will strongly challenge the continental political order (what will be the resistance of the inherited colonial boundaries?). It will also present a strong international pressure particularly targeting the European Union.

What are the options to deal with in such a unique context?

A reasoned analysis of the world population trends could provide an answer. While Sub-Saharan Africa faces its demographic transition and its demographic dividend lies ahead (perhaps too far ahead), the other regions of the world with ageing populations, particularly East Asia and Europe, will have to deal with increasing dependency ratios. This is particularly the case in China, which is expected to have a population of around 330 millions people over 65 years in 2050. This demographic asymmetry could provide huge opportunities for international migrations and allow a better allocation
of the labor factor around the world – labor being clearly today the single factor escaping the global liberalization.

We cannot, however, expect the same kind of mass migrations that occurred at the end of the 19th and early 20th centuries. First, again, the world order has changed and the figures at stake are clearly different. Social and cultural acceptance is an issue and politicians are clearly reluctant to deal with unpopular decisions. For instance, could Europe absorb 1 million Sub-Saharan people every year, which is the size of migrant cohorts entering the United States in the early 20th century and which will correspond to about 5-8% of Europe’s yearly additional EAP in the 2020s?

The emerging option, which clearly could be managed by the World Trade Organization agreement under the GATS treaty mode 4 related to the “presence of a natural person,” is the management of temporary migrant workers through bilateral or regional agreements – a solution which existed in the past, for instance, between Mexico and the USA (the Bracero program) and between Turkey and Germany (the Gastarbeiter program). This option could clearly decrease population pressure (Pritchett 2007) but the clear challenge here will be the scaling-up.

A part of the answer is clearly also to be found at the country level. In the case of Sub-Saharan Africa, strong policy responses, such as support of an inclusive development in agriculture, which will remain SSA’s main absorption sector for at least two decades, are critical. The transition will have to be accompanied with policies targeted at “big numbers”, i.e. at producers of food crops, as more than 90% of the rural population is engaged in the production of staples. Because economies of scale are necessary to deal with the challenges of globalization, another big option is regional economic and, probably, political integration. From this perspective, many African nation-states – and due to their specific trajectories – will clearly need to join forces.

To conclude this rapid overview of demographic and economic transitions confronting globalization is related to the analytical challenge mentioned earlier. In the nation-state design of today’s world order, every society has its own diachrony marked by the pace of events of its historical trajectory. To understand the origins and causes of development lags between countries, to identify room for maneuver, and to design adequate policies, there is an imperative collective need to deal with this difficult task of simultaneously analyzing how these different “diachronies” in synchronization with globalization. This is the context within which it is essential that policies be designed that can manage the growing asymmetries of the current period.
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Chart 1 [source: FAOSTAT 2007]
Chart 2 [UN, World Population Prospects, The 2006 revision]
Chart 3 [UN, World Population Prospects, The 2006 revision]
PANEL 5

Migrant Politics and Development

This panel considers the relationship between migration, politics and development. The first paper, by Devesh Kapur, considers an issue that has received little attention in the literature: the impact of migration on political life and institutions in the sending country. The second, by Luin Goldring, looks at the various forms of migrant political participation. The contribution by Peggy Levitt is not an introduction to the issues, but rather an essay reflecting on the importance of considering culture in research and policy focused on the relationship between migration and development.
Taking Culture Seriously: Unexplored Aspects of the Migration-Development Nexus

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SSRC Migration & Development Conference Paper No. 13

Most discussions about the relationship between migration and development suffer from two misguided assumptions. First, they focus too much on the economic at the expense of the socio-cultural. It’s as if we just get the money right, and all else will follow. Second, they assume that redressing poverty in immigrant communities and alleviating underdevelopment in the communities migrants come from are two separate goals when, in fact, they are often inextricably linked. Migration takes place in a transnational social field such that immigrant incorporation and migrant activism vis a vis the homeland are two sides of the same coin.

My comments try to redress these weaknesses. First, I suggest a way of “bringing culture back in” to debates about the migration-development equation. Second, I show how thinking culturally elucidates aspects of development normally obscured. I focus on the social aspects of development or on how migration potentially alters the homeland landscape, in both positive and negative ways. I draw on my own fieldwork on Latin American and South Asian migrants in the United States and on selective research by other scholars also working on these questions. My comments are offered in the spirit of defining a research program rather than reporting on one that has already been completed.

Understanding migration as a transnational process brings to light several of its important features. From this perspective, migrants and non-migrants, although separated by physical distance continue to occupy the same socio-political space. Because goods, people, money, and social remittances (ideas, practices, values, and identities that migrants introduce to their homelands) circulate regularly, individuals do not have to move to be affected by the dynamics within this social space. People who have barely visited their national capital, let alone traveled abroad, also learn about and adopt ideas and values from far away. The religious, civic, and political organizations in which they participate also assume new forms and functions in response to their changing constituencies. As a result, rather than seeing immigrant incorporation and enduring homeland involvements as separate processes, they occur simultaneously and mutually reinforce each other.
Looking at migrants and non-migrants transnationally also drives home that this is a multi-layered as well as a multi-sited field. The horizontal ties between a particular sending community and the urban neighborhood where migrants settle are important. But these must be understood within the context of the broader, vertical ties in which these relationships emerge. For example, if we want to grasp the lives of Salvadorans living in Los Angeles, we must factor in the role of the Salvadoran state and the U.S. government as well as the Salvadoran and U.S. Catholic churches. Similarly, understanding the religious lives of Brazilians in Massachusetts requires looking beyond the connections between specific congregations in Boston and Brazil and placing them in the context of the thick, multi-layered web of regional and national denominational connections that also link these countries.

Finally, seeing migrants and nonmigrants as occupying the same social space also drives home dramatic changes in the meaning of incorporation. The immigrant experience is not a linear, irreversible journey from one membership to another. Rather, migrants pivot back and forth between sending, receiving and other orientations at different stages of their lives. The more their lives are grounded in legal, health care and pension systems on both sides of the border, the more likely it is that their transnational lives will endure (Caglar 2003). Increasing numbers of newcomers will not fully assimilate or remain entirely focused on their homelands but continue to craft some combination of the two (Levitt and Glick Schiller 2004, Morawska 2003).

**Images of Culture**

Scholars and policymakers increasingly acknowledge that culture strongly influences development. They tend to treat it, however, as contextual (a dependent variable, i.e. “America’s culture of individualism”) or as a characteristic (a sub-unit of some other independent variable, e.g. a belief system within an organization that values collective decision-making). What is actually meant by culture merits further attention.

The notion of culture (or ethnicity) implicit in much early migration scholarship, as a set of unitary shared values, parallels earlier understandings of culture in sociology in general. “Culture” generally referred to either a realm of human activity and set of artifacts that were distinct from the mundane, practical world or to the way of life of a group or a people (Spillman 2002). Culture was shared, discrete, and coherent – we could identify and agree upon the cultural package associated with a particular group. Swidler (1986) critiqued this view, using the culture of
poverty argument as an example. Culture, she argued, could not be understood as an underlying set of values that explained behavior, since surveys found that lower and middle-class respondents espoused the same kinds of values despite their different socioeconomic positions. Instead, she suggested that it was how a group’s culture organized its overall patterns of behavior that made the difference. Culture, from this perspective, was a style or set of skills and habits rather than a set of preferences or desires, a toolkit. Because we have a certain set of skills, styles, and know-how that are the tools with which we live, “action is not determined by one’s values. Rather action and values are organized to take advantage of cultural competences” (Swider 1986:275).

Jeffrey Alexander takes this several steps further. From this perspective, “culture is not a thing but a dimension, not an object to be studied as a dependent variable but a thread that runs throughout, one that can be teased out of, every conceivable social form” (2003:7). He urges us to acknowledge the structural autonomy and causal power of cultural meanings. Borrowing from the sociology of science, which sees scientific ideas as “cultural and linguistic conventions as much as results of other, more ‘objective’ actions and procedures, Alexander urges researchers to recognize the autonomy of culture and to uncouple it analytically from social structure” (2003:7).

Finally, in a recent paper using cultural approaches to advance the study of poverty and inequality in the U.S., Lamont and Small (2007) argue that using cultural sociological concepts such as “frames,” “cultural repertoires,” “narratives,” “symbolic boundaries,” “cultural capital,” and “institutions” allows us to get beyond the unproductive culture/structure dichotomy that has so often characterized these debates.

They call our attention to meaning-making or how individuals actually make sense of their everyday lives and the world around them. Individuals and small groups construct their identities and practices from the cultural resources available to them which are, in turn, shaped by the social organization of meaning production and the discursive frameworks which structure these meanings. Again, rather than expecting these to be shared, internally coherent, or transparent, different cultural repertoires are used, and different meanings applied, depending upon the context (Spillman 2002).

Cultural sociology asks migration scholars to take culture seriously and to pay more explicit attention to the dynamics of meaning-making and the construction of boundaries between different groups. It asks us to look not only at the process of adaptation from one culture to another but at what is inside that cultural “black box” and how it changes over time. On the other hand, transnational migration studies complicate cultural sociology by
encouraging researchers to move beyond the expectation that the nation is the natural container for social life. Instead, transnational migration scholarship foregrounds how boundary creation and meaning-making can involve multiple cultural repertoires that transcend national contexts and are available at multiple levels. Transnational migrants combine local, regional, and national cultural elements from both their sending and receiving countries and they do so within the context of global cultural norms and institutions.

Once we recognize that culture plays an integral role in development, where should we look for it and what forms does it take? How can it be used effectively as an integral piece of the development puzzle and what are the costs and benefits implicit in such an approach?

Most development programs treat culture as a product -- a material and concrete object, like a dance, a piece of music, folk art, or the tradition of storytelling that is transformed, reinvented, or threatened by migration. Culture is either seen as something to be revived and preserved, resuscitated and reinforced – an unconditional good to be protected at all costs. Or it is seen as impeding development. Particular groups have negative cultural traits that prevent them from learning to work hard, trust strangers, or govern effectively --- the alleged prerequisites of modernity and progress (Harrison and Huntington 2000, Banfield 1958).

This view is problematic for several reasons. First, cultural products are not set in stone. They are not preserved in tact or completely transformed when people move but generally undergo some combination of the two. The power relations surrounding the expression and representation of particular cultural artifacts also change. Even more important, though, is the mistaken understanding of culture as a discrete, packageable whole that can be lifted out and analyzed apart from social relations.

Let me try to suggest a more fruitful approach which treats culture as a dimension of all social relations and forms and, therefore, affects all aspects of development. Patron Saints Day celebrations are one example of a cultural performance profoundly shaped by cultural influences. Many migrants throughout Latin America return to their sending communities for the annual celebration of their Patron Saint. Even if they cannot travel, they often contribute significant time, money, and resources to honor the past, present, and future of their communities on these occasions. In fact, migrants who cannot go home often organize simultaneous celebrations wherever they are. For example, in her research on Mexicans in New York, Liliana Rivera Sanchez (2004) described how a representative of the village saint (its priest) traveled to New York to “attend” migrants’ festivities. By
extending the feast of Santiago de Apóstol from Chila de Paz to New York in the early 1990s, the community created new spaces of local belonging which reached far beyond its boundaries at the same time that it claimed space for itself in New York. By looking at how meaning, narratives, and boundaries are managed during these celebrations, we can see culture at work and the opportunities and challenges it poses for social change.

I am not arguing that these celebrations, in-and-of-themselves, have far-reaching political consequences (although they are deeply political acts). They do serve as a microcosm, though, for understanding how power and resources are negotiated and distributed in transnational social fields. Similar types of negotiations are also enacted at other layers of these fields. In other words, we see comparable negotiations and distributional dynamics taking place at its regional and national levels.

Rather than seeing culture as a product, we should see it as a process. When people participate in and perform cultural representations, they also create and reinvent them. Cultural events are sites of boundary work during which communities affirm who they are and enact the boundaries of belonging for their members and for the outside world.

Patron Saints Day celebrations in Latin America are generally sponsored and organized by a patron or benefactor, a role associated with great respect and great financial and organizational responsibility. In fact, the rights and responsibilities of citizenship in many indigenous communities throughout Mexico were predicated on fulfilling certain collective obligations. In the past, this role generally went to older male residents.

But migration changed all that. For one thing, many senior members have migrated. There are too few men still living at home to sponsor the celebration. As a result, many communities have rewritten their rules so that someone living abroad can be a patron, who then delegates the day-to-day responsibilities to a non-migrant relative or friend. Or the community allows younger men to be patrons and women to assume ancillary roles with significant responsibility. By so doing, the community signals that its territory extends to include people living in the United States. Membership without residence is not only a possibility, it is a necessity.

The fiesta patronal is a performance for outsiders as well as insiders -- the community’s representation to itself and to the outside world. New kinds of communities are created through cultural performances (Gil et al. 2005). La Hora Mixteca, a program on Radio Bilingue, a station serving indigenous people in Mexico and in the southwestern United States, helped create a pan-indigenous community. When listeners heard programming in their own
language for the first time, it made them feel that they belonged to Mexico in a way that had not experienced before. By hearing their shared indigeneity broadcast back to them, they also felt a sense of belonging to a pan-ethnic community that included members in Mexico and the United States. Listening also reinforced generational ties because family members, in Mexico or California, listened ‘together’ (NATC Report 2005).

The Fiesta Patronal is also a site where gender norms are redefined. Women are allowed and, in some cases, required to assume roles they were previously excluded from because there are not enough men to go around. This earns them access to power and decision-making circles that had always been off limits. Furthermore, when migrants return to live or visit, they bring different ways of managing gender and family relations with them, shaped by their experiences living abroad. Smith (2005) writes of the tensions around gender that arise between young second generation Mexican American men and women when they visit their ancestral homes. What is considered acceptable behavior in New York is considered inappropriate in Mexico. The brother who never thought twice about his sister going out alone in Manhattan feels he is responsible for regulating her behavior back in Mexico. At least two sets of norms are competing with each other and individuals and communities must find ways to balance between them.

In fact, migrants and non-migrants increasingly manage multiple cultural repertoires, not only around gender but around race, ethnicity, faith, and generation as well. Migration inverts the generational hierarchy imbuing middle-aged men with more power than their elders. When parents become economically dependent on their children, they are under pressure to abide by their children’s wishes and to follow their advice in ways that would have been considered inconceivable before. Not only do migrant children influence how money gets spent, they also influence how nonmigrant family members vote, the religious communities they join or who their children should marry – all things that it was previously up to the older generation to decide.

Moreover, migration forces communities to revisit their narratives about progress and success --- about what the goals of development should be. Since migrants generally make more money than non-migrants, they tend to influence agenda setting more. Their motives for contributing to the community and what they hope to achieve through their participation grow increasingly different from people who stay behind. Migrants see their community as a place to vacation, retire, and eventually die, while non-migrants see it as a place where they still need jobs and health care. Migrant members want to build funeral homes while non-migrant members want to build schools. Migrant members only want young men from the community to play on the village baseball team, regardless of how good they are, because
that is how things have always been done. Non-migrants want to hire young men from other communities to play on the team because they are only interested in winning (Levitt 2001).

Some migrants want to be the benefactor of the Patron Saint Day celebration because they want to give back to their community. Others seek the position as a platform from which to display their enhanced status. They spend so much money trying to make that point that sponsoring the festival grows beyond the means of most non-migrants. As each new patron hosts an even more luxurious celebration, villagers’ already inflated consumption aspirations grow even more. What native sons and daughters must do to signal their loyalty is beyond what most residents (migrant or not) feel they can or should do. Their worth is measured by their financial contributions rather than by their moral authority or leadership skills. Yet no one seems willing or able to stop this vicious cycle. Toning down the celebration would suggest that the community prospered less than it has led itself to believe or that the benefits of migration do not always outweigh the sacrifices it entails. It can also weaken the community’s ability to compete with neighboring villages with which it is often engaged in an ever-escalating battle of “can you top this?”

Technology plays a key role. E-mail, videos, and letters are cultural products and part of the cultural process. Although migrants and non-migrants can be in touch quickly and often, they are not guaranteed equal access or equal participation. In fact, inequality generally increases. As Besserrre (2005) notes, in the case of Radio Bilingue, which broadcasts messages from one family member to another, “The telephone messages aired by radio stations (that connect separated family members) reveal and to some degree, even augment the inequalities in the use of technology, the imperfections in Mixtepequenses’ knowledge of their community, and the uncertainty in the way they live their everyday transnational lives.” Because not everyone knows about this radio service or how to use it, the line between “the haves” and “have nots” becomes brighter.

Technological innovation can also be a double-edged sword for activists trying to mobilizing across borders. While it certainly aided some aspects of the Oaxacan Indigenous Binational Front’s (FIOB – an NGO for indigenous Oaxacans in the U.S. and Mexico) efforts to organize transnationally, it also exacerbated the gulf between its members. Members in California were much better at using computers and e-mail than their Mexican counterparts. Mexican colleagues could not participate equally in the planning and mobilization process because they were technologically disadvantaged. Training programs to rectify these skill imbalances were put in place.
Understanding culture as process resonates with Appadurai’s (2004) idea of culture as a regime of norms, power, and status that enables and constrains behavior. He emphasizes the meanings, scripts, symbols and narratives that make cultural production possible but, at the same time, restrict it because cultural repertoires only contain certain things. The terms of recognition have to be altered for development to occur. Rituals and symbols that mirror those in place but challenge existing arrangements have to be deployed (Levitt and Merry 2008). Moreover, cultural doesn’t emerge in a vacuum – the way things have always been done shape what follows.

Decisions about how remittances are distributed and managed brings some of the norms underlying these regimes to the fore. Some migrants send remittances as a form of social insurance. They keep up their relationships with people back home in case things go wrong in the countries where they settle and they have to return. Deborah Bryceson and Ulla Vuorela (2002) use the term “relativizing” to describe how individuals establish, maintain, or curtail ties to specific family members or how they pursue or neglect blood ties and fictitious kinship. They choose strategically which connections to emphasize and which to let slide based on what they anticipate their needs will be in the future.

How acceptable it is for someone to make these kinds of choices, however, is shaped by the normative regimes in play. In many contexts, it’s almost impossible for individuals to feel whole if they are not part of a family or group. Thus, the woman from Gujarat State in India who told me that her actions would still reflect positively or negatively on her family until the day she died. She could not make any decision without thinking first about how it would affect her family’s reputation.

In contexts like these, social embeddedness is so thick and dense that individuals cannot make self interested choices without the risk of being ostracized by the group (i.e. Portes’ (1993) notion of bounded solidarity). Take the example of Moreno, a middle-aged man who returned to his Dominican village to open a cement factory, one of the few employers in the town. When I asked him about his responsibility to his family members, he said that he would always support his mother but that he was really struggling with what to do about his brother. Although he knew it was difficult, he felt that his brother should “earn his own keep.” Although he knew he would be criticized, it was no longer his responsibility to keep his brother on “the dole.” A Pakistani hi-tech entrepreneur I talked with faced similar issues. He was chastised by his friends in Karachi for not hiring every distant acquaintance who came to him looking for a job.
Doris Sommer (2005) and her colleagues conceptualize culture as agency. Art, she argues, has the capacity to ‘interrupt’ or ‘to unblock procedures mired in habitual abuses or indifference in order to get those practices back on track.’ Art unsettles habits and regimes through ‘defamiliarization’ or the surprise that is elicited by a new artistic technique or encounter. Cultural engagement nudges actors outside their comfort zones and habitual ways of doing and thinking in ways that can lead to positive, purposeful social change. According to Sommer (2005), we are all cultural agents, referring to the small shifts in perspective and practice that turn artists, teachers, and religious and community leaders into the catalysts of collective change. It’s not a question of whether we exercise agency but how self-consciously we do so, she writes, to what end and with what effect?

Throughout the world, creative culture has long been a vehicle for agency. In the United States, as in Brazil, theater improvisations foster collaboration and find dramatic outlets for frustrations that might otherwise fester or explode into violence. Without the “Teatro Campesino,” many labor organizers who worked for César Chávez argue, there would be no United Farm Workers’ Union. On the flat backs of pick-up trucks parked just beyond the limit of a landholder’s property, loudspeakers would call pickers to come watch and join the plays that poked fun at bosses and celebrated workers’ solidarity. My colleague Sally Merry and I (2008) also observed NGOs in rural Gujarat in India which used the age-old tradition of street plays to introduce the idea of sexuality rights.

The example of the village banda in Mexico is also useful. The Banda is not just important during the fiesta patronal; it is also an integral part of collective mourning when someone passes away. When listeners grasp that the type of music being played and the kinds of instruments used to play has changed, they also experience their community differently. Incorporating these new elements signals to them that something has shifted on the margins – that who they are has expanded in some small way to include something new. Moreover, when communities need to ask musicians from neighboring villages to fill in for the migrants who are absent, neighbors cooperate where they may have competed in the past.

In some cases, these activities plant the seeds of collective action around other kinds of issues. The Tamejavi festival, a multicultural celebration held in Fresno each year, has created bridges between immigrant groups and between immigrants and Anglos. Founders created the festival to foment culturally diverse networks of immigrants and refugees living in the San Joaquin Valley. Leaders claim that working together to organize these public events helps immigrants realize that they have a lot despite their differences. Although many have had few prior contacts with people outside their
communities, crosscutting alliances sometimes emerge based on gender, age, and religious commonalities (NATC 2005).

But culture is also about profit. We should not forget the underlying economic interests that shape cultural enactments nor the economic benefits that flow from them. The markets engendered by transnational migration build and expand upon already-well-developed ethnic and nostalgia markets in many immigrant communities. A successful fiesta patronal requires all the trappings, including costumes, instruments souvenirs, and food. Migrants from the village of San Juan de Bautista in Mexico, for example, organized celebrations in Arvin, California to honor their patron saint. The saint had to be blessed by a priest so it could be transformed from “merchandise” into a holy object. Now, the saint has acquired U.S. citizenship and requires papers to travel back and forth across the border (NATC 2005).

Even places get marketed. One of the fastest growing religious shrines in Mexico, for example, is Santa Ana de Guadalupe in Jalisco State, believed to be the birthplace of Mexico’s Patron Saint of Migrants, St. Toribio. It was not economic development that transformed this former backwater into a thriving community but the many tourists who make pilgrimages there each year (Levitt 2007).

The potential for profit is not lost on the State. Governments produce their own versions of tradition for public consumption and worldwide dissemination, which often differ significantly from the community’s account. For instance, the Chilena, originally considered a dance of the poor, became legitimate and marketable after it was appropriated by the Mexican state (Revilla López 2000). The state, for its part, pushed a commercial, tourist spectacle, displaying the splendor of Mexico to its urban residents and foreigners. Grupos Chilenos and technobandas, however, used the form to invoke a strong sense of membership among Mixtecos, whether they were born in the community or not. Because Chilenas do not consist of a fixed set of elements, musicians could incorporate new instruments and rhythms, producing an alternative national self-representation that was outside the reach of the state.

Finally, an important piece of understanding the relationship between culture and development is to unpack cultural diffusion. Cultural diffusion is key in transmitting and maintaining the collective experiences, values, and memories underlying transnational identities. Migration engenders several kinds of diffusion – the migration of ideas themselves; the migration of people and things between different geographies, cultural toolkits, and historical
periods; and the migration of identities between nations and between secular and spiritual domains.

In *The Transnational Villagers* (2001), I coined the term *social remittances* to call attention to the ideas and behaviors migrants exported back to their sending communities. There are at least four types of social remittances -- normative structures, systems of practice, identities and social capital. Social remittance exchanges occur when migrants return to live in or visit their communities of origin; when non-migrants visit those in the receiving country; or through exchanges of letters, videos, cassettes, e-mails, and telephone calls. They are distinct from, but often reinforce and are reinforced by, other forms of global cultural diffusion.

In some ways, this conceptualization now seems to me to come up short. Remittance exchanges do not move along neat protected train tracks linking one station to another. Instead, they are like the elements in organic systems which bump up against each other within and between systems. These exchanges are not confined to flows between sending and receiving countries but occur between all sites and levels of transnational social spaces, moving in all directions.

A variety of carriers disseminate culture directly and indirectly in transnational social fields. Some cultural products are communicated during face-to-face interactions; others travel across several "degrees of separation," thus increasing the likelihood that they will be diluted or changed along the way. In some cases, information is purposefully transmitted; in others, receivers are randomly exposed to new ideas. Some carriers are merely *transporters*. They convey information without being transformed by it or transforming it, reporting rather than adapting. Such is the person who tells those at home that women and men pray side by side at the mosque in the United States but does not want to herself. Others are *transplanters*. They convey ideas and practices they themselves have adapted and encourage others to do so. This is the person who tells everyone that men and women pray together and tries to emulate this in a new context. Still others are *translators*. They convey and interpret information so that it is suited to a new context. They problematize or define the identities and interests of others as consist with their own, thereby convincing them to accept their definitions. This is the person who tells about men and women praying side by side but recommends that in Pakistan they pray on separate sides of the room. Often, what they impart is not an exact replica of the old or new but a hybrid.
Where to Go from Here
Thus far, I’ve suggested ways to think about culture and how it shapes the relationship between migration and development. In this section, I suggest ways in which cultural factors could be integrated into development planning and programs to heighten their effectiveness.

Rethinking Space - The socio-cultural and geographic spaces that migrants and non-migrants occupy are not nationally bounded. The catchment area for development programs and policy needs to reflect the transnational socio-cultural spaces in which people actually live or in which they imagine themselves. This means paying attention to how migrants themselves define the landscapes of their daily lives rather than superimposing a map onto them. Much research suggests that this terrain encompasses a multi-sited, ever expanding landscape of destinations between which migrants move.

This is also a multi-layered landscape. The trans-local connections linking migrants throughout Mexico and the United States are produced and reinforced by social and economic flows between regional, national, and supranational entities. Development within that space is not just a matter of getting the local connections right but of using the resources, scripts, norms, and organizational arrangements circulating at other layers of transnational social fields. Changing gender norms, for example, result from migration-driven changes and from the narratives and scripts produced by international aid agencies and the United Nations. The same women who push for new social roles do this because of what they learn from their migrant sisters and because there is an International Women’s Day.

Redefining Outcomes – Those who live in transnational social fields manage at least two, often conflicting, cultural repertoires. They are also trying to make sense of multiple images of progress and success. For instance, the ways in which people think about race in Latin America and in the United States are almost opposites. You are a person of color in the United States when you have one drop of black blood while the slightest link to whiteness makes it possible to ascend the racial hierarchy in Latin America. How do we classify race, and its associated socioeconomic concomitants, when people move between two racial classificatory systems?

Similarly, those whose lives cross borders earn their living and measure their success with respect to two different socioeconomic ladders. They may move up with respect to both, move up with respect to the homeland and downward with respect to the host-land, or they may experience downward mobility in both settings. Where should class be measured? How do we make sense of the immigrant who receives government assistance toward their housing costs in the United States at the same time that they are building a house back home? What about people who can’t pay their rent because they have to
send so much money back each month? In such cases, both remaining poor and getting ahead and where one locates oneself in the class hierarchy are influenced by home and host-country factors. Poverty is a transnational problem that must be measured and remediated transnationally.

**Getting the Institutions Right** - More and more, governments and the nonprofit sector recognize that class, education and health are produced by factors at work in and outside national borders. But policy still fails to reflect that reality. New institutional arrangements are needed that more accurately reflect how migrants and nonmigrants actually live their lives. Some examples already in place include:

- **Extending Sovereignty** – Some states formally or informally allow other states to act within their territory. Such is the case of the *matricula consular*, an identity card issued by the Mexican government to help migrants without social security cards to get a driver's license or open bank accounts. In 2004, more than 100 cities, 900 police departments, 100 financial institutions and 13 states accept the cards as proof of identity.

- **Fostering Partnerships** - Cooperative arrangements have emerged between sending and receiving-country education and health care providers to encourage record sharing, reciprocal credentialing, and joint training programs. The French Aid agency, for instance, established a program allowing immigrants to set up special bank accounts in France that their relatives could draw upon to pay for health care costs in Mali.

- **Taking Advantage of Non-Resident Skills** – Governments recognize that many migrants who study abroad will not return home but that they are never-the-less willing to contribute to some of the talents and skills they acquired abroad. The government of Taiwan, for example, invites emigrants who have completed their PhDs in the United States to participate in meetings, compete for fellowships, and use research facilities in Taiwan in the hope that they will train Taiwanese researchers and engineers in the process.

- **Professional Associations** – Some governments actively support emigrant professional organizations abroad. The Thai government, for example, maintains active consular contacts with associations of expatriate Thai health care providers and professionals.

- **Education Programs** - Cooperative arrangements between sending and receiving country educational institutions are also emerging. Some
of these work informally, like the Dominican Ministry of Education, which sends materials to curriculum specialists in New York City or the teacher exchange and cultural orientation programs that take place each summer. Some are more complex, like the agreement between Cambridge College in Massachusetts and the Brazilian government that the BA degree the College awards will be valid in both countries.

- **Hometown Associations** – Hometown associations have been at the forefront of transnational community development. They emerged in response to changing community needs. Some initiatives aim to strengthen migrants’ capacity to represent their interests on both sides of the border. While the Citizen’s Councils established by the Brazilian Consulate were created as forums for airing community problems, they also gave rise to a more organized community that could negotiate more effectively with officials in Brazil and in the United States.

**The Target Population** - Transnational migration creates at least three distinct categories of experience – those who migrate, those who stay behind but receive support from migrants, and people who don’t move and receive no outside support.

Clearly, this third group is the most at risk. Not only do they not reap the benefits of migration, they live in a cultural context where the standard of living that has become the norm is beyond their reach. Sending states’ motivation to address the causes of migration diminishes with each remittance transfer. The unequal distribution of migration’s rewards also creates a disjuncture between the needs of the individual and the group. Individuals may have more money to go to school or to get health care but this doesn’t necessarily translate into parallel collective improvements in education and health care provision. This disconnect, between the better-off individual and the perpetually needy group, also poses dilemmas for resource distribution.

**Taking Faith Seriously** – Religion is clearly a significant force in the lives of many migrants, and religious institutions are potential sites of enormous power and resources. Religious social movements, writes Christian Smith (1996), bring unique assets to the table, including the sacred legitimation of activism; moral imperatives for love, justice, and freedom; powerful motivating icons, rituals, songs, testimonies, and oratory; and ideologies demanding self-discipline, sacrifice, and altruism. Religious groups come with built-in organizational resources, including trained and experienced leadership; funds; congregated participants and solidarity incentives; and
pre-existing communication channels, authority structures and deviance-monitoring mechanisms. Although religious groups generally remain on the margins of the development process, they represent powerful, though admittedly sometimes problematic, potential partners.

**Development, But at Whose Expense?** - Migrants make major contributions to national development. This fact is not lost on sending-country governments, multilateral institutions, or the foundation community; in fact, they all seem to be turning to remittances as the answer to their development prayers. But designing development strategies based on the promise of future remittances is dangerous. For one thing, it lets states off the hook, allowing them to ignore migration’s root economic and social causes. For another, it disproportionately burdens migrants, saddling them with social and financial responsibilities they may not always want or be able to fulfil.

Moreover, as argued above, migrants and nonmigrants’ interests diverge over time. Migrants want their homelands to remain as they were before they left. They want a place where they can vacation and retire. Who should speak for the village or the nation? Governments walk a difficult line between responding to migrant demands so that they will remain active in their homeland but not at non-migrants’ expense.

**The Second Generation** - Transnational activism is primarily a first generation phenomenon. The children of immigrants will not be involved in their ancestral homes in the same ways and with the same intensity as their parents. But whether or not individuals forge or maintain some kind of transnational connection often depends on the extent to which they were brought up in a transnational space. Children raised in households permeated each day by ideas, practices, and people from afar have been socialized into a set of relationships and skills they can activate at any time, if they so chose. The desire and ability to engage in transnational practices naturally ebbs and flows at different phases of the lifecycle and in different contexts. At the point of marriage or childrearing, the same individual who was uninterested in her ancestral home becomes interested when she wants to find a spouse or values to teach her children. The children of Gujaratis who go back to India to find marriage partners, the second generation Pakistanis who begin to study Islam when their first child is born, or the Chinese American business school students who specialize in Asian banking are doing just that. At critical junctures in their lives, the children of immigrants claim what were latent identities and skills, becoming transnational actors in the process.
**Cultural Resonance** – Culture is part of the development diagnosis. Interventions will be more effective if culture is considered when problems are framed, leaders are chosen, and solutions are designed and implemented. This implies, according to Rao and Walton (2004), that generalizable best practices are difficult to come by because they must be developed in response to specific local conditions. Cultural resonance also implies a different time horizon. Institutions that assume projects can produce rewards within a short timeframe do not bring about lasting social change or enable learning by doing. They create unrealistic expectations which set projects up to fail before they even begin.

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The Political Impact of International Migration on Sending Countries

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SSRC Migration & Development Conference Paper No. 14

Much of the current research on international migration focuses on three broad areas: the social, economic and political effects on receiving countries; the variegated and complex effects on migrants (and their families); and the economic, social and cultural effects on sending communities, including the effects of financial remittances. One area, however, that has received relatively little attention is the political effects of international migration on sending countries and its consequent effects on development.

The political effects of international migration on the country of origin can occur through three channels: Absence; Diaspora, and Return.

I. The Absence Channel
The absence channel measures the direct effects when some fraction of a country’s population has emigrated. The almost canonical theoretical framework for analyzing the political effects of international migration is Albert Hirschman’s well known treatment of “exit, voice and loyalty”. Hirschman argued that “exit has been shown to drive out voice,” and “voice is likely to play an important role in organizations only on condition that exit is ruled out.” 2 In this framework, societal groups that exit through international migration would lose voice and their political influence would wane. However, this is hardly inevitable. When emigrants “exit” a given society, it is usually not the case that they no longer contribute to that migrant-sending state. Emigrants often have greater access to important resources, ranging from remittances, skills-transfer through return, and networks, that “buy” them voice. International migration can consequently amplify rather that attenuate voice, depending on the selectivity characteristics of the migration.

Exit can also serve a stabilizing role by removing disaffected groups. Since the Cuban revolution more than one-eighth of the population has left the country (Pedraza, 2007), and Kapur (forthcoming) argues that international

1 This discussion draws from chapters 1, 2 and 9 from my manuscript, Democracy, Death and Diamonds: The Consequences of International Migration from India on India.
migration has eased the political ascendancy of India’s numerically dominant lower castes. The introduction of universal franchise in India signalled the death-knell of the political hegemony of India’s high castes. In recent decades, as the inexorable logic of numbers has reshaped the political landscape of India, and as lower and middle castes have gained a bigger share of political power, they have sought to use this new-found access to redistribute economic resources. The question was not if this would happen, but when and at what cost. No group gives up its privileges without a fight and the ‘silent social revolution” in India could have been much more contentious but for the possibility of exit open to India’s elites. The exit possibilities of international migration, whether for jobs or education, has reduced the insecurity of India’s elites – thereby making them less implacably opposed to the political ascendancy of hitherto marginalized social groups. In turn, this has made Indian politics less contentious than it might otherwise have been in the absence of possibilities of exit for elites. Thus, while in Cuba’s case, international migration may have helped to consolidate an authoritarian regime, in India’s case it contributed to the strengthening of its democracy.

But when does the “exit” entailed by international migration consolidate a regime (as in the contrasting cases of Cuba and India), and when does it bring it down – as exemplified by the East German case in 1989? What political characteristics of the origin country and selection effects inherent in international migration shape the political consequences? For instance, the exit of Sephardic Jews in the late 1940s and 1950s and more recently of Christians (Sennott, 2004), may have affected the politics of the Middle-East, not just by removing important religious minorities but also by removing the middle-class. For instance, Iraq was one of the most secular countries in the Middle-East. But the Christian population in Iraq, a large constituent of the country’s middle class, dropped from 1.4 million in 1987 to one million before the Iraq war to 850,000 in September 2004, leaving some to argue that this mass exodus is “robbing Iraq of a politically moderate, socially liberal, and largely pro-Western population at a critical juncture.”

The last example posits an important research question: are the negative effects of the “brain drain” most manifest on institution building? International migration from developing countries is invariably positively selected, i.e. the average human capital of migrants is greater than those remaining behind. To the extent that this human capital is critical for institution building, and institutions are critical for development, the long-term effects can be quite negative.

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The loss of human capital can adversely affect a country’s institutions in several ways. The option to emigrate could make younger people less willing to invest in skills that are most relevant to local institutions, preferring instead to invest in private sector skills that are more internationally marketable—e.g., becoming programmers rather than lawyers. Most critically the absence of talented individuals affects the supply of institution builders (Kapur and McHale, 2005). These are the professional classes with the managerial and technical capabilities to run schools and hospitals, banks and government statistical systems, supervise road building and the like. As Fukuyama (2004, p. 65) notes, “public agencies with poorly trained staff and inadequate infrastructure will have difficulty delivering services.” The implications of the loss of scarce educated individuals may go beyond the loss of their narrowly defined human capital: it also undermines social capital and with it the more informal parts of the country’s institutional infrastructure. In addition, absence can also impact the demand for better institutions. While by new means universal, historically the middle class – professionals and intellectuals – has played an important role in democratization (Kurzman and Leahey, 2004). The more educated (and internationally marketable) are often better positioned to exercise “voice” and press for changes in the status quo (although it is certainly possible that highly talented individuals have a stake in the continuation of bad institutions that allow them to extract rents). Emigration can thus rob the country of influential voices for reform, especially those with internationally marketable talents, and those who are not in the business of rent extraction at home.

*Impacts on equity and thereby on politics.* The affects of migration on equity are complex depending critically on who leaves. Emigration with a given skill composition changes the size and composition of the domestic labor supply, and with it the distribution of incomes among those remaining behind. Given the reality that international migration from developing countries is inevitably positively selected, this will have adverse impacts on income distribution due to an increase in the skill premium. Although there is now considerable evidence on the importance of remittances in reducing poverty (for a survey see World Bank, 2006, Chapter 5), its effects on equity are more ambiguous. Indeed remittances are more likely to amplify inter-household inequality, especially in the short run, although this may change over the medium and the long run both because of the spillover effects of remittance spending and the lower risks of migration for lower income households. Another negative impact of migration on equity is its possible effects of amplifying regional and inter-ethnic inequality since migrants are rarely randomly selected but rather usually concentrated in the towns and regions of the sending country.
II. The Diaspora Channel
The diaspora channel captures the role emigrants play from afar. The central idea is that an emigrant retains certain connections to the home country, and so should not be viewed as “just another foreigner” from the perspective of the home country. Since diasporas reside outside their kin-state yet claim a legitimate stake in it, they challenge the traditional boundaries of nation states. Foner (1997) argues that “immigrants are seen as maintaining familial, economic, political, and cultural ties across international borders, in effect making the home and host societies a single arena of social action.” They demonstrate “continuing commitment to the norms, values, and aspirations of the home society,” even as they put down roots in the new country. And with today’s cheap and fast communications and transportation make it possible “for the first time for immigrants to operate more or less simultaneously in a variety of different places.” As actors that straddle national boundaries, diasporas have recourse to autonomous resources and values. Moreover, unlike most domestic actors, they can more easily interact with other actors across state boundaries.

An important research question concerns the forms of political participation that diasporas engage in and why they vary across immigrant sending countries. Members of diasporas participate in the politics of their country of origin in a variety of ways. In some cases they have the right to vote (whether as dual citizens or as citizens residing abroad). Perhaps more importantly they influence the voting preferences of kin in the country of origin, an influence that is amplified if they send financial remittances (Dominican Republic and Mexico are good examples). In other cases, they return and run as candidates themselves. Where direct participation is ruled out diasporas attempt to influence politics in the country of origin through financial contributions to political parties and candidates. The impact of these contributions will depend both on the relative magnitude of these contributions as well as the groups and parties to which they are made. But how important are the different mechanisms, and how does this importance vary with the characteristics of the diaspora, the host country and the country of origin?

While the flow of financial remittances has received much attention, with few exceptions, the political economy consequences of remittances have been weakly analyzed. Kiren Chaudhry investigated the process of institutional development and business-government relations in cases of reliance on two types of external capital in the Middle East. She found that financial inflows into Yemen in the form of labor remittances from temporary

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migration initially weakened the Yemeni state bypassing both state institutions and the formal banking system going directly to millions of Yemeni migrants.

Alternatively, to the extent that there are strong selection effects in who migrates (by ethnicity and religion), remittances induced differentials in income and consumption can rapidly reorient hierarchies in the sending country. Note that since in poor countries even small amounts of overseas remittances can have large effects, the resulting rapid hierarchical changes could drive conflict. Another variant stems from the fact that remittances are used more for consumption rather than investment and “conspicuous consumption of religion” through the buildings of new and lavish places of worship. The cognitive effects can increase inter-community conflict.

The complex long-term political effects of migration are evident in Wood’s analysis of democratic transition in El Salvador (Wood, 2000). The landed oligarchy had long suppressed democratization leading to a near civil-war in the 1980s. The resulting political instability led to a large outflow of uprooted peasants (especially to the U.S.). Even as agricultural exports dropped, by 1991 remittances exceeded export earnings. On the one hand, due to Dutch disease affects, the upward pressure on the exchange rate undermined the competitiveness of Salvadoran exports (further impelling elites out of agriculture). According to Wood, Salvador’s political economy was driven not by export agriculture and its processing but by international assistance and overseas remittances. The shift in elite interests reshaped Salvadoran politics. The new winners were sectors that controlled significant shares in courier companies that transferred remittances, foreign exchange financial intermediaries, retail sectors that provided consumption goods, and real estate and construction companies. The broad shift in elite economic interest from agriculture to services in turn abated the severity of rural repression and shifted elites to adopt a bargained instead of a coerced resolution toward conflict (Wood, p. 62-65).

There is a large literature on the political economy effects of international financial flows, be it from international financial institutions, FDI and portfolio flows or natural resource windfalls. For instance in contrast to the effects of remittances on Yemen, in the neighboring Gulf countries and Saudi Arabia, oil rents have strengthened the state strong by creating a huge, financially autonomous distributive bureaucracy. Thus the different sources and channels of external financial inflows differentially affect state-society relations – and we have very limited understanding on the macro-political effects of financial remittances.

Another channel through which a diaspora can affect the politics of its
country of origin is its cognitive impact and a channel for the flow of ideas. Is it the case that it is the less visible, non-quantifiable, and intangible remittances or the flow of ideas, that may have a more critical impact than the flow of money? Levitt (2001) shows the power of “social remittances” at the household and societal level. But is there a political counterpart?

There are several mechanisms through which diasporas influence policy changes in the country of origin. It can do so directly particularly on issues where the diaspora has strong economic interests, or as Wood’s study shows by reshaping policy preferences of elites. Thus, a developing country’s political economy might be affected not just by the usual sources of influence – be it the Bretton Woods Institutions, international financial markets, or the US Treasury – but also by its diaspora, in particular if the latter enjoys legitimacy and points of contact with decision-making elites in the country of origin.

A very different mechanism through which diasporas affect the country of origin is their role as key drivers of global criminal networks. There are several factors underlying the growing role of diasporas in international criminal activities. Much like any international industry, many criminal networks rely upon expatriated populations to help facilitate their activities abroad. As with any business, international criminal activity also requires enforcement mechanisms and trust, and diasporic networks can more easily internalize these mechanisms. Increased migration—much of which stems from states with weak economies and political instability—has created a large demand for both financial support and larger global networks. In many cases, the strength of such networks is compounded by diasporas’ weak integration into host societies. Finally, forced repatriation of felons (e.g. from the US to Central America) has also strengthened international criminal networks.

While the impacts are large on source and destination countries, the effects are understandably much greater on the former. These transnational links provide domestic criminal groups in source countries with substantial financial resources that are often large enough for them to emerge as significant political actors with the power to destabilize weak states. The profits from drugs, often funneled through diasporic networks, have played an important role in Haiti’s narco-coup in 2004, the ongoing violence in Colombia, and the war-lordism in Afghanistan. These activities bring in billions of dollars of revenue to source countries each year, but also increase

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5 According to UN estimates, international crime is a $1-1.5 trillion annual industry, with drug trafficking, illegal arms trade, human trafficking and smuggling (especially women and children for prostitution and servitude), and money laundering constituting the principal activities.
their economic dependence on drug trafficking, prostitution, and other forms of illegal activity. Virtually all international criminal networks—whether Albanian, Italian, Colombian, or Chinese—rely upon their respective diaspora as a base for their activity (Table 1).

**Table 1. Diaspora based Global Criminal Networks**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organized Crime group</th>
<th>Country of Origin</th>
<th>Global Presence</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Italian Mafia</td>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>Europe, Central and South America, the Caribbean, the US and Canada.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russian Organized Crime</td>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>Nearly 60 countries but especially East and Central Europe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Albanian Criminal Groups</td>
<td>Albanian</td>
<td>EU, East Europe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chinese Triads</td>
<td>China, Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan</td>
<td>Netherlands, the UK and Germany.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>Over 80 countries in West Africa, Europe, North America</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latin American</td>
<td>Colombia, Central America</td>
<td>Europe, US</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


*Long distance nationalism:*

Diasporas have long been known to engage in long-distance nationalism. Diasporic identities range from the cosmopolitan to virulent ethnic nationalism. It should therefore not be surprising that the actions of a diaspora towards the country of origin manifest itself in complex ways. The fact that diasporas are prone to long-distance nationalism is now well established and indeed nationalism as a modern phenomenon of imagined communities is one that often grew in the minds of diasporic elites. *The act of migration and living abroad affects identities, attenuating some and amplifying others – but which ones and why?*

Most explanations on why diasporas engage in long distance nationalism put cognitive explanations centering on identity issues as the driving force. *However, these theoretical explanations are of little help in understanding the intensity of a diaspora’s nationalism relative to that in the country of origin, the intensity of one diaspora’s nationalism relative to others, or what form this long-distance nationalism takes: whether ethnic or civic nationalism. Diasporas engage in civic nationalism, ranging from lobbying the government*
of their adopted country on foreign policy to sending funds during a natural calamity – what might be expected of a civic nationalism. Yet they also support, to varying extents, ethnic nationalism, whose consequences can be deeply inimical but can also be easily exaggerated.

The role of diasporas in ethnic violence and civil wars in the country of origin has drawn particular attention given the serious implications (Shain and Sherman, 1998). Historically, however, as was the case with Greeks, Poles, Irish and Slovak diasporas in the 19th and 20th centuries, or the communities of Russian Socialists throughout Western Europe at the start of the 20th Century, long-distance nationalism of diasporas was portrayed in a more benign and positive light as "freedom fighters". Context makes an ideology appear threatening or not. While diasporas in the earlier period were fighting multinational non-democratic empires, today they are battling democratic states, and hence perceived as more threatening. When they are not (Cuba, Iran), they appear to enjoy greater international forbearance.

In recent years diasporas have played a particularly important role in sustaining insurgencies. The cases of Palestinian, Irish and Sri Lankan Tamil diasporas in helping foster strong insurgencies are well know. The sudden upsurge in strength of the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) during the summer of 1998 at the expense of more compromise-oriented Kosovo elites may have been at least partially due to fundraising efforts by the Albanian diaspora in the West. The Croatian diaspora was quite effective in helping swing the international community behind the Croats in their conflict with the Croatian Serbs in the mid-1990s. Collier and Hoeffler (2000) find that, all other factors being equal, the risk of conflict starting after at least five years of peace is six times greater in nations with the largest diasporas as compared to those with the smallest. Moreover, “after peace has been restored, the legacy of conflict-induced grievance enables rebel movements to restart conflict by drawing on the support of their diasporas.” Still, although their study also presents suggestive evidence that diasporas are an important factor in civil wars, their relative importance relative to other factors continues to be disputed.

Why have diasporas emerged as important actors and supporter of civil insurgencies, militant movements and terrorism around the world especially after the end of Cold War? In their survey of 74 active insurgencies between 1991-2000, Byman et. al. (2001) found that 44 received state support of a magnitude critical to the survival and success of the movement; another 21 movements received significant support from refugees, 19 received significant support from diasporas, and 25 gained backing from other outside actors, such as Islamic organizations or relief agencies. Table 2 lists diaspora support for extremist causes (including insurgencies) in the “home country”.
Non-state actors including diasporas apparently play a particularly important role in funding.

Table 2. Diaspora Extremism since the 1990s

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Conflict Country</th>
<th>Insurgent Group/Ultra-nationalist/Extremist groups</th>
<th>Diaspora Hostland</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>Taleban</td>
<td>Pakistan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kosovo</td>
<td>Kosovo Liberation Army</td>
<td>Albania</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>Islamic Salvation Army (AIS); Armed Islamic Group (GIA)</td>
<td>France</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Azerbaijan</td>
<td>Armenian separatists in Ngorno-Karabakh</td>
<td>Armenia, North America, EU</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Croatia/Former Republic of Yugoslavia</td>
<td>Croatian nationalists</td>
<td>Croatia, Germany</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cuba</td>
<td>Cuban Exiles</td>
<td>US</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>Gamaat Islamiya (IG)</td>
<td>Middle-East, UK</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India (Kashmir)</td>
<td>Hizb al-Mujahideen, Harkat al-Ansar, Lashkar-e-Taiba</td>
<td>Pakistan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>Vishwa Hindu Parishad</td>
<td>US, UK</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>Free Aceh Movement (GAM)</td>
<td>Libya, Malaysia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Israel (occupied territories)</td>
<td>PLO, Hamas</td>
<td>Midde-East</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Israel</td>
<td>Zionist Organization of America; Jewish Defense League</td>
<td>US</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>Hezbollah</td>
<td>Americas, Middle-East</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>Chechen Rebels</td>
<td>EU, Middle-East</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rwanda</td>
<td>Forces Armees Rwandaises</td>
<td>Burundi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sri-Lanka</td>
<td>LTTE</td>
<td>Canada, EU</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>Kurdish Workers Party (PKK)</td>
<td>EU (especially Germany)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>IRA, PIRA, Islamic groups</td>
<td>US, Pakistan</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Kapur (2007)

A different research questions centers on why certain diaspora fuelled conflicts ebb while others continue to simmer. For instance in South Asia, conflicts within Punjab (in India) and Sri Lanka led the Sikh diaspora in the former
and the Sri Lankan Tamil diaspora in the latter to actively support armed groups. Yet, while overseas support for the Khalistan movement has waned, overseas Sri Lankan Tamil communities continue to finance the LTTE. What explains this divergence? Fair (2005) argues that an important factor in this divergence was differences in the geographical and political reach of their institutional arrangements. However, it could be argued that changes in the domestic context that gave rise to these movements in the first place were even more important. While India succeeded in the restoration of democracy in Punjab and the elimination of militants there, Sri Lanka was unable to do so. A similar case could be made of Northern Ireland where concessions and agreements made by the British government, together with changes in the international context post-September 2001, led to a sharp decline in the Irish diaspora’s support for militant groups there.

The factors that affect the likelihood, form and intensity of diasporic long distance nationalism – fine grained characteristics of the diaspora and the countries of origin and settlement – need better understanding. The conventional wisdom is that diasporic nationalism is a consequence of the failure of immigrants to identify with the host society: it fills their identity “needs” in the host society primarily because of low levels of assimilation. Thus Portes (1997) argues that the preoccupation with the country of origin is greatest among those immigrants who intend to return (e.g. political exiles and migrant laborers) and least among those immigrants who have made a long-term commitment to the host society (e.g. professionals and immigrant entrepreneurs). Others argue that ethnic identity will be salient even among professionals if they experience discrimination (Gellner, 1983). Similarly, another view argues that loss of status is a driving force behind diasporic transnational political activity. Jones-Correa (1998) for instance argues that Latino males face a greater loss of status upon migrating to the United States and consequently are more likely to participate in political activities in the country of origin. While these theories argue that diasporic nationalism is linked to levels and aspirations regarding assimilation, Kenny (2001) argues that support for diasporic nationalism is strategically adopted by particular groups within the immigrant community as a means of generating support for their own local goals in the host society.

Ethnic diasporas have been empowered in recent years because of their growing size, visibility, and impact within the international system. Diasporic communities now have more mechanisms to call attention to issues of interest in their home countries. The ongoing communications and information technology revolution, including the Internet, allows non state actors to more easily fundraise, mount international public relations campaigns, or exert pressure upon governments in host countries. Global banking nets make it easier, faster and cheaper to move money than ever
before. What is the role of new technologies in the political empowerment of international migrants?

III. The Return Channel
The final channel through which emigration affects the country of origin is the return channel when emigrants return with new skills, savings, connections and ideas. Return migrants are often viewed as those “who did not make it.” However, a smaller subset who return are those who may be more intensely nationalist and more committed to national building—exemplified by the leaderships of ant-colonial nationalist movements, virtually all of whom had studied and lived abroad.

A different way of thinking of ideas is the role of migration in developing new skills, changing preferences and expectations, particularly through higher education abroad. The role of the “Chicago Boys,” economists trained in the University of Chicago who returned to spearhead neoliberal reforms in Chile— is an example (Barber, 1995). In general, however, this is an area that is poorly understood. Given, the current large movements of international students (nearly half million from China and Indian alone), this issue deserves much greater examination.

Here too, there is no reason to believe that skills and ideas acquired abroad always have positive consequences. The new skills of return migrants could lie as much in new agricultural techniques as the organization and techniques of violence. Pakistanis and Yemenis, who migrated to Afghanistan in fight in the wars there and returned, have brought with them a set of new ideas, which is unlikely to be beneficial to their countries. Similarly gang members of Central American origin in the United States who were deported back to their countries are much more adept in the use of guns. This appears to have increased the levels of violence in their countries when they return.

Final Thoughts
It must be remembered that citizens leave their country for a reason. And when they leave the factors that caused them to leave do not disappear—indeed they could worsen. There are likely to be considerable differences on the motivations for individual action between migrants who leave for better economic opportunities versus those forced out by conflict. Understanding the reasons for leaving is critical in understanding the varying behavior and effects of diasporas.

Theories that try to explain the salience of long-distance nationalism among diasporas are weaker in helping to understand the form this nationalism takes. Analytically examining why diasporas may behave in a certain fashion
is seldom clearly accomplished other than with regard to the selection effects of who leaves and a perceived “identity crisis”. It is not clear what characteristics of emigrants would result in specific such behavior or why an identity crisis (even if that term can be clearly specified) would necessarily manifest itself in support for violence.

Finally we need to think about several critical overarching or “meta questions” regarding the political effects of international migration on sending countries. How does international migration reconfigure origin state sovereignty in the international system as a result of changing demands and material resources of their diasporas and return migrants? What factors drive or shape states policies on international migration? When do they promote labor exports or try to rein in the “brain drain”? What explains the differences in steps that states are taking to expand sovereignty over people located outside of their national territory? How does the status of émigrés in host countries affect changes in policies of the origin state? As Aihwa Ong and Donald Nonini (1997), in their discussion of the “cultural politics” of the Chinese diaspora, diasporas don’t just “transcend” or “subvert” the nation-state’s political and economic discipline and liberate their agents, they are just as likely to strengthen them, while at the same time perpetuating old forms of exploitation or inventing new ones, and granting them extraterritorial impunity. “One should not assume that what is diasporic, fluid, border-crossing, or hybrid is intrinsically subversive of power structures.” But when do diasporas attenuate or amplify state power? What are the effects of international migration on the nation building project? And when (and how) are diasporas themselves used as political resources by origin and destination countries?

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Migrant Political Participation and Development: Re-politicizing development and re-socializing politics

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SSRC Migration & Development Conference Paper No. 15

Introduction
This discussion paper addresses research on migrant’s political participation in relation to development. Research in a several social science disciplines has established that migrants from a wide range of contexts of departure in the global South remain involved in homeland affairs while living and working various countries. In addition to documenting trends, this scholarship offers explanatory analyses. Two broad literatures are of current relevance to the topic. First, in migration studies, economics and anthropology there are studies of remittances (mainly economic remittances), and of the potential and/or actual role of migrant organizations and diaspora groups in development. This work tends to focus on contributions to economic development through poverty alleviation (income security through remittances) and community infrastructure improvements organized by groups of migrants. Second, in political science, sociology and migration studies, there is a rich body of work on political transnationalism. This research analyzes state policies toward emigrants, migrant participation in electoral and non-electoral politics “back home,” and transformations in citizenship practices and institutions without necessarily using the language of development.

After a surge of interest by various institutional development actors (e.g. International Financial Institutions, foundations, migrant producing governments, etc.), particularly in the last five years or so, there are signs of change in the framing of the issue. Initial enthusiasm over the possibility of using remittances for development has been tempered by statements about remittances as private income, while plans for diaspora involvement in homeland development and peace-building are similarly qualified by questions about how to support positive outcomes rather than abetting

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2 Most of this work is on South-North transnational connections, in spite of recognition of the importance of South-South migration.
negative ones. Whether or not this is a short term response to financial volatility, anti-immigrant movements, and security concerns, it is a good time to reflect on the state of the art, consider why interest may be dampening in some quarters, and how we might draw on broader discussions regarding development on one hand, and migrant political activism on the other, to gain insights into participation and development (together), with an eye to developing an informed research agenda.

To contribute to this research agenda, it is useful to reflect on how knowledge has been produced and why. My argument is that after an initial opening and flourishing of discussions on migrant transnationalism and development during the late 80s and early 90s that included overlapping discussion regarding development and transnational political organizing, the terms of debate began to narrow and diverge, so that work on migration and development became practically synonymous with remittances and development, while research on transnational political participation took off on an increasingly separate track. I identify and discuss two reasons for this. One is the “developmentalization of the diaspora,” in which many stakeholders have gotten caught up (including academics and migrant organizations). Drawing selectively on Foucauldian approaches to development, I suggest that efforts to de-politicize development by making it a technical problem have contributed to the enchantment and potential disenchantment with migration and development.

The second has to do with contending approaches and developments within migration studies. The last 15 years or so have produced enormous advances, but there have also been tensions between narrower and broader definitions of and approaches to migrant transnationalism, and between scholars of transnational migration studies and critics. Without going into the debates, I suggest that they have contributed to the narrowing and abstraction of “the political” in research on migrant transnational engagements. This has contributed to narrowing the definition of political actors and institutions, and separating the political from the social relations in which they are embedded. My argument is that a research agenda on this topic should draw on the available research by building on efforts to broaden the terms of discussion in each of these literatures, and work to increase the overlap between scholarship on migration and development, and on migrant political participation. That is, we need to bring politics back in to transnational mobilization for development, and broaden the analysis of transnational migrant political activism by highlighting how it is embedded in broader social relations. In so doing, we can contribute to efforts to build a more global sociology and strengthen interdisciplinary transnational studies.
I. Remittance Based Development and Political Transnationalism

Reviewing Existing Research
Research on migrant’s political participation in their homelands and in a set of practices called “development” has grown tremendously in the last decade, spurred by at least five processes: (1) the phenomenal growth in migrant remittances and associated changes both in research tracking remittances and services offering money transfers; (2) “on the ground” changes in the frequency, intensity and density of collective and individual migrant claimmaking and involvement in local and national affairs “back home;” (3) federal and subnational policies in migrant producing and receiving countries that facilitate or at least do not dramatically constrain such involvement; (4) interest by International Financial Institutions (IFIs) as well as Foundations and other donors in supporting migrant participation in “development;” and (5) conceptual shifts in migration studies, particularly in transnational and diaspora studies, which have generated research on cross-border engagements and identities.

The two areas of concern, transnational political participation and migrant participation and development, have generated somewhat distinct bodies of work.

Migration and Development
Interest in the possibility of migrants contributing to development in their communities and countries of origin has generated an enormous amount of academic and policy analysis, which I do not need to review in detail. I will note that individual and collective remittances and migrant hometown associations have come to embody participation in development “back home” for many parties, including migrants, policy-makers, development planners, and political authorities in migrant producing and receiving contexts. High expectations surrounding remittances and, to some extent, the increasing profile of migrant associations and “diaspora groups” led Sarah Gammage (2006), Luis Guarnizo (2003), and others (Goldring 2004) to identify remittance-based development as the newest development paradigm. Concerns raised by these authors have been joined by questions regarding the effectiveness of remittances as “the new development mantra” (Kapur 2004), and unease about assumptions underlying the spread of “remittance euphoria”(De Haas 2005; Mitchell 2006; Orozco 2007). These analysts agree that remittances contribute to recipients’ well-being and help reduce “transient” poverty, but they and others also warn that these funds will not address the structural causes of poverty (Orozco 2004) or contribute to human and social development (Orozco 2007).

Academic critiques of the idea that migration and remittances will address or somehow significantly advance poverty reduction and development goals
have been joined more recently by signs of disenchantment on the part of development and multilateral organizations. Some governments (Canadian) and quasi-governmental organizations and foundations remain interested in Diaspora involvement in development and peace-building (University for Peace 2006). However, discourse regarding migration and development appears to be shifting slightly. A declaration produced by the VII South American Conference on Migrations (VII Conference on South American Migrations 2007) notes that:

“...remittances are private transfers generated by the migrant population which are used to improve the quality of life of the recipients, and which, therefore, should not be considered official aid for development, under any circumstances.”

Similarly, after developing innovative programs to support and accompany migrant organizations in the United States in 2003-04 (IAF and Ford), programs designed to capture migrant investment and leverage remittances for development (IDB 2001), and other projects aimed at strengthening capacity among migrant organizations, these programs seem to be narrowing in on improving the efficiency of remittance transfers while reducing broader claims about working with migrant organizations, capacity building, and development.

It is too early to tell whether this signals the eclipse of another development paradigm. The interesting question in my view is to understand what lies behind the widespread enchantment with remittances as a proxy for migrant participation in development.

Migrants and Transnational Political Participation

Research on migrant political involvement in national or subnational arenas has also produced a considerable body of scholarship, although curiously, it does not overlap much with work that uses the language of development. There are various ways to categorize this research (Levitt and Jaworsky 2007). One could, for example, distinguish between normatively critical and celebratory approaches. Among the former, political scientists have a history of being suspicious of long-distance nationalism (Anderson 1992), although anthropologists have also raised concerns about its negative impacts (Glick Schiller and Fouron 1999). Regarding the second category, the overly celebratory tone of some of the early work in the area of transnational studies that claimed migrants were circumventing state power was registered some time ago (Guarnizo and Smith 1998; Mahler 1998).

3 Author's translation of: “...que las remesas son flujos financieros privados producto del trabajo de la población migrante que inciden en el mejoramiento de la calidad de vida de sus beneficiarios, y, por lo tanto, no deben ser consideradas ayuda oficial al desarrollo, bajo ningún concepto.”
Another way to categorize work on migrant political transnationalism is based on research orientation, definition of and approach to transnationalism, and focus of research.¹ I will distinguish between four approaches that are informed by structural and political economy accounts of global migration, but diverge in other ways.⁵ One approach analyzes the frequency and scope of transnational political practices and their determinants, and relies on quantitative survey research (cf. work by Alejandro Portes and his colleagues, e.g. (Guarnizo, Portes and Haller 2003)).⁶ Transnational practices, political and otherwise, are defined in specific but relatively narrow terms as habitual behavior across borders in order to avoid the danger of the term “transnational” being applied too broadly. In order to operationalize this definition, research methods rely on individual-level surveys, though data analysis is contextualized with additional information. Conceptually, this work emphasizes the importance of analyzing both individual attributes and contexts of departure and reception to understand outcomes. In practice, individual level analysis takes center stage, as the context of departure is captured by aggregating people by country of origin, while contextual elements of the destination locality or country are captured by aggregating by period of arrival and location. This research has made critical contributions to transnational studies. In particular, it has addressed questions about who is active in transnational engagements, and offered insight into determinants (part of the why). At the same time, questions remain about how, or the specific mechanisms and processes that facilitate transnational engagements, in specific settings and over time.

A second approach is institutional and mainly, though not exclusively, qualitative. Here the focus is on identifying the institutional and contextual parameters that shape migrant political transnational engagement, including state policies and subnational regional and urban contexts (Itzigsohn 2000; Landolt 2007; Landolt 2008; Levitt and Dehesa 2003; Ostergaard-Nielsen 2001; Smith 2003). This category also includes comparative crossnational studies of the types of claims immigrants make (national versus transnational) and the level and location of political institutions to which they direct claims (Koopmans et al. 2001). This research has contributed to our comparative understanding of how and why transnational engagements take place, focusing on macro-determinants and opportunity structures.

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¹ I am limiting this discussion to research that focuses transnational engagements, and leaving out work that examines political incorporation.
⁵ I am overdrawing distinctions between these approaches for purposes of discussion. There are examples of researchers that have heeded the call to study in-between transnationalism, which is consistent with working between the second and third approaches that I outline.
⁶ This systematic and positivist aspect of this work contributed to making transnational approaches legitimate within migration studies.
A third approach focuses on migrant cross-border agency, networks and coalition politics to analyze transformations in political institutions, citizenship and civil society as institutions and arenas, as well as shifts in power relations between states and emigrants (Cheran 2007; Fox 2005; Smith and Bakker 2005; Smith 2006). Work in this area is usually qualitative and interpretive, often includes ethnography, and takes various approaches to historical depth. Though in some ways similar to the second approach, the focus is more squarely on the role of migrant agency in social change and the transformation of political institutions, rather than on the institutional parameters of migrant transnationalism. As such, it adds to our understanding of how transnational engagements unfold, and how institutions can be reshaped through migrant agency. This approach also highlights tensions surrounding gender, generation, class, and racial formation as these intersect with and shape power negotiations in local and translocal arenas.

A fourth approach is interpretive, sometimes historical, and examines transnational political engagements from a broader social fields or social transformation perspective (Basch, Glick Schiller and Szanton Blanc 1994; Castles 2002; Castles 2003; Levitt and Glick-Schiller 2004). The focus is on understanding transnational political participation as part of broader processes of social transformation using conceptual categories that are territorially and nationally “unbound,” and informed by theorizing in the areas of transnational migration, transnational studies (more broadly), and globalization. The transnational social fields approach focuses on the constitution of multi-dimensional and trans-local social fields that include migrant and non-migrant actors, where “politics” are embedded in multi-level social relations. Castles’ (2002) call for the development of social transformation studies as the “analysis of transnational connectedness and the way this affects national societies, local communities and individuals” is consistent with the transnational fields approach, particularly when the latter is informed by Glick Schiller’s (2005) call for bringing a theory of power to transnational studies.

In this fourth approach, migrants are framed as social actors who negotiate contradictory social relations at the family and community level; as heterogenous actors whose engagements are also embedded in contradictory national and transnational class, gender and racialized hierarchies; as actors organized into political networks and organizations that contest and negotiate power relations vis-a-vis political authorities in countries of origin and destination; and also as actors operating within global relations of inequality and geographic terrains marked by spatialized inequality (Glick Schiller 2005; Landolt and Goldring 2006; Levitt and Glick-Schiller 2004; Wong 2006).
Contributions of Existing Research

Research conducted from each of these approaches has contributed to building a rich and nuanced body of scholarship and made important contributions addressing a range of questions and conceptual issues.

- US based research confirms that a small but active share of Latin American immigrants engage in habitual transnational political practices. However, a larger share is involved on a more sporadic basis.

- US based survey research finds that migrant political involvement in homeland affairs is a gendered process that can take place alongside successful individual-level incorporation (exclusion and marginalization are not the only motivations for transnational engagement) (Guarnizo, Portes and Haller 2003). Established men with higher levels of education tend to be most active in political (and economic) transnational practices. Research conducted using a similar approach in Canada offers different findings, namely that migrant transnationalism decreases over time and with incorporation (Hiebert and Ley 2003). However, Canadian based research using other approaches identifies a more complex relationship between incorporation and transnationalism (Goldring and Krishnamurti 2007; Satchewich and Wong 2006).

- The context of departure affects the extent and intensity of migrant organizations’ involvement in politics, but the relationship is not always straightforward. Violence and limited opportunities for involvement may discourage involvement in some cases, e.g. Colombians compared to Salvadorans and Dominicans (Portes, Escobar and Walton Radford 2007), although we know it can also encourage opposition movements (Cheran 2007; Lyons 2006).

- Migrant producing states have responded to increased emigration and fiscal crises through constitutional and other legal changes, as well as uncodified rhetorical shifts, to redefine national membership, and in many cases, political rights, so as to include emigrants.

- The context of reception also shapes patterns of transnational engagement, and this may help account for divergent patterns associated with apparently similar contexts of departure—although not entirely. Here too the evidence regarding the exact relationship indicates a need for further research. Ostergaard-Nielsen (2001) found that the multicultural policies and relative inclusion of the Netherlands limited transnational political involvement while the absence of multiculturalism—in fact, strong assimilation pressure combined with exclusion of non-ethnic Germans and non-citizens in
Germany—was associated with higher levels of transnational involvement. A comparative study of immigrant claims-making in Germany, the UK and the Netherlands supports the finding regarding high levels of transnational claims-making in Germany, but found higher levels in the Netherlands compared to the UK, a pattern attributed to the Netherlands’ relatively more open citizenship regime (Koopmans et al. 2001). Landolt’s (2007) work on Salvadorans in Los Angeles and Toronto identifies different trajectories of organizing in each context of settlement. This is explained in relation to differences in the Canadian and US refugee policy, the processes of migration and the two populations, but also with respect to the relative importance of Salvadorans in these two countries to Salvadoran opposition groups and governments in El Salvador.

- Place matters for transnational engagements; transnational social fields do not homogenize place and space. Different regions and cities within migrant producing countries and contexts of settlement offer different institutional opportunities, and help to shape different forms of political transnationalism. For example, Salvadorans in Los Angeles, Washington, and Toronto display distinct patterns of engagement vis-a-vis El Salvador (Landolt 2008), as do Mexicans from different localities and states in Mexico (Goldring 2002; Smith and Bakker 2005; Smith 2003). Similarly, Mexican HTAs in Los Angeles and Chicago exhibit different patterns of consolidation and activism (Rivera-Salgado, Bada and Escala-Rabadán 2005).

- Transnational social fields are contexts in which contradictory politics take place at various levels. Some social actors can leverage resources and status through the “exit” of migration and gain “voice” and power vis-a-vis homeland politics (Kearney and Nagengast 1989; Moses 2005; Smith 2003; Smith 2006), sometimes through engagement in “ethnic” politics in the destination country (Karpathakis 1999). At the same time, these actors may experience negative racialization and other forms of social exclusion in other geographic spaces within these fields (Smith 2006). Meanwhile, other actors in the same transnational social fields may loose power and voice, depending on tensions associated with immobility, social location (e.g. class, gender, racialization, legal status, ethnicity), place, political importance to the homeland government or opposition, etc. (Al-Ali, Black and Koser 2001; Goldring 2001; Guarnizo and Smith 1998; Landolt 2007).

**Concerns**
These findings have greatly advanced our knowledge of migrant political participation. At the same time, questions remain, particularly about why, how and when various groups of migrants organize (beyond HTAs), how
organized migrants read and respond to shifting opportunities, and how they form strategic and longer-term networks and spaces of engagement with a wide array of institutional actors. To focus the discussion for this meeting, I want to raise two concerns to contribute to a reflection about how we produce knowledge, before moving on to the research agenda:

First, approaches to the role of migration and development have narrowed the definition of development. In spite of the prominence of concepts such as human development, social development, good governance, and Sen’s (2001) arguments in favour of conceptualizing development as expanding capabilities, rights and freedom, economistic approaches (with some intrusion from Basic Needs approaches) prevail in the development industry. This has helped to narrow the framing of migrants’ contribution to development as participation in small infrastructure development, support for the construction of schools and clinics, “productive projects,” and investment schemes.

Second, research on migrant political transnational participation has privileged a specific set of institutional actors: (1) migrants and their organizations; (2) nation-states of exit and destination; and (3) political authorities at various levels, and sometimes political parties, usually in countries of origin. In spite of noting the importance of non-electoral politics, the result is that this work ends up employing a narrow definition of politics (and what is political), and a similarly narrow conception of political actors and institutions. Efforts to conceptualize political alliances in transnational spaces focus on migrants (e.g. migrant civil society), and exclude non-migrants, activist campaigns, social movements and networks (unless these fit neatly into the “migrant” category). That is, by focusing on claims to membership and participation in formal political institutions, this scholarship has reinforced a narrow definition of politics; given short shrift to claims and identities associated with non-electoral and non-nationalist agendas; and excluded from the picture a broader set of political actors and interlocutors and forms of mobilization. This has been accomplished by abstracting political participation from the broader social relations in which migrants are embedded.

How and why has this narrowing process taken place? In what follows I discuss my interpretation of why and how these discussions have been narrowed. This will inform the subsequent discussion regarding future research.
II. Containing the Terms of Discussion

The narrowing of discussion regarding migrant’s participation in development is relatively recent, and closely mirrors the development industry’s seizing upon remittances for development. Before that, studies in this area were recovering from a period of stagnation following an inconclusive debate regarding the effects of migration on development, and in fact, were generating interesting case studies of what Peggy Levitt described as transnational community development just over ten years ago (Levitt 1997). This research analyzed cases of migrants mobilizing to build community infrastructure and related projects in localities of origin and highlighted a recurrent tension between the power of migrant agency and mobilization on one hand, and concern about the impacts of transnational community development on social inequality at the “local,” translocal, and other levels (Goldring 1992; Landolt, Autler and Baires 1999; Levitt 1997; Mines 1981; Popkin 2003; Smith 1995).

My interpretation of what was (and is) behind the subsequent narrowing of the terms of discussion is that a variety of stakeholders, including many researchers and migrant organizations, got caught up in the “developmentalization of the diaspora” and, more generally, in what Li (2007) calls “the will to improve.” Why? Because of the powerful and contradictory effects of development as a discourse, project and industry. Development holds out the promise of improving very real problems, and migrant participation has the appeal of exercising agency, empowerment, and enhancing capabilities. It also provides a legitimate label to describe what many migrant organizations were doing on their own. But problems can arise in the process of implementing and contesting different visions of development.

Development as Anti-politics and the Will to Improve
At the end of the 1980s and early 1990s, scholars began to employ Foucauldian approaches to produce trenchant critiques of development (Escobar 1995; Ferguson 1990; Mitchell 1998). Elements of this work can be drawn upon to offer insights into the rise of remittance-based development. In his analysis of development projects and policy in Lesotho, Ferguson (1990) argued that development policies operating at various levels (multilateral organizations, central governments) worked to de-politicize and reduce conflict. Far from reducing or eliminating poverty, Ferguson argued that the development industry (policies and projects) serve to increase the administrative control of the state. By increasing state control over people and resources, states—or elite sectors--were able to further their interests.

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7 Mitchell, Ferguson Escobar’s work played an important role in the development of what has become known as the “post-development” approach, which includes, authors such as Sachs (1992) and Crush (1995).
One of the key mechanisms involved in the anti-politics of development was the continuous recasting of political problems and conflicts into technical problems.

From this perspective, development issues and problems would be presented and represented as having technical solutions, rather than being social or political problems with less manageable solutions. For example, inequality would be re-framed in terms of a lack of employment or investment, rather than a social or political problem. Unemployment might then be addressed through education and job creation programs, job-preparation training, and campaigns designed to instill certain values (work ethic). Similarly, the problem of insufficient investment might be addressed through programs and campaigns aimed at attracting large and small private investment. Neither would involve fundamental changes in economic policy or in the organization of society. Furthermore, programs and projects would be designed to address the technical problems.

Using this lens, remittances and migrant involvement in small infrastructure projects can easily be seen as becoming part of the technical solution to rural poverty, unemployment, low incomes, and insufficient infrastructure in communities with high out-migration—not to mention helping to solve problems with the balance of payments. Governments court migrants, who are expected to send money to their relatives, contribute to collective projects, and/or invest in employment- and income-generating schemes. The attraction of the remittance mantra is that it provides a set of technical problems, which can be addressed without necessarily referring to the politics of the structural causes of migration, or the politics of migrants financing public infrastructure. Working to reduce the costs of transferring money, improving financial services, banking the un-banked, and extending identifications (matrícula consular and drivers licenses) thus become key elements in the effort to improve efficiency in remittance transfers. Remittance-based development, particularly versions focusing on collective remittances, was also attractive to migrant organizations, whose leaders and members were generally happy to put on the mantle of “heroes” after being largely ignored.

This reading of development as an anti-politics machine could easily fit much of the Mexican state’s outreach activities toward Mexicans and Mexican-Americans in the United States. As widely known, the Mexican government has recognized the importance of family remittances and collective remittances; developed matching funds programs for infrastructure projects; implemented strategies to attract family remittances into housing and mortgage programs, and health insurance; and funds into investment scheme—with varying success. It has also extended capacity for bureaucratic control over Mexicans in the United States through the matrícula consular, a
consulate-issued ID that was accepted to open bank accounts. For Mexican-Americans, the Mexican state has sponsored educational “roots” tours, etc. A number of analysts have written about the politics behind these programs. These efforts can be understood as part of a strategy to defuse conflict because they began in the wake of the 1998 presidential election, which many consider to have been fraudulently won by Salinas de Gortari. Prior to the election, Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas campaigned in the United States, something noteworthy at that time because of its novelty.

However, a direct adoption of the anti-politics model has at least two problems. First, it does not account for the growth in the number and types of institutional actors now involved in migration, remittances and development. The state is not the only actor on the stage, nor does it control the show. Secondly, and related to the first, the anti-politics model does not do justice to what (Li 2007) describes as the “messy politics” that surround efforts to implement state governmentality and the hegemonic anti-politics of development. States may attempt to run the show, but hegemony, as Gramsci reminds us, is a contested rather than completed project.

Tania Li uses the will to improve to refer to practices associated with the common-sense term “development.” Development practitioners, donors, local and international experts, local elites, and others often promote improvement of various sorts. The discourse of improvement may or may not be associated with concrete practices aimed at re-organizing power relations so that socio-economic transformation actually occurs. But that is not the central point. Following Ferguson, Mitchell, and others, Li argues that it is important to study the discourse and practices surrounding the will to improve, which means drawing on Foucauldian work on governmentality to analyze discourse and power in the context of development.

However, unlike some of her colleagues, Li argues for examining the “messy politics” involved in the incomplete project of government that is part and parcel of development. Li’s focus is consistent with my position that it worth adding a measure of actor oriented approaches to the version of governmentality adopted by the pioneers of post-development, and to infuse it all with an appreciation of the macro political economy. Her approach calls for an examination of contending interpretations of development, and how development projects and policies are conceived, received, responded to, re-shaped, contested, and so forth.

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8 Translating that capacity for bureaucratic control into actual control is a separate question, which would have to be addressed at specific times and places. Early development of the matrícula database was plagued by unevenness and poor data entry. However, later on, these data were used to map the distribution of Mexicans in the U.S. by municipality of origin in Mexico. As the data improved, they were used to direct outreach and develop policies and programs.
From this perspective, one would analyze efforts to “developmentalize” the diaspora, or render them active agents of development, through strategies that include turning remitters and remittances into part of a development anti-politics machine. That is, one would examine efforts to define development as a process involving only technical solutions. However, one would also examine how migrants and their organizations have taken ownership of the will to improve by developing their own scripts and rationales regarding their roles in national and community development. One would also examine the interventions of other actors such as local governments, non-government organizations, unions, social movements, etc., in migrant producing areas where remittance-linked interventions are planned; a range of civil society groups in locations where migrants live and work; and gendered micro-politics surrounding remittance sending. One could also make better sense of how this wider range of actors—not only migrants and migrant-producing states have jumped on the remittance bandwagon.

Abstracting the Political from the Social; Narrowing the Scope of Analysis by Limiting the Range of Legitimate Interlocutors

Early research on migrant transnationalism attempted to integrate the analysis of changing identities, political relations, economic activities, class formation, gender, and nationbuilding in the broader context of social transformation engendered by the construction of transnational social fields and broader processes of globalization (Basch, Glick-Schiller and Szanton-Blanc 1994). This was followed by efforts to systematize the study of migrant transnationalism (Portes, Guarnizo and Landolt 1999). We find ourselves now at a point where there are renewed calls for more integrative approaches that adopt a social fields approach to study ways of being and belonging in transnational social spaces (Levitt and Glick Schiller 2004). Added to this are calls to beware of methodological nationalism (Glick Schiller, Caglar and Guldbrandsen 2006). Despite these recent calls, research on political transnationalism in particular, because of its thematic focus on states, state institutions, electoral politics, and claims to membership in political communities, remains focused on politics toward homelands, and on a narrow range of institutional actors. The geographic orientation of political transnationalism studies might be taken as selfexplanatory or for granted. Of course it focuses on homeland involvement, that’s the whole point! But there is also ample discussion of the relationship between incorporationist politics and homeland politics, usually organized around questions about whether

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9 Hernandez and Coutin’s insightful analysis of the Salvadoran state’s treatment of remittances as a national resource and cost-free income is consistent with these Foucauldian approaches to development. (Hernandez, Ester, and Susan Bibler Coutin. 2006. “Remitting Subjects: Migrants, Money and States.” *Economy and Society* 35:185-208.)

incorporation precludes transnational political involvement. That is, the former is an independent variable in models designed to test effects on indicators of political transnationalism. However, research is pointing to the importance of understanding feedback over time between the two, and to the importance of conceptualizing them as mutually constitutive processes. While homeland engagements may be more salient initially for many organized migrants, there is evidence of feedback such that it can become difficult to arrange incorporationist and homeland claims and activities in a linear causal and temporal sequence (Rivera-Salgado, Bada and Escala-Rabadán 2005). Furthermore, restrictions on mobility caused by distance, lack of resources, or legal status can also make it difficult to start the sequence with claims made directly on homeland governments.

However, even the language of incorporationist versus homeland oriented politics speaks to a divide between here and there, a divide that a social fields and social transformation approach tries to bridge. While it is important to pay attention to differences within transnational social fields, it is also worth considering how to overcome conceptual binaries that can limit us from gaining more comprehensive perspectives. This can contribute to considering the potential multi-directionality of economic transfers (Besserer A. 2002), and social learning taking place in multiple directions. 11 In spite of considerable work on the brain drain, migration and development discourse focuses on knowledge brought back to the global South by migrants and members of the diaspora, rather than considering the political and other learning that im/migrants bring and contribute to social and economic development in the North. Our analysis of the pre-migration political culture of Chileans and Salvadorans in Toronto (Landolt and Goldring 2006) is a small example, but it examines political learning more dynamically, and shows how political culture and learning build on previous experiences and repertoires, and change through interaction between immigrant and non-immigrant groups, as well as among various immigrant groups, in Canada. This challenges models that focus on knowledge (and social remittances) and economic remittances going from North to South.

What is to be done?

Reviving concepts from writing on transnational community development could, in theory, address the problem of the narrowness to which the migration and development discussion has succumbed. We could look more closely at social remittances (Levitt 19), political learning, knowledge production and circulation, and argue for expanded approach to development that would include attention to messy politics, one that would pay closer

11 The very definition of remittances builds in a directional North-South bias, as they are defined and understood as income from migrants. While the definition includes S-S flows, it generally excludes from analysis the transmission of income, other forms of support, knowledge, etc., in other directions.
attention to the politics of expanding capabilities and freedoms—to the structural changes necessary. However, the geographic orientation of development would still define the “development project” with respect to the global South.\(^\text{12}\) Perhaps it is time to transnationalize the development project, or rather, bridge “development” and “community development” as practiced in North America. This would be consistent with Castles’ social transformation approach, and allow for examinations of contention over definitions of development among multiple actors at various sites in transnational spaces.

III. Developing the Research Agenda
I have argued in favor of bringing the “messy politics of development” back in to the study of migration and development, and for delivering more adequately on the promises of a transnational social fields approach by infusing analyses of migrant political participation in transnational social fields with greater attention to the complex and multiple social relations, spaces and scales of migrants mobilization. I have also outlined the conceptual need to bridge between development “there” and development “here” as part of the project of studying transnational social transformation. In what follows, I outline suggestions for developing a research agenda that would take these points into account.

Examining the “messy politics” of development as the will to improve
Adapting Tania Li’s proposal to studying the messy politics of development opens up the study of migrants’ participation in development in two important ways. First, it points to considering a wide array of actors and their discursive and practical interventions in development, including contending definitions and visions of development (see next heading). Second, it brings politics, negotiation, and contention into sharp relief. Third, bringing politics back into the study of migrants in development can also push scholars to analyze more closely the politicization of development projects framed in technical terms (when and how does a paving project become political). Fourth, it can focus greater attention on interaction between various forms of migrant organizations and non-migrant organizations (e.g. HTAs, pan-ethnic and multi-ethnic coalitions, religious groups, unions, and rights groups—in various national contexts).

Calling for research on these politics also presents challenges. First, there are questions of methods and access. In order to document formal and visible as

\(^{12}\) The historical roots of global inequalities are clearly rooted in colonial and post-colonial asymmetries. However, it is also important to recognize that the last 70 years or so have deepened inequalities associated with colonial legacies (including with respect to First Nations within the global North and South), while also producing new topographies of inequality.
well as behind the scenes negotiations, it may be necessary to work retrospectively rather than on current issues. Furthermore, researchers have to study “up” and “down,” and navigate gendered, racialized and classed spaces. Second, working closely with migrant organizations and developing long-term ties with activists draws researchers into networks of activists and makes them accountable to community members. Finding appropriate ways to frame critical comments may not always be easy.

**Broader approaches to development and actors in development**

Home-country development can include social justice activism with interlocutors outside the usual cast of development actors and institutions. For example our work (Landolt and Goldring 2006; Riaño-Alcalá and Goldring 2006) shows that Colombian activists in Toronto have worked with NGOs, indigenous groups, labour unions, rights groups, and faith based groups in Colombia as well as with faith-based, human rights, union and solidarity groups in Canada to advocate for and support struggles of indigenous people, unionists, and other marginalized groups in Colombia. Narrower definitions of development could exclude these initiatives and actors from what is considered part of development practice, although it is certainly consistent with Sen’s approach.

Broadening the range of actors considered to be involved in the migration-development nexus can valorize the contributions of migrants who organize in ways that are not consistent with the current focus on HTAs. Landolt (2003) has argued, for example, that the Salvadoran state privileged migrants organized into home-town associations, while avoiding and marginalizing partisan organizations that included migrants by limiting their access to development funds.

**Broader approaches to politics and political actors in transnational social fields**

Similar to my call to bring politics back into development, I am calling for putting the political back into the social. Research on migrant political participation needs to adopt a broader approach to political engagement, one that does not abstract the political from immigrants’ social relations, and can thus include various arenas of participation, organizing, and mobilization, and rest on a more expansive definition of politics.

In our work on Latin Americans in the Toronto area, we began with questions about the relationship between incorporation and transnationalism that were framed in terms of various arenas of transnational engagement. As we continued with the fieldwork, we saw how important transnational political organizing was (and is) for many Chileans, but how much less so it has been among Colombians. We also documented a rich set of organizing activities among Salvadorans that declined. Rather than focus on differences
in the scope of transnational engagements, we became interested in understanding what was behind the different patterns. That is, we became interested in identifying and explaining the constitution of different kinds of transnational social fields. This has led us to complicate our understanding of the role of violence in each of these contexts of departure, and attach greater importance to migrants’ political culture, understood as cultural repertoires of strategies for political organizing.\(^{13}\) This also helped us develop the notion of activist dialogues to bridge gaps between institutional approaches and migrant-focused approaches and move our work into the social fields approach.

**Ongoing attention to the differential impacts of transnational political engagements in general and political participation related to development in particular**

Researchers have warned that migrant contributions to and participation in development can widen disparities between migrants and non-migrants, and between communities with high proportions of migrants and those with low shares. Differential opportunities for migrant political transnationalism based on class and gender have also been noted. We need additional studies that examine the politics of migrant engagement in development, or lack thereof, across various settings. Examples of work one might draw on to formulate such work include Smith and Bakker (2008), Levitt (1997; 2001), and Wong (2006).

Questions under this heading could address:

- Contending definitions and visions of development (from infrastructure to social justice)
- The comparative effects of more and less active emigrant involvement in local/regional development and political control
- Changing conceptions of “local” or community citizenship and government in the context of migration
- The relationship between activist mobilization in different geographic and institutional arenas, with attention to gendered processes
- The dynamics of political culture(s) on activist dialogues (among various im/migrant groups and racialized minorities, and between immigrants and non-immigrants)

**Violence and forced migration**

An emerging literature is correcting the dramatic lack of attention to the specificities of transnational engagements and migration from contexts marked by violence and repression (Al-Ali, Black and Koser 2001; Cheran 2006; Hyndman and Walton-Roberts 2000; Landolt 2007; Menjivar 2003;  

\(^{13}\) An early suggestion from Peggy Levitt to look at literature on the sociology of culture was very useful.
Further research is needed into the relationship between immigration policy and entrance status on one hand, and opportunities and constraints on mobilization by refugees, asylum seekers, people living in camps, etc. on the other.

- How are asylum seekers and refugees constructed in various contexts of settlement?
- How do networks of migrants originally from contexts of violence develop networks of interlocution and with what kinds of actors?
- Are those constructed as “good” or “authentic” refugees more successful in forming stable coalitions with diverse institutional actors, and does this translate into thicker transnational social spaces? If so, how does these coalitions contribute to effecting change in various locations and arenas? (e.g. International tribunals, national judiciaries; electoral politics; etc.)

### Activist dialogues and political learning in transnational social fields

The ways in which newcomer groups are constructed by civil society activists at the national and local level in countries of destination affect the group’s experiences of incorporation and transnational engagements (Landolt and Goldring 2006). These constructions are related to whether migrant organizations and non-migrant activist and organizations establish patterns of interlocution, and the quality and sustainability of their dialogues. We have found that Canadians welcomed Chileans coming to Canada following the military coup and constructed them as exiles leaving an oppressive regime. Canadians activists from religious, labour, inter-faith, solidarity and rights groups had a political culture that contributed to this construction, and facilitated dialogue in spite of cultural differences. We characterize them as convergent dialogues. These same Canadian activists did not develop the same kind of dialogue with Colombian activists—rather, we characterize those as divergent dialogues. Differences in the patterns of interlocution contribute to the production of different types of transnational social fields. Chilean-Canadian dialogues were characterized by relatively frequent and durable interaction between a number of Chilean organizations and a variety of Canadian civil society actors, which contributed to the political learning of both types of actors, and to specific achievements (bringing more refugees, public education about the dictatorship and Canadian mining in Chile, solidarity work with other Latin American activists, the legal case against

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14 Reasons for the gap may include: the hegemony of American-based early research on transnationalism and the peculiarities of US refugee policy; less attention being paid to South-South movements more generally (which account for significant numbers of forced migration and displacement); normative assumptions about refugees and agency (if there is agency they must not be refugees); the importance of mobility in some approaches to transnational studies; and inadequate analysis of social networks among various types of refugee movements.
Pinochet, long-lasting networks, Chilean participation in unions, elected office, etc.). Colombian-Canadian activist dialogues are characterized by sporadic and strategic alliances and differences regarding strategies, priorities, and agendas. While effective in achieving specific objectives, they have not led to long-term and sustained collaboration.

- US-based analysts appear to have been unprepared for the strength of marches in favour of immigrants and the undocumented. Broadening the scope of research on migrant transnational politics to include contact and coalitions with groups that have a domestic orientation would enhance our understanding of immigrant politics in general, whether or not specific actions appear to be transnational in orientation. Analyzing the social relations in which migrants and their families are embedded may help us account better for participation in multiple arenas/orientations and understand how they are interrelated. It can also enhance analysis of how activism based on one area/identity is related to activism in others (e.g. faith-based, labour, ethnic, national, etc.). This involves placing political engagements in a broader social (c.f Polanyi) and geographic context.

- Given the anti-immigrant backlash in the US, how important are migrant and nonmigrant dialogues and coalitions in constructing responses and mobilizing opposition? How are some of the coalitions forged in the context of earlier and more recent antiimmigrant legislation faring over time?

- To what extent are Mexican civil society actors that were important in the movement for Mexican emigrant voting rights translating their involvement in emigrant politics into coalitions with those active in “immigrant” politics?

- How do activist dialogues take place across various contexts that explicitly encourage multicultural policies, and others that do not? (This would involve paying closer attention to connections among various migrant organizations and between migrant organizations and civil society and other organizations, including government settlement organizations, in Canada, Europe, the U.S., etc.)

**Gender and transnational political participation**

How do geographies of gender and power intersect with community development in transnational social fields? Research on political transnationalism indicates that male privilege extends to many arenas of “grassroots” transnational political organization (e.g. HTAs in the US, much Latin American political party organizing in the US, Chilean political parties in exile in Canada), but not all (e.g. the state-led Council for Mexicans Abroad, CCIME, and the National Alliance of Latin American and Caribbean Communities, NALACC). Work on community organizing among Latino immigrants highlights the significance of women’s and men’s activism in
unions and community organizations (Zolniski 2006). Further research is needed into whether and how gender matters, not only by pointing to the presence of male and female bodies, but rather, in terms of setting agendas and priorities, designing strategies, political negotiations, etc.

- Why and how do women achieve positions of authority in some HTAs, and does it matter in terms of process and outcomes?
- Do other forms of migrant organizing (Caribbean school alumni associations)
- How do socially expected duration (SED), political culture (experience in social movements or parties), policies affecting the geographic location of family members, and social exclusion in contexts of origin and arrival contribute to women and men’s decisions about participation in (1) homeland oriented organizing and (2) community organizations, unions, local churches and other spaces in contexts of settlement..

The challenge of critiques of methodological nationalism
Questions have been raised by Glick Schiller and others about the limitations of taking nationality as an unquestioned point of departure for categorizing groups in migration studies (Glick Schiller, Caglar and Gulbrandsen 2006; Wimmer and Glick Schiller 2003). Among other things, these critics argue that we need to investigate identity construction more critically. In our own work, we have found that indigenous Latin Americans from various countries organized with each other and with Indigenous Canadians, and not with co-nationals, with whom they felt no social or other connections. While not discarding the importance of national identities in the process of migration and immigrant mobilization, further research can address multiple and shifting bases for organizing across borders by paying attention to identities that are not contained by national labels (Itzigsohn and Dore-Cabral 2000). Studies of religious transnational engagement (Levitt 2007; Menjivar 1999) can complement work on ethnic and racialized identities.

Studying the backlash
Most research on migrant political participation across borders leaves suspends attention regarding the significance of borders and immobility. The current anti-backlash and Huntington-style efforts to re-define the national “we” in narrower terms calls for those studying political transnationalism and transnational community development to examine these issues more closely.

- How does the hardening of borders affect different forms of political participation in various transnational social fields?
IV. Closing
The study of migrant participation in development and transnational politics has employed various approaches and generated a significant body of interesting and nuanced research. However, many questions remain. A forward-looking research agenda can be developed based on the concerns and questions outlined here, and the questions identified in the SSRC document that went out to participants. Perhaps mechanisms can also be found to consult with activists about the research agenda as well, not in a token way to ensure participation, but in a meaningful way based on the experiences of researchers and activists who are trying to build bridges (e.g. NALACC and the International Network on Migration and Development, RIMD).

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PANEL 6

Gender, Migration, and Development

This panel examines the ways in which migration’s relationship to development is shaped by gender. The paper by Rachel Murphy presents an analysis of the gendered nature of the migration process and its outcomes, with a focus on internal migration in China. Carolina Taborga’s paper focuses on the benefits of including a gendered analysis in policies aimed at increasing the benefits of migration, and particularly remittances, for development. The introduction, by Patricia Pessar, provides a critical review of gendered studies of migration, with suggestions for a future research agenda.
A panel on gender is important to our collective project of informing future research and policy on migration and development. The questions raised and knowledge produced by scholars attentive to gender are always focused on power. As such, a gender perspective insists on socially and politically embedded understandings of migrants, migration, and development. As both Rachel Murphy and Carolina Taborga remind us, this is a necessary stance in light of the common constructions of migrants as mere surplus labor or as *homo economicus*. In practice, such thread-bare constructions encourage development schemes in migrant communities and nations that fail to attend to local gender ideologies and norms, or to the sexual divisions of labor in social reproduction, production, and citizenship. Moreover, a gender perspective--with its attentiveness to dispersed power—becomes a corrective to narrowly economistic notions of development. As Taborga warns, the dominant development paradigm converts structural inequities into technical problems best solved at the level of individuals and households. A gendered approach, by contrast, insists that development include the expansion of capabilities, rights, and agency. In such a formulation of development, gender is but one among many structures of power that create inequities and promote containment, negotiation, and struggle.

The panelists join those who charge that international policy debates and interventions--including those about migration--are insufficiently informed by knowledge produced through gendered research (Piper 2006). A panel on gender offers an opportunity to assess our abilities to provide policymakers with the over-arching findings so often solicited. Here our claims must be at once bold and modest. There is a large and compelling body of scholarship demonstrating that *gender matters*. This literature documents that the causes and consequences of migration are gendered, as are the associated migratory bodies and institutions. Accordingly, Murphy (who focuses on Asian internal migration) and Taborga (who privileges Latin American immigration) discuss how dynamic gender ideologies and practices in origin and destination sites influence personhood, legal status, production, and social reproduction. Our panelists find that women's personal and collective gains in migrant households, workplaces, communities, and nations are uneven, contingent, situational, and often contradictory. For example, Murphy notes that much of the normative change accompanying the migration of Chinese women “occurs under the orbit of claimed conformity with existing ideas about gender attributes and roles.” This includes
workplace protest under the banner of female politeness, and migration under the banner of a sacrificial notion of motherhood. That gendered research should unearth the uneven and situational nature of migration’s impacts across multiple scales is hardly surprising. Feminist and gender scholars belong to a deconstructivist tradition: one which disturbs notions of the unitary subject and grand theory.

In practice, this means that the bold statement that gender matters must be coupled with more modest claims about how our specific findings might be extended more widely. Yes, gender differences exist in the remittance practices of internal migrants and immigrants. Yet, as Taborga cautions, development initiatives involving remittances are bound to suffer if place specific gender inequities in financial systems, in land and business ownership, and in the operation of diasporic and migrant associations are not understood and redressed. In short, fine-grained local research in specific origin and destination contexts remains crucial to the success of development initiatives sensitive to gender.

Moreover, across any particular social field, the expansion of women’s and men’s capabilities, rights, and agency will prove uneven and likely contradictory. Hence, a vulnerable Dominican nanny in Spain may herself be exploiting the labor of her mother or daughter left behind. A transnational immigrant mother may be bound in chains of sacrifice, but there are many loops on that chain. Extreme caution is required, therefore, in advancing generalizations about the role that gender assumes in development within local, national, regional, and global migration circuits. In each context, we must consider how gender intersects with other axes of power such as generation, class, race, and ethnicity.

Murphy proposes multiple scales that need to be considered in the study of gender, migration, and development. Nonetheless, she focuses upon gendered social norms and social roles relevant to migration. Murphy concludes that “[t]he migration process subsumes and reworks existing normative arrangements including the gendered divisions of labor and gendered attributes and roles of individuals that are maintained through socialization and obligation within the networks of the rural family system.” Among the many strengths of the paper is the author’s attention to migration’s modest and often uneven impacts on patriarchal norms and practices. For example, she notes that Chinese wives who have been partners in internal migration may struggle to retain their personal and interpersonal gains by refusing, upon return, to relocate to their rural communities of origin. Unfortunately, such women are often thwarted in their attempts to establish independent off-farm undertakings in neighboring towns due to gender discrimination on the part of financiers and local authorities. If, as Taborga’s paper asserts, the goals of sustainable
development include the empowerment of women and gender equality, then a message of Murphy’s paper is that within Chinese migratory social fields, patriarchal gender norms and other gender inequities remain hard nuts to crack. Nonetheless, Murphy does point to a few promising trends. These include: the increased acceptance of mobility for married Chinese women into previously restricted settings; greater equality between migrant spouses in destination areas; workplace activism among migrant daughters; and reduced son preference among migrant workers in Chinese cities.

Although contributing to a fuller understanding of the relationship between gender and migration, Murphy’s paper engages less directly the third feature of the panel—development. It is here that Taborga’s contribution excels. She and her colleagues at the International Research and Training Institute for the Advancement of Women (INSTRAW) propose an analytical framework for future research on the dynamic relationships among migration, gender, remittances, and development. Elements in this framework include: the gendered global economy; the feminization of migration as a household survival strategy; and gendered ideologies and labor markets in origin and destination countries. As Taborga notes, the framework “aims to better answer such pressing questions as: How does the growing feminization of migration affect remittance flows? How might remittances contribute to the achievement of gender equality? And, how might we mobilize remittances to achieve sustainable development that includes women?” Rebutting gender-free development models and interventions, Taborga notes that a feminist perspective on remittances challenges the popular assumption that the productive investment of remittances is the only positive development outcome. This assumption highlights only one aspect of peoples’ economic lives and diminishes the value of other types of investments, including those that are emotional, symbolic, and communitarian.

Both Murphy and Taborga raise two central points about contemporary global migration. First, it removes gendered individuals from households. Second, women predominate globally among remittance receivers (i.e., wives, mothers, and other female caretakers). More research is needed, especially in those societies with large numbers of female-centered families, with traditions of child fostering, and with matrilineal forms of kinship. But Murphy is correct in alerting us to a disturbing finding emerging in some research, that children whose mothers are absent appear to be the most vulnerable. In contrast, when mothers remain behind and administer remittances, migration seems to exert a positive impact on children’s diet, health, and education. In light of women’s growing participation in internal and international migration, more research is needed on how the departure of culturally-constructed, female nurturers affects the material and emotional wellbeing of the children left behind.
On the one hand, the two papers chart similar territory. Both describe powerfully how the changes promoted by migration are instigated by and filter back upon gendered terrain. On the other hand, the two works are complementary. Murphy highlights research on gender and internal migration, while Taborga focuses on studies of international migration. To date, there has been little comparison between, and fertilization across, the literatures on gender and internal migration, on gender and international migration, and I would add, on gender and refugees. What is striking about the panelists’ papers is how similar their findings are regarding the modest impacts (im)migration has had on improving gender inequities in places of origin and destination. What, then, are the most strategic targets to ensure the protection and extension of women’s gains within migratory social fields? A promising target noted in both papers is along fissures developing within conventional, gender norms of parenting. In many societies, mothering is understood to be place bound and to privilege acts of social reproduction. By contrast, fathering is normatively conceived to be more mobile and is associated with primary breadwinning. As mothering by absent migrant women comes to encompass both significant income production and nurturing, an opening emerges in how gendered parenting is conceived and practiced. This creates the space for women to participate more fully in local, national, and global discussions about development. Given their dual roles as nurturers and producers, migrant women/mothers have the potential to emerge as champions of sustainable and more equitable forms of development. My own research in the 1990s on organized Guatemalan refugee women, who negotiated the terms of development in their returnee communities, revealed such a pattern (Pessar 2001).

Finally, much of the literature on gender and migration has struggled with popular misconceptions which hold that gender equals women, and gender operates foremost in the contexts of households and families. Both Murphy and Taborga are successful in noting the multiple scales ranging from the body to the global economy in which gender operates. Nonetheless, given the unevenness of the available literature, both authors emphasize the household and family. I know I speak for the panelists when I urge researchers to include these micro-level units, while branching out to associated, meso and macro-level arenas. In this spirit, I would propose gender-sensitive research on migration and development, which is cross-scalar and inter-disciplinary (see, Donato et. al. 2006; Mahler and Pessar 2001). To illustrate, a gendered study of remittances would begin at the scale of the body. It would consider, for example, how the gendering of migrant laborers’ bodies relegates many women to employment in the low paying and insecure caring sector. It would also explore how the gendered bodies of remittance senders, managers, and recipients affect such outcomes as diet, health, and education. A trans-scalar approach would continue to move up in scale until it reached global entities like the World Bank and the international women’s movement. Among the
topics to be explored at this scale would be how global discourses about migration and development are gendered and whether such discourses reflect or challenge Third World Women’s understandings of local and global capitalism.

**Gendered Globalization and the Feminization of Migration: A Paradigm Swing**

For the most part, the authors avoid certain pitfalls and limitations of the growing scholarship on gendered globalization and the feminization of migration. I would suggest that this new scholarship represents a paradigm swing, of sorts, in the study of gender, migration, and development. The swing has definite virtues, including the insistence that globalization is not gender neutral and the widening of conventional migration studies to include such phenomena as sex work and international adoption. Nonetheless, its foci threaten to narrow our engagements of gender, migration, and development to impoverished women’s survival strategies and to care work in globalizing economies. For the remainder of this introduction, I will comment on four central features of the new paradigm: scale, demographics, the categorization of migrant women, and empowerment. My purpose is decidedly not to disparage the important literature on the feminization of migration and on gender and globalization. Rather, it is to suggest areas for rethinking and potential revision. At various points in my discussion, I will also return to issues raised in the papers by Murphy and Taborga.

**Scale** is a central feature in the feminization of migration paradigm. In their influential volume, *Global Woman*, Ehrenreich and Hochschild (2003) proclaim that women are independently joining the vaunted ranks of men who travel long distances for work. While no doubt unintentional, their celebration plays into a gendered geography: one that views mobility across long distances as more significant and noteworthy. The danger, here, is the marginalizing of women’s long histories of internal and cross-border migrations, especially in Latin America, the Caribbean, and Africa (Piper 2008), as well as more recent trends in female internal migration, which Murphy draws to our attention in the case of China.

**Demographics** are a second, key element in the literature on gendered globalization and feminization of migration. Quite rightly, scholars underscore the virtual parity between male and female immigrants. An acknowledgement of this equivalence should effectively put to rest popular thinking about the immigrant as male. My one quibble, however, is why it has taken so many decades to acknowledge a trend that has been ongoing since the mid-20th century. This half-century time frame necessitates a longer historical engagement with globalizing political-economic and cultural trends than most of the newer scholarship on the feminization of migration affords.
We will need a greater integration of works on military bases and war brides, on global industrial restructuring, on gender, violence, and refugee displacement, on structural adjustment programs North and South, on the growth of global cities, and on global transfers of care work. As currently constituted, today’s scholarship over-emphasizes global, informalized care work to the detriment of other forms of female employment in manufacturing and higher skilled professions. The presentist bent also fails to engage the household, labor, and political struggles of earlier waves of immigrants and refugees. These struggles have helped to frame the discourses and to build the networks and associations, which more recent female and male migrants have inherited.

Some clarification is in order regarding the statistical evidence supporting the feminization of migration. To start with the basics: where do the figures that Taborga and others cite about rates of female and male immigration originate? How reliable are these figures, especially in light of common complaints that immigration statistics are often not disaggregated by sex? Will the rate of female immigration grow and outdistance that of males, as theorists of gender and globalization seem to suggest, or has an equilibrium of sorts been reached? (United Nations population statistics suggest the latter; Hania Zlotnik, personal communication, March 2008). And lastly, how are undercounts of women or men in national censuses and in survey research likely influenced by such phenomena as gender differences in legal status and sex-segregated labor markets (e.g., the incorporation of women in domestic service and sex work versus high tech employment)?

Questions about the gendered demographics of 21st century migration arise when we take up a paradox raised in Taborga’s paper. On the one hand, she informs us that the number of female immigrants has grown globally at a faster pace than male immigration. On the other hand, work permits and legal residence are less available to women than men. How are we to account for this inconsistency, especially in light of the claim that women are emigrating in growing numbers as independent subjects not as beneficiaries of family reunification? If both of these trends are true, then, we require more research on how women navigate the contradiction between legal regimes that discriminate against them and escalating rates of female migration. Here, additional research on female-centered social networks would be useful: especially those networks that operate in matters of asylum, in correspondence marriage, and in manufacturing, domestic, and sex work.

Gendered demographics become relevant when we consider proposed policy changes in North America, Europe, and Australia aimed at reducing family reunification quotas in favor of guest worker plans (ILO 2004). If we take the male-centric discourse surrounding recent U.S. debates as illustrative, we might well surmise that women will be losers in systems that reward
temporary work over family reunification. Yet, a different pattern may hold in European nations, which allocate a substantial number of work visas to providers of care services (e.g., Spain and Italy). A gendered perspective would lead us to ask: How do we account for the contrasting ways in which developed countries with a growing female labor force regulate immigration to address care deficits? Why do certain nations view care for the young, old, and infirm as a social right while others construe care as a responsibility best managed privately by female family members? On a related point, students of gender and development would be well served to research more systematically how the feminization of migration has, and will continue to impact, state and corporate policies directed at compensating family care work (Zimmerman, Litt, and Bose 2006).

Let me turn now to the type of female labor featured in most discussions of gendered globalization and the feminization of immigration. In my view, there is an unfortunate flattening in the category of woman present in this scholarship. This is particularly the case, when following the pioneering theorizing of Saskia Sassen (1996), researchers have elected to emphasize female migration as a “survival strategy.” This widely-advanced contention flies in the face of a large body of research, which documents that international migration from developing countries is positively selected in favor of those with greater human and social capital. This leads me to ask whether scholars have been overly eager to dub most female immigration as a survival strategy of the global poor. Have some made the mistake of conflating immigrant women's socio-economic status at destination with their status prior to migration? There are, after all, many case studies indicating that factory and care workers, as well as correspondence brides, experience profound deskilling and the lowering of class status when they migrate abroad (Parreñas 2001; Constable 1997; 2005). Might it not be that a significant segment of female immigrants are being called upon to shoulder not survival but their families’ precarious middle-class and working-class status? If this is the case, as I suspect, we require more research on how the emigration of more positively-selected female immigrants impacts the true survival strategies of impoverished, third-world women and men.

In celebrating migration as a female survival strategy, we also run the risk of diverting attention from that segment of female migration which falls under the rubric of “brain drain.” More research is needed on how the formal recruitment of teachers, nurses, and other female professionals impact development (in the broadest sense) in countries of origin. The need for such research is underscored by a recent study, which documents that the number of practicing female nurses in the U.K. from Africa has increased dramatically over the last five years. This transfer of workers only intensifies a care crisis, which finds 66 nurses per 100,000 in Nigeria and 129 per
100,000 in Zimbabwe. The ratio in the U.K. is a more enviable 847 per 100,000 (Aiken et al: 2004).

Finally some parting words on the empowerment of immigrants. Reminiscent of earlier dependency theory, there is a tendency in many works on the feminization of migration to see the glass empty or decidedly half full. Perhaps, this is an overcorrection to earlier scholarship which, as Taborga notes, championed developed nations as sites and engines for the liberation of Third World female migrants. Yet, today’s overcorrection finds authors asserting that female immigration “restores features of oppressive feudal relations, such as indentured servitude, servile relations, political disenfranchisement and sexual slavery” (Hawkesworth 2006:24). This emphasis on migrants as victims needs to be balanced against research, such as that contained in the Murphy and Taborga papers, which document the modest gains in gender parity occasioned by migration. We also require additional research substantiating those collective efforts, on behalf of and by migrants, which seek to challenge and reverse those contemporary, feminizing strategies of power designed to create helplessness and dependence among migrant women and men (Piper 2008).

In drawing our attention to empowerment, I purposefully underscore the word collective, because communitarian efforts resist neo-liberal projects, which seek to individualize, privatize, and re-domesticate responses to global deprivations and uncertainties. With this in mind, I would urge us to consider how researchers might best counter those neo-liberal initiatives which, in the name of gender equity, replace women’s collective self-help programs with commercial and micro-credit programs based on individual entrepreneurship and personal fiscal responsibility. Is it fair to say, following Hawkesworth (2006), that in co-opting the discourse of women’s empowerment, key supranational entities have erased the critique of capitalism at the heart of Third World feminists’ alternative vision of development?

Finally, the literature on the feminization of migration has been largely silent on matters of refugee status and exile. An important exception is found in the work of feminist legal scholars, who examine the causes and consequences of gender discrimination in refugee law, institutions, and practices (Bhabha 1996; Crawley 2001). Pioneering research in the U.S. documents that women are far more likely to gain asylum when, on the advice of NGOS and legal counsel, they depoliticize their claims, (Oxford 2005). The women then claim persecution on the grounds that they have been the victims of “exotic” sexual practices, rather than on the grounds of their actual participation in targeted labor or political organization. More research in the United States and elsewhere would indicate whether this is a common pattern. If so, it would reveal a serious give-back: one in which progressive
struggles to convert persecuted women into a recognized social category in refugee law have fallen hostage to a familiar gender geography. A geography in which women are relegated to the "private," micro scales of the body, the household, and ethnic cultures.

Conclusion
Gender matters when we research and frame policy on migration and development. Despite the fact that gender inequalities exist in all societies, Murphy and Taborga correctly observe that significant variation exists in how gender inequities are organized, embodied, and best redressed. This variance is governed by local gender norms and institutions, as well as by the positioning of origin and destination contexts within national, regional and global economic, cultural, and racial orders.

Murphy and Taborga contribute to a growing and lively body of scholarship on the feminization of migration and its relationship to development. This scholarship is extremely valuable in slaying the myth of the male immigrant and in revealing that globalization, like migration, is a fully gendered phenomenon. My remarks have been intended to build upon and help refine the focus of the literature on gendered globalization and migration as we seek to better research and theorize the links among migration, gender, and development. In this spirit, I have pointed to matters of scale, demography, categorization, and empowerment which require revision and further exploration.

Let me say in conclusion, that in the early 80s, when I began my research and writing aimed at engendering migration studies, I was quite convinced of the lack of concepts, analytical frameworks, and research methods to lead the way. Now, I am confident that we possess powerful tools to document how gender infuses migration and development, including the associated scales though which both operate. This leaves me with the conclusion that the problem is no longer a lack of analytical frameworks or substantiating documentation. Rather, the challenge is to convince scholars of migration and development as well as policy makers that gender is important and to provide them with the tools to think and act with an eye to gender difference and gender equity. One step in the right direction would be to include a paper like Carolina Taborga’s not in a separate panel on gender and migration, but in a session on migration and economic globalization, and to reposition Rachel Murphy’s paper in the panel on family and networks. We will only bring migration to the service of development in its fullest sense when a free-standing panel on gender and migration is no longer thinkable and my role as gender maven becomes obsolete.
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The Impact of Socio-Cultural Norms on Women’s Experiences of Migration and the Implications for Development

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SSRC Migration & Development Conference Paper No. 17

Introduction
Gender relations - underpinned by cultural values and social norms - influence many dimensions of labour migration. Cultural values refer to shared understandings about what is important and about desirable ways of being, while social norms are the informal rules that shape understandings of acceptable behaviors and sanctioned pathways for achieving goals, with social opprobrium occurring in instances of transgression (Portes, 2006). Cultural values and social norms which pertain to the relationship between males and females undergird decisions about who migrates, who the migrant moves with, where individuals migrate to, their employment activities in the destination areas, their obligations to kin in the sending areas, the ways in which these obligations are carried out, the allocation of resources generated by migration and the coping strategies of people who remain in the sending communities (Curran and Rivero-Fuentes, 2003; Murphy, 2004).

Cumulatively these gendered dimensions of migration affect development. Development is a multi-faceted concept that encompasses changes in the cultural and socio-economic environment, which in turn are affected by national strategies to mobilize and equip citizens to partake in and benefit from global economic restructuring. The concept of development also incorporates corresponding changes in individuals' capabilities to improve their own wellbeing and to contribute to wider efforts to enhance the prosperity and wellbeing of their communities. Migration, understood here as the movement of people for work across regions and economic sectors, is both a cause and effect of development and a fundamental component of the development process.

The approach to the concept of development adopted in this essay is influenced by Amartya Sen’s analysis of the factors that affect individuals’ capabilities to achieve the ‘functionings’ that comprise their wellbeing. Functionings refer to the ‘beings’ and ‘doings’ that a person values; examples of functionings pertinent to migration include spatial mobility, being educated, accruing material possessions, having leisure time (not being overworked) and improving the lives of family members. In this approach the achievement of ‘functionings’ necessitates access to resources, for
instance, money, land, labour, social networks and information (Murphy, 2004). But this approach also recognizes that people may need different bundles of resources to attain the same functionings, with their resource requirements being affected by personal characteristics such as marital status, age and health and by the socio-cultural and economic environment that they inhabit (Sen, 1983; Sen, 1992: 115-116). For instance a young woman may have money for a bus fare but she may still not be able to achieve the functioning of ‘shopping at market’ because she does not have the male companion who is culturally required to give her respectability and protection in public spaces. Alternatively, a woman who is culturally permitted to go to market may be prevented from doing so by the absence of roads and public transport.

The attainment of functionings also involves the exercise of agency. People may have the capabilities for achieving any number of functionings. Yet the functioning of ‘exercising agency’ - to choose freely which capabilities to convert into functionings - is itself integral to wellbeing (Kabeer, 1994:30). In his work on gender and household bargaining Sen shows that individuals’ potential for choosing freely and for converting capabilities into functionings may be compromised by their internalization of norms about how the world is. This is because the internalization of socio-cultural norms pertaining to gender, age, kinship and class often cause underdogs to adapt their expectations to those that seem possible. Moreover, adaption may mean not only that the underdog colludes in her own oppression but also that she perpetuates the oppression of others. For instance, a woman may make a choice on behalf of her daughter in relation to marriage over school attendance; a decision which may be intended to improve her daughter’s standing in the local community but which in fact devalues her (Sen 1991).

Migration interacts with both the ideational and resource dimensions of normative change. With regard to the ideational dimension, migration scholars have drawn on Edward Said’s insights about how living in a different society creates possibilities for standing outside ones’ own life and viewing it through another lens: this ‘perspective’ widens ideological parameters (Constable 1997; Levy 1989; Murphy 2004). Such perspective is clearly integral to women’s experiences of migration. It has long been noted by migration studies scholars that women often pursue migration for reasons other than the wage differentials between origin and destination areas: for a feeling of independence, the opportunity to participate in commodity consumption and the experience of urban life (Fawcett, Khoo and Smith, 1984; Mills, 1997; Jacka, 2006). It has also long been observed that migrants who return to their home communities for visits are typically intensely critical of the community’s customs and social arrangements, and that women are especially critical of the aspects of family relations that give women less voice and choice (Davin, 1999; Levy, 1989). At the same time,
however, exposure to norms prevailing in global factories or in destination area societies may present women with new agency constraints.

With regard to the resource dimension of normative change, in affecting who obtains income as well as how, migration may transform the norms that prevail within families and communities with regard to the worth of male and female labour, the appropriate family and community roles of males and females, and perceptions of their resource entitlements. This process may benefit some individuals while disadvanta ging others. The outcomes of such interactions among migration, socio-cultural norms and patterns of resource distribution become manifest in conventional indicators of development such as the labour force participation rates of males and females, income levels of households, and the health access and education levels of boys and girls. At an aggregate level, these indicators in turn affect the wider socio-cultural and economic environment with knock-on implications for the capacity of people with different attributes to obtain resources and exercise agency.

The remainder of this essay explores how socio-cultural norms mediate women’s scope for exercising agency and their access to resources in migratory environments, and the implications for development. Specifically, the essay considers the following six gendered dimensions of the migration and development relationship:

(1) The interaction between gendered social roles and how women participate in labour migration
(2) The influence of family forms and associated social norms on decision-making and women’s possibilities for migrating
(3) The effects of social norms on the wellbeing of migrant women living and working in the destination areas
(4) The effects of social norms on women’s experiences of being left behind in the sending areas
(5) The impact of gender roles on the arrangement of care and the allocation of resources to children in the origin communities
(6) The influence of migration on the socio-cultural norms that underpin son preference in some societies.

Cumulative discussion of these six dimensions demonstrates that all decision-making, action and resource distribution occurs in settings that are permeated by socio-cultural norms, and that all facets of the migration and development relationship are therefore fundamentally gendered.

**Gendered Roles and Labor Migration**
Gendered social roles affect how women participate in and are affected by labour migration. Social roles refer to the set of expectations and duties
associated with the position of an individual in relation to others in his or her social networks (Lopata, 1999). Several innovative micro-studies illustrate how migrant women are embedded in cross-cutting multi-leveled networks including the kinship and community networks of the native place, the horizontal networks which incorporate fellow migrant workers, and vertical networks with managers and administrators in destination areas (Jacka, 2006; Mills, 1999). Such studies show that migrant women must balance the conflicting demands of the multiple roles that come from participation in these overlapping networks, for instance, as mother, wife, daughter, worker and workmate (Constable, 1997; Mills, 1999). The influence of migrant networks on women’s social roles demonstrates vividly that ‘gendered roles’ and corresponding identities are far from static or immutable (Lopata, 1999).

Despite the fluidity in gender roles, however, there exists across many societies a fairly stable perception of complementarity in the attributes and functions of women and men. Women generally do ‘domestic, caring and lighter work in the ‘inside’ realm, while men do heavier farm work, maintenance work and business negotiations in the ‘outside’ economy (Jacka, 1997; Lessinger, 2001). Gendered work roles obtain even when the substance of the work changes because of labour migration: so on the occasion of predominantly male outmigration, heavy male farm tasks may become subsumed under the banner of light female domestic work (Jacka, 1997).

Attention to the multifaceted and gendered dimensions of individuals’ social roles helps researchers to perceive more acutely the developmental costs and benefits of labour mobility and to consider possibilities for more sensitive interventions. As an example, many national planners and economists assume that only ‘surplus’ laborers migrate, a perspective which sees laborers as homogenous and substitutable entities. While at an aggregate level it may indeed be mainly surplus laborers who leave, at the household or community level people who fulfill a variety of essential economic and social roles also leave. In situations where people who perform key roles leave, those left behind take over new work tasks. But owing to the prevalence of gendered divisions of labour and the predominance of the cultural model of the ‘male household head,’ development agencies commonly overlook the fact that many farmers are women and/or elderly people and so omit them from agricultural extension services, micro-credit services and the distribution of community political information (Chant, 1992; FAO 1995; United Nations report).

There is also the matter of the less visible emotional effects of rapid disruption to gendered roles. Left-behind men may feel emasculated when they have to take over domestic chores and child care activities, and so resort to drinking, violence, womanizing and other hyper masculine behaviors (Parreñas, 2005). For their part, left-behind women may feel that they are
enduring particularly intense physical and emotional hardship in cases where they are required to take over a work task in a social environment where that task (for instance, ploughing) is still seen as men’s work (Murphy, 2004). In some countries in areas of high out-migration, for instance in the Philippines, there are a small number of social work and community organization programs which try to give emotional and practical support to left-behind men and women (Parreñas, 2005). For the most part, however, the gendered nature of social roles is not within the purview of migration policy-makers.

Socio-cultural norms and migration decision-making

Socio-cultural norms and women’s family roles as daughters, wives, and mothers influence decision-making processes about resource allocation, which in turn affect female possibilities for migration. Family roles underpin how families allocate resources to daughters vis-à-vis sons, support females’ migration and justify a claim on a share of their earnings. This works differently in matrilineal and patrilineal societies. As an example of the former, in the Philippines and Thailand a normative framework in which daughters migrate for the wellbeing of their parents is reinforced through a family system in which daughters have responsibility for caring for their parents in old age and in which they ultimately inherit the land and take over rice-farming (Lauby and Stark, 1988; Mills, 1997; Curran and Saguy, 2001). In this system sons are free to migrate for themselves to obtain the patron-client ties, knowledge and resources for their lives off the farm; accordingly they face less of an obligation to remit. This arrangement benefits the sons and disadvantages the daughters because on account of major shifts in the global organization of production sons build their futures in the more profitable and prestigious off-farm and urban sectors while daughters remain within the poorly remunerated agricultural sector (Curran and Saguy, 2001).

As an example of the influence of socio-cultural norms on migration decision-making in patrilineal societies, in Taiwan, during the rapid industrialization of the 1970s, parents strategically cultivated a sense of filial debt in their daughters by investing in their education. Yet they invested only in the vocational and general education that would enable their daughters to earn higher wages. The parents’ rationale was that on account of their investment in education, their daughters would feel compelled to repay the debt through remittances which could then be used to finance the senior and college education of sons, with sons in Chinese culture being entrusted with the longer-term care of their parents (Greenhalgh, 1988).

Perceptions of family roles also affect decision-making in relation to the independent or unaccompanied migration of married women. On account of
the emergence of a culture of migration, over time, views in origin communities change so that taboos against the migration of females in general and married women in particular become diluted. For instance, in the case of China, increasing numbers of married women in their late twenties and early thirties have started to migrate, seeking the material gains that they have witnessed a younger cohort of village women enjoy (Roberts et al, 2005). Alongside this trend, new norms of good parenthood have been emerging so that now increasingly both parents show their commitment to their children by working hard in the city for several years to save for their future and education. This new normative framework for good parenthood is echoed in other regions too. For example, Latina female migrants to the US forsake deeply held ideas that biological mothers should raise their own children and instead define the mother as one who negotiates the provision of affection, care and financial support through translocal circuits of exchange (Hondagneu-Sotelo and Avila, 1997).

Across a range of cultural settings, women who have migrated directly by themselves often invoke the theme of sacrifice in their narratives to help them maintain their self identities as caring wives and mothers despite their protracted physical separation from husbands and children. This narrative theme has been reported by scholars who have interviewed female immigrant workers from Latin America and from the Philippines. In the mainstream Chinese media, too, dagongsao or married migrant women are officially praised for making a sacrifice to improve the lot of their families. During the late 1990s and early 2000s part of the logic for the official encouragement of dagongsao was to redress a shortage of cheap female labour in the 16-22 age group that had come about as a result of rapid industrialization and demographic transition (Cai, 2006; Yang, 2004). In other countries planners and capitalists also see advantages in the labour of ‘older’ married women. For instance in Southeast Asia some factory bosses reportedly prefer the practiced, mature and steadfast labour of married women (Hondagneu-Sotelo and Avila, 1997).

Migration not only underpins normative change that facilitates women’s direct participation in migration, it also provides women with the information, connections and resources that enable them to exercise greater agency with regard to other aspects of their family lives. Even for women who do not migrate, simply knowing about the existence of an exit option may increase their bargaining power. For instance in rural China unhappy wives may threaten to migrate, and grandmothers who do not receive enough remittances when caring for grandchildren may threaten their absent sons and daughters-in-law that they will go to the city themselves to work as nannies (Murphy, 2004). There are of course limitations to the extent to which women’s agency is increased by ‘perspective’ backed up by the exit opportunity of urban labour markets. These limitations comprise socio-
cultural norms such as taboos against divorce (Murphy, 2004), or requirements that good daughters share their earnings or return home (Silvey and Elmhirst, 2003). There are also constraints to mobility and therefore to exit opportunities which stem from individual characteristics such as those associated with education level or health that are in turn affected by longer term patterns of resource allocation within families. On the whole, then, family forms and roles have a strong bearing on the investment that women receive to support their migration, and the expectations that they must fulfill to those who remain in the origin community.

Socio-cultural norms and women’s wellbeing in the destination areas

In destination areas, gendered socio-cultural norms constrain women’s possibilities for achieving a range of functionings central to their wellbeing including enjoying decent living and working conditions, being treated respectfully and being informed about sexual health and contraception. As the following paragraphs show, even though women migrants in destination areas mobilize norms to serve their interests, their efforts are generally constrained by the wider discursive and structural processes of gender and migrant marginalization.

In countries pursuing export-led development strategies, the explicit use of socio-cultural norms which help to confine migrant women’s work to low status and menial tasks is common. In particular, women are said to have psychological and physiological traits such as patience and ‘nimble fingers’ and are on this basis confined to assembly line and repetitive manual positions. In developed urban centers across the world, owing to their ascribed caring and home-maker roles, migrant women are also increasingly employed in domestic service: this is in part because the women of the emerging middle classes want more time for education, career development and leisure and so are prepared to allocate household income to hiring this help.

The gendered occupational bias experienced by women migrants is intensified by the tendency of employers and urban dwellers to use compounding marginal identities such as ‘rural’ (or ‘ethnic’ other) to extract further value from female labour. As an example, in China women from Anhui province are regarded as better quality housemaids and women from Sichuan as cleaner housemaids than those from provinces further West because Anhui is more developed and Sichuan has more plentiful water: labour brokers therefore often try to represent “their” women as being from these localities in order to obtain a higher introduction fee and wage rate (Pun 1999; Sun forthcoming).

Conversely, within the work place it is common for employers to routinely invoke stereotypical socio-cultural norms about femininity when the labour
control of migrant workers is at stake. Studies conducted within the manufacturing and service sectors show how managers urge women to regulate their bodily deportment, behaviour and attitude in ways that live up to the image of a modern woman, so gender serves as the medium for structuring and naturalising class subordination. Pun Ngai (1999; 2003) describes vividly how foremen call on women to be more lady-like and less clumsy in their assembly-line work, how they rebuke women for speaking crudely or out of turn, remarking ‘you still haven’t got yourself a boyfriend’, and how they call on women workers to be more patient and calm. Amy Hanser (2003) similarly reports that in China’s department stores the productivity and moral worth of women as workers are strongly correlated with their youth, consumerism and personal grooming and deportment.

Yet women do not conform passively to normative expectations of femininity, but use them in their pursuit of agency. For instance, an ethnographic study of Indonesian housemaids describes how the women consciously cultivate a pleasant feminine demeanour, a smart and uniform-like dress and a caring nature to secure a space for themselves within their employer’s home (Williams, 2005). Similarly, studies on Muslim women in Iran and parts of North Africa show that their entry into wage labour is accompanied by overt displays of feminine modesty. Such displays enable them to demonstrate to male family members that they continue to deserve respect, support and protection (Kandiyoti, 1988).

There are however at least two caveats when considering the empowering possibilities of women’s creative use of gender norms. First, as Tiantian Zheng cautions, the scope for migrant women to shape their identities remains constrained by the ways in which they are positioned within a wider political economy of representation. She gives the example of rural bar hostesses in Dalian city, China, and describes how they invoke different tropes of rural femininity such as pure and natural country virgins, vamps with untamed sexual appetites, or chic urban women, depending on the personality and tastes of the clients. Yet, as Zheng notes, even though such flexibility in self-presentation may create room for manoeuvre, the possibilities from which these women are able to choose remain limited by wider power relations (see Zheng, 2003; Zheng, 2004). Even additional possibilities for womanhood opened up to some women migrants through the outreach activities of NGOs, including those with transnational linkages, remain constrained within the wider political economy of representation. This is because such activities prescribe a language of feminist action and self-improvement, ‘development speak’, that migrant women are required to use in articulating their experiences and hopes (Jacka, 2006).

A second caveat is that women’s possibilities to empower themselves through creative use of norms are constrained by connections to the origin areas. The
identities used or pursued by women in the cities often conflict with normative expectations grounded in the rural-based social networks to which many belong. As one example, studies of women in Africa and Southeast Asia who are involved in prostitution commonly report that the migrant women do not let people in the home village know of their work. Or else if they do, their migrant work is explained in terms of their sacrifice for the family, thereby subsuming it within the rubric of a moral femininity (Kempadoo and Doezema, 1998). As a further example, research on Filipina migrant workers’ participation in commodity consumption in Hong Kong reveals that they often feel guilty when they spend in pursuit of an urban model of womanhood rather than sending more money to their parents or children (Constable, 1997).

The social networks that women form through communal working have however been identified by some scholars to be a resource that under certain circumstances may provide the basis for new and empowering norms (Pun, 2007; Silvey 2003). As an example, Rachel Silvey’s comparative research conducted in two peri-urban villages in Indonesia illustrates a relationship between the nature of women workers’ social networks and the gender norms within their immediate environment. In one village where most migrant workers lived with local relatives, Silvey observed that the influence of neighbors and family was such that the normative emphasis within the community was on being polite and dignified, bringing honor to the families and upholding community harmony. But in another village where most migrant workers lived a considerable distance from their home villages and therefore formed strong supportive ties with each other, a local culture emerged in which female activism was validated in daily interactions. Silvey (2003) quotes one young woman who told her: ‘We young women all live together and do everything together including form strikes. We are like each other’s family here.’ Significantly though, whilst engaging in activism the women invoked the gender norms of motherhood and of natural feminine peacefulness. For instance, they argued that they needed higher wages to save for the futures of their anticipated or actual children. And they assumed that on account of their peaceful and polite female models of protest that they would not face retribution from the authorities.¹

Whilst women’s networks may be useful in enabling them to lobby for better wages and working conditions there are nevertheless factors which limit their emancipatory potential. The first is that employers often invoke other bases

¹ Through this comparison, Silvey reveals that social networks underpin diversity in how gender norms are used in women’s responses to their incorporation in export-oriented development strategies. Silvey is therefore able to show that it is too simplistic to say that global capitalism appropriates traditional gender norms such as those of Islamic patriarchy to enforce labour discipline, a point that others have made with regard to the gender norms of dutiful daughters more generally (Bennholdt-Thomsen 1981).
of identity formation to fragment the solidarity of women workers. For instance, in the case of China, managers allocate women from different native places to different production lines and then give bonuses to the most productive line. They also set pay for piece-rate work at a level that depends on the number of units produced by all members of a group, thereby focusing the attention of the women on their inter-group dynamics and the productivity levels of different group members (Lee 1999).

Second, as Maxine Molyneux has argued, women’s networks should not be essentialized as the ‘social capital’ band-aid that can meet the development needs of the poor (Molyneux, 2002). The networks do not redress the lack of resources and institutional discrimination that migrant women experience. For example, even though rural migrant women in China’s cities can turn to their female friends for access to pills and information, this does not give them adequate access to sexual health and contraceptive protection and many endure long-term gynecological problems (Hoy, 2008). Moreover, owing to cost and fear of penalties for unapproved births, pregnant migrant women in China avoid urban prenatal health services: in Shanghai migrant women have nearly four times the rate of stillbirths as local women (Wang et al, 2004).

Hence, whilst women migrants in destination areas certainly do mobilize both feminine norms and social networks to obtain support and exercise agency, such creative use of norms and networks is insufficient for them to overcome the disadvantages that they face on account of their marginalization as both outsiders and females. Indeed during the early stages of an export-oriented development strategy, much of its viability depends on securing the cheap and complaint labour of migrant women by confining them both discursively and institutionally to the margins of the host society and labour market.

**Migration and Women’s Lives in Origin Communities**

Socio-cultural norms in origin communities mediate how family members experience being left behind in the village. Many aspects of socio-cultural norms underpin unequal relationships between men and women. Further, many aspects of these socio-cultural norms are also shaped by migration, while arrangements for migration are in turn shaped by gender norms and gender roles.

Family systems are possibly the most crucial element in shaping the socio-cultural world in which rural women live. In societies characterized by patrilineal family systems and predominantly male patterns of outmigration, some evidence indicates that women may gain increased scope for exercising agency: they may co-ordinate agricultural production, oversee house repairs,
manage remittance savings and expenditure and forge new feminized social ties (Dendekar 1986; Murphy 2004). For instance, in parts of Fujian province China which have high rates of male outmigration, the relative stability of the women has endowed them with the perceived trustworthiness necessary for establishing and running their own credit rotation societies (Tsai, 2000).

However other scholars express caution about unreservedly celebrating women’s autonomy gains. Scholars writing about communities in Africa, Latin America, Europe and Asia note that more responsibility means more work and more potential blame if things go wrong (Chant and Radcliffe 1992; Davin, 1999; Nelson, 1992; Menjivar and Agadjanian 2007). Moreover, in patrilineal settings across many parts of the world, scholars report that any increased power accrued to women on account of their husband’s migration is often counterbalanced by the supervision of in-laws. Additionally, as is observed in a comparative study of Albania and Guatemala, the economic and status inequalities between women and men widen on account of the fact that while women remain within a patriarchal environment that has few economic opportunities, men gain experience and contacts from their employment in a technologically and economically more advanced environment (Menjivar and Agadjanian, 2007).

Further, as several scholars have pointed out, often, on account of socio-cultural arrangements woman’s entitlements to use resources are conferred through men. As one example, in China, farmland belongs to the patrilineal family – a female’s right to land is obtained first on the basis of being a daughter in her father’s village and then, after marriage, on the basis of being a wife in her husband’s household and village. In the absence of a fallback position such as a stable urban job, the option of divorce is effectively closed to her unless she can find another husband to take her in (Murphy 2002). This means that a man retains ultimate authority over major household decisions even if he is absent. As another example, in the indigenous irrigation systems of some villages in Kenya, cultural expressions of unequal gender relations prevent women from partaking in the collective labour necessary for maintaining and repairing the channels (articulated as a concern that women’s fluids pollute the water). Within this system, a household’s entitlement to the water depends on male labour contributions. Female-headed households must therefore find a male relative to help them, or else rely on rainfall or turn to crops such as yams which need less water than the staple millet crop and are also less nutritious (Adams and Watson, 1997).

Given the restrictions on women left behind in patrilineal villages, it would appear that women who live in communities characterized by family systems that permit greater female autonomy stand to gain most from male outmigration. For instance, in the matrilineal society of Kerala state in India,
left-behind women are reported to directly manage family funds, bank accounts and land and to obtain additional support for their caring and economic endeavors from their own extended family members (Gulanti 1993). As a further example, in family systems in parts of sub-Saharan Africa the household is a flexible entity (Townsend, 1997) and often the conjugal unit is secondary to ties between parent and child. Husbands and wives maintain their own budgets and houses, and the two engage in negotiated reciprocity, for instance a husband might labour on his wife's land in exchange for cooked meals (Kandiyoti 1988; Kabeer, 1996). However, a possible downside of male migration in the context of family systems in which there is much flexibility and in which women have more autonomy is that the risks of abandonment by husbands may be greater, especially if he forms a new family in the destination area (Kabeer, 1996; Nelson, 1992). Indeed Menjivar and Agadjanian note that in the patriarchal family systems of Albania and Guatemala, even though outsiders might perceive the migrant husband's instructions and calls as control and monitoring, these actions are interpreted by the women themselves as reassuring signs of his continued engagement with the family (Menjivar and Agajanian, 2007).

The unequal gender relations in origin communities are such that women migrants are generally more reluctant than men to return home. In the case of Dominican migrants in USA, research suggests that whilst men want to return to their status as family heads in the home community, women enjoy their status as co-wage earners and try to delay or permanently suspend return by spending money and savings to establish the couple in the destination area (Grasmuck and Pessar, 1991). Research on rural-urban migrants in Turkey similarly reports that when men encounter hardships in the city they are happy to return to the village but their wives often insist on staying in the city because they enjoy greater freedoms than in the countryside (Erman, 1997). Whilst it seems that women’s prospects for exercising agency are greatest when they do not live in the home communities, it is nevertheless the case that the possibility of migration (Sen’s ‘fallback position’) and the income from migrant savings and remittances afford some left-behind and returned women greater leverage when exercising agency and claiming resources. For instance, in rural China returned migrant women are often able to use the threat of re-migrating to bargain with their husbands for money to hire farm labour or machinery or to transfer land to another household and use cash to purchase grain (Murphy, 2002; Murphy, 2004). Hence, even though gender norms shape women’s experience of being left behind, migration may nevertheless offer scope for some individuals to challenge unfavorable normative arrangements.
Gender Roles and the Wellbeing of Children

Gender norms affect how parents provide care in the context of migration, and this has implications for key dimensions of development such as educational progression and outcomes, and good physical and emotional health among children. A limited body of ethnographic literature on left behind children finds that there are strong gendered divisions in parenting roles with, for instance, the fathers as disciplinarians and mothers as the carers. These studies suggest that disruptions to such normative roles cause family stress (Kandal and Kao 2001; Parreñas 2005). It is not surprising therefore that the literature indicates that who leaves the household affects children’s wellbeing. It seems that migration may exert a relatively neutral or even positive impact when the mother remains (Chen, 2007; Asis, 2007).

It is possible that this is because mothers are more attentive to their children and are more intuitively responsive to their needs. Indeed a recent longitudinal survey of parenting and child outcomes in England produced a finding which has bearing on this point. Maternal absence was found to exert a detrimental impact on the child’s cognitive and emotional development during the early years of a child’s life whereas paternal absence did not. However in the child’s later years and early teens, paternal presence and engagement was found to contribute positively to the emotional development of sons in particular (Washbrook, 2007).

Studies conducted in the Philippines, Indonesia and Mexico about the migration of fathers have found that even though children feel distanced from him, they nevertheless see the migrant father as reliably fulfilling his breadwinner role and appreciate his economic contributions, while the extended family offers compensating support (Asis 2003; in press Jampaklay; Lloyd and Kane 1996; Parreñas 2005). Moreover, as it is the mother who has greater say in the day-to-day allocation of family income and remittances, the needs of the children are generally well catered for – this corresponds with findings from the wider household economics literature that when income or economic benefits accrue to mothers, the children benefit more (Kabeer 1994). Daughters in particular may benefit from living in a female headed household which ethnographic data among the urban poor in Mexico suggests may practice more gender equity than male headed ones (Chant, 1991). In contrast, in the literatures of both development studies and migration studies, research suggests that children whose mothers are absent are the most vulnerable. This is perhaps because it is more difficult for the extended family to substitute for the roles performed by the mother (in press Jampaklay; Parreñas 2005).

As mentioned earlier, in some situations, left-behind fathers may try to claim their masculinity by shunning domestic work and engaging in violent behaviors. In extreme cases, there are also situations where long-term outmigration of mothers is associated with the abuse of daughters (Chen,
Meanwhile, rather than the migrant mother being seen as the breadwinner, which would challenge the husband’s masculinity she instead uses money as well as phone calls to try to fulfil her role as maternal carer (Parreñas 2005). The prospects for her to do this vary according to her working and socioeconomic conditions. Parreñas reports that migrant women from the Philippines who worked as housemaids and in other occupations had sufficient money and autonomy to phone their children two or three times a week. By contrast, research conducted in China suggests that owing to their meagre wages, long working hours and a disciplined labour environment, many migrants are only able to phone their children once or twice a month, with calls generally lasting fewer than five minutes (Ye et al, 2004). Qualitative interviews in both the Philippines and China indicate that such gifts and phone calls are seldom sufficient to remove the children’s feelings of abandonment and insecurity (Parreñas 2005; Ye et al 2004). Nonetheless, given that we know children’s perceptions of parental support affect their self-esteem (Gaylord-Harden et al 2007) and that parental aspirations for their children’s education positively affect school results (Hannum and Park, 2006) it is likely that these calls and parents’ questions about school contribute positively to their emotional wellbeing and engagement with education.

In cases where one or both parents have migrated, children may experience greater demands on their labour (Murphy 2004; Xiang 2006), but owing to the ‘fixedness’ of the gendered division of labour within households, it is common for daughters to be called upon by parents or guardians to help more with domestic chores. Indeed even in studies of children’s educational engagement which do not consider parental migration as a variable, the evidence for rural China suggests that mothers generally expect more time in domestic help from daughters than from sons (Hannum and Park, 2006).

Many children are left behind with grandparents, a situation that is found across the developing world. This arrangement has been the subject of major concern in the Chinese media, with gender equality issues informing some of the criticisms. One charge levelled is that elderly carers are more likely to practice daughter discrimination in caring for left behind children because they are less likely to be enlightened in this regard than the children’s migrant parents. Whilst this may hold some degree of truth, criticism of elderly carers overlooks their tremendous contribution to making the migration of rural labourers socially and economically possible, and the way in which their labour subsidises the labour costs of urban capitalists.

Both the gender of the carer and the gender of the left behind child have implications for children’s wellbeing. Limited evidence suggests that in the case of a father’s absence, the lack of role models negatively affects sons’ academic performance, which is consistent with findings from the wider
social science literature on the impact of paternal absence on older sons (Washbrook, 2007). Meanwhile daughters’ appreciation of their mother’s difficulties and sacrifice may cause them to study harder (Lloyd and Blane, 1996). The role of the child’s gender as well as the carers’ gender in mediating the impact of being left behind are poorly understood dimensions of migration, and scholars have called for robust quantitative and qualitative analysis to address these questions (Bryant 2005).

Migration, Gender Norms and Son Preference
A final area in which migration interacts with norms to change how agency is exercised and how resources are allocated is son preference. Whilst a vast body of literature testifies that migration is very much associated with changes in reproductive norms in origin areas, most studies address this in relation to family size rather than family sex composition (for a review see Hoy 1999; Portes 2006). Given that family systems in North India, Bangladesh and China underpin growing distortions in sex ratios at birth (Das Gupta et al, 2003) this is a grave omission.

It is only in recent years that scholars have started to investigate linkages between labour migration and son preference. In their study in Shenzhen, China, the demographers Li Shuzhou, Wu Haixia, Jin Xiaoyi and Marcus Feldman found that son preference remained more entrenched among rural migrants than amongst long-term urban residents (2006b). However, they also noted that some migrants had adopted the view that parents must rely on their own savings rather than on sons for their old age care, a perspective which may in the longer term erode son preference (2005; 2006a). Migration may also precipitate a change from virilocal to neo-local post-marriage residence patterns which could help to dilute son preference; this is because if parents recognize that neither sons nor daughters are likely to be by their side in their old age then the sex of their child may matter less. Finally some qualitative evidence from rural China suggests that migration possibilities for young women and their resulting remittances may cause parents to value daughters more (Yan, 2003). Over the longer term such normative change with regard to son preference could help to bring about improvements in aggregate patterns for development indicators such as sex ratios at birth and mortality rates among female infants.

Conclusion
Through attention to the impacts of socio-cultural norms on migration, two processes become apparent. On the one hand the national development strategy of many low income countries depends on harnessing low-paid compliant labour so that the economy can participate competitively in changing global systems of production. Indeed national planners, municipal
authorities, factory managers and destination area residents commonly invoke gender norms and stereotypical views about migrants in ways that sustain the marginalization of migrant women. On the other hand, migration precipitates changes in the normative environment in which migrants live and/or originate from. Migration can also increase migrant women’s and left-behind women’s access to resources. And such normative and resource changes increase many women’s capacity to achieve functionings.

The effects of individuals’ strategies to achieve functionings through migration and other economic and social activities are manifest at an aggregate level in conventional development indicators. Many of these indicators pertain to core Millennium Development Goals: for instance, the eradication of poverty through access to improved pay and working conditions, universal primary education for boys and girls, health care for boys and girls, and more balanced birth sex ratios. Improvements in such indicators in turn feed into changes in the wider normative and resource environment in which families evaluate the worth and roles of males and females, decide about migration, and deploy resources.

Some development planners, particular those who focus on labor markets or on the optimal deployment of resources, tend to see laborers as homogenous and substitutable – some surplus, some transferrable, some who migrate, some who stay behind. A more holistic approach to the relationship between migration and development would see both the migrants and those who stay behind as complex, interdependent and gendered human beings who struggle within socio-cultural as well as economic environments to exercise agency and achieve functionings. Such a revised approach would make gender norms, gender relations and the gendering of social roles central to the analysis of the migration and development relationship.

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Remittances, Migration, Gender and Development: Future directions for Research and Policy

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SSRC Migration & Development Conference Paper No. 18

In the current phase of globalization, international migration for economic necessity is a phenomenon affecting increasing numbers of people, households and communities worldwide. In order to maintain contact with their families and countries of origin, migrants are expanding their relationships across geographical, political, economic, and cultural boundaries, creating transnational families and communities. Within these social fields of interaction there is a constant flow of resources and discourses that question and transform traditional ideas of identity and belonging.

Remittances—money earned by migrants working abroad that is sent back home—constitute the monetary, as well as the most visible aspect of this constant circulation between migrants and their countries of origin. In the last decade, remittances have emerged as the second largest source of external funding for developing countries, and their volume continues to grow. This flow of money has caught the attention of governments and financial and development institutions who have begun to identify and implement initiatives aimed at maximizing the impact of remittances for poverty reduction and local development.

Women are increasingly participants in migratory movements, contributing to the maintenance of their households and to the development of their communities of origin through the sending of remittances. However, gender inequalities differentiate the migratory experience for men and women. The decision to migrate, the networks utilized, and the individual migrant’s insertion into the labor markets of the destination country, to mention just a few factors, are all affected by gender differences. In this regard, the money remitted, the frequency of remittances, the channels used, and the impact of remittances on the development of the country of origin are equally impacted by gender.
Despite the growing number of women migrants and the importance of remittances for the material wellbeing of many families in developing countries, very few studies have analyzed the relationship between gender and remittances. This vacuum of information is particularly disconcerting in view of the evidence that shows that integrating a gender perspective into international development policies and programs increases their effectiveness and sustainability. A critical review of the flows and impacts of remittances from a gender perspective is crucial to the design and successful implementation of programs intended to harness the development potential of remittances.

This paper contributes to the current debate on the link between remittances and development. Its purpose is to present key elements for the development of a framework that will strengthen the understanding of the interrelationships between migration, gender, remittances and development and also serve as an entry point for future research and project proposals. It also attempts to formulate policy recommendations for better integrating gender perspectives into migration, remittances and development initiatives. This framework aims to establish the basis for formulating a more adequate response to questions such as: how does the growing feminization of migration affect remittance flows?; how can remittances contribute to the achievement of gender equality?; and how can we mobilize remittances to achieve sustainable development that includes women? To this end, the paper reviews the main elements that are in play and that cannot be overlooked in a gender analysis of the sending, use and impact of remittances. Gender is not an arbitrary choice. As a social construction that organizes relations between men and women, gender is central to the migratory experience, differentiating the experiences of settlement in the destination countries, and the relationships that migrants maintain with their countries of origin.

**International Migration in a Gendered Global Context**

Between 1990 and 2000, the number of international migrants increased by 14%. According to World Bank estimates in 2007, some 200 million people lived outside their country of origin,¹ and this figure is projected to reach 230 million by 2050 (UNFPA, 2004). Neither economic recession nor increasingly strict border controls in the recipient countries seem to be able to reverse the constantly increasing trend toward international migration. One of the most relevant characteristics of the migratory phenomenon has been the rapidly rising participation of women. According to the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), in most destination countries the number of women migrants has grown at a faster rate than that of their male counterparts such

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¹ This figure represents approximately 3% of the world population. (Morrison et al 2007)
that women currently represent almost half of the total international migrant population, and in some countries they account for up to 70% or 80% of the total.  

This notable female presence is not a new development. In 1960, women represented 47% of the total number of people living outside their countries of origin. This percentage has steadily increased; reaching 48% in 1990 and 48.9% in 2000. What is new however is the economic role assumed by migrant women in the migration process. Women are increasingly migrating on their own as main economic providers and heads of households while fewer are migrating as “dependents” of their husbands or male relatives. The steady and constant increase in the number of women who migrate autonomously can only be understood within the context of the current phase of global capitalist development, in which gender exists as a crosscutting variable throughout the process.

Despite the scope and characteristics of the feminization of migration, the incorporation of gender in the analysis of migration is relatively recent. Until now, most of the literature on migration has focused on the patriarchal conceptualization of the family as a cohesive unit where the man is the provider and the woman is the wife or daughter, or in other words the “dependent” (Jiménez, 1998). Both the presence of autonomous women migrants and the economic and social contributions to the destination societies made by women who migrated with their husbands had been kept hidden (Lutz, 1997). The resulting invisibility of women migrants can be attributed to: 1) the predominance of androcentric viewpoints in the social sciences, even in studies where women represent the majority of migrants; and, 2) a failure to disaggregate statistics by gender (Zlotnik, 2003). The absence of a gendered analysis of the remittances phenomenon can also be attributed to, on the one hand, the low importance that has thus far been given to the feminization of migration and, on the other hand, the fact that only recently have theoretical models of migration begun to consider the multiplicity and interrelationships of various factors present in migrations.

The Feminization of Migration as a Household Survival Strategy

Behind the feminization of international migration is a complex network of political, social and economic experiences taking place globally and affecting both the societies of origin and destination. Due to current demographic trends in wealthier countries such as ageing populations, women’s incorporation into labor markets, and the deregulation of certain economic sectors, labor from developing countries is in high demand. On the other
hand, the impact of globalization on developing countries has led to the economic marginalization of peripheral areas, the impoverishment of already vulnerable groups and the expansion of alternate circuits of survival (Sassen, 2003).

The increasing percentage of women in migratory flows is also directly related to the extreme austerity measures imposed by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank (WB) on developing countries in the last decades of the twentieth century. Structural Adjustment Policies (SAPs) imposed as a precondition of loans to developing countries have resulted in the failure of small and medium-sized businesses, increasing unemployment, cuts to social services and unsustainable national debt. The implementation of such policies has also worsened living conditions for the most vulnerable population groups, especially women and children. Many women have been forced to enter the informal economy in an attempt to make ends meet through the cultivation of subsistence crops, street vending, sewing, cooking, etc. These subsistence activities, whose economic value or social utility are often not recognized, provide women with less income and less prestige than participation in the formal economy.

In addition, the deteriorating role of men as economic providers, a result of high rates of unemployment, has led to a crisis in the reproductive model. While this crisis has not led to a questioning of the sexual division of labor, several studies have shown that a significant number of men have distanced themselves from reproductive activities, adopting individualist strategies or leaving the household (Juliano, 1999). Consequently, women are taking over as heads of households. In this context, one of the survival strategies adopted by households is migration to developed countries where a growing service economy demands an inexpensive and vulnerable labor force, a requirement which is perfectly met by migrant women. The informal and unregulated nature of domestic work benefits employers by keeping wages low and preventing the workers from accessing a number of social services and protections. Other regulations make it difficult for migrants to move into other labor sectors, even if they have the qualifications to do so.3

**Households and Transnational Social Networks**

During the 1980s, feminist scholars began to critique the then accepted vision of the migratory phenomenon. Faced with the predominance of the *homo

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3 For instance, in Spain, an employer who wishes to hire a foreigner must first visit a government office to verify that no nationals are available for the position. Likewise, the bureaucratic complications, delays and costs of validating a university degree helps to explain why so many women with university degrees end up working as domestics or in other low-level service occupations.
economicus perspective, attention was directed to socioeconomic phenomena previously ignored or undervalued in the study of migration. Among these are phenomena such as informal activities, the economic role of the family, the variety of labor strategies within households, and the development of ethnic networks with an important transnational economic role. The study of these migratory networks shows the diversity of the strategies of women, family, and community, as well as the complexity of gendered divisions. Migration, from this viewpoint, is based on household strategies in which both the migrant and non-migrant family members interact; those who have left and those who remain (Ribas, 2000). This new perspective implies a critique of the neoclassical model of the household, arguing that migration is not only an adaptive reaction to external conditions but the result of a gendered interaction within households and social networks of the socially constructed ideas of masculinity and femininity (Hondagneu-Sotelo, 1994; Grasmuck and Pessar, 1991). Therefore, in considering migratory movements, the central role of households in the gendered decision to migrate and in the formation of migratory networks should remain foremost in mind. By focusing on the hierarchies of gender and age within households, feminist critique has revealed how the sexual division of labor shapes the migratory experience, the conditions of settlement in the recipient countries, and the relationship that women maintain with their households and countries of origin (Pessar, 1999; Hirsh, 1999; Lawson, 1998).

Another fundamental characteristic of the current phenomenon of migration is its transnationality. The transnational focus presupposes that the efforts of migrants to integrate into the host society do not necessarily imply a break in their connections with their communities of origin. On the contrary, migrants continue to participate actively in the social, economic and political life of their societies of origin. In this regard, living transnationally implies living in cross border territories, and participating in networks and interactions that transcend the borders of any given country.

Transnational relationships constitute a fundamental element that conditions, facilitates and explains the migratory process. Those who have migrated return to their countries of origin, send money and gifts, and transmit images of the ‘here’ and ‘there’ in which the diversity of social spaces are compared, intermixed and rethought (Vallejo, 2004). Social networks provide information about job opportunities and living conditions in the destination countries and can even finance the journey. Once the migrant individual has arrived in the new country, social networks continue to play

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4 The concept of homo economicus originates from the social sciences. It focuses on the individual as a rational being who makes decisions that will maximize benefits and reduce costs. From this perspective, migration is explained as resulting from a decision made by an individual in an isolated manner – sort of a Robinson Crusoe, outside of any context, without a family (Carrasco, 2001) – under econometric criteria of the search for benefits.
an important role in linking migrants with those who remained in the countries of origin, reinforcing loyalties and obligations to the family. Today, the decreasing costs of the telephone, the Internet and airfares facilitate permanent contact between migrants and their loved ones, reinforcing links between them.

For migrant women who are held responsible for the care and maintenance of family ties, these factors represent the possibility of preserving the “affective circuit” with their children and other members of the household. In addition to money, an enormous volume of ideas, resources and discourses that influence and transform social identities, households, and power relationships, also circulate within transnational networks (Huan et al., 2003) in a bi-directional flow from destination countries to countries of origin and back again. Transnational networks are social spaces located within specific contexts across which gender dynamics differentiate men and women’s participation.

**Remittances**
Remittance transfers from destination countries to countries of origin represent the most visible aspect of migration, not only because they are more tangible than other benefits derived from migration, but also because remittances are currently portrayed as a critical factor in the development of countries of origin.

Remittances represent long-distance social links of solidarity, reciprocity and obligation that connect women and men migrants with their relatives and friends across national borders controlled by States. This intimate and long-distance “bounded solidarity,” which in principle has a rather narrow scope of action since the intention of individual migrants is to benefit their domestic groups and social networks, easily becomes a macroeconomic factor that sets off a vast chain of effects not only in the countries of origin but also at a transnational level (Guarnizo, 2004).

While the average size of an individual remittance may be quite modest, at the global level remittances are emerging as the second largest source of external financing for developing countries. According to the World Bank, remittances to developing countries reached $251 billion in 2007, more than twice the amount of Official Development Assistance (US$103.6 billion) and nearly two-thirds of foreign direct investment flows to developing countries. Remittances are the largest source of external financing in many poor countries (World Bank, 2008). Furthermore, this volume has been steadily

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5 According to Orozco (2003), the mean value of a remittance received in the Latin American and Caribbean region is US$200.
increasing and all factors seem to indicate that unlike other financial flows, the flow of remittances will continue to grow in the future.  

From a regional perspective, the Latin America and Caribbean (LAC) region remains the largest recipient of (recorded) remittances, receiving nearly 24.3% of global remittances; while Eastern Asia and the Pacific receive a close 23.5%, Europe and Central Asia (18.7%), South Asia (17.5%), the Middle East and North Africa (11.5%), and Southern Africa (4.7%) (World Bank, 2008). This data reflects a general change in the regional position; while LAC has remained the main regional receptor, their rate of growth has slowed markedly due to several factors including the US recession. In comparison to 2004 data, there has been an increase in the reception of remittances in regions such as Eastern Asia and the Pacific, and Europe and Central Asia, which have displaced Southern Asia and the Middle East and North Africa as second and third ranked regions of reception, mostly due to updated data in some countries.

The main recipient countries for remittances in 2007 were India, Mexico and China, which accounted for nearly one-third of remittances received by developing countries. From the perspective of the relationship between remittances and the total volume of the economy however, the countries receiving the most remittances are small, middle-income countries such as Tajikistan, Moldova, Tonga, Kyrgyz Republic and Honduras, where remittances exceeded a quarter of the GDP (Ratha et al, 2007). Despite these impressive figures, official records only represent the tip of the iceberg. Remittances can be sent back to countries of origin through a variety of channels. In some cases, migrants use formal channels such as banks, post offices or remittance companies. In other cases, they use informal systems, carry the money themselves, or send it with other persons traveling back to their countries of origin. Remittances transferred through formal channels are usually recorded in national accounts, while transfers made through informal channels are not. According to some estimates, if informal transfers were also taken into account, the estimated value of remittances could double.

A high percentage of remittances are sent via informal channels for several reasons: in certain contexts they may be faster, cheaper, more convenient or more secure; undocumented migrants face risks by using formal channels; there are no alternatives because the recipient individual lives in a rural area that lacks financial infrastructure or in an area of armed conflict; the

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6 According to World Bank estimates, remittance flows towards developing countries increased from US$116 billion in 2002 to US$251 billion in 2007, which represents a 118% increase over a period of eight years. (Word bank 2007)  

7 For example, in Pakistan, the Philippines, Sudan and Egypt, several studies have shown that informal transfers are twice or three times the official figure. (Van Doorn, no date)
exchange rate of the recipient country is overvalued; or the migrant and/or the recipient are unfamiliar with bank procedures, among others. The cost of sending money home varies considerably according to the country and method used and could represent a significant loss to the migrant and his/her family. Moreover, since the fees for remittance transfers include many charges that can be difficult for some clients to understand, in many cases neither the person sending remittances nor the recipient knows the real cost of the transaction. Nevertheless, growing competitiveness and the implementation of regulatory mechanisms in the international market are lowering prices and increasing transparency. For example, while the cost of sending money to Latin America and the Caribbean in the 1990s averaged some 15% of the value of the transaction, that cost had fallen to 5-9% by 2003 (IDB/IMF, 2004). Yet this percentage continues to be unjustifiably high considering that an international transfer (swift) costs approximately 15 cents (World Bank, 2004).

Remittances are agile transactions that unlike the exportation of primary goods, do not respond to market fluctuations or to the volatility of foreign investment. On the contrary, remittances are stable and can be countercyclical in times of economic recession. Moreover, remittances are person to person transactions that elude the intervention of corrupt governments or the conditions imposed on loans by the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank.

The Impact of Remittances on Development
There is a general consensus on the importance of remittances for the survival of many poor households in developing countries. Studies on the use of remittances show that they are used primarily to meet the basic needs of households – including food, housing, clothing, health and education (Van Doorn, no date). According to the World Bank, a 10% increase in the percentage of remittances as a proportion of a country’s GDP would result in a 1.6% reduction in the number of people living in poverty in that country (World Bank, 2003). The Moroccan Association of Demographers estimates that 1.2 million Moroccans have escaped poverty because of remittances (Bourchachen, 2000).

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8 According to an IMF study cited in UNFPA (2004), informal channels only take 6 to 12 hours to transfer funds between major international cities with an average cost of 2 to 5 per cent. A DFID study (2005) shows that transfers made through banks from UK take an average 5 days (varying from 2 to 10 days depending on such factors as the transfer mechanism used and the processes of the receiving bank) and that the fees vary between 2.5 and 40%.

9 Commissions charged for remittance transfers include fixed commissions, the application of different exchange rates between currencies, and other indirect costs.
More controversial is the debate about the effect of remittances on the development of recipient countries. Experts have identified both positive and negative effects in terms of development. On the positive side, evidence indicates that remittances increase national income; augment reserves of foreign currency and contribute to stabilizing the balance of payments; support entrepreneurial activities; contribute to savings; and create demand for local goods and services (Ratha, 2003). In post-conflict economies where no formal financial infrastructure exists, remittances sent by the refugee population can help to maintain payment systems and contribute to reconstruction efforts. Though not directly related to remittances, other financial contributions that migrants make to the economies of their countries of origin include an increased demand for local tourism, communication services and “nostalgic” commerce. On the negative side, remittances are also said to increase the demand for and consumption of imported goods; cause inflation; increase inequality; raise the costs of land and housing; provoke dependency; and discourage the search for other income-generating activities. It is also said that international migration drains the available labor force, an instability that consequently discourages foreign investment (IFAD, 2004).

Some studies have also shown that a growing number of young people are losing interest in education and local livelihood options because they maintain the (often unrealistic) hope of being able to emigrate (Carling, 2005). A further negative aspect of remittances is the brain drain from developing countries and the obstacle that this loss of skilled human capital presents to economic and social development. In any case, there is no consensus on any of these points, and empirical evidence of the positive or negative impacts of remittances is not conclusive but rather points to an intricate set of mixed influences. What is commonly agreed upon is that the effects of remittances sent by migrants to their countries of origin are highly complex and depend upon a series of variables such as the characteristics of the individual migrants and their households - both in the country of origin and the destination country - their motivations, the way in which the money is utilized, and the overall local context and economic environment. Other contextual factors such as access to credit, infrastructure and business opportunities also influence the impact of remittances on development (Meyers, 1998).

Much of the literature on remittances and development has addressed the division between the use of remittances for productive investment and for consumption. Because only a small proportion of remittances are used to set up small businesses, improve agricultural practices, or for other forms of “productive investment,” doubts have been raised among many policy-makers
and researchers about the development potential of remittances (Carling, 2005).\textsuperscript{10}

However, this emphasis on the productive use of remittances has also received criticism. On the one hand, the use of remittances to acquire basic goods and services that otherwise could not be obtained reduces the poverty of many households, which in itself is a development objective. Expenditures on “consumer” goods such as food, education and health should be seen as investments in human capital. Although the effects of improving human capital are not immediately perceived, their long-term societal consequences should be taken into consideration in any estimation of the benefits of remittances. The feminist movement has questioned the consideration of this productive use as the only measurable and “real” aspect of remittances. An emphasis on the need to use remittances in productive investments while criticizing their use for so-called “ostentation” (such as parties and religious celebrations) considers only the economic aspect of the lives of human beings, diminishing the value of other types of investments –emotional, symbolic, communitarian, etc.– for different societies.

One fundamental issue that must be remembered is that remittances are private, hard-earned money (frequently earned at the cost of possibilities for career advancement, training or leisure time in the destination country). The concern over encouraging the productive use of remittances may place a burden on migrant workers that is not placed on other productive sectors, whose workers are not questioned about whether their earnings are being used to accelerate the development of the country. It must also be noted that motivating migrants to contribute to the development of their countries of origin through one use or another of remittances can only be successful if the needs and priorities of the migrants themselves are taken into account. A study conducted on domestic workers from Sri Lanka by Gamburd (2003), and cited in Asis (2004), documented how the families put the money to productive uses –land, housing, businesses and dowry– prioritized according to a local hierarchy of goals and objectives. Money was invested into businesses only after land, housing and dowry had been secured. This study thus demonstrated the need to consider local views and conditions in order to understand migrants’ own perceptions of what constitutes productive and non-productive investment.

Finally, it must be noted that the effects of remittances go beyond the economic realm. The economist bias that characterizes much of the discourse on development masks the changes that can be produced in other areas such as gender relations. Very few studies have analyzed the role played by remittances in the transformation of ideas about gender roles, which are

\textsuperscript{10} Data on this is very sketchy, but, for example the Central Bank of El Salvador estimates that 1% of remittances go to savings.
questioned from the moment in which women send remittances as heads of households. The receipt of money by households and the utilization of this money also have an impact on gender relations that cannot be ignored. When discussing the potential of remittances as a tool for development, the empowerment of women and gender equality as a basis and an end in every notion of sustainable human development must be considered.

**Gender Dimensions of Remittances**

Because much of the research on remittances has been conducted from a purely economic perspective, the principle aim has been to determine the volume of remittances, assess their contribution to local development through investment in productive activities, or identify the transfer channels and related costs. From this perspective remittances appear to be gender neutral. The sex of the migrant sending the remittances is not taken into consideration, nor are the possible gender-related differences that could exist in the amount remitted, the frequency or use of remittances, or their socio-economic impact on either the sender or the recipient household. The gender differences that operate at the macro and micro-structural levels and that undoubtedly determine the sending, use and impact of remittances thus remain hidden. Moreover, using de-contextualized individual subjects as the unit of analysis ignores the fact that sending remittances is an act carried out by a subject who is influenced by various structural variables—gender, class, ethnicity—and who acts within family and social dynamics that in turn are structurally determined by far-reaching social, economic and political processes.

What most of the research seems to ignore is that the amount of money sent to households by migrant men and women, the manner in which it is sent, and the form in which it is utilized, are not only determined by the market economy, but also by the political economy of the household. Remittances are more than just periodic financial transfers; they are the result of complex processes of negotiation within households that are immersed in an intricate network of relations between the Diaspora and the countries of origin. Literature suggests that the money sent by migrants to their homes is more than an act of individual altruism; remittances represent a family strategy to diversify the sources of income and to secure additional funds through migration (Kapur, 2003; IMP, 2003). This model of “household strategy” has been widely studied and documented in the research on migration. Questioning the unitary definition of the household implicit in this model, the feminist critique has shown how the power hierarchies of gender, age, authority and resources within households play a crucial role in determining the dynamics of migrant families and social networks, which also influence the flows of remittances. Understanding remittances and their effects requires, therefore, a gendered analysis of the household.
Current migratory movements are to a large extent a household survival strategy. Moreover, these movements are strongly conditioned by social and migratory networks before a decision to migrate is taken. In this regard, migration can be seen as the result of an interaction between networks, households and migrants. At the same time, households and social networks are inserted into specific political, economic and social contexts in both the countries of origin and destination. In this intricate map of interaction, developing countries send a labor force to developed countries, which in turn have a strong demand for labor due to the deregulation of labor markets, women’s incorporation into the labor market, population ageing, etc. The sex/gender system is also introduced as a vector that cuts across all of these phenomena, since none of the processes that occur in the countries of origin or of destination, in the households or the social networks can be analyzed outside the social relationship of inequality implied by gender. And all of these processes –international migration, feminization of migration, transnationalization of households and networks as well as remittances—occur within the context of the development of global capitalism.

Remittances are not only a flow of money, but also of ideas, images and discourses, affected by different factors that occupy distinct spaces. Studying remittances from a gender perspective allows us to approach all these aspects simultaneously and comprehend their mutual relationship of dependency and transformation. It also allows us to understand how the gender dynamics established in a particular social, political and economic context shape the behavioral patterns behind remittances –both of the people who send them and of those who receive them. In addition, it allows us to understand how the economic and social roles women acquire through the sending and/or management of remittances can catalyze transformations in gender relations, and in turn, stimulate social, cultural, economic and political change.

Elements for the Analysis of the Gender Dimensions of Remittances
There is an extensive body of literature that seeks to explain why migrants send money home, and tries to define the behavioral patterns of those who send remittances –how much is sent, the frequency, the utilized channels and how the money is spent by the recipients. A review conducted by Sorensen (2004a) suggests that the amount and characteristics of transfers depend on the:

- Legal status of the migrant;
- Marital status;
- Household income level;
- Level of employment and occupational status in the countries of origin and destination;
- Length of stay abroad;
- Labor market opportunities available to migrants;
- Cost of living in the destination country;
- Number of dependants in the household in the country of origin and family relationships;
- Household members working abroad;
- Wage rates;
- Economic activity in the countries of origin and destination;
- Facilities for money transfers; and
- Exchange rates between the country of origin and the destination country.

None of these elements are individual variables operating in a vacuum, rather they are inserted into social, economic and political contexts that are rooted in patriarchal ideology and organized around the sexual division of labor. Therefore, each one of these elements influences and is influenced by the different roles that each society attributes to men and women.

**Gender Patterns in the Sending of Remittances**

The few studies that have attempted to analyze the influence of gender on patterns of sending remittances have not revealed conclusive results. These studies have argued that as a result of the dedication to the household and care for family members that characterize the feminine role, women can be expected to establish longer-lasting and more intense relations with their relatives, specifically their children, wherever they may be located. Women's greater propensity to lead processes of family reunification and their consistency in sending remittances therefore is better understood from a gender role perspective.

Contrary to these interpretations, which are supported in several research studies (Ribas, 2000), is a study conducted by Semyonov and Gorodzeisky (2005). In this study of male and female overseas workers from the Philippines, almost all migrants, regardless of their sex, send money back to their households. However, the study also indicated that men send more money than women do, and therefore the income level of the households of migrant men is significantly higher than those of migrant women. These findings appear to contradict the commonly accepted notion that families promote the migration of women because they are more responsible than men and because daughters are expected to send money to their parents. However, although it could seem more rational for households to send men as migrants, the number of Filipinas who go abroad for work continues to grow. To interpret these findings, one must take into account the context of the global labor markets and the combination of conditions in the country of origin (high rates of female unemployment and scarce opportunities), and in the
destination country (labor markets segregated by sex and ethnicity), which are at the base of the migration phenomenon.

However, a recent study conducted by UN-INSTRAW revealed that women are the primary senders of remittances from Italy to the Philippines, and that they largely conceive their migratory projects in terms of the well-being of future generations; whereas men, in general, tend to reserve their money for more personal expenses and interests. Women therefore develop a strategy based on savings and the strict control of their spending habits in Italy in order to send the highest possible amounts of remittances to their households in the Philippines (UN-INSTRAW 2008).

Another important factor that undoubtedly conditions the sending of remittances is women’s positions within the household in the country of origin. Three different groups (not excluding the existence of others) can be identified:

- Migration to sustain the family: women who migrate as providers for the household. Most women who send remittances are found within this group. Their economic strategies are aimed at the optimization of resources, which leads them to undertake long, arduous shifts in order to save the most money possible to send it to their country of origin. The attainment of more personal objectives—improving their education, having more leisure time, devoting part of their income to personal expenses, etc.—is heavily conditioned by the pressure to sustain the family group both economically and emotionally.

- Autonomous migration: women for whom migration is not based on the need to maintain a family unit. The tendency to remit is less for women in this group, even though they most likely also contribute remittances to support family investments, such as financing the studies of siblings.

- Migration as dependents of husbands: women in this group have little relevance in terms of sending of remittances; however their economic and social contribution through reproductive labor, which remains hidden within the private sphere, should not be overlooked.

Gender is a cross cutting element throughout the migration process. The idea of returning, for example, is different for men and women. Some studies indicate that women have a higher tendency than men to stay in the country of destination. Fieldwork conducted by Pessar (1986) with Dominican immigrants showed that women tend to prefer to purchase expensive durable goods rather than save money for their return home or to be sent as remittances. Contrary to this, men prefer to live in more austere conditions and save money in order to assure their return to Dominican society and culture. These distinct interests regarding settlement in the destination
country are relevant to understanding patterns of remittance behavior as well as the different types of participation of men and women in transnational organizations. While gender inequalities exist in all societies, the expected behavior of men and women may vary in each culture. Women's potentials and limitations for remitting are therefore often affected in different ways by the gender norms that prevail in each country of origin.

**Gender Dynamics in the Destination Country**

Patterns of sending remittances are influenced by a series of political, social and economic factors pertaining to the destination country, and crosscut by gender dynamics. This section analyzes some of these factors.

**Immigration policies of the destination country**

The ways in which each State manages and organizes migration flows has a direct effect on the legal status that the migrant has in the destination country. In turn, the legal status of migrants greatly influences the patterns of sending remittances, in that it conditions the possibilities to access formal channels and affects the migrant’s insertion into wider social networks. An irregular legal situation can also expose the migrant to situations of labor exploitation and wages below the legal minimum. In the current context, where migration is mainly related to the labor market, the legal status of migrants is tied to the possession of a work permit, to the conditions of family reunification, or to marriage with a migrant worker possessing a work permit or with a citizen. In all these cases, women are the most disadvantaged.

Women are less likely than men to obtain a work permit or legal residence because they tend to work as domestic servants and caregivers, as sex workers, or in the service economy, sectors in which informality, irregularity, high turnover, and in some cases, seasonal work predominate. Given the substantial restrictions on migration at the global level, some of the ways which women find to enter destination countries are through marriage (either with a legal migrant or with a citizen) or through family reunification. In both cases, however, the legal status of women becomes attached to their husbands, at least for a period of time, which can become a barrier to autonomous migration. Migration restrictions that predominantly affect women also result in an increasing number of potential migrants resorting to networks of illegal smuggling of persons. This channel of migration generates debts for the person migrating through the network and often forces them to devote the income earned at the onset of the migration period towards repayment of the debt, thereby reducing their available economic resources.

**Labor Market**

The strict stratification by gender and ethnicity of the labor markets of the destination countries signifies a double discrimination against women
migrants. Not only are they introduced into the most precarious and worst remunerated sectors, but their very insertion reinforces gender roles since they are required to perform services in the sectors of care and domestic work that national women do not wish to do. The volume and characteristics of the transfer of care to migrant women and ethnic minorities in developed countries vary according to the country and the regulation of the sector. However, in general, it is a labor market characterized by informality and a lack of regulation, which leads to low wages and a scarcity of work-related benefits, as well as facilitating exploitation.

Integration Policies
Integration policies are usually scarce, targeting only legal migrants and overlooking the specific contexts of migrant women. Policies addressing entry into the labor force tend to strengthen gender roles as they direct women towards typically feminine sectors that are also typically relegated to ethnic minorities. Other types of policies aimed at improving women’s social and/or labor insertion do not take into account the triple burden of work borne by migrant women (who bear the same double burden as national women but without family networks to help with reproductive tasks, and who are also responsible for supporting family members in their country of origin). Moreover, these policies do not respond to needs that are linked to the gendered status of migrant women within their households (such as the specific difficulties of women who have migrated as wives). Policies are also often designed from an ethnocentric point of view that considers women from developing countries as passive victims and not as agents of change with the capacity to redefine their living conditions.

Furthermore, the degree of settlement of migrant populations sanctioned by each State has a decisive influence on remittances. Policies that favor the integration of migrants range from allowing, among other things, a foreign person to acquire material goods and real estate, to a policy that promotes or at least does not hinder the reuniting of families.

Gender Dynamics in the Country of Origin
Women constitute the majority of recipients of remittances. Gender relations within the households and communities of origin influence decisions such as how and for what purpose the money from remittances will be used, as well as which family members will benefit. Some of these influences are analyzed in this section.

Gender and power relationships within households
We have seen how feminist theory emphasizes the sexual division of labor and the differences in power relationships within the household as key
analytical elements for understanding migratory processes. In the analysis of remittances, we must therefore bear in mind, that decisions on how to spend the money from remittances, who will benefit from the money, and the short and long-term effects that remittances might have on family structure are not gender neutral. Households are subject to tensions that result from the unequal distribution of economic resources and power negotiating among family members. Consequently, in deciding how to use limited resources, the benefits will most likely go to certain family members—probably males— or towards certain types of consumption.

On the other hand, the social construction of gender that makes women responsible for maintaining the welfare of family members also determines the ways in which men and women invest money from remittances. In this regard, research has shown that women tend to prioritize family needs (food, clothing, housing, education, and health) while men, in addition to helping their families, often devote the resources to savings and investment in order to generate greater benefits in the future (Escrivá and Ribas, 2004). As gender roles within households influence the use of remittances, any initiative aimed at maximizing the productive potential of remittances must also consider the established gender relations in the recipient households.

**Economic, political and social context**

As has been previously stated, remittances are primarily used for basic consumer goods. The probability that remaining funds will be used in productive investments depends to a large extent on the economic conditions (minimum conditions of infrastructure) of the country of origin. Given that women are largely excluded from formal economic processes, and when they do participate, they do so in traditionally feminized sectors (beauty salons, shops, etc.), it is highly likely that productive investments financed through remittances benefit, to a large degree, the men in the household.

**Changes in gender relations**

The role that remittances sent and managed by women play in the balance of power within unequal gender relationships is a key element to be considered in the evaluation of development and social change processes. As has been determined, monetary remittances contribute in a decisive manner to the improvement of women’s economic status in both countries of origin and destination. But in addition to money, ideas, images, beliefs, and values also circulate between these countries. These additional elements are what Peggy Levitt (1996) has called “social remittances,” and although they are more difficult to value and estimate than monetary remittances, they can also have a profound impact on development and the promotion of equality, including gender equality. The roles played by migrant women in the maintenance and redefinition of transnational networks have attracted growing attention in
the research on migration. Gender not only influences physical movement across national borders, but gender relations are themselves reaffirmed, negotiated, confronted and reconfigured within transnational contexts. Migrant women who send money to their households acquire new roles and transmit new images, which have an effect both on their families and their communities. Women who stay behind also experience changes in their roles, as they assume more responsibilities and acquire greater autonomy in deciding how remittances are to be used. Any attempt to analyze the link between migration and development cannot exclude the impact that migration, and more specifically remittances, have had on social relations, gender roles and on the empowerment of women.

Migrant women
For many women, migration can represent an opportunity for economic independence, access to new spaces of social participation and the renegotiation of gender roles, and increased power in decision-making within the household. However, one must avoid linear or one-dimensional approaches; migration does not always involve women “fleeing” from oppressive contexts or represent a break with “traditional” gender models. In many cases, a migrant woman’s insertion into the destination society necessitates a great deal of sacrifice of her personal autonomy. In this regard, it is important to avoid ethnocentric views that assume that destination societies offer women from the developing world opportunities for personal “liberation.”

Literature on the changes in gender relations that women migrants experience suggests that there is a great diversity of realities and possibilities in this process of renegotiation. While some women may gain independence and autonomy, others may be overwhelmed by greater workloads and isolation; nevertheless, the majority gains in some respects and loses in others. It is important to note, in any case, that studies of patterns of remittance sending suggest that changes in gender roles derived from the act of remitting are limited (Gregorio, 1998). On the one hand, saving an important part of one’s wages in order to remit considerably limits the amount of money that women set aside for themselves. Furthermore, remittances are not always used for what the migrant woman intended, but are redirected to another objective by a male family member who receives the remittances. Participation in social networks can also have the effect of increasing social control over women, thereby increasing gender inequalities. One strategy to cope with discrimination and adverse contextual conditions in the destination society is a return to traditional gender roles. This reaffirmation of traditions can mean, for certain social groups, further control over women’s mobility through efforts to convert them into guardians of identity and tradition. This control can even be exercised from a distance.
Changes in gender roles within countries of origin

When migrant women become providers, their negotiating power within their households increases and their status improves, which in turn creates better conditions for other females in the family. The role of provider alters gender relations at the symbolic level and access to the productive sphere grants social privileges not endowed by the reproductive role. As other networks of women take on reproductive tasks in the absence of the migrant woman, networks of female solidarity are strengthened and even broadened, which has both positive and negative effects in terms of gender relations. While there is a benefit to be gained from the expansion of solidarity networks, there is also an increase in the workload carried by the women who remain in the household. It is a mistake to perceive the women who remain in their countries of origin as merely passive recipients of remittances or as victims of spousal desertion. Not only do these women manage the funds sent through remittances, but they also adopt strategies aimed at diversifying income-generating activities in order to confront the irregularity or precariousness of remittances.

Many women become heads of households or expand their participation in productive activities, in the regional labor market or in informal micro-enterprises. This means that, in many cases, the migration of a family member may lead to women’s participation in traditionally male social activities. However, access to the labor market does not necessarily mean that women’s reproductive labor disappears; rather, this work must now be combined with new productive activities. In those societies of origin that limit women’s mobility and where the migrant is male, the absence of this male family member presents activities that must be carried out “outside” the household. This new role not only changes the traditional division of labor but also allows women to move freely outside the boundaries of the household in order to attend public meetings, manage public resources or participate in religious ceremonies (Dáubeterre, 2005). In these situations, the migration of a male family member represents an opportunity for women to reorganize borders -the material and symbolic boundaries that delineate the meaning of femininity and masculinity- and their time, which facilitates the feminization of social life.

Finally, some studies suggest that when migration is predominantly female, the males remaining in the communities of origin may be forced to replace the work of migrant women in the absence of female networks, and to take on the responsibilities of reproductive work which they had not done in the past, further altering the sexual division of labor (Curran et al., 2003).
Policy Recommendations: The Development and Remittances
Overall considerations of gender and migration could potentially cover a broad spectrum of issues that have scarcely been mentioned in this discussion; for example, issues of development in general, and remittances in particular. However, the aim here is to formulate policy recommendations and tips to promote comprehensive and gender-responsive measures to harness the development potential of remittances. The magnitude of remittance flows has attracted the interest of governments and international organizations that are beginning to promote and implement initiatives aimed at maximizing the impact of remittances. The interrelations between global, regional, bilateral, national and local spheres need to be taken into account while formulating proposals, since the globalization process implies greater integration and dialogue among the different levels.

At present, there are two main areas of intervention; harnessing the potential of remittances and establishing partnerships to enhance development. On the one hand the actions have focused on: 1) the improvement of mechanisms for remittance transfers –lowering costs and 2) promoting productive investment. On the other hand, strengthening development, the actions have been 1) Promoting state-Diaspora partnerships –involving migrants and associations in the development of their communities of origin and 2) Co-development and cooperation for development.

Improving mechanisms for remittance transfers
Interventions in this area involve dual objectives:

- **Reduce the costs of transactions.** Evidence shows that increased competition and the monitoring of money transfer markets lead to reduced prices and greater accountability and transparency in the companies’ operations. A reduction in the high costs of remittance transfers would, in itself, have a significant impact on the welfare of migrants, their families, and by extension, on the development of their countries of origin. Considering that US$251 billion in remittances entered developing countries in 2007, even a slight reduction of 1% in the costs of remittance transfers would have been enough to introduce an additional US$2.51 billion into poor countries.

Banks and money transmitters are the most commonly used channels through which to transfer remittances. The earnings gained by these institutions through these operations tend to increase as remittance flows continue to grow. Nevertheless, they operate under the market logic of maximizing profits, regardless of social responsibility. Therefore, strengthening local institutions, as well as savings cooperatives and social banks would expand the number of users, while providing credit and financing institutions with specific productive investments in key
development areas (agricultural production, rural communities and social projects). Opening the market to a variety of institutions democratizes the financial system, providing services and products to novel economic agents.

- **Channel a greater percentage of remittances through the formal financial system** - Banks, financial entities and microfinance institutions. However, the existence of very different models for the provision of financial services must be acknowledged, as well as the advantages and limitations associated with each, rather than assuming *a priori* that private banking institutions from the formal sector will offer the best results.

There is general consensus that the channeling of remittances through the formal financial system is essential in order to harness their potential for development. First of all, remittances through formal channels offer opportunities for finance education, which opens the door for migrants to access financial systems, and hence, savings and credit. Secondly, financial institutions receive an introduction of capital that allows them to finance credit. Furthermore, remittances contribute to the balance of payments and increase reserves of foreign currency (UNFPA, 2004).

As previously mentioned, one of the main barriers that migrants face in deciding which transfer mechanism to use is the lack of accurate and clear information about the real costs of the transfer. This lack of information may be even more acute for migrant women, who normally occupy positions within the private sphere such as in domestic service, are socially isolated, and have less access to information exchange networks.

All of the above-mentioned initiatives have the potential to be highly beneficial since lower costs for transfers, accurate information on fees, efficient and transparent sending mechanisms, and strong local financial institutions, constitute an undeniable benefit for poor remittances recipients, especially those living in rural areas (most of whom are women).

Nevertheless, despite potential improvements in policies and conventional financial infrastructure, informal money transfer systems will likely continue to represent an important and often necessary element of finance in poor countries. They are simple, efficient and inexpensive in comparison to other options.

**Promoting productive investments**
The dilemma between productive investments and private consumption can be understood as a reconciliation of two extremes: respect for the decisions of the households receiving remittances, and the collective interest in implementing practices that favor productive investment and development.
The latter is essentially a political question that should involve a wide range of actors—national political institutions, financial institutions, international organizations and civil societies of the countries of origin and destination. An increasing number of initiatives aimed at maximizing the development potential of remittances include a variety of measures such as:

- the introduction of incentive measures in order to increase the flow of remittances, such as fiscal incentives for savings, or financial regulations that do not penalize the repatriation of savings;
- stimulating the provision of remittance services of banks, credit unions and microfinance institutions—facilities to access credit;
- facilitating migrants’ investments in entrepreneurship, self-employment and the creation of transnational businesses—with the availability of advisory services for the creation of businesses; support for capacity building in business administration; and simplified administrative paperwork for setting up businesses.

However, even though financial systems may be gender-neutral, their effects are not. Some practices are clearly discriminatory against women, such as the required approval of a male family member to open a bank account or apply for credit. Other practices which are supposedly gender neutral—such as the requirement for identity documents, land and/or house deeds, or the need to fill out written forms—end up affecting women in a disproportionate manner as a consequence of their traditional marginalization, particularly in the case of rural women. Therefore, the impact on development of programs focused on strengthening financial institutions would improve to a considerable degree if they were to consider the different obstacles faced by women and men in accessing banking and credit systems.

The current food crisis forces one to reconsider the changes in rural labor, agricultural production and migration. Apart from the complexity of effects that global markets have directly had on the quality, costs and distribution of food, there is a link within the production chain directly linked to migration that should be examined. The lack of attractive opportunities in agricultural jobs, the lower or inexistent payments for peasants and the implicit policy to encourage rural-urban migration have also greatly contributed to the reduction in the rural-local production of food (including subsistence crops). In addition, countries such as Mexico, the Philippines and El Salvador, have consistently encouraged international migration, which has led rural populations to partially or totally abandon the production of local agricultural, and migrate to become agricultural workers in developed countries, creating a dependency on remittances. While the agricultural workers effectively receive higher salaries in the destination countries than they would in their own countries, these policies seriously compromise the food security of poorer countries that highly depend on remittances.
Gender patterns also greatly influence this shift in agricultural production. While male peasants are the ones most often considered in agricultural labor, the double workload of women in rural areas, such as their share of the daily responsibilities of food production (agriculture, cattle and manufacturing and selling goods), is often ignored. In addition, the legal systems of some countries limit and even exclude women from access to resources such as credit or ownership of land. In such cases, the possibilities that women will use remittances for productive investments are greatly reduced.

Therefore, the current food crisis represents an opportunity for countries of origin that have become labor exporting countries, to promote agricultural production, retain and attract potential migrants and turn them into producers. Female agricultural labor should guarantee an increase in their bargaining capacity at the household level and in their communities. In addition, promoting investment in rural areas among returning migrants promotes the repatriation of capital, while also allowing the community to benefit from the techniques, innovation and knowledge acquired through their migratory experiences. States, local communities and the private sector can promote the creation of joint ventures for transnational agricultural business.

**Promoting state-Diaspora partnerships**

Many countries of origin have initiated processes of acknowledgement and networking with Diaspora populations, marked within the agenda of migration and development. These initiatives are aimed at promoting transnational bonds between the communities abroad and the countries of origin, promoting development through savings and investments in the communities of origin, and promoting the sharing of knowledge and trainings through transnational networks.

Nevertheless, within this “transnational focus” the participation of destination countries has been disregarded so that the transnational approach to promoting state-Diaspora partnerships often tends to focus solely on the impacts of migration on sending countries. In this sense, these strategies tend to be merely uni-dimensional, only searching for tangible benefits and directed towards the communities of origin and their governments. These strategies do not translate into state policies that recognize the importance of the Diaspora as collective agents that connect multiple spheres (domestic, local, national, and transnational) in the globalized world. A true transnational focus is therefore required that will simultaneously take into account the dynamic interactions between the development processes of developed countries and destination countries, as well as their effects on the migration phenomenon.
Considering the growth in transnational migrants, States need to promote spaces for the exercise of transnational citizenship. These measures need to recognize the role of migrants as agents of development and change, while at the same time increasing their political capacity in their countries of origin as overseas communities and in the destination countries as “ethnic collectives.” These proposals promote the political participation of migrants while at the same time bringing about recognition beyond the economic environment.

In terms of the proposals that have been implemented so far, states have promoted projects that link migration and development in the areas of assisted return, the promotion of transnational entrepreneurial activities, the circulation of knowledge and the local investment (individual and group).

Home Town Associations (HTA) are grassroots immigrant associations or clubs, which facilitate information, networking and support for immigrants. These organizations allow immigrants from certain communities or regions to maintain ties with and materially support their communities of origin. HTAs also help to re-create a sense of community, assisting migrants to become familiar with their new societies. The associations themselves represent the model of the transnational migrant, deeply rooted as much in the migrant's country of origin as in the migrant's country of residence. HTAs also facilitate philanthropy among immigrants, supporting infrastructure and developing projects funded through collective remittances. Nevertheless, these types of civil society initiative should not replace the social and political responsibilities of national and local governments to create sustainable livelihoods in communities with high rates of migration.

While women constitute a minority within the Home Town Associations, the opening of new spaces for social participation, in addition to the possibilities of influencing decisions in their countries of origin represent two positive benefits of their participation. Women’s presence in HTAs also helps to increase the visibility of women’s needs both in the receiving countries and in the development of communities of origin. On the other hand, migrant associations are also affected by discriminatory gender hierarchies that are imported from the societies of origin. As a result, women are not always guaranteed equal social participation within these male-dominated organizations. In addition, women’s agendas are often different from those of men, leading to disapproval and marginalization.

**Co-development and cooperation policies for development and gender**

The impact of remittances on the development of countries of origin largely depends on the political will of the destination countries to synchronize their migration policies with their policies for development cooperation. The degree
to which this development includes the needs, priorities and interests of women migrants will depend on the extent to which these policies incorporate gender perspectives. The term co-development refers to the implementation of practical initiatives derived from the articulation of migration policies with the aim of cooperation in the development of the countries of origin. For this purpose an alliance must be established between the developed and developing countries while simultaneously promoting advancement towards a new architecture of international economic relations in the current global political economy. Concretely, co-development would entail programs promoted and financed by destination countries, aimed at the local development of the regions of origin of the migrant population, in which the active participation of the migrant population and its associations is encouraged. However, immigration policies in the destination countries continue to be aimed at protecting national interests, with particular emphasis on the demands of the labor market. Co-development programs, however encouraging they may be, are in conflict with restrictive immigration policies implemented in the destination countries, which in many cases condemn migrant women and men to live marginalized from the benefits of society under irregular social and work conditions. A co-development policy that would most efficiently harness the development potential of remittances would improve the socio-economic situation of migrants. However, a basic precondition would be that the gender perspective cut across the design of immigration policies and development cooperation. Finally, the use of migration solely for material purposes should be avoided, so that migration constitutes a real source of development for countries of origin.

A general consensus on the need to merge migration and development agendas has been reached in recent years. However, these agendas must also include employment and social security. Recent reform in the Spanish government did just that with the creation of the Ministry of Labor and Immigration, which aims to incorporate the needs of the labor market into migration policies. Both countries of origin and destination should also develop strategies to gradually integrate the informal economy into the regular market. While most of the labor from the informal sectors is highly irregular, the contributions of this section of the economy represent gains for wide sectors that should be integrated into the formal fiscal system. In return, there should be incremental strategies to improve the working and contracting conditions, and tax revenues.

Furthermore, migrant workers need to be recognized beyond the labor force for their contributions. In the current economic crisis, immigrants are the first targets of restrictive policies seeking to reduce the impact of the shifts of markets. Resident immigrants should be guaranteed their right to stay should they choose not to return to their home countries. In addition,
promoting bilateral agreements on social security are necessary measures to assure the right and fair returns for migrant workers who have split their labor record between countries. The right to retirement pensions should consider the average contribution that the worker has made that would guarantee a decent life for the elderly, taking special consideration of flexible labor markets. Although women migrants who work as domestic workers in developed countries are regular workers who contribute to the social security system, they find it particularly difficult to receive a pension, since very few meet the minimum requirements as a result of the informal nature of their work.

Finally, there is a need to facilitate the process of family reunification as well as the autonomous process of citizenship or residency. If the migrant decides to settle in the destination country, s/he will most likely invest money there. On the other hand, if the conditions for settlement are not favorable, it is possible that the flow of remittances will increase and the investment of remittances will be made in the countries of origin with the idea of future return.

Some studies indicate that women show a greater tendency to settle in the destination country, thereby initiating the chain of family reunification. From this perspective, the tendency of these women to remit would also be less, although other factors must be considered, such as whether the entire family has already been reunited or if there are other family members in the country of origin waiting to be reunited. In the case of women whose migratory status is dependent on the status of their husband, some migration policies prevent dependents of a worker from obtaining independent remunerations. Furthermore, women whose migration status is dependent on their husband’s status and are dependent on their husband financially, may also face discrimination in the courts when filing cases of domestic violence or divorce. In some cases, women may even be deported and forced to return to their countries of origin. A special policy that takes into consideration the gradual autonomy of “accompanied” migrants is therefore essential.

Open Questions
INSTRAW identifies some future directions for research:

- Analysis of the ways in which migration and work policies in developed countries influence women migrants’ access to labor markets and their mode of insertion, as well as an evaluation of the impact that the different types of labor insertion have on remittances;

- Analysis of the changes, breaks or continuities in gender dynamics
and inequalities resulting from women’s migration, both in the countries of origin and destination;

- Impact of remittance flows on specific local economies, with a focus on the impacts on health, education, food, housing and social protection; while also considering factors that limit or could potentially promote a gender-sensitive development process. This would constitute a pre-diagnosis for the design of concrete interventions that aim to generate sustainable livelihoods;

- Analysis of the global care chains. While economic and social gaps are widening in poor countries, there is a crisis in the established reproductive model in developed countries due to an ageing population, the incorporation of women into the labor market, and the lack of public services for the care of dependents;

- Gender analysis of the initiatives, programs and policies for channeling remittances towards productive investment;

- Case studies to analyze remittances and their impact from a gender perspective within specific social, economic and political contexts;

- Systematize and disseminate good practices and experiences in the areas of remittances and development with a gender perspective;

- Elaboration of guidelines and recommendations for migrant sending and receiving countries for the integration of gender perspectives into proposals for policies and projects that link remittances and development;

- Assessment of the impacts of projects which are being carried out in different places around the world within the co-development framework.
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PANEL 7

Families and Networks

The papers in this panel consider the ways in which migration affects families, with a particular focus on the implications of the separation of families resulting from migration. Valentina Mazzucato and Djamila Schans provide an overview of the research in a variety of disciplines dealing with how transnational family life affects different family members. Ye Jingzhong presents his research on the impact of internal migration in China on the families that migrants leave behind in rural areas. In her comments, Prema Kurien discusses her research on Indian migrants from Kerala.
In this essay I briefly discuss my research on short-term migration from Kerala, India to the Middle Eastern countries to examine some of the issues raised in the other papers in this panel. Kerala is a state in south west India that has had a long tradition of out-migration, both within the country and internationally. It also has diverse types of communities which manifest different patterns of migration. For both of these reasons, it presents a good test case to examine the effects of migration on different types of communities and households and the long-term consequences of migration.

International migration from Kerala began as early as the first few decades of the twentieth century with migrants leaving for Singapore, Malaysia and Sri Lanka (then Ceylon). The out-migration to the Middle Eastern countries began after the Second World War and became a large-scale phenomenon from the early 1970s. I conducted my research in Kerala between the late 1980s and the early 1990s focusing on the impact of the migration on three very different religio-ethnic communities in Kerala since I found that ethnicity, or the differences in the culture and social structure of the communities, profoundly affected the patterns of migration from the three communities and the impact of migration on them. The three areas that I studied were Veni, a Mappila Muslim village in the North of Kerala, Cherur, a largely Ezhava Hindu village in the South of Kerala, and Kembu, a Syrian Christian village in central Kerala.

Perhaps the most dramatic difference between the three communities was the impact of the migration on women. In Veni, young couples generally lived in the husband’s family home and male migration resulted in women and children coming under the direct supervision of the man’s family. The migrants entrusted the economic and social supervision of their households to their father or other male relative. Wives of migrants were secluded and their in-laws were strict about enforcing rules to make sure that they did not leave the house without proper escort and that they participated in housework. Male migration also delayed the family’s move to an independent house. Even after moving to an independent house, wives of migrants had to guard against giving rise to any rumor regarding their behavior. The separation of spouses as a consequence of the migration hindered the development of a personal relationship between them and contributed to a higher divorce rate.
Many women in Veni seemed to manifest signs of psychological stress. Migration also resulted in the earlier marriage of young girls. Early marriage had been a long standing ideal in the community but had usually taken families several years before they could accumulate the money for the dowry and the wedding costs and marriages had been delayed. Due to the affluence gained through migration however, many families no longer had to wait as long and girls were getting married in their mid to late teens.

In the Cherur Ezhava community, the long tradition of male migration had strengthened the position of women since they were able to remain in their parental homes even after marriage. Thus male migrants left their fathers-in-law in charge of their wives and children. Remittances were generally sent to the wife, particularly after children had been born to the couple. Many older migrant wives continued to perform the economic tasks that had traditionally supplemented the household income (raising cows and chickens, growing vegetables and fruit in the land around the house, weaving coconut fronds) which gave them some economic independence. Women were in charge of lending out a portion of the remittances and collecting the interest. Wives of migrants often played an active role in supervising the construction of the family home. As a consequence of the migration, Cherur had become a female-dominated village, with women being very visible and active in local affairs and politics. The rise of hypogamous marriages where relatively less educated Gulf migrants married college-educated women from reputable families had also raised the status of women and their families.

There were many female migrants from Kembu (most were nurses) and international migration provided such women the opportunity to become the primary income earners or at least important income earners in their own right. The male migrants from this area were also well educated and most were able to obtain white collar jobs in the Middle East which allowed them to obtain longer term work contracts and have their families with them. White-collar migration had increased the emphasis on women’s higher education and employment — those who were not nurses usually worked as teachers or as bank tellers. Family migration strengthened spousal bonds and correspondingly weakened the power of the extended family to regulate female behavior. Male migrants who were not able to have their families with them sent their remittances to their wives. Many women played a major role in deciding how the remittances were to be invested and in supervising the management of the rubber cultivation that many of them invested in, as well as the construction of the family home.

The differences in the impact of migration on women in the three communities were not only due to the variation in gender and intergenerational norms but also a consequence of the definitions of honor in each of the three communities. Gender, intergenerational norms, and
definitions of honor were in turn influenced by religiously shaped ideas of identity. I would therefore argue that it is important to focus on the community level as well as the household level to understand how migration impacts family members since definitions of “family” might vary across communities. For instance it would surely make a big difference whether “the elders” who come to the aid of the migrant’s wife are her parents or her in-laws.

Since the Middle Eastern migration from Kerala is at least two generations old now, we can look at Kerala as a case study to examine the longer term impacts of migration, particularly on the children of migrants. Although this was not the focus of my research when I was in Kerala in the 1990s, I heard a lot of talk about how juvenile delinquency was common among the children of migrants. However, I did not come across any evidence to indicate that this was a major problem, and I have also not seen any discussion of this issue in the popular and scholarly literature about the Middle Eastern migration. This might at least partly be because migration is so wide-spread and institutionalized in Kerala that the absence of migrants from their households and communities has been normalized and families have developed alternate mechanisms to deal with child care issues. A more recent research trip (in 2006) to a Syrian Christian dominated central Travancore area of Kerala (near Kembu) seemed to show that the children of Syrian Christian migrants were better educated than their parents and were doing well economically. Some were in good positions in the Middle East or the United States, and others were working in professional positions in urban areas. During the discussion, one of the conference participants similarly made the point that some literature (based on a study of the Philippines, I believe) shows that children of migrants have better educational outcomes than the children of non-migrants. Thus, it is clear that the long-term consequences of the migration on children do not necessarily have to be negative. We need more research to examine this issue.
Transnational Families, Children and the Migration–Development Nexus

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SSRC Migration & Development Conference Paper No. 20

Introduction
Research on the effects of migration on the development of migrant-sending countries has largely focused on the economic effects of remittances on households and treated the household as a single unit. This paper explores the possibilities of including a broader array of effects of migration on development by focusing on the effects of migration on ‘the family’ and in particular on family members located in different countries. Increasingly families are living apart-together. On the one hand, high rates of urbanization, modern production systems and an increase in transport technologies make migrating internationally in search for higher paying jobs attractive and accessible for many more people than was previously the case even just fifty years ago. On the other, increasingly stringent migration laws restricting entry into countries and the feminization of migration have led to families ‘splitting’ with at least one member migrating while the others stay behind. This creates families living apart-together, or transnational families, with members living in different nation-states facing the challenges of organizing care of family members transnationally. Through this process roles and relationships between spouses, parents, children and elderly parents change. What effects do these changes in relationships have for the different actors? And what development outcomes do these effects have for sending country societies? These questions remain largely under researched due to theoretical and methodological gaps in the study of transnational families yet different disciplines are beginning to address these gaps. This paper reviews some of the most recent contributions to our knowledge on transnational families in the fields of transnationalism, family sociology, gender and psychology studies and identifies some gaps. It then proposes an approach to build on these most recent theoretical and methodological innovations in order to bring the effects of migration on the family to bear on the migration and development nexus.

1. Families in migration and development research
The focus of research and debates on the effects of migration for developing countries has largely revolved around remittances (Adams and Page, 2005;
Ratha, 2003), with the main questions being why do migrants remit, how much and what is the effect of their remittances on poverty levels of people back home. How migration impacts the various family members however, is left open yet it too, will have development outcomes. If children or elderly lose care as a result of migration, this creates social costs for society, in the first case because children may not be able to act as productive citizens of a sending country, in the latter case because an entire generation is left without care. If, on the other hand, children are given better prospects and elderly care can be organized in other ways, paid for by migrant remittances, migration may have positive outcomes for families. Yet studies focusing on remittances do not consider non-economic effects such as psychological, emotional and health outcomes for spouses, children and elderly who stay behind. Furthermore, economic studies on migration treat the household as one homogenous unit with one set of preferences (Alderman et al., 1995; Becker, 1981). Even New Economics of Labor Migration (NELM) studies, which conceive of migration as a family decision to explain why migrants remit, do not distinguish between who receives remittances within the family and whether their use benefits some members more than others. Mostly these studies are based on migration or living standards surveys in which only households back home are interviewed, usually represented by the household head, and with no data from migrants. These studies thus say little about the impacts of migration on the various family members.

Research and statistics on how remittances are used by recipients are scarce however, and effects on family and community well-being, as well as the contribution of remittances to reducing poverty and inequality remains unclear. Apart from the uncertainty in estimates of remittances, assessments of impact need to be sensitive to the complexity in which this is embedded. Data on remittances need to take account of reverse flows (Lipton 1980; Findley 1997, Mazzucato 2006), of initial investment, and, from a home country public policy perspective, remittances need to be off-set against the (public) investment in education, elderly care and other forms of publicly funded investments.

Some recent studies have begun to look at differential effects and show that split families do have an impact on the distribution of resources between migrants and the stay-behinds. For example, Chen (2006) uses a household bargaining model to study migrant husbands and their stay-behind wives in China using the China Health and Nutrition Survey. She argues that mothers seem to consume more leisure when fathers migrate as they reduce their labor supply in income-generating activities as well as in household activities. Another example is De Laat’s (2006) study of split families between rural and urban areas in Kenya, which argues that asymmetric information leads migrant husbands to spend considerable resources on monitoring their rural wives through rural-based siblings. He finds that better information
through monitoring does not lead to different behavior of wives, but it does allow husbands to reduce remittances to their wives.

In the remainder of this paper we will review studies on the differential impacts of migration on family members and focus on the case of children being separated from their biological parents due to migration by way of illustration. However, much of what we find for the case of children and parents is also applicable to other relationships such as migrants and their elderly parents or other elderly members of the extended family (Baldock, 2000). It is also important to note that although the focus is on the nuclear family, we also consider examples of wider kinship relationships such as uncles and aunts as well as non-kin relations such as can exist between a child and his or her caretaker.

2. Transnationalism studies
Transnationalism studies emerged in the early 1990s in reaction to the bifocal conceptualization of migration studies dominant at the time. These studies were fundamental for drawing researchers’ attention to the linkages that migrants maintain with their home regions (Glick Schiller 1992; Levitt 2001; Smith and Guarnizo 1998; Vertovec 1999; Watson 1977). Although not a new phenomenon, transnationalism scholars argue that modern production relations, and greater and cheaper travel and communication technologies make it easier for people to move and maintain linkages with the regions they come from, as well as other regions they pass through. These linkages result in flows of people, goods, money and ideas that affect the way migrants conduct their lives in the new country as well as the lives of people back home.

Surprisingly, transnational families only became a topic of focus after the year 2000. Various authors on transnationalism mentioned some of the issues facing transnational families, but more by way of side information rather than the focus of research. Levitt (2001; 74-89) discusses the challenges that come with raising children transnationally. Focusing on children left behind by their parents, and especially mothers, she highlights the emotional consequences, the problems with managing decision-making and power sharing between parents and grandparents, and the problems that occur if parents start a new family in the host country.

Smith (2006) on the other hand, devotes one chapter of his book Mexican New York: Transnational lives of new immigrants, on how gang life flows back and forth from Mexico and New York through children of Mexican immigrants brought up in New York who visit Mexico in the summer holiday or are even send back by their parents to escape New York gang life.
Kyle (2000) emphasizes the historical context when discussing migrants from Ecuador in his book *Transnational Peasants* and says little about children. He does comment on gender relations in transnational families, by explaining the predicament stay-at-home wives are placed in because the emigrant men create a “code of silence” in which they “actively conspire to reveal as little information as possible to their wives and other female relatives regarding their activities abroad” (p. 107).

Bryceson and Vuerela (2002) were the first to have transnational families as the central focus of research. The studies in their compilation show that transnational families have to cope with multiple national residences, identities and loyalties. Like other families, transnational families are not biological units *per se*, but social constructions or ‘imagined communities’. And like other families, transnational families must mediate inequality amongst their members, including differences in access to mobility, resources, various types of capital and lifestyles (Bryceson and Vuerela 2002:3-7).

Yet there are two significant gaps left by transnational family studies. The first is that they are small-scale and do not collect data systematically on the topic. It is difficult thus to assess and verify the information found in these studies. The second relates to a criticism made more generally of transnationalism studies: they study cases of the phenomenon itself so it is difficult to say anything about the extent of the phenomenon and whether it is increasing (Portes 2001). Furthermore, as there is no comparison group it is not possible to determine if what is being observed is particular to transnational families or is a wider phenomenon affecting more people than just those with split families.

We therefore now turn to specific disciplines in which split or transnational families have begun to be researched to see what can be learned from their theoretical approaches and methodologies in order to make the study of transnational families more systematic.

3. Family sociology and gender studies
Recent developments in family sociology and gender studies have drawn the consequences of a transnational approach into their conceptualization of the family and into the methodologies used to study migrant families. In this section we look at the findings and methodological approaches of these two, inter-related disciplines.

Family sociology typically emphasizes proximity as a prerequisite for interaction and exchange within families thus ignoring family ties that cross borders. Recently, some scholars have taken up the challenge to incorporate transnational families by analyzing the ways that families increasingly
organize their productive and reproductive labor across borders and more specifically, by addressing the consequences of a transnational lifestyle for children who are left behind by migrant parents.

Schmalzbauer (2004) draws on data from a 2-year two-country study that included 157 people to explore the survival strategies of poor Honduran transnational families. She notes the gendered structure of the transnational division of labor. When women migrate, their care work is handed over to ‘other-mothers’, usually grandmothers or other female relatives. Schmalzbauer also notes that transmigrants endure great sacrifice in order to accumulate a surplus to send to their families back home. Not only do they face the emotional burden of separation from their families and home country, they also have to deal with the economic and physical insecurity that comes from working in low paying jobs. Many of Schmalzbauer’s informants also told her of living in cramped, rundown apartments and skimping on food and goods for themselves in order to have the necessary extra money to send home (2004: 1326). Although for many migrants being able to send home remittances was one of the main reasons for migrating, some frustration is present among migrants if they feel their family back home expects too much. At the same time, unrealistic expectations among those who stayed behind can lead to resentment on their part if they feel remittances are not sufficient. In some extreme cases, this mutual resentment resulted in a break down of family ties.

Dreby (2007), using ethnographic fieldwork and interviews with a total of 141 members of Mexican transnational families describes that parents expected their children to be grateful for their sacrifices, but instead often found that children were ambivalent about joining their parents in the host country. This finding was related to the fact that children felt abandoned by their parents and in some cases responded by detaching from the parent that left. Such feelings might lead to unwanted behavior as for example dropping out of school or getting involved in gangs (Smith, 2006). For migrants who migrated to ensure better opportunities for their children this means that the unintended consequences of migration might include a strained relationship with their children and even a loss of educational opportunities.

The above mentioned studies present important steps forward in the research on transnational family life and its consequences. The authors made use of different data collection strategies like ethnographic fieldwork, structured surveys, time diaries and open interviews to gain better insight into transnational family life. Nevertheless, reporting is still largely based on rather small-scale studies predominantly based on qualitative evidence. Moreover, although data from family members in the country of origin is included, the focus remains on informants in the host country. None of the
studies collected data simultaneously from family members in different locations.

Finally, some research questions can only be answered by collecting longitudinal data. For example, Schmalzbauer (2004) is concerned about the transnational second generation that remains in Honduras. Because of family remittances, many of these children have been afforded a Honduran education, yet few employment opportunities await them upon graduation (p.1329). It remains to be seen if this higher educated 2nd generation will follow the path of undocumented migration into low status jobs in the U.S.

3.1 Gender

Recently, the demand for immigrant labor in the West shifted from a demand for male workers in manufacturing to a demand for female workers in the service industry, especially in the care industry. According to scholars in the area of gender studies, this shift has led to the emergence of ‘care-drained’ transnational family forms; as in conventional supply-push and demand-pull theory, global care chains are being created by the importation of care and love from poor to rich countries, in which the transfer of services associated with the wife/mother’s traditional role leads to a ‘care drain’ in the countries of origin (Hochschild 2000; Ehrenreich and Hochschild, 2003; Parrenas 2001). This signifies a potential change in family care structures, because women, who historically migrated for reasons of family reunification, are now moving to seek work independently (Hochschild 2002).

Migration may serve to reorient and question normative understandings of gender roles and ideologies by altering traditional roles, divisions of labor and other meaningful categories of gender and generational construction. Hondagneu-Sotelo (1994) found that in the case of Mexican migration to the U.S., several women embarked on migratory projects in order to change their relationships with spouses or other relatives that oppressed them back home. Their migration often involved leaving behind a set of limiting family relations and finding in the U.S. opportunities to question their more traditional roles as mothers and housewives. Yet other scholars argue that gendered expectations of women and especially of mothers remain unchanged when they migrate.

In her work on Filipina migrant domestic workers, Parrenas (2001; 2005) notes that emotional suffering and feelings of abandonment of children left behind are common in cases where mothers migrate and that mothers try to compensate for their absence by staying in close contact through phones and by sending money and goods. Nevertheless, many, transnational mothers suffer because they were unable to live up to their own (cultural) expectations of providing care. Aranda (2003) concluded that to alleviate their emotional
struggle transnational mothers had to return home, but this option is only open with economic resources and legal protection; two qualities rarely found among the often undocumented female immigrants.

These studies of transnational family life have made clear the importance of gender. Nevertheless, although categorized as gender studies, most research in this area focuses only on mothers and the mother-child bond. Adding fathers to the picture, not just on the sideline but as main actors would be a useful contribution in trying to get a complete overview of transnational family life. The same is true for adding the perspective of the mostly female caretakers of the children who stayed behind. They play a key role in maintaining family unity and in easing the anxiety or emotional burdens borne by children who are separated from their parents. So far, little attention is paid to care-takers.

4. Psychology
Migration has never been a core issue in psychology (Berry 2001). Although recently attention has been directed towards the types of psychological problems migrants face while integrating into the host society, few studies address the potential impact of family separations arising out of the immigrant experience for parent-child relationships and psychological well-being.

An exception is the study by Suarez-Orozco et al., (2002) among 385 immigrant adolescents in the United States in which they show that extended periods of separation of parents and children caused by migration can lead to conflicts and depressive symptoms. The impact of separations related to immigration were measured for several sub scales such as depression, anxiety, hostility and cognitive functioning. Family reunification - sometimes not possible until many years later – does not automatically solve these problems but can be an additional source of stress when parents and children have grown apart or when additional family members were added to the parental household during separation. Moreover, when children are left in the care of extended family members such as grandparents or aunts, children are confronted with two separations from loved ones; first the separation with the parents and later the separation with the care-taker to whom the child became attached.

The psychological research described above does try to quantify the occurrence of and effects of transnational family life however it does so by studying children who have migrated and been re-united with their parents. A transnational perspective is thus missing in psychological research on immigrant families. The focus is solely on parents and children already in the destination country and little attention is paid to the countries of origin.
Moreover, psychological concepts and scales to measure certain effects are mostly assumed to be universal and cultural differences are rarely taken into account.

5. Legal studies
All of the above-mentioned studies focus on the micro-level effects of split families, that is, how do split families affect individuals, their roles and responsibilities vis-à-vis each other. A focus on structural causes of split families can be found in legal studies, especially in legal anthropology. Here too studies are just at the beginning.

While there are various factors that can induce people to migrate and to decide to split the family, migration laws are increasingly shaping the length of time families are split, the possibilities for physical visits to each other, and the possibilities of living together. This then shapes the kinds of roles and relationships that evolve, the strategies that are devised to unite a family or not, and the effects that split families have on individual members.

Transnational families are a form of family life that is not yet recognized by migration policies, health care policies or educational systems in most migrant receiving countries. Transnational relations give raise to increasingly complicated legal issues. In international private law the problem is seen as a question of what law applies when people live in several countries. Research looks at how the choice of laws correspond to complex transnational life situations and women’s right to equality in marriage and family matters. Although according to international human rights law families have a right to live together, nation-states often make it extremely complicated if not impossible for families to reunite. Bernhard et al. (2005) show how legal barriers preventing or delaying the migration of dependents in Canada come at a tremendous human cost for couples, extended families and children. Family members are often separated for years, while waiting for a decision on their application for family reunification.

Van Walsum (2003) investigates the implications of international human rights law (the right to life with a family) for family reunification possibilities under Dutch immigration policies. These policies assume that after a certain period of time, there will be no real bond anymore between immigrants in the Netherlands and their children abroad and hence no reason for admission on the grounds of family reunification. Van Walsum states that especially single mothers from developing countries are affected by these restrictions since it takes them longer to get established in the Netherlands and therefore they are separated from their children longer. Some of these women appeal to international human rights law with mixed results. Van Walsum shows that immigration policies rely on notions of ‘genuine mothers’ that provide fulltime care even though such notions do not apply to autochthonous mothers anymore.
A migrant’s ability to care is also affected by migration policies that hinder free access to family members in the country of origin. Transnational care should be a factor taken into account in the debate about dual citizenship, as dual citizenship allows people greater freedom to travel home to see their families.

In general, little is known about how immigration policies affect immigrants’ decisions about and possibilities for family life. Undocumented immigrants have little legal options to reunite with their children but even for legal immigrants family reunification can be a lengthy and stressful process. Future research should take into account how policies affect migration decisions, but also psychological well-being of both parents and children.

6. Ways forward
Research questions investigated by the different disciplines remain important to investigate as all of these studies are just at a beginning stage. How do migration and split families change roles and responsibilities that different family members have towards each other and how are these changes negotiated between members? How do split families affect the distribution of resources between migrant sending and receiving countries? What are the non-economic effects of split families on children, parents, the elderly and caretakers? How do structural factors, in particular laws, affect family formation practices and shape the way families split and reunite and how do people respond to different legal systems in shaping their family life? And we add to this list, how can these economic and non-economic effects be up-scaled so as to have a more complete assessment of the impact of migration on development of migrant sending countries than the current focus on remittances is giving us? From the approaches and gaps identified above, we propose here important elements that an agenda for future research on transnational families in our view should contain.

6.1 Cultural contextualizations: the importance of anthropology
Transnational studies have highlighted the importance of taking both sending and receiving countries into consideration. Yet we have seen that many studies on split families either focus on the migrants in the receiving country or on the family members back home. An equal focus on both sending and receiving countries allows the researcher to gain a thorough understanding of the institutions and cultural norms guiding family relationships in the migrant sending country. This is something that is still lacking in the studies reviewed above as they mainly assume a Western model of ‘the family’, without explaining the culturally relevant notions of family that are pertinent for understanding family relationships in the
particular case under study. Anthropologists have long been studying child fostering systems and the workings of reciprocal relations within extended family systems. Anthropological insights thus need to be incorporated into transnational family studies in order to contextualize familial relations within a culturally relevant context.

6.1.1 Shifting norms and institutions
While it is important to embed studies of transnational families in cultural understandings of norms guiding family life, it is also important to recognize a change in these norms that occur as a result of migrating families. The study of child fostering systems is a case in point. Child fostering systems have been studied by anthropologists, especially in the West African region where the system is an age-old institution (Allman 1997; Bledsoe and Isiugo-Abanihe 1989; Goody 1982; Isiugo-Abanihe 1985; Lallemand 1993; Page 1989; Schildkrout 1973; Shell-Duncan 1994). Similar to family sociology studies, these studies give attention to different actors in child fosterage systems, yet to date, most studies focus on the ‘traditional’ system of fostering children between rural and urban areas of the same country: either parents migrate to cities for work, and entrust their children to extended family members in rural villages, or parents send their child to extended family in the city, hoping that a brighter future will await the child in an urban context. In this case, parents are often poor rural dwellers that foster their children with family in the city who use them as household help (Goody 1982). These studies show that conditions of fosterage arrangements are based on informal agreements of rights and responsibilities of each of the actors. These rights and responsibilities are subject to negotiation and are based on reciprocal relations and trust between extended family members (Alber 2003; Goody 1982; Isaac et al. 1982).

Long-distance, international migration poses some interesting questions because many of these conditions are not present. First, geographic distance and costs of travel make it difficult to maintain relationships of trust between parents and caretakers through regular visits. Second, caretakers tend to be in urban contexts where they cannot rely on the help of extended family with child-raising tasks, as is done in a rural setting. At the same time, migrant parents do not want their children to be used for household help, but rather want them to get high-quality education. Third, migrant parents are perceived as having more economic resources than caretakers and therefore are expected to provide financial help to the caretaker and his or her family. Research on transnational families can contribute to these anthropological studies by considering how local institutions guiding family norms change as a result of modern conditions of international migration.
6.2 Multiple methods, multiple sites and inter-disciplinary approaches
The most insightful studies of those reviewed above are those that integrate large-scale quantitative methods with in-depth qualitative understanding of how relationships work. Yet the integration of methods is challenging and one often finds that even when both are used, findings are mainly drawn from one part of the study or the other, with little integration of findings. Recent developments in anthropological demography seem to offer some interesting possibilities although still at a beginning stage.

6.2.1 Anthropological demography
Anthropological demography is a specialty within demography, which uses anthropological theory and methods to provide a better understanding of demographic phenomena in current and past populations. It asks how population processes and socio-cultural practices affect each other (fertility, mortality, migration). Turning specifically to migration, the former emphasizes economic and social factors as causes of migration and sharply distinguishes between receiving and sending communities. The latter reflects a move away from bounded units of analysis and localized community studies towards an interest in the complex articulation of sending and receiving areas and in the migration experience of individuals as part of nuclear and extended families. Incorporated into anthropological demography, this approach attends closely to the perception of the actors involved in the production of vital events such as births and marriage in the life course, to transregional and transnational movements of individuals and families, and to health and ageing.

The combination of demographic and anthropological theories and methods is not straightforward though. Whereas the largest innovations in anthropology have been theoretical, the major advances in demography have been in the domains of data and method. Whereas contemporary anthropology focuses largely on ideology, power, and phenomenological experience, demography in the last ten years has been dominated by the statistical analysis of variation within western populations. As Coast et al. (2007) say:

“What most interests demographers, and yet simultaneously is most traumatic for them because it undermines the whole positivist, empirical platform on which demography is built, is the utility of qualitative data to investigate “problematic behaviours” that do not fit in with the philosophy of reasoned action, a notion that underlies much of the demographic enterprise (for example, survey questions on ideal family size). Qualitative data are also seen as a solution to researching ‘sensitive’ topics (such as abortion, teenage sexual activity, sexual practices) in which demographers
are very interested but where responses formal questionnaires are unreliable for a variety of reasons”.

However, demographers tend to have a mechanistic and ill-informed use of ethnographies (Coast 2003). Quotes are often poorly grounded when used by demographers (Randall, 2006). On the other hand, anthropologists tend to present poor or inadequate use of quantitative data. Often anthropologists do not use data collected and analyzed by demographers as their representation of a demographic context, and are more inclined to collect their own data thus using demographic data without the methods, theory or epistemology. Finally, when anthropologists represent demographic change it may be based on a few examples that stand out in their minds (probably because of the fact that they are different) rather than on population level data. They also tend to be unaware of biases and omissions (Keenan 2006; McKinnon 1997; Charsley 2005).

Innovative research at the Max Plank Institute for Demography is working at bridging this gap. Bledsoe (2006) investigates how family reunification dynamics affect mother-child relations. She analyzes demographic data that show that Gambian migrants in Spain seem to have much higher fertility rates than other populations. She then compares the definition of family used in European family reunification policies with African notions, and in this case, Gambian notions of family. She argues that the narrower European definition excludes co-wives and their (foster) children. This, she hypothesizes using her anthropological understandings, leads Gambians to replace one wife with another, while accumulating children from different wives to live with the father in Spain. This configuration would be legitimate in African kinship practices and it falls within the legal boundaries of family reunification policies: a man can legally bring a 2nd wife to Spain as long as he only has one wife at a time in Spain and have as many children from different wives in his household. Whether the 1st wife is send back to Africa, or remains in the household – undocumented - is not always clear, although it might be the case that mothers become separated from their children against their will. This implicates that women become more vulnerable under the family reunification laws in Spain than they were in Gambian society. These anthropological understandings have served to formulate a hypothesis about the reasons for the high fertility rates recorded statistically. More fieldwork would be needed amongst Gambians in Spain to verify this hypothesis.

6.3 Intergenerational, longitudinal research
Migration is a long-term process of which the outcomes can only be seen much later than when the actual act of migrating is conducted. Furthermore, a focus on different family members means an inter-generational approach in which the effects of migration on children, parents, grandparents and
caretakers are all taken into consideration. Yet the effects of splitting on these people, how they are cared for, what results this has on their health, educational and/or emotional outcomes can only be assessed over a longer period of time. Even from an economic point of view, whether migration allows households to accumulate assets and capitals necessitates a longer-term perspective. Here recent work conducted by Caroline Moser and colleagues (forthcoming) is particularly illuminating. In their study on intergenerational asset accumulation in Ecuador, Moser and Felton (forthcoming) studied income and asset accumulation histories of families interviewed three times between 1978 and 2004. Of interest here is their comparison of those families who had someone migrate in that period nationally, internationally and those who did not migrate. For all of these categories they looked at asset accumulation as defined by financial-productive capital, human capital and social capital using what they term ‘narrative econometric methodology’ in which people’s narratives about their lives are used to explain econometric trends in asset indexes. They show that migration is not a cure-all solution to poverty; rather its effects depend on the portfolio mixes of households and the reciprocal relations between children (often migrants) and their parents. At the community level, they show that children now have better access to education than their parents, yet this has also raised children’s expectations in terms of consumer durables. Some resort to drugs and theft, making the community a much more dangerous place in the 26-year period.

6.4 Follow the actors
Transnational families, as all transnational phenomena, encompass different national contexts and thus present a methodological challenge. As Wimmer and Glick Schiller (2002) explain, most research has had a national bias, in which units of analysis are located in one nation-state. This they call methodological nationalism. We have seen this in some of the studies above, such as in psychology and economics in which the dominant focus has been on families living in one location or data is collected from the portion of the family located in one nation-state. One way to get beyond methodological nationalism proposed by Marcus (1995) is to follow the people. In the case of split families, this means following the various family members to where they are located: where migrants live and where their family members reside. This way enables researchers to understand the effects of split families on all family members. In some of the studies reviewed above, especially in the fields of family sociology and gender studies this is done, yet the focus has been primarily on few of the members, namely, mothers and children. More attention needs to be given to other members of transnational families such as fathers, caretakers of children and elderly and siblings.
6.5 Up-scaling: incorporating transnational family effects in the migration – development nexus

Ultimately, with reference to this conference on migration and development, we are interested in seeing how research on transnational families can be brought to bear on the migration – development nexus. If migration helps families, despite the distance of their members, to construct better futures for their children and allows them to care for their elderly, then this contributes to a positive outcome for inhabitants of developing countries. If, on the other hand, migration leads to difficult upbringings for children leading to unproductive or less productive lives for them, or to elderly who are abandoned in their old age, this implies social costs for a society. Furthermore, numerous remittance studies have shown that remittances are predominantly private transfers sent to family members for their upkeep and maintenance, covering costs for food, education and health. As such, transnational family relationships guide the allocation of resources, including remittances, between migrant sending and receiving countries. The question, thus, is how can studies on transnational families be up-scaled so that their impact on development can be assessed? Until now, most studies on transnational families are small-scale and focus solely on the phenomenon thus they do not give an idea of the extent of the phenomenon nor of the difference it creates with respect to a control group. These characteristics have kept research on transnational families separate from economic approaches to migration and development.

We argue that while there is an emerging literature on transnational families that has been central for raising the issues encountered by such families, there is a need to collect more systematic data on transnational families, in order to understand their extent and effects in migrant-sending countries: how pervasive are transnational families? What effects do they have on all of the actors, not only children, and how do effects and issues affecting transnational families differ from those of families living together? Another purpose of more systematic analysis is to try to distinguish between different types of transnational families. For example, although there are many different types of transnational child rearing arrangements, none of the literature reviewed above makes a systematic categorization of these types. Child rearing arrangements can take on different forms: those in which children are raised by a caretaker in the extended family, those in which children are raised by either their biological mother or father, and those in which children are raised by a non-kin caretaker. What are the different types of transnational child rearing arrangements and do they have differential impacts on the various actors?

The study by Suarez-Orozco and colleagues (2002) is a step in this direction as it provides a large-scale assessment on the effects of migration on children’s wellbeing. Anthropological demography is also of interest because
it incorporates large-scale systematic data collection with in-depth anthropological knowledge of migrant-sending contexts. Future research could adapt these methodologies to a transnational perspective.

There are studies that take a transnational perspective directly into account in their methodologies by studying multiple, linked sites. Douglas Massey’s (1987) ethnosurvey methodology, which has been applied to study Mexican communities as well as their migrants in the US, is a promising avenue. Its use of both in-depth anthropological work with large-scale surveys is of interest, although the component in which migrants and people back home who are tied to each other has not been conducted at such a large-scale as was originally hoped. It is precisely this component that is needed for the study of transnational families, their relationships and resources that cross national borders. A number of studies use matched sample methodologies (with medium-sized samples of around 150 people), which are particularly suited for the study of transnational families as they draw samples of people who are tied to each other across multiple sites. This has been done by Osili (2004) to study remittance behavior for housing construction, Dreby (2007) to study family relationships between Mexican migrants and their children back home and Schmaltzbauer (2004) for the case of Honduran migrants and their children. Mazzucato (2008) conducted such a methodology simultaneously, in which a team of researchers was employed to study a matched sample of people at the same time. This enabled the study of small, every-day actions and transactions that influence the way transnational relationships take shape. Further development of such methodologies can help up-scale research on transnational families in order to broaden our assessments of migration’s contribution to development by bringing the effects of migration on families to bear on the migration and development nexus.

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The large movement of surplus laborers from rural China to cities started in the 1980s, along with the initiation of economic reform and the relaxation of the household registration (hukou) system. During that period, the process of industrialization accelerated, and demand for labor in the secondary and tertiary industries in urban areas grew rapidly. Meanwhile, the amount of land per capita was shrinking as a result of population growth and the conversion of agricultural land to non-agricultural uses. This resulted in growing unemployment and underemployment in rural areas and many former agricultural laborers headed into cities, seeking better employment opportunities and sources of income. Gradually they came to constitute a large social group. According to statistics based on the 1% population sample in 2005, the temporary worker population nationwide amounted to 0.147 billion, or 2.05% more than in 2000. With accelerated urbanization, this trend will continue. Indeed, the National Demographic Development Strategy Report, issued in early 2007, predicted that 0.3 billion more rural people will move to cities and towns in the next twenty years.

It should be noted that the movement of rural laborers to cities in China is distinctly different from what is happening in other countries. Generally speaking, the number of temporary urban workers in China is high, but the permanent “migrant” population is low. Very few of the laborers coming to cities for work can become permanent urban residents. For most of them, urban areas are merely potential workplaces, not homes, largely because rural and urban areas have long been segregated, with separate economic and social structures. Individuals are registered as either rural or urban residents, and as a result have access to different social security systems. Therefore, temporary migrants flow to and from the urban and rural areas seasonally and are often compared to migratory birds. Most of them move from rural areas to big or medium-sized cities, and from provinces in central and west China where income levels are low (for instance, Henan, Sichuan, Anhui, Jiangxi, Hunan, and Hubei) to relatively developed areas, particularly the coastal areas in the southeast (including Guangdong, Beijing, Jiangsu, Shanghai, Zhejiang, and Fujian). Forty percent of them work in secondary

1 Quoted from Chen Jiansheng, From Floating Population to Migrated laborers, China Youth Research, 2007, Vol. 10.
industries, mainly in manufacturing, construction, and mining; while 60% of them work in tertiary industries, mainly in services.\textsuperscript{2}

The arrival of “peasant workers” (nongmingong) is a response to the demands of the labor market and an inevitable outcome of the development of the market economy. Migrant workers play an indispensable role in the development of urban and rural areas, and of society as a whole. Their migration to work in cities increases their family income, promotes the economic and social development of the rural areas from which they migrate, and contributes substantially to the country’s overall economic and social development. According to the reports of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) and the National People’s Congress (NPC), in 2004 the proportion of peasant workers in the workforce reached 25% in the highly-developed Pearl River Delta. The National Statistics Bureau revealed that in 2003 China’s GDP was 11,669.4 billion RMB. In other words, the value created by migrant workers would be 2,333.8 billion RMB even if they contributed on only 20% of GDP in that year. Further, the migration of rural laborers has accelerated the adjustment of the industrial structure in cities, challenged the planned welfare system, and fueled the growth of labor markets. With an adequate supply of cheap labor, labor-intensive industries are able to develop and the influx of the migrant workers has also increased the mobility of the urban labor force and promoted the rational allocation and effective utilization of labor resources. All these changes have made an enormous contribution to the development of a national labor market.

In spite of their enormous contribution to urban and rural development and general prosperity, migrant workers usually cannot move their families to the cities. This is due to the segregation between rural and urban areas, which have separate social welfare systems, as well as to their own economic constraints. The symbol of the separation between rural and urban areas—the strict residential registration system—appeared in 1958. Its purpose was to support rapid and centralized industrialization at the expense of the development of the countryside. At that time, the residency system was characterized by the rigid control of population flows into cities.\textsuperscript{3} People who were registered as having agricultural residence had to be approved by the relevant city agencies if they wanted to settle in the city.

Since 1979, reform of the household registration system has been driven by the market forces and by institutional reforms aimed at promoting development. The clearest progress toward breaking up the urban-rural

\textsuperscript{2} Topic-Based Groups in Research Office of the State Council, China Migrant Rural Laborers Report, China YanShi Publishing Co., April, 2006.

divide can be seen in reforms at the township level. Transferring between the countryside and towns is now open but migration to medium-sized and large cities is still limited for most of the population, although it is possible in some cases. While the household registration system has changed for the better in the last twenty years, its socio-political meaning remains; it stands as a rampart between city and countryside, impeding interregional population flows.

The effects of the household registration system, especially for the agricultural labor force, can be characterized as follows: (1) The absence of fair labor and economic rights: migrant workers are treated differently from urban citizens in terms of salary, work time, and work load, and their economic rights to labor contracts, fair treatment, and reasonable pay are often violated to varying degrees. (2) The absence of rights to education and welfare services: if they do not have an urban hukou, the school-age children of migrant laborers are not admitted free to public schools in cities but are either rejected or required to pay an extra charge. Migrant households are excluded from social welfare services in urban area as well. (3) The absence of political rights: despite their large numbers, migrant workers are not legally organized and lack formal channels to express their interests. (4) The absence of civil rights: the basic civil right to move freely and find housing is elusive for migrant workers, and a direct reason for their flow between urban and rural areas.

The absence or curtailment of these rights—in other words, the absence of “citizenship”—shapes the circumstances of migrant workers and leads to the phenomenon of “left-behind households.” Migrants have no choice but to leave some of their family members in the village and a unique “left-behind population” of women, children, and the elderly, has thus formed in rural areas.

In April 2007, the study group on the rural left-behind population at China Agricultural University chose five provinces where labor outflow has been significant—Anhui, Henan, Hunan, Jiangxi and Sichuang—as research sites. One county was chosen in every province, and two towns or townships were chosen in each county; finally, one administrative village was chosen in each town or township. Altogether, ten administrative villages were designated as the research communities. The study group designed questionnaires which were administered to all the left-behind population groups (children, women, and elders): a total of 400 in all. Another 200 questionnaires were

5 In this survey, a prerequisite for the concept of “left-behind” is that the migrant workers should spend at least six months working outside for these recent years. The migration of rural labor forces can be characterized as a long period in the cities and a low frequency of
distributed to non-left-behind children, women, and elders living in the same village. The questions focused on the educational experiences, daily life, workload, and emotions of the left-behind children; on the emotional life, workload, and living and economic situation of the left-behind women; and on the workload, emotional lives, economic burdens, and daily care of the left-behind elders. The study sought to reveal the changes brought about as a result of the migration of rural laborers, and the impact of migration on rural families, rural communities and society as a whole.

**The Family Decision-Making Process**

Generally, the husband and the wife decided jointly whether they should migrate for work. The elders usually did not participate in the decision-making process. Only when both of the spouses chose to migrate, and when they were given custody of their grandchildren, did elders take part in the decision-making process. And even then their role was more to provide suggestions than to be a decision-maker. The low level of participation of elders in the decision-making process was mainly a function of their economic status in the family. Once they are unable to work, the economic status of the elderly decreases and they became highly dependent on their children. The decision-making power therefore transfers gradually from the elders to the younger generation.

When rural young people decide to migrate, in some cases only one of the spouses leaves, while in other cases both do. It was more common for the husband to leave than the wife, mainly because of the division of labor between the genders, which is still strong in rural China. When a family needs more income, the preferred choice is for the male to migrate. In the eyes of left-behind women, the migration of females was both inconsistent with their social values and economically disadvantageous, since males could earn more in the cities while the cost of leaving was the same for men and women.

In addition, women were considered more suited to stay in the villages than the men. First, women are needed to take care of the children because leaving them in the custody of grandparents is often problematic. Secondly, the elderly, especially those who are sick or senile, often need to be tended by their children, and, again, females were considered more suited for this responsibility. Finally, rural women are less educated than the men and may

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*returning home. Take the group of left-behind children, for example: according to the survey reported in this paper, 70% of their migrant parents worked outside for more than ten months a year. Before this survey was conducted, 80% of migrant parents had been outside for more than three years, 70% for more than five years, and 45% for more than seven years. In reality, the migrant working life of rural laborers lasts much longer than that. A large portion of migrant workers began to leave before their marriage.*
feel less able to deal with the difficulties involved in migration. As a result they are less likely to migrate out for work.

The Impact of Migration on Agricultural Production
The migration of rural workers has brought about changes in the ways that families organize production. Agricultural production, which was originally the responsibility primarily of men, has shifted to women and the elderly as men have left to work in the cities, increasing their workload. As a result, families have had to change the family production structure in order to reduce the burden on those remaining on the land.

The alteration of the production structure is mainly reflected in changes in planting and breeding. Women and the elderly have reduced the amount or changed the genres of the crops they plant to lessen their workload. For instance, instead of planting a double harvest of rice, they plant one harvest of rice or wheat, or only vegetables. They also choose to produce crops or other commodities that are more valuable but less labor-intensive, such as cotton, watermelon, gingko, sugarcane, fruit trees, or fish. Some have increased the acreage of fruit trees and reduced the planting of rice, or switched to silk production in order to better manage their time. Many of them have started to use mechanical devices to plant seedlings instead of transplanting rice seedlings manually, which significantly reduces the time involved. In livestock rearing, the most common way to reduce the workload is to breed fewer animals, because the breeding period is relatively short and can breeding can easily be controlled. For instance, many families have reduced the number of cattle, pigs, chickens, and ducks they raise. One of the left-behind women mentioned in an interview, “I used to feed four pigs, but I am too weary after my husband migrated out to work. Now I only keep one.”

The Impact on Family Size and Composition
Traditional families in China were mainly composed of united families and trunk families. However, the size of families in rural areas has shrunk dramatically as the result of rural-urban migration, especially when both of the spouses left. Families composed of grandparents and grandchildren, or of the left-behind wife, elders, and children, have become most common types of family unit in rural areas.

6 United families consist of parents, two or more children, and the children’s spouses, with or without grandchildren. They can also refer to families in which two or more brothers or sisters live together with their spouses and children.

7 Trunk families consist of parents, one of their children and the child’s spouses, with or without grandchildren.
Take the residence situation of the elders, for instance: The migration of their children led to the increase of families with skipped generations and or lone elderly. The survey found that 26.0% of the families were composed of a husband and wife, and 32% were trunk families before young couples left to work. However, after their migration, the proportion of husband-and-wife families and trunk families was reduced sharply, while families with skipped-generation and lone elderly greatly increased: to 49.8% and 48.5%, respectively.

The Impact of Migration on the Distribution of Resources

After the migration of their husbands, left-behind women have to make more decisions, to some extent independently, about family affairs. This gives them considerable freedom to make choices about family finances and agricultural production activities, such as breeding and planting.

With respect to family finances, 71.4% of the left-behind women surveyed handled the family finances after their husbands left, while only 18.1% of non-left-behind women did so. Although these left-behind women usually discussed financial decisions with their husbands via telephone or waited until they came back home to make decisions, in many cases they made decisions independently. When they faced difficulties, like a lack of money (possibly because their husband did not send remittances), they usually borrowed money from others, applying for loans from Country Credit Organizations, or temporarily buying goods on credit. They consulted their husbands for approval only when the amount of money needed was large.

(1) Borrowing money: Women usually borrowed money from family members. They said their strategy was to “borrow from anybody who is likely to lend, borrow to pay for the debts nearly due, emphasize that their husbands are earning money outside, and pay back in time so that borrowing again from the same person is not difficult.” When the amount of money needed was large, the women borrowed from a lot of people. This strategy made the lender feel less pressured, and the debtor was able to manage the debts with more flexibility when she needed to pay the money back.

(2) Applying for loans: Loans were more common in the south. Women applied for loans when the amount of money needed was large, so they usually did so after consulting their husbands.

(3) Buying on credit: This strategy was employed when women needed money contingently, for instance, when they needed to purchase materials for production, such as seeds, fertilizer, or pesticides; or when they needed to visit a doctor. They paid off the debts when their husbands sent funds or came back with money.
In terms of agricultural production, especially breeding, it was mainly the women who decided how many and what type of animals to raise, as well as when to sell them. They returned decision-making power to their husbands only when the family was purchasing a huge piece of furniture or electrical appliances, building houses, or doing business. Therefore, to a great extent, the women were empowered to make decisions on some family affairs. However, it should be noted that although left-behind women had more decision-making power, they wielded it rather passively, handing the power back when their husbands came home.

**Provision of Funds for the Elders**
The survey found that the migration of children not only improved the economic situation of the elderly, but also changed traditional ways of supporting them: from providing food and material goods to providing money. In traditional rural communities, sons usually supplied their parents directly with food and other goods, with some money as a supplement. However, as an increasing number of young rural laborers have left the country for the city and left agriculture for non-agricultural industries, the foundation of the traditional way of supporting the elders has been undermined. According to the field research, “the children at home give grains, and the children out to work provide money.” The elders still obtained food stuffs and other items from their children who remained at home, but the trend of providing money increased among those who migrated to work and the most frequent economic exchange between generations became currency.

**The Changed Family Living Situation**
Generally, the living situation of women and elders depends on whether the family has already been broken up. If the young couple and their parents previously lived apart, the left-behind women and elders continue to reside separately after the husband migrated. But in a few cases women asked left-behind elders to move back and live with them because their workload had greatly increased: the women had to manage agricultural production and do housework, while at the same time taking care of their children. The elders therefore moved back to assist the women with the chores, and at the same time it was easier for the women to care for them. In addition, some left-behind elders returned to their children’s homes because they were needed to take care of the house and grandchildren when both spouses left for work.

The departure of one or both spouses re-integrated small families that had originally been independent, illustrating the strategy adopted by the left-behind population of dealing with difficulties collectively, and rearranging and redistributing family resources. For example, the elders were contributing (looking after grandchildren, doing housework, assisting in
agricultural production) and also gaining (being cared for by their children), and they were sharing some family resources with left-behind women.

The Changed Distribution of Land Resources
Land has to be cultivated by the family members who are left behind, which adds to their workload. Left-behind women have to undertake onerous agricultural production, shoulder tedious chores, and often also take care of children or elderly parents. In addition to changing what they planted and the number of animals they raised, reducing the acreage they planted became one of the most effective ways to lighten their burden. According to the survey, they used three different approaches to reduce the areas to be planted: (1) they temporarily transferred part of the land to others without demanding any land rent (here “others” usually refers to relatives, such as parents-in-law or brothers and sisters); (2) they leased the land to others for a relatively low rent (or for grain instead of cash); and (3) they just left the land fallow, a last resort when the migration was prevalent and suitable persons to cultivate the land could not be found.

Hence, although the migration of the rural population did not change the nature of land tenure, it changed the utilization of land resources remarkably. When the area of the land was larger than the women or elders could cultivate, they rearranged the land use rights to create a new structure through unofficial channels, with the land tenure remaining untouched.

Strengthening Cooperation among Women and the Elderly
Women and the elderly have combined forces to manage the heavy workload in production and daily life resulting from migration. They have spontaneously adopted various approaches to expand the scope of mutual assistance and maintain cooperation. However, the form and content of cooperation among the women differed from those of the elders.

The cooperation and assistance among the women lay mainly in agricultural production, which was undertaken by men and women together before the men left and women became the main force in agricultural production. They could manage to deal with daily field work by themselves, but were incapable of doing all the harvesting and seeding in busy farming seasons on their own. Therefore, the women cooperated, and were able to assist each other efficiently in accomplishing agricultural production because they shared similar life experiences and perceptions. In addition, women also collaborated in taking care of housework and providing economic assistance.

The elderly adopted different strategies for dealing with various difficulties in their daily lives, including the sudden increase in workload, the absence of
daily care, and loneliness in their twilight years. Their strategies mainly consisted of the exchange of labor, visiting and chatting, borrowing money, helping to look after grandchildren, and exchanging information. But compared with the women, the number of persons assisted by the elderly was quite small: mainly peers of the same age.

**Changes in the Responsibilities of Family Members**

The trunk and united families that were the main family forms in traditional China encourage the support of the elderly, bring the different generations closer, and foster mutual assistance among family members. Indeed, in rural China the elderly used to be supported mainly by their families. But with the heavy flow of labor from rural to urban areas, traditional family patterns have been replaced by lone parents whose children have left and families with skipped generations. This change has prevented families from functioning normally to support the elderly, especially when they are left entirely alone.

To compensate for the absence of daily care and emotional support, and to express appreciation to their parents for nurturing their children, many young migrants provide more economic support. According to the survey data, 65.4% of the left-behind elders reported that the money provided by their children would be reduced if they did not migrate to work, with 46.1% indicating that the amount of money would be “greatly reduced.” Further, 58.0% mentioned that their living conditions would decline. The data showed that the increase in economic support and improvement in living conditions could, to a large extent, provide the elders with emotional comfort, and compensate for the loss of daily care and emotional support.

In relatively isolated traditional rural communities, giving gifts to family members used to be quite uncommon, especially between children and parents. Economic support from children took the form of agricultural produce. However, gifts became more common as a resource for elders when their children migrated: the survey showed that 75.9% of the elders received gifts from their migrant children. They mainly comprised: (1) clothing, such as clothes, socks and shoes; (2) items to nurture their health, such as ginseng, melatonin, oatmeal, and soy milk powder; (3) non-staple food items, such as cigarettes, alcohol, meat, fruits, biscuits, and milk; and (4) electric appliances—the least common—such as rice cookers, electric blankets, and DVD players.

The presents sent by the children were an economic resource for the elders and another kind of compensation for the absence of daily care and emotional support and for the elders’ care of their grandchildren. They also provided an emotional link between the children who left and the elders.
Grandparents’ Responsibility for the Care of their Grandchildren
Because of the segregation between urban and rural areas, the dual economic and social structure, and the related household registration and social security systems, most rural laborers cannot take their children with them when they go to work in the cities. When both parents leave, they often give custody of their children to their grandparents, a relatively common practice in rural areas: the survey showed that 52.6% of the left-behind elders needed to look after grandchildren.

This skipped-generation custody had both a positive and negative effect on the elders. On the one hand, the grandchildren were company for them and dispelled their loneliness while their children were away. It brought the elders and their migrant children emotionally closer and improved the relationship between generations. At the same time, assuming custody of the grandchildren was a way for the elders to get material support.

However, the task of taking care of grandchildren increased the workload and mental stress for the elderly. The survey showed that the increase in workload was the most direct and evident negative impact of skipped-generation custody on elders. This impact was more severe for lone grandparents, aged widows and widowers, and those who had more than two grandchildren to look after. The survey also showed that of the elders who needed to care for grandchildren, 84.1% still engaged in agricultural production and 48.7% felt that they had an extremely heavy housework burden. In addition, the elders felt some psychological pressure when taking care of their grandchildren, including concerns about the children’s safety, health, and education. Further, the economic burden was heavier for a few elders who had to pay for part of their grandchildren’s tuition and other expenses.

Expectations of Children
Parents’ migration changes the family structure and forces left-behind children to undertake a larger workload at an earlier age. But the stereotyped and distinct social expectations for girls and boys in rural families result in different workloads for each gender. Regardless of how the family structure changed, parents and guardians expected that girls would undertake some housework and look after their younger brothers and sisters. Therefore, the parents’ migration created more housework for their daughters. Also, because they had to handle more chores, they had to endure heavier psychological pressures from other family members.

The proportion of girls who frequently did housework was distinctly higher than boys: 47.2% and 25.1%, respectively. This disparity was especially great in terms of fetching water and cutting firewood. These kinds of heavy manual
work were usually undertaken by fathers or boys before the parents’ migration, but girls increasingly took on that physically demanding work after their parents’ migration.

It is reasonable for children, as family members, to take on some light work that is within their capabilities, but work should not occupy their entire life. In the guardians’ eyes, however, doing housework became the children’s—especially the girls’—fulltime responsibility, because as the number of workers in the family decreased the workload for those who were left increased proportionately. If the children complained about their workload, they were viewed as being disobedient or badly behaved. Sometimes their complaints invited blame or a spanking.

The Reversal of Care
Children should be looked after and protected in a family, but some guardians in the left-behind families were unable to provide children with basic care because they themselves were aged or in poor health. Instead, the traditional parenting arrangement was reversed, and in families with skipped generations care for children and elders was mutual and two-directional. The elders took over the parents’ responsibility to bring up the grandchildren, but the children needed to take care of the elders as if they, the children, were the parents. This reversed custody by the grandchildren—nurturing their grandparents—was a fundamental component of family ethics. More specifically, it was a sort of compensation for the absence of support from their parents due to migration, and an indication of their devotion. Here, too, there was a gender difference in the provision of care to grandparents: 12.3% of girls were often required to take care of their guardians, while only 5.9% of boys were required to do so.

The Impact of migration on Left-Behind Women’s capacity building
Women spent more time on production and housework after their husbands’ migration, which led to the reduction of their leisure time. This was most prevalent among women under age 25 but it also applied to some 45- to 55-year-old women. In fact they were often only partly at leisure because they need to take care of children at the same time.

Women’s leisure activities mainly included watching television and visiting and chatting with neighbors or relatives. The women also played cards or Mahjong and went to rural markets. While there were few entertainment choices for rural women, they sought out information in many areas. Influenced by their husbands’ migration, the women were more interested in news about safeguarding the rights and interests of peasant workers than were other rural women. In general, women with a lower level of education
were less interested in seeking out information and, in some cases, the heavy workload meant that they had little time to pay attention to the news.

The women cared most about their children’s education: the survey showed that it was the top concern for 56.6% of left-behind women. The majority of women did not have any sort of training themselves, but they had a strong desire for it, particularly for education about planting and breeding techniques, and about public health. They were also somewhat eager for training that would enable them to work outside the home. More than half of the left-behind women wished to join organizations or associations of various kinds, especially those providing production services and those that provided entertainment organizations or associations. However, they were rarely able to do so because most of their time was occupied with work.

A Reconsideration of Rest Homes for the Elderly
The rural elderly used to have a very negative attitude toward rest homes, believing that only aged widows or widowers and those abandoned by their children would go to one. Elderly people with adult children who lived in rest homes were regarded as “having lost face,” and were whispered about. This attitude stemmed largely from the fact that rest homes in rural areas were mostly relief institutions set up by the government, and they served a unique local function. Conversely, most of the rest homes spawned by the market or welfare systems were located in cities and towns.

Families’ ability to care for their elderly was weakened with the large flow of rural labor into cities and the left-behind elderly faced many problems: a lack of daily care, an increase in their workload, and loneliness. Although other family members (such as their spouses, non-migrant children, and other relatives) might partially replace the children who left and meet some of the elders’ needs, the assistance provided by them largely depended on their where they lived. The further away these family members resided, the less likely they were to be able to provide support to the elderly. Meanwhile, support from rural communities was limited: there were no professional social workers to provide services for the elderly and communities had finite resources to provide them with entertainment and places to spend leisure time.

When it was impossible to gain support from rural communities, left-behind elders had to reconsider the function of rest homes. The survey showed that 45.8% of the elders wished for there to be rest homes, places for outdoor activities, common rooms, entertainment facilities, and sport facilities for the elderly in the village. In fact, 14.5% of the elders put rest homes first place on the list. Evidently, elders’ original beliefs about rest homes have changed, and they now have a relatively strong desire for them.
The Influence of Religious Beliefs

The survey showed that quite a few left-behind women and elders (mainly women) believed in a religion, either the local Buddhist and Taoist religions, or various “imported” denominations of Christianity. Religious participation became an important way for the women and elders to dispel loneliness, seek comfort, alleviate their sadness, and pray for blessings from those in heaven. It became an indispensable part of their daily life.

There was no distinct difference between left-behind women and non-left-behind women in terms of religious beliefs. The longitudinal data before and after their husband’s migration indicated that the percentage of women with religious beliefs increased by just 2.5% after the migration, but it is undeniable that religious beliefs played a positive role in the life of the left-behind women. The left-behind women with religious beliefs went to the church or temple when they were in a bad mood; although religion could not directly solve their problems, it played an essential role in helping them release negative emotions, and it comforted them. Further, people with the same religious belief felt a sense of belonging, since their religion advocated mutual assistance among believers, which created an especially social network among disciples. Religion was a place for the women to seek help and support.

There are four additional reasons why the left-behind women believed in religion: (1) A low sense of security, which was prevalent after their husbands migrated out to work: the women needed to be assured of their family members’ safety. (2) Illnesses: They could either be the women’s own or their family members’ incurable illnesses, or they needed money to pay for medical services. (3) The attraction of the tenets of religions: The left-behind women believed that “God is educating people to be good and to do good deeds,” “It is a blessing to believe in God,” and “As long as you believe in God, He will bless you.” (4) The influence of other family members sparked their involvement with religion.

The motivation for left-behind elders to believe in religion was quite strong. They became believers because they wanted to pray for safety, good health, and the avoidance of disasters. In addition, some elders believed in religion because they had to undertake a heavier workload, and endure loneliness or their children’s lack of love and care, and they had no other way to escape from reality. Religion thus became an effective tool in helping them to alleviate sadness and release their negative emotions.

As with the women, religion played a positive role in the life of the elders. They faced a “cruel” and unchangeable reality, but with comfort from religion, they asked less from life, and their desire for material goods lessened, which helped them feel less pressured, become peaceful, and find emotional support;
overall, they felt safer and surer about life. Furthermore, some regained their values through religion. With the sense of belonging that religion gave them, they felt less lonely and bored. They also could obtain various types of assistance from other believers since the provision of mutual aid was common among members was of the same religious group.

Coping Strategies
While the flow of rural labor into cities significantly influenced the life of the children, women, and elders in left-behind families, the family members did not passively endure the difficulties. Instead, they fully utilized the resources at hand, exerted their agency, and adopted coping strategies in order to offset the negative impacts of being left behind.

Almost half of the left-behind children told other people of their worries, but almost a third of them were unwilling to confide in others. The children only revealed their feelings when they were worried about their studies or experienced violent emotional swings. They most often sought out peers for emotional support, but also turned to the guardians and classmates for help when they had difficulties. Most of them sought help from teachers or classmates when they had difficulties with their studies. It was not uncommon for the children to be teased in daily life and in school, and when they were bullied they had three coping strategies: (1) Passively enduring other people’s beating, scolding, or deprecating looks. (2) Seeking help from teachers, peers, or elders at home. (3) Actively fighting back.

The coping strategies adopted by the left-behind women can also be classified as either active or passive. With respect to agricultural production and housework, they asked for help from parents-in-law and relatives, or solved the problem through inviting helpers, exchanging labor, or hiring a worker. As for family finances—given that husbands were usually in charge of the larger portion of the savings while wives were in charge of the smaller portion, because husbands earned more than wives—the women “spent money on the most important things, saving as much as possible.” They used various strategies to reduce family expenses.

The women felt linked to their husbands and trusted and understood them. They installed a telephone or bought a cell phone to keep in contact with them, and when they spoke, they “talked more about good events, less about misfortunes,” to make their husbands worry less. They usually appealed to their husbands to remain loyal to them by making jokes. When their husbands did have an affair, the women tried to bring them back by “affecting their husbands with kind behavior,” “begging them with gentleness,” “asking them to think more about their children,” and “requesting them to consider their own reputation and face.”
The women usually encouraged their children to study hard through their own example and experience. They contacted teachers in order to learn about their children’s performance at school and daily life. They made efforts to be on good terms with neighbors, mothers-in-law, and husbands. When they were not in a good mood, they released their negative emotions through watching television, calling their husbands, visiting others, playing cards, chatting, or weeping. As noted, the women sometimes turned to religion.

The women also had passive coping strategies. When their husbands had an affair, they submitted to the humiliation for the sake of their families and children. When they experienced sexual harassment, most of them lacked the consciousness to defend themselves through the law. Instead, they were constrained by tradition and did not tell their husbands, since it might arouse their suspicions. They dared not call the police either, since it might generate gossip in the village.

The left-behind elders reduced their burdens mainly through three strategies: hiring a worker, exchanging labor, and adjusting the methods and structure of planting. The last strategy included reducing the area for planting and changing the types of crops planted or animals bred. The elders usually sought help from their children who were at home or neighbors. In order to prevent accidents, the elders were cautious, strengthened safeguards and watched over each other.

The elders tried to avoid financial problems by finding a way to support themselves or lowering their standard of living. When they did experience a financial problem, they managed to survive it by buying on credit, borrowing money or turning to their children for help. The elders sought comfort and emotional support by confiding in others, phoning their children, engaging in leisure activities, turning to religion, requesting to take care of grandchildren, or keeping a pet.

The three left behind groups never existed independently because they emerged from a common social context, and many families included two or even three of them. They all faced the same difficulties from their common family member’s migration, but it affected them in different ways. Usually the elders, women, and children took care of each other, providing mutual support, and managing to sustain a temporarily disunited family together. This ensured that every family member would obtain the care that they deserved, and the family livelihood would be sustained. Ultimately, with respect to both the material and the spiritual, the groups supported each other and also their family members’ migration by acting together.
The Daily Lives of Left-Behind Family Members

Left-behind children are neglected despite the rhetoric of their being the sole focus of the family. All the family arrangements and activities—the parents’ migration, and other family members’ hard work—were said to be in order that the children could have a better life. But we drew an entirely opposite conclusion when closely observing the children’s lives. Children were indeed the center of family objectives, but not the center of their concerns. While they were very important in the arrangement of the family’s, overall goals, they were usually neglected in actual daily life, although families did not recognize that fact.

For example, many parents migrated in order to be able to afford their children’s education. But many of them did not call home for several months. Further, grandparents worked hard to take care of the children but in busy farming seasons the children had no food for an after-school snack. Sometimes they had to wait until past nine o’clock for dinner. When a child was bitten by a dog or hurt in another type of accident, nobody brought them to a hospital or showed concern. When the children were forced by family members to do fieldwork, nobody considered that they are too young for this type of work or that they might be unwilling to do it. When they felt sad or wept because they missed their parents, nobody understood their feelings. Grandparents believed that “little children have no worries.”

Constrained by the bad health, economic conditions, and ideology, many left-behind elders could not adequately take care of their grandchildren. Some were unable to meet even the children’s basic needs. With the elders shouldering a heavy workload, some older grandchildren had to share the burdens. Many children therefore had limited time to study, play, and communicate with peers. Elders were also often unable to manage the children’s lives and education; their main way of educating their grandchildren was scolding and they could not communicate on an emotional level with them. They were unable to help them study, and provided inadequate supervision. They paid more attention to feeding the children than to other ways of nurturing them, attaching importance to the children’s basic needs and security while neglecting the development of their personality, creativity, and moral values, and their emotional needs. They were also likely to spoil their grandchildren, making them selfish, capricious, and unsociable. Another frequent result of skipped-generation care was the distancing of the children from their parents who left.

The migration of parents, while improving the economic condition of the family, brought sharp changes to the circumstances in which their children lived and developed which caused them to face more risks compared with non-left-behind children. These risks not only included physical threats (such as traffic accidents, drowning, assaults, and food poisoning), but also feelings
of insecurity, loneliness, and discrimination; and delinquency due to out-of-control of behavior, such as fighting, early sexual activity, and gambling. Thus, the development of the children was fraught with frustration and risk, which needed the efforts of their families and the community to alleviate.

Left-behind women felt heavily pressured, especially by the family economic situation, and also by their children. The women wept more often after their husbands left, and it was the chief channel, and an effective way, for them to release their pain and sadness. The women did not want their husbands to know that they were weeping or to worry about them, so they never cried when they are talking to their husband on the telephone.

The women felt insecure, and some emergencies—seemingly more frequent after their husband left—exacerbated that feeling: thefts, bad weather, illnesses of the elders, and their children’s crying and or strange behavior that might indicate illness. The company of their children and parents-in-law, good relationships with neighbors, and a nice community environment could to some extent enhance their sense of security, and also take the place of their husband in terms of safeguarding them and providing comfort. Their husbands’ migration led to the women’s being thought of as disadvantaged, and, therefore, when they were in conflict with others they were more likely to be bullied. Some women also experienced sexual harassment from men in the community, which contributed to their feelings of their insecurity and potentially threatened their marriage.

The women experienced many sorts of negative feelings, some of them were extreme; loneliness was most evident. In addition, their marriage was in potential danger because the women were living separately from their husbands and their sexual demands could not be met within the marriage.

The women’s burden of nurturing their children was extraordinarily heavy. The main problems they encountered were an inability to help the children with their studies, to control their behavior, and to find a helper to take care of the children; and a lack of time for their parental responsibilities. The women mainly used in three approaches to help educate their children: persuasion, scolding, and corporal punishment. Sometimes they beat or scolded their children to release their inner pressure, pains, or physical weariness, which adversely affected the children’s personality. Because their husbands were away, mothers became the parent who their children turned to for help or confided in, but they had such heavy burdens physically and spiritually that their communication with the children was effected.

Within the context of rural labor migration in an aging society, elders left behind in rural areas were facing double pressures: their aging and their
status as a left-behind family member. They needed to deal with a lot of challenges for survival.

After their children migrated out, most elders took over agricultural production and the care of their grandchildren, which were originally their children’s responsibilities. Meanwhile the support that they had been obtaining from their family was greatly reduced although their workload increased. According to the survey, the proportion of left-behind elders who were engaged in agricultural production was as high as 80%, and many of the elders needed to manage and plant the land left by more than one child who migrated out. They had to deal with the difficulties of agricultural production, which mainly included a lack of labor and energy, and the insufficiency of agricultural inputs, and many elders felt the heavy workload was beyond their capabilities.

Some elders reported in the survey that they were unsatisfied with the daily care and material support they received from their children, who traditionally constituted their primary source of support. Sick or senile elders, widows and widowers, and empty nesters had the lowest level of satisfaction about the care and support they received, largely because they were either in poor health or unable to live independently and therefore were highly dependent on others. It was difficult for them to acquire support and resources from other channels after their children’s migration, and their needs were likely to go unmet.

It is commonly recognized that family members were the main source of elders’ spiritual comfort, with their children undertaking the responsibility for providing emotional support. The large-scale migration of rural laborers severely limited the provision of such support, however, hampering communication and interaction between the generations and creating a separation between the two generations. The elders’ cultural life became quite monotonous, and their children’s migration left an emotional gap that could not be filled. The elders felt psychological pressure, loneliness, and suffered from a lack of security and sense of happiness, which had a direct and negative impact on the quality of their life and health status.

**Policy Issues**

The interregional population flow of rural laborers to cities was closely linked to urbanization as a structural initiative. For a long time, development of cities in China was based on the deprivation and depression of rural areas. By the 1980s, however, conflicts within the urban-rural dual system began to attract attention from policymakers as well as scholars. 8 The goal of

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8 Wen Tiejun, Wen Li, Township-izations in China and the Lessons from the Urbanization in Developing Countries, China Soft Science, 2007 No.7, pp. 23-29.
urbanization, namely integration of the previously separated socioeconomic structures of the city and countryside and the promotion of a modern lifestyle for the whole population, could not be achieved overnight in a country with a deeply rooted dual social system. Considering the deficiency of the cities in absorbing the rural population with respect to employment and residence and the reality of the urban-rural dual system, China adopted a practical strategy for urbanization and social development: balanced development for both urban and rural areas. At the end of 2005, the national policy of New Countryside Construction was instituted as a landmark for this overall development strategy. This policy not only emphasized rural development in a process that previously focused on the modernization of cities, but also had great significance in the context of large-scale labor force migration. Most of the rural migrated workers could not integrate into city life in terms of their identity and life style and returned to their rural community after working in a city. Although urbanization to some extent implies the sacrifice of rural areas as their labor force is encouraged to come to the cities for work, social scientists had hoped that the returning workers and their rural communities would eventually prosper. In practice, however, New Countryside Construction has encountered problems related to migration. Rural communities, where only women and the elderly remain because the men migrated out, lack of human capital for agricultural production, infrastructure construction, and fair social organization, and the left-behind groups, especially women and the elderly, are facing many types of difficulties, most especially increased workloads.

Serious attention is need to the education and care giving of children in migrant households, regardless of whether they are left behind or come with their parents to the city. Some concern has already been shown about the education of migrant children in cities, with a focus on how to improve access to public schools and encourage the building and improvement of private schools to meet these children’s education needs.

Parents bring their children with them to the cities to eliminate the impact of a split family on the children’s growth and to enable them to enjoy more care and love in a whole family environment. However, education in cities for these children is not unproblematic. Migrant parents often have low-paid, high-intensity jobs and find it hard to maintain a decent standing of living. Tough living conditions affect children’s development both physically and psychologically. It is also common for migrant laborers to move between different cities and regions frequently, and interrupted education and interregional difference in schools and courses are disruptive to children’s education.

lives.\textsuperscript{10} Coordinating different textbooks and teaching methods when they move to a new school in a different region makes it very difficult for the children to complete their education.\textsuperscript{11} Moreover, children from rural areas often face discrimination and social exclusion when they attend public schools in the city.\textsuperscript{12} Making education accessible to children who migrate to the city can involve structural changes, including reforming the educational financial system, coordinating interregional government agencies and revising related policies.\textsuperscript{13}

Moving the entire family to the city, and providing an education for the children, is not affordable for many families, and therefore most parents who migrate leave their children in their rural community. Different ways to care for left-behind children include boarding school, foster parents, and community-based caring centers. Strengthening the primary education system and social infrastructure construction in rural areas for the children, as well as their left-behind families, requires a public investment. Unfortunately, the pressures of a split family have been reflected in the children's school performance and emotional development, but a solid community with effective social supports could offset the negative effect of a split family situation to a great extent.

\textbf{Recommendations for Further Research}

The research presented here was focused at the family level, concentrating on the lives of the three groups left behind as a consequence of the outflow of rural labor to the cities—the children, women, and elders—and identifying the various impacts of migration on them. It did not consider the impact on communities as a whole, such as their economy and cultural and political activities, and future research should provide such an analysis.

Additional study is also needed of the individuals affected by migration, including these three type of studies:

\begin{itemize}
\item[(1)] The heterogeneity of the left-behind families: Within the left-behind families, the members experience different impacts from the migration of family members. Thus, future research should address, for example, the differences among left-behind children by sex, age, and type of guardianship.
\end{itemize}

\begin{footnotes}
\item[12]Wu Xinhui, Liu Chengbin, Inclusion or Exclusion: the Social Space of Rural migrant Children's Integration in City, China Youth Study, July 2007, pp. 13-16.
\end{footnotes}
Different perspectives of different actors: Future research should analyze the various left-behind groups from the perspective of members of a different group. For instance, research should investigate the perspective of migrant husbands with respect to their wife, children, the elderly, and other individuals in the community and government agencies.

The relationship and communication between the migrated individuals and those left behind including family members as well as other members of the rural community.
State Policies toward Migration and Development

Beginning with the close association between urbanization and development, the introduction and papers of this panel present new analyses of the roles that rural-urban and international migration and mobility have in these processes with important implications for future demographic and migration policy making.
The two papers offered by Ronald Skeldon and Cecelia Tacoli on the relations between migration – or mobility – urbanization, and development have led me to think about how to explain some of the critical demographic issues behind their arguments, issues that I think not all researchers and policy makers focusing on migration and development understand as well as perhaps they should. We have been talking about multidisciplinary approaches, including the views of economists, demographers, political scientists and others. We use the same terms assuming that others understand the complexity behind the terminology, but perhaps they do not. I wish to address both papers in relation to some basic demographic questions, the answers to which we should all understand, and then suggest some questions for future research.

The first question is: “what is the demographic transition?” Skeldon’s paper describes transitions that he calls demographic, urban and migration, and their connections to development. But the critical transition, the one that inspires us demographers at any rate, is the demographic transition. When I started studying demography, the “demographic transition” was described as a theory. Yet, as Skeldon’s paper points out, the demographic transition is in fact more a description than an explanation of a process that is affecting almost all populations in the world. In 1970, this process was still at its beginning stages in most developing countries. Today, I can affirm that it is definitely advancing in most developing countries and that it has almost run its course in the developed world. There are very few countries where the demographic transition is still at its early stages.

So, what is the demographic transition? Everyone has heard that it is the passage from a state of high mortality and high fertility to a state of low mortality and low fertility. In most societies, mortality decline comes first and this is important because reductions in mortality have a major impact on population growth. If, as is usually the case, mortality declines earlier than fertility, population growth accelerates and is mostly concentrated at the younger ages. This happens because, when overall mortality is high, it is especially high among children and, when it starts declining, it declines most at the youngest ages. As a consequence, more children survive than would had mortality remained high and the base of the age distribution increases.
Therefore, the age distribution becomes younger during the first stage of the demographic transition. Today, we mostly forget that the demographic transition involves at first a rejuvenation of the population because most countries have completed that phase of the transition—especially the most populous countries in the developing world—and have gone on to the stages where population ageing dominates. It is worth underscoring that rejuvenation of the population takes place at the beginning of the demographic transition when population growth accelerates.

During the second stage of the demographic transition, fertility declines and, after a certain period, the number of children starts decreasing. It is at this stage that population growth also declines. We once thought that the decline in fertility would lead to zero population growth, but today we know that populations often overshoot and many are now experiencing or will soon experience negative population growth (that is, the population itself will decline). The decline in fertility produces population aging. Again, it is worth underscoring that the cause of the growing proportion of older persons in a population is the reduction of fertility, which causes successive cohorts of children to become smaller. As a result, the proportion of children decreases and the proportion of adults and older persons increases. This ageing process is very important. Skeldon’s paper tries to clarify the implications of this demographic transition for the urban and rural parts of a country.

We know that the demographic transition starts in urban areas. Why? Because urban areas tend to be better-off and have better services and infrastructure than rural areas. Therefore, when knowledge about how to reduce mortality spreads, especially in the developing world, it spreads first among the better educated in urban areas and then to other people in cities who can get access to health services or appropriate treatments. In rural areas, where people are poorer and services are less accessible, information spreads more slowly and access to healthcare is limited.

Therefore, when the demographic transition starts, the first places to experience accelerated population growth are urban areas. I think that we demographers have not given enough attention to this aspect of the transition process, having neglected the implications of the demographic transitions for the urban-rural divide.

My second question is: What is urbanization? As Cecilia Tacoli indicates in her paper, which focuses on mobility between rural and urban areas, urbanization is the increase of the proportion urban and the rate of urbanization is the growth rate of the proportion urban.

How does the urban population grow? Three processes contribute to urban population growth: an excess of births over deaths in urban areas; positive net rural-urban migration, and expansion of urban areas by the
transformation of rural settlements into urban centers or the expansion of urban centers to absorb rural settlements. Tacoli’s paper begins by saying that a common misconception about urbanization is that rural-urban migration is the primary cause of population growth in urban areas.

A third question is: How does urban population growth affect the rate of urbanization? The relation between the two is expressed by a simple formula. The rate of urbanization—that is, the rate of growth of the proportion urban—is the difference between the rate of growth of the urban population and the rate of growth of the rural population. This relation is very important because it implies that, for the proportion urban to increase, the rate of growth of the population in urban areas must be higher than that of the population in rural areas.

Let’s consider now a hypothetical country where there is no rural-urban migration when the demographic transition starts and assume that the demographic transition begins in its urban areas. Then, when urban mortality declines, the urban population will grow more rapidly than the rural population. Consequently, in this hypothetical population, the onset of the demographic transition will increase the rate of urbanization because urban growth will surpass rural growth even in the absence of migration. That is, the onset of the demographic transition accelerates urbanization and contributes to trigger the “urban transition”. Although this acceleration probably happened in every country undergoing the demographic transition, we have no data illustrating these dynamics because we demographers have not focused on estimating the effect of the demographic transition on the process of urbanization.

Instead, most of the focus has been on net rural-urban migration as the main process accelerating urbanization because it has undeniably been a major contributor to the difference between the urban and rural population growth rates. There is also a historical reason for paying attention to net migration instead of concentrating on differences in the natural increase of urban and rural populations. Historically, in Europe, urban populations did not grow from natural increase because mortality was so high, so they could only grow as a result of migration. Inspired by such history, demographers have come to expect migration to be the most important component of urban population growth.

It is not surprising, therefore, that in the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s, when we asked governments, “Are you worried about the rate of increase of your urban population?” they said, “Yes.” And when we followed-up with the question: “What are you doing in order to reduce it?” They would answer, “We will stop migration.” That is, most governments discounted the possibility of reducing fertility to slow down urbanization, largely because they have not been aware of the importance of natural increase for urbanization.
And we are still living with the idea that controlling urbanization and urban population growth depends on reducing migration and there is a sense that both urbanization and migration are detrimental. Yet, within the prevailing economic model, where the most productive areas are those where industries and services congregate, the concentration of the population in urban centers is necessary. Nevertheless, the case for urbanization can be difficult to make. Even economists keep on misunderstanding what the question really is. For instance, in a recent article in a special issue of Science\textsuperscript{1} devoted to cities, well-known researchers claim that urbanization by itself does not lead to economic growth. Certainly, we, demographers, have not argued the contrary. Instead, we have noted that sustained economic growth would be impossible without urbanization. Consequently, countries that are more advanced economically are highly urbanized and Skeldon’s paper presents the rationale for this outcome very clearly.

Now the fourth question: In how many countries is rural-urban migration the major contributor to increases in the urban population? Studies carried out by the United Nations Population Division have found that in three-quarters of developing countries, natural increase is the most important contributor to urban growth. This finding applies to the 62 developing countries with data for the 1980s. For the 1990s, we have data only for 34 countries, but in 25, or two-thirds of them, natural increase is a more important contributor to urban population growth than net migration. Of course, internal migration also has made an important contribution, but almost everywhere we look in the developing world, natural increase makes a greater contribution to urban population growth, both in terms of the rate growth and the number of people it adds.

China, however, is a major exception. In China during the 1980s, natural increase accounted for only 30 percent of urban growth, and in the 1990s, for just 20 percent. China is exceptional because its fertility is currently very low, especially in urban areas. Hence, migration is the main force driving urbanization and, I should add, a major contribution is also being made by the reclassification of rural areas into cities. According to the statistics on cities that China releases, some cities appear “fully grown”. Indeed, the number of areas classified as cities in China has been growing dramatically, mostly as a result of administrative changes that had not been possible before and that maintained large population centers classified as rural. Mostly because of reclassification, China appears to be experiencing a relatively high level of urbanization although its population is still only 40 percent urban.

The next question: What explains urbanization without development, which,

as Tacoli’s paper points out, seems to be the case in Africa? Africa is one of the world’s least urbanized regions and includes some of the least urbanized countries. Only 10 percent of Burundi’s population, for example, is urban. Uganda is 13 percent urban. Tacoli’s paper points out that the proportion urban has actually declined in some African countries. We estimate this decline in the proportion urban has occurred in seven African countries and in 39 countries of the whole world, many of which are highly urbanized and developed and whose population is decreasing. So there is a great variety of trends in urbanization. Tacoli’s paper claims that limited data have contributed to misconceptions about the contributions of rural-urban migration to urbanization and to urban poverty. We have better data now. The latest version of our urban estimates and projections has just been issued.\(^2\) We call it the “2007 Revision” and it is based mostly on the 2000 round of censuses, which ended in 2004. Out of the 56 countries in Africa, we have recent data on urbanization for only 38 or 68 percent of those countries. Africa is one of the regions where we have low coverage on urbanization. Coverage is almost poor for Europe, where we have data on urbanization for just 60 percent of the countries: 32 out of 48. Coverage is better for all other regions. So, Tacoli is only half right. Although coverage is not perfect, there is sufficient information to make credible estimates in most of the world. However, lacking recent data probably makes the projections to 2050 more tentative.

Tacoli’s paper makes another extremely important observation: that there is often confusion about the relation of internal migration to poverty. Very often discussions of how the urban areas grow focus on migration and assume that poor migrants give rise and maintain urban poverty. Even when there is evidence that migrants are not always poor, the assumption that they are seems to prevail. No matter how many studies we have showing that migrants come from every walk of life, that they are usually positively selected from their places of origin, that they tend to do pretty well at destination, that they are not equivalent to slum dwellers, and that people living in slums could have been living there for generations, this confusion persists.

Researchers are the World Bank have estimated for the first time changes in poverty in rural and urban areas in 90 developing countries, four fifths of which have data allowing an assessment of trends from 1993 to 2002. To estimate poverty levels the authors had to take into account that the cost of living is higher in urban areas than in rural areas. Their results show that, considering as poor those living on less than $US1 a day, rural poverty declined by 98 million but urban poverty increased by 50 million. In both

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cases, the proportion of people living in poverty declined but the proportion of the poor in urban areas, 13 percent, is much lower than the 30 percent in rural areas. The countries in which the number of rural poor declined and that of urban poor increased are mostly in South Asia, Latin America and the Caribbean. It is important to note that in Latin America and the Caribbean, the population is 78 percent urban. So, the increase in urban poverty should perhaps not be a surprise: since most people live in urban areas, poor economic performance in countries of Latin American and the Caribbean is likely to affect more urban dwellers that rural inhabitants.

Nonetheless, there is a big debate about where poverty is more concentrated and what attention governments ought to give to the poor in rural and urban areas. I think that the answer has to depend on the type of government and type of country. Poverty is undesirable no matter where it is found, so governments have to pay attention to both. But in countries that are highly rural, poverty is likely to be more concentrated rural settings, while in populations that are highly urban, it will be more concentrated in urban areas.

I have said that rural-urban migrants are not always poor. But are they the majority of slum dwellers? Definitely not. However, we do not have good data about slum dwellers, but rural-urban migrants are definitely not equivalent to slum dwellers.

Tacoli’s paper raises a sixth question: In how many countries does rural-urban migration predominate over other forms of migration such as urban-urban, rural-rural, or urban-rural migration? As she knows, not in many.

We have some new data from the Demographic and Health Surveys (DHS) that has really shocked me. The surveys asked women where they were born and raised and identified those who had moved within the six months prior to the interview. Because we have data for just 46 developing countries, the sample is not representative the whole developing world, so take the following results with a great grain of salt. In those 46 countries, rural-rural migration is the most important in 26, or 57 percent. Urban-urban migration predominates among women in 15 countries, or 33 percent. So, where is rural-urban migration, the one that we are usually interested in? In this sample, rural-urban migration predominated in only three countries or 7 percent. Then, in just one country, Burundi, urban-rural migration predominated.

For males the numbers come out somewhat differently, but essentially, the direction of migration flows within countries seems to reflect the concentrations of rural and urban populations: Latin America is 80 percent urban while Africa is 60 percent rural. Therefore, in analyzing migration flows in each country, we have to pay careful attention to the proportion of
the populations in urban and rural areas. Otherwise, generalizations can be very misleading.

Consideration of the above questions about demographic transitions raises another: what is the relation of demographic transitions to urban transitions and what Skeldon calls the migration transition?

The demographic transition in developing countries has taken place more or less at the same time as those countries have urbanized. Latin America, for example, has become highly urbanized as mortality and fertility have declined.

Skeldon’s paper points out that, when we estimate urban growth in Latin America, the proportion due to natural increase is still relatively high. The reason for that outcome is that the rural population has been depleted and comprises such a small percentage of the total population that rural-urban migration cannot contribute that much to urban population growth. The same is true for developed countries, particularly European countries. However, their fertility is so low that natural increase also cannot contribute much to urban population growth. So from where are their urban centers gaining population? From abroad.

Skeldon’s paper calls the shift to international immigration a new transition but, rather than a transition, it might make more sense to view it as the next stage in urbanization when, once domestic possibilities for urban population increase have been exhausted, if a city is to grow, additional people must come from abroad.

This is not the first time that cities have grown from international migration. When I started working, my boss, an Argentinean demographer, was very worried about the fact that demographers seemed to assume that international migration was not particularly significant for urbanization. She knew that the population of Buenos Aires had grown mostly because of international migration. So urbanization through immigration has happened before, but it is likely to become increasingly common because more population have reached the late stages of demographic and urban transitions. Although at this point this explanation may seem straightforward, I think it is pretty important and enlightening, because we have not told the story this way before.

In sum, I think that Ron Skeldon’s and Cecelia Tacoli’s papers have made a very important contribution to how we think about the relations of the demographic and urban transitions to internal and international migration: they allow to distinguish the different stages of the transitions and suggest the changes of population dynamics they entail. Even if their contribution is nothing but a description of a process, and not a theory, as Skeldon’s paper
suggests, it may nonetheless enable us to ask better questions in the future. What might those better questions be?

One that Tacoli’s paper raises is: what is the significance of temporary movement or other forms of mobility? From the research of Graeme Hugo, I learned that circular migration was a relatively frequent coming and going of people between places of origin and destination. Now, I frankly do not know what circular migration is. In the context of international migration, it seems to be a new term for an old concept: temporary labour migration, taking place under highly regulated contractual arrangements. In other contexts, what is circular migration? If it is temporary movement, or temporary mobility, how short must it be for us to consider it migration and pay attention to it? The shorter the duration, almost everyone moves. Is it important?

Another questions relates to how much mobility and redistribution of the population takes place within the urban system of highly urbanized countries. In the countries that are highly rural, why and how are rural areas transforming themselves into urban areas?

Earlier, I mentioned the issue of Science magazine devoted to cities. It contains a very interesting article by an urban planner, whose discipline is not represented in this conference. The summary of his article says, “Despite a century of effort, our understanding of how cities evolve is still woefully inadequate.” He goes on to say, “Recent research, however, suggests that cities are complex systems that mainly grow from the bottom up.” 3 This position is consistent with my own separately formed view that most urban growth takes place at the base rather than from migration. This is not so much the case in the mega-cities or in big cities, but in places that are being transformed and becoming urban. How are the small cities growing into bigger cities? The Science article argues that in growing from the bottom up, size and shape of cities follow well-defined scaling laws that result from intense competition for space, a process that urban planners are trying to model mathematically.

As the Science article indicates, there is a lot we have yet to understand about how human beings organize themselves into territories to produce, exchange news, transport themselves, et cetera. Even as we improve our interpretations and refine our questions to guide future research, I think we will find that the fundamentals lie in the urban-rural dichotomy. I do not think that I presented all of the valuable ideas contained in Skeldon’s and Tacoli’s papers about rural-urban divisions and relations, but I am grateful for having the opportunity to present my thoughts about how we can improve

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our understandings of these processes.
Over the last tumultuous century, the world has been transformed in many ways, politically, economically and socially. These shifts have not been evenly distributed and some parts of the world have been transformed in ways that have brought greater prosperity to their citizens. This brief essay will limit the scope of the discussion to what can be classified as three transitions:

- A demographic transition.
- An urban transition.
- A migration transition.

These three transitions have to be set against the most basic transition of all, a development or economic transition. The world has seen the accelerating creation of wealth and consumption, and also increasing inequalities across states, with some emerging as rapidly growing, wealthy economies while others have been left behind at low levels of income and stagnant, even declining, growth. The difference between the richest and the poorest country in the world about 250 years ago was about 5:1; by the end of the twentieth century it was in the region of 400:1 (Landes 1998). In 1900, global consumption was around US$1.5 trillion. By 1950, it had reached US$4 trillion and, by 1998, US$24 trillion (New Internationalist, January 1999, issue 309). More people in more parts of the world have become relatively wealthy over recent decades and although wealth differences within countries have grown, they have fluctuated and "virtually all the observed rise in world inequality has been driven by widening gaps between nations" (Lindert and Williamson 2003: 227). In this transition, some states have increasingly been left behind (Collier 2007).

That economic growth has driven the other transitions is axiomatic, even if not in any neat or necessarily systematic way. Nevertheless, no highly developed economy has high levels of either fertility or mortality or has most of its population living in rural areas. In 1900, global fertility was probably around six children per woman, expectation of life at birth was around 30 years, and about 13 per cent of the world's population lived in cities. By 2000, global fertility had declined to 2.7, expectation of life at birth was over 65 years of age, and some 46.7 per cent of the world's population lived in urban areas (United Nations 2007). The data presented in table 1 show the trends in fertility, mortality and urbanization across the major regions of the world.
from 1950 through to 2030. Although considerable variation exists within each of the major regions listed, the universality of a trend towards low fertility, low mortality and urban society is apparent.

Table 1. Basic variables in the demographic and urban transitions, 1950-2025, world and major regions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>TFR</td>
<td>e0</td>
<td>Urban</td>
<td>TFR</td>
<td>e0</td>
<td>Urban</td>
<td>TFR</td>
<td>e0</td>
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<tr>
<td>World</td>
<td>5.02</td>
<td>46.4</td>
<td>29.0</td>
<td>3.92</td>
<td>60.2</td>
<td>37.2</td>
<td>2.65</td>
<td>66.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Africa</td>
<td>6.75</td>
<td>38.5</td>
<td>14.7</td>
<td>6.61</td>
<td>48.7</td>
<td>25.4</td>
<td>4.98</td>
<td>51.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asia</td>
<td>5.87</td>
<td>41.0</td>
<td>16.8</td>
<td>4.19</td>
<td>59.1</td>
<td>23.3</td>
<td>2.47</td>
<td>67.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europe</td>
<td>2.66</td>
<td>65.6</td>
<td>50.5</td>
<td>1.97</td>
<td>71.3</td>
<td>65.6</td>
<td>1.41</td>
<td>73.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latin and Caribbean</td>
<td>5.88</td>
<td>51.4</td>
<td>42.0</td>
<td>4.48</td>
<td>63.0</td>
<td>61.2</td>
<td>2.52</td>
<td>72.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North America</td>
<td>3.46</td>
<td>68.8</td>
<td>63.9</td>
<td>1.78</td>
<td>73.4</td>
<td>73.8</td>
<td>1.99</td>
<td>78.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oceania</td>
<td>3.87</td>
<td>60.4</td>
<td>62.0</td>
<td>2.73</td>
<td>67.9</td>
<td>71.5</td>
<td>2.37</td>
<td>74.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Total fertility rates (TFR) and expectation of life at birth (e0) are given as averages for the five-year period indicated. Urbanization (urban) levels are given for the start year.


The role of migration in these transitions is more problematic and no migration transition can be reduced to a few statistics as new destinations and sources of population movement have emerged and declined over the decades. At the highest level of generalization, a transition from economies of net emigration to economies of net immigration has been observed from countries in Europe to economies in East Asia, even if the data are often less than entirely convincing (see United Nations 2004). Clearly, too, the settler societies of the Americas and Australasia have pursued different paths. For long, their population growth rates were built upon international migration, but, there too, transitions occurred. In South America, international migrations essentially had dried up by the middle of the last century; in North America and Australasia, international migrations have persisted as sources of growth as absolute numbers of migrants increased and fertility
declined. The proportion of the foreign-born increased in the United States from 7.9 per cent in 1990 to 12.5 per cent in 2006, representing a virtual doubling in the total number of foreign-born over the period to 37.5 million, for example. However, emigration from those countries, too, is also important and the United States and Australia are significant, and probably increasing, sources of migrants to other parts of the world (Hugo 2006).

Yet, national patterns in these transitions are deceptive. Large cities as the centres of power, innovation and transnational trade are both the key expression and the drivers of these transitions. This brief paper will attempt to map how transitions in migration have been related to shifts in vital rates, urbanization and economic development.

**The first urban transition**

In pre-modern economies, when most people lived in rural areas and mortality was high, the populations of towns were sustained through migration. It was perhaps not until the end of the eighteenth century that towns in England became self-sustaining and contributors to, rather than consumers of, population growth (Chambers 1972). In the pre-industrial city, mortality among the generally young and unmarried migrant populations of towns was significant. That population was not reproducing itself and the urban sector was essentially reducing the rural populations. Where migration from surrounding rural areas was not sufficient to maintain urban populations, elites in the larger cities resorted to importing labour, often as slaves from more distant parts. These unfree workers, together with traders from other cities and perhaps soldiers recruited from marginal areas, created the multi-ethnic populations of early cities (McNeill 1986: 14).

The decline of mortality began in towns and urban growth began to increase, powered by three components: natural increase, or the excess of births over deaths; net migration, or the balance of people coming in to the city over those going out; and the expansion of urban boundaries, part of the reclassification of rural to urban areas. The relative balance of these components shifts over time, with the volume of migration as well as urban growth ultimately a function of fertility and mortality. By far the most problematic of the components is reclassification, which is normally included with net migration as there is normally no easy way to calculate the number of people added to a city during any period through the extension of urban boundaries. As will be seen in the conclusion, political units, cities and states expand their access to labour through extending their borders. In table 2, reclassification is included with net migration.
Table 2. Components of urban growth, 1960s to 1980s, selected regions and countries, mean values in percentages

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region/country</th>
<th>1960s</th>
<th>1970s</th>
<th>1980s</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Natural increase</td>
<td>Net migration</td>
<td>Natural increase</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Africa</td>
<td>54.5</td>
<td>45.6</td>
<td>59.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asia</td>
<td>55.1</td>
<td>44.9</td>
<td>56.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latin America</td>
<td>61.9</td>
<td>38.1</td>
<td>62.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>58.8</td>
<td>41.3</td>
<td>59.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Korea</td>
<td>39.7</td>
<td>60.3</td>
<td>43.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>42.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>51.7</td>
<td>48.3</td>
<td>52.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Amongst the present developing countries, the average contribution of migration to urban growth has remained constant at around 41 per cent, although considerable variation exists among regions and countries. In Africa, for example, the contribution of net migration declined over the two decades as high fertility contributed to the urban growth. In Asia, as fertility has declined markedly, especially in China, and economic growth accelerated attracting migrants to cities, the contribution of net migration increased. In Latin America, a gradual increase in the contribution of natural increase is observed over the two decades. These broad trends observed from the data have to be treated with a great deal of caution as inter-country variation, relative rates of urban growth and the absolute size of the populations involved all need to be taken into consideration. For example, it can be seen that Korea experienced a very significant contribution from migration during the 1960s when its urban population was growing at over 6 per cent per annum. Numbers employed in manufacturing in Seoul metropolitan area quadrupled during the 1960s, with household income in Seoul tripling between 1965 to 1970 alone (Mills and Song 1979). The population of Seoul increased from 2.4 million in 1960 to 5.3 million in 1970, 8.2 million in 1980 and 9.9 million in 2000. The contribution made by net migration to Seoul's growth was between 74 and 78 per cent in the decade of the 1960s, declining to 54 to 60 per cent during the period 1970-85 (Kim, Kim and Son, 1991: 11). By the 1970s, the population of the rural areas of Korea was declining by -1.45 per cent per annum, a decline that accelerated to -3.63 per cent per annum in the 1980s. Hence, the reduction of the contribution of net migration to urban growth in the case of Korea could be expected even in the face of
sharply declining fertility from 5.63 in the early 1960s through 4.3 in the early 1970s to 2.2 in the early 1980s and 1.7 in the early 1990s.

Although the data for Korea appear logical, the figures for other countries might seem contradictory. For example, the contribution that migration makes to Thailand’s urban growth is shown to have declined from the decade of the 1970s to the 1980s at exactly the time that Bangkok was growing rapidly with GNP per capita more than doubling between 1985 and 1995 and numbers employed in manufacturing increasing by over half (Phongpaichit and Baker 1996: 3). This anomaly can be explained by the underbounding of Thailand’s urban places, and Bangkok in particular. Most of the migration to Bangkok associated with the economic boom took place to areas on the periphery of the urban area that were still classified as rural and hence the basic data for urban Thailand cannot capture the real relative contributions of migration and natural increase. Fertility in Thailand declined from 6.4 in the early 1960s through 5.0 in the early 1970s, 2.9 in the early 1980s to 2.0 in the early 1990s, almost mirroring the decline in Korea but a few years later.

Guided by the available if inadequate data, and speculating far beyond their capability, a simple model of a first urban transition can be proposed. Initially, when urban populations are small compared with the number of rural dwellers, the growth of cities is dominated by high mortality and net migration, and particularly the migration of young men. As mortality declines and with increasing participation of women in internal migration flows, the reproductive capability of cities expands and the contribution of natural increase rises. The earlier internal migrations of women tend to be to accompany or follow spouses or other close family members but as service activities expand and light, labour-intensive industries become established, the migration of women independent of husbands, brothers or fathers gathers importance. The incorporation of women into education and the labour force acts to lower fertility in urban areas, and urban fertility is generally lower than rural fertility. The contribution of net migration to urban growth rises, although it is only in the fastest growing economies that it dominates as a component of urban growth. As the proportion of the population urban in any country increases, so, too, does the proportion of the migration that originates in the urban sector. Internal migrations within a country become mainly within the urban sector, leaving natural increase as the dominant component, as seems to be the case in Latin America at present. At the global level, the faster than anticipated decline in fertility from the 1970s onwards must have been a major factor in explaining why projections for many city populations that were made from the mid-1970s to the late 1980s consistently overestimated the actual 2000 populations (Satterthwaite 2007: 67-69).
The second urban transition

Once the proportion urban in any population is in excess of 70 per cent, the first urban transition can be said to be over. Nevertheless, this situation does not imply some indefinite stasis; the process of change continues but in directions that are still largely unknown and with elements that make the process of change different from that which occurred before. The qualitative and quantitative differences may justify the term "second urban transition". Coleman (2006) has argued for a "third demographic transition" to describe the processes currently being experienced by the most developed countries of the world. The first demographic transition is from high to low mortality and fertility, which brings about a phase of rapid population growth because of the lag between the onset of fertility compared to the onset of mortality decline. The second demographic transition (van de Kaa 1987) characterizes those societies that have reached very low levels of fertility and mortality, have ageing populations and are entering a phase of population decline. For example, as early as 1998, the United Nations listed 33 countries that were projected to decline in population between 2000 and 2050 from 796 million to 669 million people. On the other hand, the United Nations also listed 15 countries, overwhelmingly in sub-Saharan Africa and covering 182 million people in 2000, that had not embarked upon the first demographic transition by 2000.

The third demographic transition, according to Coleman, is based upon persistent low fertility and leads to high immigration from distant areas, which itself leads to the ethnic diversification of the population. The transition can be said to begin when the once majority group in any population declines to below 50 per cent of that population. While Coleman nuances his provocative argument in several ways, a dimension missing from the discussion is the role of the city: Coleman examines only national data. However, it is argued in this paper that the cities are the driving force of this transition and the relative roles of internal and international migration to cities may provide a better benchmark for the onset for the transition. Hence, the idea of a second urban transition better captures the nature of the processes of change, but it also adds weight to the transition that Coleman describes.

In the United Kingdom, the 2001 census showed that 45.7 per cent of the ethnic minority population was concentrated in London, where 29 per cent of the population, or some 2.2 million people, was made up of minorities (UK 2002). Of the social and linguistic groups that could be identified in London as non-indigenous, some fifty communities had populations of 10,000 or more and over 300 languages were identified as spoken by the residents of the city. The proportion of the foreign-born, as opposed to ethnic groups, living in London, according to the 2001 census was 27.1 per cent, with 40 per cent of the UK's foreign-born living in the Metropolitan London Area (MPI 2008b).
The second most important concentration of the foreign-born in the UK was the West Midlands, which contains the city of Birmingham, with 13.9 per cent of its population foreign-born. In comparison, some 36 per cent of New York's population was foreign-born in 2000, representing 2.9 million people, again with a high degree of diversity in origin (New York 2004). Tokyo, another so-called "global city" (Sassen 1991) may only have about 2.4 per cent of its population foreign-born (Benton-Short and Price 2005).

This is certainly not to say that international migrants are to be found solely in metropolitan areas. In the United States, those states showing the most rapid increase in the number of foreign born are far from major metropolitan areas, states such as South Carolina, Nevada or Georgia (MPI 2008a). Agricultural workers in many parts of the United States and those employed in certain activities such as Chinese restaurants in the UK, for example (Baker 1994), are found in rural areas and small towns, but the vast majority of immigrants are concentrated in the main cities. Here, the clear distinction between the settler societies in the Americas and Australasia needs to be drawn. In Europe, international migration was not entirely absent during the first urban transition but it tended to be relatively small compared with the number of internal migrants to the major cities and was weighted towards either a transnational elite or selected groups fleeing persecution. In the settler societies, international migration always played an important role and, at times, the dominant role in urban growth. Yet, the differences can be overdrawn. As cities in Europe relied on migrants from within the state, the settler societies drew on sources constrained by history and policy to very particular international origins. The fundamental characteristic of the international flows in the second transition that applies to both settler and non-settler societies alike is their heterogeneity. The second urban transition appears to be returning the city to the "poly-ethnic norm", as described by McNeill (1986) for pre-modern cities.
Table 3. Japan, total population, selected age distribution and numbers of internal migrants, 1970-2005

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Total population (in 000s)</th>
<th>Population 20-34 years (in 000s)</th>
<th>Percentage of age group 20-34 years</th>
<th>Internal migrants</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Intra-prefectural</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>103,720</td>
<td>28,121</td>
<td>27.1</td>
<td>4,037,503</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>117,060</td>
<td>27,654</td>
<td>23.6</td>
<td>3,710,931</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>123,611</td>
<td>24,659</td>
<td>19.9</td>
<td>3,350,450</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>125,570</td>
<td>26,809</td>
<td>21.3</td>
<td>3,582,529</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>126,926</td>
<td>26,988</td>
<td>21.3</td>
<td>3,333,206</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>127,768</td>
<td>25,386</td>
<td>19.9</td>
<td>2,999,912</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The second urban transition is driven by very low levels of fertility that would ultimately lead to the decline of the native urban populations. In addition, however, there is the draining of the pool of potential rural-to-urban migrants in the rural sector that supplied the cities with labour, in the case of Europe, and of the pool of potential migrants in Europe itself, in the cases of the Americas and Australasia. In these areas of origin, the demographic transition had progressed to very low levels of fertility where the populations were not replacing themselves.

The development associated with urbanization has shifted populations from rural to urban. To take Japan as an example, between 1947 and 1990 some 28 million new jobs in industrial areas were created but 13 million in agriculture and forestry were lost (Totman 2000: 472). Over this period, the rural population of Japan had been drained to the extent that virtually half of the total land area was classified as "severely depopulating" by the 1990s (figure 1). Some 40 per cent of Japan's rural population and over 60 per cent of its farmers are currently over 65 years of age. Japan's fertility had fallen below replacement level by 1960 and the number of young adults, who are those most likely to migrate, has been declining since 1970. Nationally, the number of young adults 20-34 years old in 2005 was almost 10 per cent fewer than in 1970. The number of internal migrants in Japan has also steadily decreased over recent decades, from 4.0 million intra-prefectural migrants in 1970 to just under 3 million in 2005. The number of interprefectural migrants fell even more sharply from 4.2 million interprefectural migrants in 1970 to 2.6 million in 2005. In 2005, more migrants moved within prefectures than between prefectures, suggesting that internal migration in Japan is increasingly made up of residential shifts within metropolitan areas. The similar draining of Korea's rural population can be seen in the extension of
the severely depopulating rural areas in the 1980s compared with the 1970s (figures 2 and 3).

The conclusion seems inescapable: the supply of that "ultimate resource", population, from internal sources is decreasing and, if the cities are to maintain their growth and demographic dynamism, other strategies will be required. Of course, a reduction in population may not necessarily be negative for the urban future but, in a competitive globalizing world, labour shortages, and specifically skilled labour shortages, appear to characterize the global city. A central part of any second urban transition is the extension of the migration fields overseas and the substitution of internal migration and natural increase with international migration. Yet, both Japan and Korea have resisted pressures to import large numbers of foreign workers, even if the numbers in Korea have virtually doubled from 217,384 in 1999 to 423,597 in 2004, although the increase for Japan was much more modest from 670,000 to 800,000 foreign workers (Skeldon 2006b). No Asian economy currently allows large numbers of immigrants to settle. Hence, the second urban transition, unlike the first, is subject to much more policy intervention and likely to take divergent forms. A critical dimension in the process will be the role of metropolitan government relative to national government. Immigration is a national concern but authorities providing services for immigrants and those areas requiring labour are likely to be local.

The second urban transition is the urban counterpart of the "migration turnaround", in which countries shift from being economies of net emigration to economies of net immigration (Abella 1994). In southern Europe, Spain, Portugal, Italy and Greece have all gone through this shift from emigration to immigration in recent decades and, in Asia, Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and increasingly Malaysia and Thailand, appear to be following suit though often not in a neat and tidy way. For example, see the results of some of the work summarized in Skeldon (2006b), and also Fielding (2004) and King, Fielding and Black (1997). A shift from net emigration to net immigration does not imply that outmigration from a country ceases. In fact, theoretically, outmigration could increase in tandem with the greater increases in immigration. The outmigration continues as skilled nationals move overseas as part of global corporate expansion, governmental and non-governmental development aid programmes or simply to compete in global markets. For example, the United Kingdom has a similar proportion of its population overseas to countries more commonly associated with emigration such as Mexico or the Philippines, even if the types of emigrants are quite different (see Sriskandarajah and Drew 2006). In absolute terms, the United Kingdom has more skilled workers overseas than any other country (Docquier and Marfouk 2006: 175). Much of this global movement is circular, of longer or shorter duration, and originates in the largest cities of the countries of origin.
Perhaps the most critical question relates to how far the second urban transition will go. The first demographic transition does appear to be a universal pattern, even if pathways through the transition vary. However, it does seem unlikely that the second urban transition can come to be universally diffused, although all areas will be linked in one way or another to one or more metropolitan centres. Global cities will only evolve at relatively few points in a global urban hierarchy: some areas will emerge as points of global and regional attraction and other areas will depopulate. Any boundary between "developed" and "developing" is constantly changing towards an enlargement in the number of the former and a reduction in the number in the latter category. Those countries most likely to experience a second urban transition are likely to be found in Asia, such as China, India, Malaysia or Thailand, but can be expected in other parts of the world, too, perhaps South Africa, Brazil or Mexico. Hence, cities at specific locations in the developing world are likely to emerge as labour-deficit. It might seem strange to argue that the demographic giant, China, might experience labour shortages. Nevertheless, two million job vacancies have already been reported in the southeast coastal region of China in 2004 (Economist, 9-15 October 2004) and labour shortages spread north into the Yangtze River and the north coastal region in 2005 (Wang, Cai and Gao 2005). To an extent, these shortages reflect bottlenecks in the internal labour market within China for certain types of labour, but more recent evidence suggests that the shortages may be as much structural as cyclical.

China's accession to the World Trade Organization and programmes to diffuse development more widely into the interior have created opportunities closer to the areas of origin of internal migrants. The result has been severe labour shortages in coastal regions and increases of around 25 per cent in the basic wage in Shenzhen, for example (International Herald Tribune, 3 March 2006). China will not yet be seeking to import workers from overseas, but already the era of cheap labour in China appears to be ending. China, like the other developed economies in Asia, has seen a precipitous decline in fertility from 4.9 children per woman in the early 1970s to 1.7 in the period 2000 to 2005, and United Nations (2007) projections envisage China's population starting to decline after 2030. That decline will ultimately lead to a slower growth in labour force and, if China follows the Japanese pattern, to a slowing in internal migration. The possibility that rural areas will be drained of their population might seem far-fetched given current levels of unemployment and underemployment in rural China. Nevertheless, the speed of economic growth and social transformation in that vast country has been astonishing and, if the current growth continues, and that in itself is a big if, it is surely not inconceivable that pressures to import labour may emerge in certain cities within a generation.
However, clearly, not all cities or countries in the developing world will necessarily follow one pattern. Although a case has been made for a second urban transition in East Asia, with the exception of Singapore where the proportion of migrants parallels those of London and New York, no economy even remotely approaches these levels. Tokyo and Seoul in the most advanced economies in the region, have around 2 per cent of their populations foreign-born (GUM 2008). Multiculturalism in these countries, despite some trends in that direction (Douglass and Roberts 2000; Douglass and Kim 1997), appears to have a long way to go and not one "hyperdiverse" city yet exists outside Europe or North America (Price and Benton Short 2007). Nevertheless, it cannot be discounted that the decline in urban and rural fertility in East Asia observed above will act as a driver through a second urban transition in Asia too.

It is much more difficult is to envisage a second transition in parts of the world less developed than Asia and there the pathways will indeed be different. Where towns were introduced as administrative centres by external powers with linkages back to metropolitan areas that were stronger than to their immediate hinterlands, different patterns are likely to emerge. The fragility of post-independence economies in Africa, for example, has not allowed many of the urban areas to develop a strong production base and they remain mainly centres of extraction or administration. The economic and political crises of the 1970s and early 1980s saw rural-urban income differences contract, migration to the cities slowed and a significant number of migrants returned to rural areas in countries such as Ghana (Songsore 2003:112; Potts 1995). Nevertheless, in Ghana, high rates of natural increase in the towns, together with the reduced migration, still brought about a slow increase in the level of urbanization through this period. It rose from 29 per cent in 1970 to 32.9 per cent in 1985. In recent years, improving economic performance in Ghana saw annual GDP growth per capita increase. The average for the period 1975 to 2003 was only 0.4 per cent per annum, whereas that increased to an average of 1.8 per cent per annum for the last part of that period, in 1990-2003 (UNDP 2005: 268). Ghana's level of urbanization was estimated to have reached 47.8 per cent by 2005 (United Nations 2006) and its fertility had declined to 4.39 children per woman by that year. This figure was high by Asian standards, but it was down by some 34 per cent since the mid-1970s and it was less than the average for Africa of 4.97.

With fertility still high throughout Africa, but urbanization levels also increasing, the question must be the extent to which the continued concentration of population in towns is sustainable in the context of levels of economic growth that are low at best. The annual average growth in per capita GDP between 1990 and 2003 for sub-Saharan countries as a whole was 0.1 per cent, and for the period 1975-2003 was negative at -0.7 per cent.
(UNDP 2005). In this context, Ghana is one of the better performers, but for many countries the urbanization is based on very weak foundations. A reversal of migration in a period of economic downturn, as seen in the 1980s, is certainly a possibility, with any continued growth of towns largely based on natural increase. Political difficulties in Somalia and Zimbabwe have contributed to declines in the populations of Mogadisho and Harare. However, given the demand for labour in other parts of the world as discussed above, it is possible, given the fragility of the migration fields in many of these countries, that the internal movements develop into international movements. While this conclusion is purely speculative at this stage, such an outcome would represent the origin side of the migration equation in the second urban transition.

These migrations need not be primarily directed towards the cities in the present most developed parts of the world, although some will be, but they will also be targeted at the new centres emerging in Asia, the Middle East and in parts of Africa itself. Again, international migration substitutes for internal migration. Any such transition in migration need not simply be from the towns to destinations in other countries, that is, internal migrants moving into unemployment in local towns and then moving on to seek jobs in another country in a stepwise progression. Some movements will evolve directly from rural origins to international destinations, as observed in some countries in Asia (Skeldon 2006a). In this way, many towns in the periphery of the developing world may become short-circuited from their hinterland in the second urban transition and enter a period of stagnant growth, particularly as fertility declines.

The simple model sketched above was based primarily on the Eurasian experiences in areas of long-established urban and rural settlement. Variants of the scenarios were suggested for those areas of European settlement. There, long-distance, rural-to-urban and urban-to-urban migrations to cities in distant lands were typical. These migrations were international even though many occurred within colonial structures. The cities in destination areas were essentially conduits for the migration. Many migrants remained within these cities themselves but many others transited through to smaller towns or rural areas. Hence, in such cases, a simple transition from internal to international migrations is inappropriate and more complex shifts among international, internal and international movements that are closely linked and in which the changing ethnic composition of the flows is significant need to be developed. More measured reflection will also surely allow the revelation of other pathways through the urban transitions but this discussion should have highlighted the importance of examining shifts between internal and international flows over time that are related to the universal shifts towards lower fertility and mortality and towards more urban societies.
Conclusion
This paper has argued for a major shift in the patterns of urban growth since about 1990 that have come about, not just through changes in fertility but in patterns of migration that make up what has been called a second urban transition. The catchment areas of the largest cities in the developed world have expanded outwards: international migration has substituted for internal migration as domestic sources have disappeared. The populations of cities have returned to a poly-ethnic pattern because of the more diverse origins of the migrants. This does not mean that, over the long term, international migration will be able to sustain the continued demographic growth of the cities. Persistent low fertility is likely to ensure slow, or even gradually declining, population growth of even the largest cities. As in the case of states as a whole, replacement migration for births averted implies too large a number of immigrants over the long term to be socially or politically acceptable (United Nations 2001).

Perhaps a more efficient way to facilitate migration, akin to the extension of urban boundaries that is such a methodological problem in the components of urban growth and discussed earlier in the paper, is to expand the catchment area for internal migration across international boundaries. In this case, what would have been international migration becomes de facto internal migration, further blurring any meaningful distinction between internal and international migration. The expansion of the European Union is perhaps the most notable example. Net migration into the EU in 2003 was around 950,000 per annum (Salt 2005: 26). On 1 May 2004, the EU accepted 10 new accession states, with a combined population of some 70 million who became international migrants to Europe without having to move. Not all will want to move domestically within the EU, but all, sooner or later, will be free to do so as internal migrants, and many will migrate to the most dynamic cities in Europe. However, these states themselves are well into the second demographic transition and cannot be expected to supply labour indefinitely. Some, such as Poland, are already importing labour from countries further east, thus diffusing the transition further outwards. More widely, we may expect to see similar enlargements in other parts of the world in which new political geographies emerge that facilitate the movement of peoples to the most dynamic urban centres.

All the transitions discussed, demographic, urban and migration, were part of the economic development that began in Europe from the mid-eighteenth century and have diffused to other parts of the world. The spatial extension and pathways through the transitions have been highly variable and not all areas will be uniformly affected. In particular, only a relatively few areas will emerge as major destinations of migration and these will be the major metropolitan cities. The number of cities of 10 million inhabitants or more increased from two in 1950 to 20 in 2005 but is projected to add only another
two by 2015 (United Nations 2006). While multi-polar, extended metropolitan regions or corridors are likely to be more prevalent than single large urban centres, these regions of attraction are, nevertheless, likely to be limited in number, although the majority will be in the developing world. Seventeen of the 22 cities with populations of 10 million or more projected for 2015 will be in the area presently defined as the developing world. However, large parts of the developing world, too, as well as whole swaths of the rural areas of the present developed economies, will enter a phase of long-term demographic decline with the virtual depopulation of large areas. Not all the present states will remain viable, demographically or economically, through the twenty-first century.

Global migration since World War II has been characterized by movements governed much more by policy than the migrations that preceded that time (Hatton and Williamson 2005). As we move through the second urban transition, that policy may become as concerned with the creation of spaces in which people can move freely as with those policies that regulate migration from one political space to another. The role of metropolitan as well as national and multi-state governments will be central to this development. Quite what form the linkages will take, or which new political spaces will emerge, remains an important area for research that brings together demographic, economic and political development.

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From Migration to Increased Mobility: The Blurring of the Rural-Urban Divide in Many Low and Middle-Income Nations

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SSRC Migration & Development Conference Paper No. 24

Introduction
In 2008, for the first time in history, half of the world’s population is expected to live in urban areas. Despite prevailing perceptions, rural-urban migration is not always the main factor behind this fundamental change in the spatial distribution of population. Natural increase (the excess of births over deaths) contributes an increasing share of the growth of urban populations. This is an established tendency in highly urbanized regions such as Latin America and the Caribbean, and a growing one in Africa and Asia, despite the limited availability of long-term estimates in these two regions (United Nations, 2006b).

At the same time, temporary mobility has increased as part of a general trend towards income diversification in both rural and urban areas. This, in turn, has both positive and negative consequences. On the one hand, it strengthens the links between rural and urban development and allows households to accumulate assets and reduce their vulnerability. On the other hand, it can increase social polarisation and the marginalisation of groups that may lose their already limited access to assets. A better understanding of the causes and impacts of mobility is essential at both national and local levels, as is a redefinition of citizenship rights and of who is entitled to participate in local governance systems.

Economic growth, urbanization and rural-urban migration: changing perceptions
‘Development’ is a complex and contested concept. Nonetheless, economic growth still explicitly or implicitly underpins it. This can be summed up as the increase of the share of GDP contributed by industry and services, which employ a growing proportion of the workforce. At the same time, subsistence (and small-scale) farming gives way to mechanised agribusiness systems assumed to be more efficient and increase worker productivity. Part and parcel of this model is substantial population movement, as the ‘surplus’ peasantry joins the urban-based industrial and service labour force.
Urbanization (the increase in the proportion of the total population living in centres classed as urban) is thus a positive transition that reflects the transformation of the economic base. Cities are important drivers of overall economic development, and historically, countries with high rates of economic growth have also had rapid increases in their levels of urbanization. Especially in nations with low initial levels of urbanization, rural-urban migration plays a major role in transforming the distribution of the population, as people move to places where economic opportunities are concentrated.

Despite these positive associations, rural-urban migration has come to be seen as a problem by policy-makers in rapidly urbanizing nations. In sub-Saharan Africa, cities have been described as a major cause of economic and social problems (World Bank, 2000). A review of PRSPs in the continent shows that migration is only mentioned in negative terms, as placing pressure on urban areas, promoting the spread of crime and HIV/AIDS, stimulating land degradation and reinforcing both rural and urban poverty (Black et al., 2006). Policies restricting or preventing rural-urban movement have become increasingly popular among policy-makers (United Nations, 2006) although in most instances their main result has been to increase both rural and urban poverty, without significantly stemming migration.

In summary, from a positive view of urbanization as an essential component of economic – but also social and cultural - transformation, the prevailing perception is now one where urban growth more often than not equals the growth of urban poverty and of slums inhabited by poor rural-urban migrants.

Rural-urban migration as a problem: some misconceptions
How did such radical change in perceptions occur? In part, it is a consequence of the widespread view that poverty in low-income nations is essentially rural. While this is true in many cases and especially where the majority of the population live in rural areas (as in many low-income countries), the scale of urban poverty in low and middle-income nations is growing rapidly (Satterthwaite, 2007; UNFPA, 2007; United Nations, 2008).

A related misconception is that the increase of urban poverty is mainly the result of rural-urban migrants who move because of rural poverty. In much of sub-Saharan Africa, however, the rural-urban gap in incomes and access to services has shrunk dramatically in the 1980s and 1990s with the implementation of structural adjustment policies, which have disproportionately affected urban populations (Jamal and Weeks, 1993). Even in countries with rapid economic growth rates such as China, where overall rural poverty has been declining, industrial restructuring has
resulted in growing numbers of urban poor (Solinger, 2004; Wang, 2004). Urban poverty is in most cases exacerbated by the failure of national and municipal governments to provide acceptable levels of infrastructure and services to low-income urban groups, rather than by rural-urban migration.

Limited data and information also greatly contribute to misconceptions. The relatively widespread view that throughout the 1990s Africa’s urbanization occurred without economic growth (Fay and Opal, 2000) fails to account for the limited availability and reliability of census data. Indeed, the analysis is very much based on figures of urbanization derived from earlier censuses, when social and economic conditions were very different and rapid urbanization levels related largely to the formation of new independent states (Kessides, 2005; Satterthwaite, 2007).

More solid evidence shows that in the 1990s, levels of urbanization in much of Africa fell following widespread economic decline, as impoverished urban populations returned to rural settlements (Potts, 2006; Potts and Mutambirwa, 1998). Where urban growth rates (but not urbanization levels) have remained high, this has been mostly because of high rates of natural increase (Beauchemin and Bocquier, 2004).

Moreover, there is ample evidence that rural-urban migrants are usually better educated and have more economic and social resources than people who stay in the rural areas. Indeed, unless they are actively discriminated against by policies that limit their access to housing and basic services (such as the household registration systems in China and Vietnam, or the apartheid system in South Africa up to the 1990s), there is no evidence that migrants are worse-off than non-migrants (Beauchemin and Bocquier, 2004; Montgomery et al., 2004).

Nor is there evidence that rural-urban migrants are the main group of residents of informal settlements and slums in the periphery of many large cities in low and middle-income nations. The expulsion of long-term residents from the inner city to the periphery is a major on-going process in many urban centres, especially the economically successful ones where central areas are taken over by financial districts, high-income residential gated communities and commercial centres.

But perhaps the most misleading – and pervasive – misconception is that most internal migrants in low and middle-income nations move from rural to urban areas, and do so, on a permanent basis. This is far from being the case: to a large extent, the direction of migration flows reflects a country’s level of urbanization and its economic base. Hence, rural-rural migration is prevalent in agriculture-based economies, whereas urban-urban movement is more important in urbanized regions, and rural-urban migration is high in areas
with relatively low levels of urbanization but high levels of economic growth and a growing non-farm sector such as China and Southeast Asia in the past few decades. But what is important is that a significant share of this movement is temporary – effectively, it may be more accurate to describe it as mobility rather than migration.

**Mobility: recent and current trends and their determinants**

Circular and temporary movements tend to elude national statistics, but their growing significance is documented by a wealth of recent research. In many cases, people move from rural homes to urban (or peri-urban, especially in Asia) destinations for varying periods of time (usually a few months at a time), especially during the agricultural slack season. Movement is often motivated by emerging employment opportunities in non-farm sectors: in Asia and Southeast Asia these include export manufacturing (Guest, 1998; Rigg, 2003) and construction (Hoang et al., 2005). Good transport and road networks and relatively cheap communications have greatly aided this type of mobility. Research in China documents the high levels of mobility of workers in the export manufacturing industry, suggesting that it may be the result of poor working and living conditions and low salaries (Zhu, 2007) – but also of the need to maintain a foothold in the rural homes, especially where access to land depends on local residential registration (Ping and Pieke, 2003). The need for a rural safety net is arguably exacerbated by the poor wages and conditions of migrants in the cities.

Circular migration between rural areas, especially from drought-prone regions to areas of irrigated agriculture, has long been a traditional coping strategy. In India, sixty percent of the 20 million people estimated to migrate temporarily each year move between rural areas. However, there are signs that this may be changing and, as a result of both agricultural mechanisation and industrialisation, temporary migration seems to be increasingly directed towards urban centres and non-farm occupations (Deshingkar, 2005). In West Africa, temporary movement between drought-prone areas of the Sahel and the coastal regions has long been an essential component of livelihoods in the drylands, but also a key element of the development of cash crops such as coffee and cocoa in the wetter coastal forest zones.

Maintaining a rural home is often crucial for migrants in the cities, even those who stay for long periods of time. This has been well documented in sub-Saharan Africa, where investment in rural homes, land and livestock has provided essential safety nets against urban economic stagnation and insecurity, and supported urban-rural movement during the difficult 1990s decade (Krüger, 1998; Potts and Mutambirwa, 1998). In Africa as in China and in many other locations, keeping a foothold in rural home areas is especially important for unskilled, low-paid migrants who have to rely on
fluctuating incomes and live in accommodation often lacking security of tenure and with limited access to basic services.

Temporary movement is a way to take advantage of economic opportunities in different locations and at different times. Put differently, it is a way to reduce risks associated with specific activities or locations.

**Mobility as a livelihood strategy**

Several conceptual frameworks developed in the 1990s point to the crucial importance of access (or entitlements) to assets (or capitals) in determining how people construct their livelihoods (Bebbington, 1999; Moser, 1998). Mobility, and the greater options for the diversification of income sources it offers, is essentially a strategy to increase access to assets.

Detailed empirical studies of the livelihood strategies of poor and non-poor, rural and urban-based groups have shown how income diversification and mobility are increasingly important in most contexts (Bah et al., 2003; Baker, 1995; Rigg, 2003). An important distinction that emerges from this work is that between strategies that lead to the accumulation of assets, and strategies that only ensure the survival of those who undertake them.

There is also widespread agreement on the importance of the diversification of income sources in reducing vulnerability and in some cases helping people to move out of poverty. Some research suggests that when opportunities for income diversification are available locally – for example, non-farm jobs located in small towns that allow local residents to combine them with farming – levels of out-migration tend to be lower and the benefits for the poorest groups (who are often less mobile) tend to be higher (Beauchemin and Schoumaker, 2005; Hoang et al., 2008).

Mobility as a form of income diversification also helps to understand how household strategies often build on cross-sectoral investments. For example, farmers in the rural settlements of Vietnam’s Red River Delta move temporarily to Hanoi and other urban centres to work in the construction industry during the agricultural slack season. These earnings are then re-invested in agricultural intensification and diversification, which in turn responds to growing demand from domestic urban markets (Hoang et al., 2005). Similarly, remittances from urban-based relatives are the key to the ability of West Africa’s family farmers to respond to urban demand for high-value foodstuffs – which in turn increases their incomes (Tiffen, 2003).

In summary, a growing proportion of rural and urban households in low and middle-income countries construct their livelihoods from a diversity of income sources, often in several different locations. These multi-activities, multi-local
strategies are usually highly effective in enabling households to increase or maintain their asset base and thus reduce their vulnerability.

Accumulation or survival strategies? The importance of factors that are not related to mobility

The positive process of asset accumulation described in the section above is not inevitable, however. Often, it is weakened by the lack of support from policies that are still rigidly divided along sectoral lines. To name but a few, agricultural policies explicitly or implicitly favour large-scale, commercial production systems (and globally, agribusiness increasingly dominates this sector) over small-scale family farming – despite the latter’s demonstrated ability to respond to changes in domestic demand far more effectively. And national strategies for economic growth in most countries rely on the concentration of manufacturing units, but often overlook the need for adequate provision of basic services for the migrant workers they inevitably attract.

The process of asset accumulation is also not unproblematic – in many instances, it is accompanied by growing social polarization and increased competition for resources. In turn, this stimulates out-migration. Perhaps the most important aspect determining whether mobility is part of an accumulation or a survival strategy is access to assets, especially security of land and housing tenure.

Inequalities in access to assets cut between income and class/caste groups, but also within households. The growing number of young women migrating independently in many parts of the world is in part a response to rapidly growing demand for their labour in industry and services. It is also, however, a consequence of the fact that, in many rural areas, they are expected to provide free labour on the family farm but are excluded from inheriting it (Bah et al., 2003). Moreover, especially for poor households, socio-cultural expectations make female family members far more reliable senders of remittances (internal and international) than their male counterparts. While this makes independent female migration more culturally and socially acceptable than it ever was, it often comes at a cost, as women may forsake safe accommodation and health expenditure on themselves while they are away (Afsar, 2003).

There is also evidence that women heading their households are more likely to move away from rural settlements and to urban centres because they often lose their rights to land following separation or the death of their spouse (Baker, 1995; Bradshaw, 1995). While these households – and especially the children living in them – are not worse off than male-headed households
(Chant, 2007), the widespread gender bias in access to land is a serious obstacle to women’s ability to take advantage of multi-local assets.

The impact of climate change and environmental degradation on migration patterns is another growing concern. Mobility is essentially an adaptation strategy, and temporary migration has long been associated to events such as droughts (Black, 2001). As these are bound to become both more frequent and more severe, it is likely that migration patterns will also need to undergo radical transformations. Vulnerability to climate change is invariably linked to poverty (both rural and urban), and this will affect the composition of the flows, their destinations and their impacts on sending and destination areas. But whether migration can be a successful adaptation by poor groups to the increasing frequency and intensity of extreme weather events provoked by climate change depends largely on the policy context.

**Some issues for policy-relevant research**

Mobility and income diversification are increasingly important for rural and urban, poor and non-poor groups in most low and middle income nations. Strong links between rural and urban development are also crucial for equitable local and national development. At the same time, however, mobility and income diversification can, and often do, result in increasing social polarization. The nature and trends of these transformations vary between and within regions and nations as they are determined by multiple location-specific factors.

Research and policy-making need to reflect this level of local specificity and avoid generalizations. At the national level, for example, the spatial impact of policies and strategies such as land tenure systems, infrastructure development, agricultural production and industrial growth on specific groups is all too often overlooked. Hence, while local understanding and action are essential, they cannot make much difference without support from national planning and policy-making.

At the same time, the capacity (and financial resources) of local governments to deal with emerging issues is very limited- and, in many cases, so is their accountability. This is not a purely ‘technical’ issue. It involves understanding and addressing the economic, social (and cultural) re-alignments that result in shifts of power between groups – including processes of social polarization and marginalisation. Local governance systems that include civil society as well as local governments can best do this.

This, in turn, means addressing the issue of how to re-define citizenship rights and participation in governance systems in a context of high mobility.
Especially at the local level, citizenship is most often based on being a resident of a specific administrative-political territorial entity. For powerful groups, maintaining representation and power in home areas where they do not reside has never been a major problem. For growing numbers of poor and lower-middle income households and individuals, however, spreading their assets in different locations, including ones that are not their main residence, is critical for sustaining safety nets and reducing their vulnerability. The redefinition of citizenship rights in the context of higher mobility is especially important for these groups – that include out-migrants but also, especially in areas with high levels of international out-migration, in-migrants from lower-income groups and poorer areas. Equally important, however, it is the inclusion in governance systems of poor non-migrants who do not benefit from remittances or income diversification, and in many instances can well be the main losers.

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