Remittances, Migration and Social Development

A Conceptual Review of the Literature

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GDP  gross domestic product
NELM  new economics of labour migration

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Summary
This paper reviews the empirical literature on the relationship between remittances and various dimensions of social development in the developing world within a broader conceptual framework of migration and development theory. Migration and remittances are generally part of risk-spreading and co-insurance livelihood strategies pursued by households and families. Migration and remittances also have the potential to improve well-being, stimulate economic growth and reduce poverty directly and indirectly, while their effects on inequality are much more ambiguous.

The significant empirical and theoretical advances that have been made over the past several decades highlight the fundamentally heterogeneous nature of migration-remittance-development interactions, as well as their contingency on spatial and temporal scales of analysis, which should forestall any blanket assertions on this issue. Notwithstanding their often considerable blessings for individuals, households and communities, migration and remittances are no panacea for solving more structural development problems. If states fail to implement general social and economic reform, migration and remittances are unlikely to contribute to nationwide sustainable development. Migrants and remittances can neither be blamed for a lack of development nor be expected to trigger takeoff development in generally unattractive investment environments. Therefore, policies aimed at increasing people’s welfare, creating functioning markets, improving social security and public services such as health and education are also likely to enhance the contribution that migration and remittances can make to social development.

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Résumé
Ce document passe en revue la littérature empirique sur la relation entre les envois de fonds des émigrés et les diverses dimensions du développement social dans les pays en développement dans le large cadre conceptuel de la migration et de la théorie du développement. L’émigration et les envois de fonds des émigrés font généralement partie des stratégies de diversification appliquées par les ménages et les familles pour réduire les risques et s’assurer collectivement contre la perte de moyens d’existence. Ils peuvent aussi améliorer les conditions de vie, stimuler la croissance économique et faire reculer la pauvreté directement et indirectement, alors que leurs effets sur l’inégalité sont beaucoup plus ambigus.

Les importantes avancées empiriques et théoriques qui ont été faites au cours des dernières décennies mettent en lumière la nature profondément hétérogène des interactions entre les envois de fonds des émigrés et le développement, ainsi que le fait qu'elles varient selon les grilles d’analyse spatio-temporelle choisies, ce qui devrait prévenir toute affirmation générale sur la question. Bien qu’ils présentent souvent des avantages considérables pour les individus, les ménages et les communautés, l’émigration et les envois de fonds ne sont pas une panacée aux problèmes structurels du développement. Si les États ne parviennent pas à mener à bien une réforme sociale et économique générale, l’émigration et les envois de fonds des émigrés ont peu de chances de contribuer à un développement national durable. On ne peut pas leur reprocher l’insuffisance du développement ni s’attendre à ce qu’ils relancent le développement lorsque les conditions sont généralement peu attrayantes pour les investisseurs. En conséquence, les politiques visant à améliorer les conditions d’existence de la population, à organiser le fonctionnement des marchés, à améliorer la sécurité sociale et les services publics dans des domaines tels que la santé et l’éducation sont aussi de nature à valoriser ce que la migration et les fonds envoyés par les émigrés apportent au développement social.
Resumen

En este documento se analiza la bibliografía empírica sobre la relación entre las remesas y las diversas dimensiones del desarrollo social en el mundo en desarrollo, en el contexto de un marco conceptual más amplio de migración y teoría del desarrollo. La migración y las remesas generalmente forman parte de las estrategias de dispersión del riesgo y aseguramiento compartido de la subsistencia que ponen en práctica los hogares y las familias. Igualmente, la migración y las remesas tienen el potencial de mejorar el bienestar, estimular el crecimiento económico y reducir la pobreza directa e indirectamente, si bien sus efectos sobre la desigualdad son mucho más ambiguos.

Los importantes avances empíricos y teóricos que se han registrado en las últimas décadas subrayan la naturaleza fundamentalmente heterogénea de las interacciones entre la migración, las remesas y el desarrollo, así como su dependencia de las dimensiones espaciales y temporales de análisis, por lo que no es posible hacer afirmaciones generales sobre este tema. No obstante los beneficios a menudo considerables que representan para las personas, los hogares y las comunidades, la migración y las remesas no son la panacea que ha de permitir resolver los problemas más estructurales de desarrollo. Si los estados no logran poner en marcha una reforma social y económica general, es poco probable que la migración y las remesas contribuyan al desarrollo sostenible de toda una nación. No puede culparse a los migrantes y las remesas por la falta de desarrollo, ni puede esperarse que sean los catalizadores del desarrollo en entornos de inversión generalmente poco atractivos. Por lo tanto, las políticas dirigidas a incrementar el nivel de bienestar de la población, a crear de mercados que funcionen y a mejorar la seguridad social y los servicios públicos como la salud y la educación, también pueden contribuir a mejorar el aporte que la migración y las remesas pueden hacer al desarrollo social.

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1. Introduction

In the past few years, there has been a remarkable renaissance in the interest in remittances. This interest has undoubtedly been triggered by a striking increase in remittance flows: after years of relative neglect, they have been rediscovered as a potential source of development finance. Remittances sent back to developing countries rose from $31.1 billion in 1990 to $76.8 billion in 2000 to no less than $167.0 billion in 2005. Registered remittances now amount to well over twice the amount of official development assistance and are 10 times higher than net private capital transfers to developing countries (Kapur and McHale 2003).

However, the current debate on migration, remittances and development suffers from a number of shortcomings. First of all, the current “remittance euphoria” often coincides with a certain perception that it concerns a “new” issue. However, any suggestion that the topic is new testifies to a striking level of amnesia of decades of prior research and policies on this issue. Lest we reinvent the wheel (Russell 2003), we should not lose sight of the findings from previous empirical research and policies on migration, remittances and development.

Second, there has been a one-sided focus on remittances and their direct economic consequences. Less systematic attention has been paid to the non-pecuniary consequences of remittances, such as their impact on health, education, gender, care arrangements and social structures and ethnic hierarchies in migrant communities and countries. There has also been less attention paid to the non-remittance-related impacts of migration, such as the role of migration and migrants in cultural and social change in origin societies (see also Levitt 1998).

Related to the two previous points is the observation that the recent empirical and policy literature on remittances has been poorly embedded in more general theoretical frameworks on migration and development. Many empirical studies have not been designed to test hypotheses and, even more important, make no reference to broader theoretical debates on migration and development at all. This renders the often conflicting findings from empirical studies difficult to interpret theoretically, when in fact they could be extremely useful in building more sophisticated theoretical frameworks that could account for the heterogeneity of migration-remittances-development interactions.

Adding to that, although migration research cuts across many academic disciplines, there is often very poor communication across disciplinary boundaries. For instance, the high level of synergy between the new economics of labour migration and livelihood approaches toward migration, remittances and development (see the next section) has largely gone unnoticed, whereas the combination of such perspectives could create significant empirical, disciplinary and theoretical cross-fertilization.

More fundamentally, and perhaps even more striking, is the almost total absence of a foundational debate in migration studies on what the concept of “development” actually means. While the concept of development is almost never explicitly defined, most approaches toward migration and development tend to be based on notions of development that focus on (gross) income indicators. Consequently, research on migration and development has been focusing on the impact of remittances on income growth and investments in productive enterprises, although there has been increasing attention paid to the effect of remittances on poverty alleviation and inequality.

This conventional focus is arbitrary, since remittances and, more generally, migration, impact on a wide range of societal issues beyond income. These may include their impact on income risks (rather than levels alone), income inequality, investments in human capital (for example, education), gender inequality, birth and death rates, ethnic relations, political change, the environment and so on. Migration impacts may also differ significantly across these various dimensions of social and economic change. Therefore, evaluating “the” impact of migration and remittances is far from straightforward, as this depends on which dimensions of socioeconomic change are considered as developmental and the relative weight attached to them. What is seen
as developmental, moreover, depends on the disciplinary, cultural and ideological perspectives of researchers and policy makers, who tend to project their own norms, preferences and expectations—for instance, on appropriate styles of consumption, housing and investments—onto the communities and societies that they study.

The focus on income growth is also peculiar because social and economic dimensions of development are fundamentally interrelated. Changes in social relations and the well-being and human capital of people also affect their productivity, freedom of choice and the capacity to participate in public debate, and vice versa. The influence of migrants on political reform in origin countries can also affect the general investment climate.

Sen (1999) offered a more comprehensive approach to development by conceiving it as the process of expanding the real freedoms that people enjoy. In order to operationalize these “freedoms”, Sen used the concept of human capability, which relates to the ability of human beings to lead lives they have reason to value and to enhance their substantive choices. The basic assumption here is that the expansion of human capabilities adds to the quality of people’s lives. Sen’s capabilities approach contrasts with narrower views of development that are largely, if not uniquely, restricted to income indicators (for example, gross national product per head) and material growth. His understanding of development includes elements such as social well-being, poverty alleviation, income inequality, gender equality and universal access to primary education, health care and meaningful employment.

Sen (1999) argued that income growth itself should not be the litmus test for development theorists, but instead the question of whether the capabilities of people to control their own lives have expanded. While acknowledging that incomes can have a high potential to contribute to the expansion of the real freedoms people enjoy, Sen maintained that the relationship between income and human development is by no means direct or automatic, making income indicators alone an inadequate indicator of the quality of people’s lives. He argued that freedom is central to the process of development for two reasons. First of all, there is the intrinsic importance of human freedoms as an objective of development, which has to be clearly distinguished from the obvious instrumental effectiveness of freedoms of different kinds in contributing to economic progress. Thus, the value of such freedoms should not only be judged by their income-generating capacity, but should first and foremost be seen as the principal ends of development in themselves (Sen 1999).

Applying such a broad view of human or social development to the remittance debate evokes the necessity of looking beyond income indicators, and also studying the multifaceted ways in which migration and remittances affect the well-being and capabilities of people in migrant-sending societies. This also points to the importance of looking not only at how remittances affect migrants and their families, but also how they affect sending communities and societies as a whole. How do remittances affect equity and inequality in social and economic opportunities within communities? Do remittances increase people’s capabilities to protect themselves from income shocks? How do remittances affect people not receiving them? Do some of the remittances indirectly accrue to them through investments and income multipliers, or do they instead deepen their poverty and exacerbate inequalities? How do remittances affect ethnic and gendered inequalities? What are the consequences for social reproduction and care regimes? And, finally, how do migration and remittances affect institutional change as well as the capabilities of people to participate in public debate in countries of origin?

This paper aims to review the empirical literature on the relationship between international remittances and various dimensions of social development in the developing world. Although the analysis focuses on international remittances, parallels are drawn with the literature on internal remittances when useful for the analysis. Because the paper looks at both the economic and non-economic (social, cultural and political) impacts of remittances, it draws on the

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1 I interpret “social” in its broader sense, that is, encompassing economic, cultural and political dimensions of change. Thus, the term “social” is not employed in opposition to “economic” because economic processes are seen as part of broader social processes.
relevant economic, sociological, anthropological, geographical and demographic literature. Because of the importance of scale issues, and to avoid ecological fallacies in applying inferences made on one level of analysis to another, the analysis distinguishes household/family, community/regional and national levels of analysis.

The remittance focus of this paper should not by any means suggest that migration does not affect development in ways other than through remittances. For instance, migration often has important effects on (transnational) identity, cultural change, social structures and political debate. In fact, the following analysis exemplifies that remittance impacts are seldom isolated from other migration impacts.

A second aim of this paper is to embed this review of the empirical literature into a broader framework of migration and development theory. In order to achieve this improved conceptual embedding of empirical research, and to facilitate the meaningful theoretical interpretation of the often conflicting findings from separate empirical studies, the paper first provides a brief historical overview of the theoretical debate on the issue of migration and development.

### 2. Migration, Remittances and Development: A Theoretical Overview

Although few scholars would deny the direct contribution of migration and remittances to the livelihoods and survival of families left behind, the extent to which migration and remittances can bring about sustained human development and economic growth in migrant-sending areas and countries is quite a different question. This issue has been the subject of heated debate over the past four decades, and it is possible to distinguish four periods in the post–Second World War thinking on migration and development. While “developmentalist” optimism dominated in the 1950s and 1960s, large-scale pessimism prevailed in the 1970s and 1980s. This changed with the emergence of more nuanced views in the 1990s and the current rediscovery of remittances, and the concomitant resurgence of optimism on migration and development in recent years (see table 1).

#### The migration optimists: Developmentalist and neoclassical views

In the developmentalist era of the 1950s and 1960s, it was widely assumed that, through a policy of large-scale capital transfer and industrialization, poor countries would be able to jump on the bandwagon of rapid economic development and modernization. In the same period, large-scale labour migration from developing to developed countries began to gain momentum. Many developing countries (such as the source countries of “guest workers” in the Mediterranean) became involved in the migration process amidst these expectations of the “dawning of a new era” (Papademetriou 1985:212). Governments of developing countries started to actively encourage emigration since they considered it as one of the principal instruments to promote national development.

Developmentalist “migration optimists” tend to think that migration leads to a North-South transfer of investment capital and accelerates the exposure of traditional communities to liberal, rational and democratic ideas, modern knowledge and education. From this perspective, (return) migrants are perceived as important agents of change, innovators and investors. The general expectation was that the flow of remittances—as well as the experience, skills and knowledge that migrants would acquire abroad before returning—would greatly help developing countries in their economic take-off.2 Return migrants were expected to invest large sums of money in enterprises in the country of origin. Interestingly, this optimistic view has recently experienced a renaissance, although it is now linked to (neo)liberal, rather than the state-centrist, visions of development policy that predominated in the 1950s and 1960s.

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Neoclassical economists also tend to see migration in a positive light. However, it is important to note that neoclassical migration theory has no place for remittances (Taylor 1999:65). Neoclassical advocates of the theoretical model of balanced growth perceive migration as a process that contributes to the optimal allocation of production factors for the benefit of all, in which the process of factor price equalization will lead to migration ceasing once wage levels are equal at both the origin and destination. From this perspective, the re-allocation of labour from rural, agricultural areas (within and across national boundaries) to urban, industrial sectors is considered as an essential prerequisite for economic growth and, hence, as an integral component of the whole development process (Todaro 1969:139). The free movement of labour—in an unconstrained market environment—is eventually expected to lead to the increasing scarcity of labour, which will then lead to a higher marginal productivity of labour and increasing wage levels in migrant-sending societies. Capital flows are expected to go in exactly the opposite direction as labour migration.

So, in a strictly neoclassical world, the developmental role of migration is entirely realized through this process of factor price equalization. Until recently, this neoclassical view of migration and development was dominant in international financial institutions. For instance, the “Policies toward migration” section of the Globalization, Growth, and Poverty report of the World Bank (2002) saw the benefits of migration for receiving countries uniquely in terms of factor price equalization, and did not mention remittances at all. This is in contrast with Ratha’s (2003) chapter entitled “Workers’ remittances: An important and stable source of external development finance” in the World Bank’s Global Development Finance only one year later, and which played a major role in the sudden resurgence in the interest for remittances.

**The migration pessimists: Historical structural and dependency views**

The 1973 oil crisis heralded a period of worldwide economic downturn, industrial restructuring and increasing unemployment. It was also thought that the great age of international migration had ended. This more or less coincided with a turning point in thinking on migration and development. As of the late 1960s, optimistic views on migration and development in sending areas were increasingly challenged due to the combined influence of a paradigm shift in social sciences toward (historical) structuralist views and an increasing number of empirical studies that often did not support optimistic views on migration and development.

An increasing number of academic studies seemed to support the hypothesis that migration sustains or even reinforces problems of underdevelopment instead of the reverse. These “migration pessimists” have argued that migration provokes the withdrawal of human capital
and the breakdown of traditional, stable village communities and their economies. This would then lead to the development of passive, non-productive and remittance-dependent communities. Besides the “brain drain” (Adams 1969), a “brawn drain” (Peninx 1982)—the massive departure of young, able-bodied men and women from rural areas (Lewis 1986)—is typically blamed for causing a critical shortage of agricultural and other labour, depriving areas of their most valuable work force. Because it is generally not the poorest who migrate the most, migration and remittances were also believed to increase inequality in communities of origin (Lipton 1980).

Migration pessimists have also argued that remittances were mainly spent on conspicuous consumption and “consumptive” investments (such as houses), and rarely invested in productive enterprises. Scepticism about the use of migrant remittances for productive investments became the common thread of the migration and development debate. Besides weakening local economies and increasing dependency, increased consumption and land purchases by migrants were also reported to provoke inflationary pressures (Russell 1992) and soaring land prices (Appleyard 1989; Rubenstein 1992).

Also, in a sociocultural respect, the effects of migration and remittances were increasingly seen as detrimental. Exposure to the wealth of migrants was assumed to contribute to a change in rural tastes (Lipton 1980) that would increase the demands for imported urban or foreign-produced goods and food. This would further reinforce the cycle of increasing dependency. Migration has often been held responsible for the loss of community solidarity and undermining the sociocultural integrity of migrant-sending communities (Hayes 1991). Moreover, the main “positive” effect of migration, the increase in family welfare for migrants and their families, was considered to be artificial and dangerous, because remittances were supposed to be an unstable and temporary source of revenue.

From this perspective, South-North migration was perceived as discouraging instead of encouraging the autonomous economic growth of migrant-sending countries (Durand et al. 1996b). Such views conform to the historical-structuralist paradigm on development that perceives migration as one among many other expressions of the developing world’s increasing dependency on the global political-economic systems dominated by the powerful (Western) states. As a natural outgrowth of capitalist penetration, migration was seen as having ruined traditional peasant societies by undermining their economies and uprooting their populations (Massey et al. 1993).

In particular, the dependency school of development thinking viewed capitalist penetration and its concomitant phenomena such as migration not only as detrimental to the economies of underdeveloped countries, but also as the very causes of the “development of underdevelopment” (Frank 1966). In a process known as cumulative causation (Myrdal 1957), increasing prosperity in the economic core areas of the Western world was causally linked to the draining of capital and labour from peripheral areas.

In fact, these approaches turned the argument of neoclassical and developmentalist approaches upside down: migration does not decrease, but instead reinforces spatial and interpersonal disparities in development. In neo-Marxist terms, migration and remittances reproduce and reinforce the capitalist system based on inequality. Although these pessimistic views have been increasingly contested in recent years, they have remained prevalent in some recent studies. Dependency and structuralist perspectives are not alone in making the point that migration can exacerbate international inequalities and can lead to a concentration of qualified human resources in a few recipient countries. New research, partly based on endogenous growth theories with increasing returns, also predicts this result (Solimano forthcoming).

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4 Taylor 1984; Rubenstein 1992; Lipton 1980.
5 Entzinger 1985; Lewis 1986; Lipton 1980.
6 King 1996; Lewis 1986; Massey et al. 1998; Papademetriou and Martin 1991; Taylor and Wyatt 1996.
7 Zachariah et al. 2001; Binford 2003; Rahman 2000.
Pluralist perspectives: New economics of labour migration and livelihood approaches

In the 1980s and 1990s, the new economics of labour migration (NELM) emerged mainly within the American research context as a response to developmentalist and neoclassical theories (the migration optimists) and structuralist theory (the migration pessimists). Such approaches seemed too rigid and determinist to deal with the complex realities of the migration and development interactions. NELM offered a much more subtle view of migration and development, which links causes and consequences of migration more explicitly, and in which both positive and negative development responses are possible.

Stark (1978, 1991), in particular, revitalized academic thinking on migration from the developing world by placing the behaviour of individual migrants within a wider societal context and considering the household—rather than the individual—as the most appropriate decision-making unit (Taylor 1999). This new approach models migration as the risk-sharing behaviour of households. Better than individuals, households seem able to diversify resources such as labour in order to minimize income risks (Stark and Levhari 1982). This approach integrates motives other than individual income maximization that play a role in migration decision making. Migration is perceived as a household response to income risks since migrant remittances serve as income insurance for households of origin (Lucas and Stark 1985). This can theoretically explain why people migrate even in the absence of substantial income differentials.

In addition to its contribution to more stable and secure household livelihoods, NELM scholars argue that migration plays a vital role in providing a potential source of investment capital, which is especially important in the context of the imperfect credit (capital) and risk (insurance) markets that prevail in most developing countries. Such markets are often weakly developed and inaccessible to non-elite groups. Hence, migration can be considered as a livelihood strategy to overcome various market constraints, potentially enabling households to invest in productive activities and improve their livelihoods. This went along with fundamental criticism on the weak methodological foundations, poor analytical quality or empiricist character of much prior research, which often failed to take into account the complex, often indirect, positive impacts of migration and remittances on migrant-sending communities as a whole, including non-migrant households (Taylor et al. 1996).

NELM has striking—though as yet unobserved—conceptual parallels with the livelihood approaches that evolved as of the late 1970s among geographers, anthropologists and sociologists conducting microresearch in developing countries. On the basis of their research, they argued that poor people cannot be seen only as passive victims of global capitalist forces (as neo-Marxist and dependency approaches tended to do), but also as trying to actively improve their livelihoods within the constraining conditions in which they live (Lieten and Nieuwenhuys 1989). This view points to the fundamental role of human agency. From this perspective, migration is seen as one of the main elements of strategies to diversify, secure and improve livelihoods.9 This conception comes rather close to the premises of NELM, and both approaches can be integrated if migration is seen as part of a broader household livelihood strategy to diversify income sources and overcome social, economic and institutional development constraints in places of origin.

These shifts in thinking on migration and development seem deeply influenced by the paradigm shift in social theory in which social scientists, sometimes inspired by Giddens’ (1984) structuration theory, sought to harmonize actor- and structure-oriented approaches. Recognition of the interaction between structure and agency seems essential for the migration and development debate, as this also enables a clearer understanding of the heterogeneity of migration impacts. In “pluralist” views on migration and development such as NELM and the livelihoods approach, the results of the structure-actor interactions allow for a greater variety of

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9 McDowell and de Haan 1997; Ellis 2000; Scoones 1998; Bebbington 1999.
outcome than would have been allowed from either the aggregation of individual decision making or from the unidirectional imperatives of structure.

The fundamental question is, therefore, not whether migration has either positive or negative developmental impacts, but why migration has contributed to development in some communities and much less, or even negatively, in others (Ghosh 1992:432; Taylor 1999) and what factors explain this differentiation. Furthermore, impacts often change with the different stages of the migration process (Jones 1998b; Lucas 1987). Hence, we need to better understand the geographically differentiated and socially disparate nature of migration and remittance impacts as well as how these impacts change over time.

The sparse amount of pertinent micro-level data has long constrained the field of research on migration, remittances and development. Fortunately, there has been a considerable increase in the number of empirical studies over the past decade. The remainder of this paper not only reviews the empirical literature on the impacts of remittances and migration on social development, but also addresses the theoretical implications of these empirical findings.

3. Current Insights into Remittance Impacts

The protective dimension of remittances: Co-insurance and risk spreading

Micro impacts
In line with NELM and livelihood approaches, most recent empirical research supports the view that labour migration, rather than being a response to destitution or absolute poverty (Hampshire 2002), is a livelihood strategy pursued by social groups (typically households) in reaction to relative deprivation (Stark and Taylor 1989; see also Quinn 2006) in order to spread livelihood risks, secure and increase income and acquire investment capital. Remittances are central elements of such household strategies to overcome local development constraints. Although this seems to contradict structuralist and dependency views in pointing to human agency, the extent to which households succeed in achieving these goals critically depends on the specific circumstances under which such migration occurs. After all, these circumstances determine the destination, selectivity and the returns to migration. For instance, recent studies conducted in Burkina Faso (Hampshire 2002; Wouterse 2006) and Morocco (de Haas 2006) suggest that internal and international migration within the African continent should primarily be seen as a means to enhance livelihood security through income diversification because the welfare gains, if any, are relatively small. In both countries, it was mainly migration to Europe that allowed households to accumulate substantially more wealth. In these cases, intracontinental migration is difficult to explain from a neoclassical viewpoint, and instead seems to corroborate the risk-spreading argument put forward by NELM and livelihood approaches.

The rather extensive literature on motivations to remit provides additional insight into this issue. Generally, the literature distinguishes two main motives for remitting money: altruism, on the one hand, and self-interest to secure inheritance and to invest in home assets in the expectation of a return, on the other. Findings from empirical studies are often conflicting, with some finding support for altruism and others for self-interest (Agunias 2006:21). However, Lucas and Stark (1985:904) argued that the motives of altruism and self-interest are often inextricable, and that, in the end, one cannot probe whether the true motive is one of caring or more selfishly wishing to enhance prestige by being perceived as caring. Therefore, they argued that instead of opposing these two motivations, one could develop a far richer model of “tempered altruism or enlightened self-interest in which remittances are one element in a self-enforcing arrangement between migrant and home” (Lucas and Stark 1985:901). In such a model, remittances can simultaneously be seen as the return to household investments in
migration, as part of a household risk diversification strategy (co-insurance through risk spreading, securing inheritance claims) and as a source of investment capital that can be used for entrepreneurial activities, education or to facilitate the migration of other household members.

This view is supported by micro-level empirical research indicating that a mixture of individualistic and familial motives explains the likelihood and size of remittances. At first sight, this evidence provides mixed support for neoclassical and NELM theory. Analysing survey data on Mexico–United States remittances, Amuedo-Dorantes and Pozo (2006) concluded that income increases in migrant receiving countries significantly raises both the propensity and the proportion of labour earnings sent home for family-provided insurance as well as for self-insurance.

A growing number of studies indicate that economic and currency crises in origin countries tend to increase remittance transfers (see, for instance, Blue 2004). Such evidence further corroborates the risk-spreading and co-insurance hypotheses. An analysis of household data collected in the North-West Frontier Province in rural Pakistan indicated that the ability to cope with negative income shocks is lower for households that do not regularly receive remittances (Kurosaki 2006). Similarly, a recent study of Turkish remittances concluded that consumption smoothing is an important short-run motive for sending remittances to Turkey (Alper and Neyapti 2006). Lindley (2006) equally found that migrants in Hargeisa, Somalia, tend to send more remittances from abroad when the family experiences a decline in fortunes and, therefore, concluded that people receiving regular remittances are better protected from exchange-rate fluctuations and have an improved ability to assist relatives in rural areas in times of crisis.

Such evidence corroborates the NELM hypothesis that remittances function as income insurance and protect people from income shocks caused by economic downturns, political conflicts or climatic vagaries. Besides protecting against income shocks, a range of empirical studies has indicated the often positive contribution of international remittances to household welfare, nutrition, food, health and living conditions in places and regions of origin.

For instance, half of the households surveyed by Lindley (2006) in Hargeisa were entirely reliant on remittances. In the Moroccan Todgha valley, 40 per cent of all surveyed households received international remittances, which doubled their income in comparison to other households. Internal and international remittances accounted for 10 per cent and 33 per cent, respectively, of the cash income of all surveyed households, and 53–59 per cent of the income of households involved in international migration (de Haas 2006). Agunias (2006:17) cited evidence from Latin America indicating that remittances accounted for a significant proportion of the average recipient’s annual income. This share ranged from 18 per cent in Ecuador to 43 per cent in Brazil (Bendixen and Onge 2005). Another study in Bangladesh and Nepal found that remittances may account for at least half of total household income in some areas (Seddon 2004, cited in Agunias 2006). A study in southeast Nigeria concluded that the contribution of those who migrate outside of the African continent may be up to 50 per cent of household expenditure (Nwajiuba 2005).

Macro impacts

Also, on the national level, there is substantial evidence that remittances are an increasingly important and relatively stable source of external finance that often play a critical social insurance role in countries afflicted by economic and political crises (Kapur 2003). Remittances have proved to be less volatile, less pro-cyclical and, therefore, a more reliable source of foreign currency than other capital flows to developing countries such as foreign direct investment and

10 For an overview, see Rapoport and Docquier (2005).
development aid. It is claimed that remittances are nearly three times the value of the official development assistance provided to low-income countries, and that they comprise the second-largest source of external funding for developing countries after foreign direct investment (Global Commission on International Migration 2005).

Because many remittances are sent through informal channels, the actual importance of remittances is even higher than official figures show. A recent review concluded that the economies of countries such as Fiji, Somalia and Surinam are in a much better state than official figures would imply thanks to highly developed informal remittance systems (Pieke et al. 2005). In the case of Somalia, for instance, it has been argued that remittances have been far more important for livelihood and survival in the country than development and humanitarian aid put together (Gundel 2002). Remittances often cover an important part of developing countries’ trade deficits. Besides their importance as a source of foreign currency, remittances can also improve a country’s creditworthiness for external borrowing, and they can expand access to capital and lower borrowing costs (World Bank 2006:xiii–xiv). At first sight, such evidence seems to corroborate developmentalist and neodevelopmentalist views on remittances.

**Time dimensions: Are remittances an unreliable source of finance?**

From dependency and structuralist viewpoints, remittances have been commonly seen as an unreliable source of external revenue for families, communities and states. This view was based on the assumption that remittances would rapidly decline with the settlement or return of migrants. Combined with the idea that remittances are rarely spent productively, it has often been thought that remittances would create an artificial and temporary improvement in livelihoods and establish a dangerous dependency on external revenues (Birks and Sinclair 1979). Bonds to the sending country would weaken and remittances would decline rapidly after migrants settle and integrate at the destination (Merkle and Zimmermann 1992; Ghosh 2006:22). This remittance decay hypothesis is linked to the common notion that young, married, low-skilled and temporary male migrants remit the most, and that integrated, highly educated, well-paid migrants invest more in host countries (Ghosh 2006:23). In migration policy debates, this remittance decay is often taken for granted. Recent pleas for temporary migration programmes have been advocated based on the argument that temporary migrants would remit more money and would, therefore, be more beneficial to the development of origin countries (see, for instance, Ghosh 2006).

Ultimately, the remittance decay hypothesis is based on the assumption that remittances are primarily sent either to pay back migration debts or for altruistic reasons. It is also based on the assimilationist model of immigrant integration, which assumes a gradual weakening of transnational ties over time. Theoretically, this model conflicts with NELM and other household approaches that see migration and remittances as co-insurance and investment capital-generating strategies for households and families. It also conflicts with theories on migrant transnationalism that criticize traditional assimilationist models based on evidence that social ties with origin societies can be sustained and renewed over many generations.

However, Stark (1991:223) already argued that it is difficult to predict future remittances, because migrants are part of larger social units such as families and households. The inclination to remit strongly depends on contractual arrangements and bargaining power within the family. Therefore, it is far from certain that remittances would rapidly decline over time. Poirine (2006) argued that even from an altruistic point of view there is no necessary tendency for remittance effort to rise or fall over time.

Hypothesis-testing empirical research on the issue of remittance decay is scarce and often conflicting at first sight. Whereas some studies show declining remittances over time (Agunias 2006:12), others show much more stable or even increasing patterns. Yet, it is possible to integrate such apparently conflicting findings by conceiving of a more dynamic model in which

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the relationship between the duration of stay, social and economic integration and remittances is not linear. Integration indicators such as employment and income tend to have a positive effect on migrants’ capability to remit. This effect might partly or entirely counterbalance the remittance-decreasing effect of the weakening of ties with home countries over time. Even this weakening of transnational ties over time cannot be taken for granted, as such ties can often be sustained over very long periods. This evidence casts doubts on the proposition that temporary migrants would be better and more reliable remitters than integrated and settled migrants.

As observed by de Haas and Plug (2006), bilateral per (migrant) capita remittance flows from destination countries to Morocco only started to stagnate or decline after two decades from the onset of large-scale migration. Other survey-based studies suggest that migrant remittances sent by individuals tend to reach a peak approximately 15–20 years after migration (Brown 1994; Fokkema and Groenewold 2003). There is also evidence that remittances increase with wages, though apparently only up to a certain point (Taylor 1999). A survey conducted in Egypt, Morocco and Turkey concluded that employed migrants remit four times more money than unemployed migrants (Fokkema and Groenewold 2003). This seems to complement macro-evidence that the level and cyclical fluctuations in economic activities in destination countries explain most of the variations in remittance flows.13

Sustained migration and the often higher than previously expected durability of transnational bonds explain why declines in remittances often occur in a much more delayed fashion, and are less steep, than once expected (de Haas and Plug 2006). Although evidence is still limited and scattered, there is generally no clear support for remittance decay as an automatic mechanism. Although declines may occur some decades after migration ceases, remittances seem to be a more stable and sustainable source of income than more volatile sources of foreign exchange for states, while they protect people from the destabilizing effects of absent or ill-functioning markets, failing state policies and a lack of state-provided social security.

Remittances, poverty and inequality

Remittances and poverty

Because of the important contribution of remittances to welfare, it has been argued that remittances are a safety net for relatively poor areas (Jones 1998a). This “private” foreign aid seems to flow directly to the people who really need it, does not require a costly bureaucracy on the sending side and “far less of it is likely to be siphoned off into the pockets of corrupt government officials” (Kapur 2003:10). Jones (1998b), therefore, stated that there is probably no other more “bottom-up” way of redistributing and enhancing welfare among populations in developing countries. While there is certainly an element of truth to this logic, there is also a clear danger of unrestrained optimism concerning the potential of remittances to reduce poverty and inequality.

First, there is a tendency to overestimate the magnitude of migration and remittances. In fact, international migrants comprise only about 3 per cent of the world’s population and, in 2001, remittances represented only 1.3 per cent of total gross domestic product (GDP) of all developing countries (Ratha 2003:10). These figures are enough to put the argument that remittances alone can generate take-off development into a more realistic perspective.

Second, the observation that remittances significantly contribute to income stability and welfare in developing countries does not necessarily imply that they contribute to poverty alleviation. This issue is related to the selectivity of migration. Because of the costs and risks associated with migration, it is generally not the poorest who migrate the most, and certainly not internationally. As migration is a selective process, most direct benefits of remittances are also selective and tend not to flow to the poorest members of communities (Centre for Development Research 2002:2; Schiff 1994:15) nor to the poorest countries (Kapur 2003:7–8).

The main beneficiaries of remittances are lower or middle-income countries, which receive nearly half of all remittances worldwide (Kapur and McHale 2003). The shares of remittances to GDP tend to be rather high in typical emigration countries such as Mexico, Morocco or the Philippines, and even higher in some small countries, especially island economies in the Caribbean, the Pacific or the Atlantic (for example, Cape Verde) (Kapur 2003:10). Although middle-income countries receive most remittances, in relative terms they tend to be more important to small and sometimes very poor countries (such as Haiti, Lesotho, Moldova and Tonga), which often receive more than 10 per cent of their GDP in remittances (World Bank 2006:89). In other poor countries, such as Somalia, official remittance figures are not available, but are likely to be very high relative to GDP.

Although most international remittances do not flow directly to the poorest people, remittances often make up an important share of the income of poor people and poor communities. Moreover, non-migrant poor might be affected indirectly (positively or negatively) through the economy-wide effects of remittance expenditure on wages, prices and employment in migrant-sending communities (Taylor et al. 1996). Furthermore, it is important to realize that the specific patterns of migrant selectivity fundamentally affect poverty impacts. High-skilled or international migration is often more selective than low-skilled or internal migration, and migration occurring under liberal immigration regimes is likely to be less selective than migration under restrictive immigration regimes. For instance, guest workers who were actively recruited in the 1950s and 1960s by Northern and Western European countries in the Mediterranean were often low skilled and relatively poor (de Haas 2003). Equally, guest worker schemes with Gulf countries have enabled relatively poor Egyptian peasants to migrate.

Most studies conclude that international remittances have reduced poverty either directly or indirectly. On the basis of an analysis of a data set covering 71 developing countries, Adams and Page (2005) concluded that international migration and remittances significantly reduce the level, depth and severity of poverty in the developing world. Their results suggest that, on average, and after controlling for the possible endogeneity of international remittances, a 10 per cent increase in per capita international remittances leads to a 3.5 per cent decline in the share of people living on less than $1.00 per person per day. Teto (2001) estimated that 1.17 million (out of 30 million) Moroccans would fall back into absolute poverty without international remittances, and the proportion living below the poverty line would increase from 19.0 to 23.2 per cent.14 Another analysis of Egyptian and Ghanaian survey data equally indicates that migration enables poor people to move out of poverty. However, it also found that the largest determinant of current poverty status for all groups was their past poverty situation, highlighting the existence of poverty traps (Sabates-Wheeler et al. 2005).

Although internal migration is generally associated with lower overall income gains, relatively poor people often migrate internally. This also implies that the positive role of internal migration in income redistribution should not be overlooked (Deshingkar 2006). In a separate study in Guatemala, Adams (2004) found that the poverty-reducing effect of internal and international remittances was particularly large in relation to the severity of poverty (measured by the squared poverty gap, which considers number, distance and distribution of poor households beneath the poverty line), because households in the lowest decile group receive a large share (between 50 and 60 per cent) of their total household income from (internal) remittances. An analysis of Chinese household data found that having an (internal) migrant increases a household’s income per capita by 8.5–13.1 per cent, but that the overall impact on poverty is modest because most poor people do not migrate, not even internally (Du et al. 2005).

Migration and inequality in a spatio-temporal perspective

One of the “truths” put forward by structuralist and dependency perspectives has been that migration and remittances have a negative effect on income inequality within migrant-sending communities as well as between peripheral and central regions (Lipton 1980; Papademetriou

14 In urban environments, this increase would be from 12.0 to 16.6 per cent, and in rural environments from 27.2 to 31.0 per cent.
1985). In turn, this increased inequality would further stimulate out-migration, setting in motion a cycle of “cumulative causation” of migration—deepening inequalities—and more migration. However, recent research has provided enough evidence to reject this as a general hypothesis. Although inequality-increasing effects have been found in various studies at the regional (Adams 1989) and national (Mishra 2007) levels, this mechanism is not inevitable. It is more correct to say that the impacts of migration on income inequality in migrant-sending communities vary for different types of migration and for different periods in a community’s migration history (see, for instance, Stark et al. 1988). First, non-migrants can benefit indirectly from consumption and investments by remittance-receiving migrant households through employment creation and income multipliers. Second, there are other arguments to contradict blanket claims that migration leads to more inequality, which are related to the spatio-temporal dimensions of migration.

As with impacts on poverty, the effect of remittances on income distribution and other aspects of wealth is primarily a function of migration selectivity. If migrants mainly originate from relatively wealthy households, migration is more likely to imply greater inequality in the community of origin, while the reverse seems likely if migrants come from relatively poor households. Pioneer migrants tend to be from relatively wealthy households, as early migration—alogous to the adoption and diffusion of a new technology through space and populations—often entails high costs and risks. Although (pioneer) migrants tend to be relatively wealthy and educated, this is not always the case. The initial pattern of migration selectivity differs according to destination (for example, international versus internal migration), type of work (for example, low skilled or high skilled, legal or undocumented) and mode of job acquisition (for example, formal recruitment or family-based forms of “self-help”).

Second, migration selectivity tends to change over time. During the first stages of the evolution of a migration system— defined as spatially clustered flows and counterflows of people, goods and remittances between a particular community of origin and a particular destination—selectivity tends to decrease rapidly. Through the development of social networks between migrants and people staying behind, which diminish the risks and costs of migration (Bauer and Zimmermann 1998:5), and the flow back of information (Korner 1987), less wealthy households tend to gain increasingly easy access to international migration. As a consequence of this diffusion process, the initially negative effect of remittances on income equality might, therefore, be dampened or even reversed in the long term. However, Jones (1998b) demonstrated that inequality may again increase at the “late adopters” stage of migration, when selectivity of migration, other things being equal, tends to increase again.

Thus, the impacts of migration on village income distribution clearly vary for different types of migration and for different periods in a community’s migration history. Kanbur and Rapoport (2005) demonstrated that increased migration from poorer to richer areas may in fact coexist with increasing or decreasing spatial inequalities, and that the question of whether divergence or convergence occurs critically depends on specific patterns of migration selectivity and agglomeration effects arising from migrant networks.

Third, differences in spatial scales of analysis may account for contradictory conclusions concerning the effect of migration on income distribution (Jones 1998b; Taylor and Wyatt 1996). For instance, one might conclude that migration has contributed to increasing interhousehold income inequality within a certain community or region. However, when comparing this migrant-sending region as a whole with other more wealthy and centrally located regions in the same country (or between countries), one may find that inequality between the regions has actually decreased as a consequence of the developmental effects of migration and remittances (Taylor et al. 1996). The choice for either of the two scales is not obvious, and might partly reflect value judgements.

16 Stark et al. 1988; Rapoport and Docquier 2005; Jones 1998b.
Spatial and temporal scales of analysis also matter when identifying whether so-called extraregional *leakage* of migrant remittances to central regions and cities occurs, which, according to dependency and centre-periphery theory, would lead to a deepening of spatial development inequalities. For the result of such analysis, it matters whether or not the village or the wider region in which it is located is identified as “origin”. In the first case, all investments made outside the village are thought to deepen spatial inequalities. In the second case, the analysis will tend to be far more on the positive side. In Morocco, for instance, many migrants do not necessarily invest their money in houses or businesses in the village of origin, but often do so in small- to medium-sized regional towns, which has given rise to a process of micro-urbanization *within* migrant-sending regions (Berriane 1997).

Such evidence indicates that migration and remittances do not automatically lead to increased inequalities between the developed “core” and the underdeveloped “periphery”, as predicted by dependency and structuralist views. However, the neoclassical assumption that migration leads to factor price equalization certainly should not also be taken as axiomatic.

**Value judgements, ancient and new forms of inequality**

Structuralist views on migration and development see migration as a process that has destabilized and uprooted traditional peasant communities. However, the idea that migration has uprooted peasants from their stable communities for the first time reflects a romanticized, and fundamentally flawed, sedentary view of traditional peasant life (Skeldon 1997:32). Assumptions of the negative impact of migration and remittances on inequality and community cohesion or solidarity are often based on the implicit, romantic idea that “traditional” communities were more egalitarian. This often ignores ancient inequalities between ethnic and class groups.

Migration and remittances can have profound consequences for class and ethnic hierarchies. Traditional social hierarchies may be fundamentally upset if lower- or middle-status groups manage to migrate internationally and obtain access to international remittances. However, whether to judge such changes as “positive” or “negative” strongly depends on whether we adopt the viewpoints of the relative winners or losers of such community transformations. While older elites might view migration as a devastating process, lower- or middle-class groups may have a more mixed or positive opinion. In San Pedro Pinula (Guatemala), for instance, the migration and return of Mayan residents has permitted them to slowly challenge ethnic roles that have developed over the last five centuries (Taylor et al. 2006).

In southern Moroccan oases, migration and remittances have been an important avenue for upward socioeconomic mobility for the *haratin*, a low-status social group mainly consisting of black sharecroppers. In this case, *new* forms of inequality, which are to a considerable extent based on access to international remittances, have been partly superimposed upon the traditional, caste-like forms of hereditary inequality based on kinship, skin colour and land ownership (de Haas 2006). There are no objective, scientific standards for determining which form of inequality was worse. However, it is important not to ignore the fact that traditional oasis society used to deny basic human freedoms to large sections of the population (including women, slaves, serfs and sharecroppers). In such cases, instead of increased inequalities per se, it is perhaps better to speak of new inequalities based on access to external monetary resources through livelihood diversification, a process in which migration tends to play a preponderant role.

Hence, it is important to carefully consider the specific historical evolution of class or ethnic stratifications as well as the relative access of classes and ethnic groups to migration in order to assess the impact of migration and remittances upon inequalities. A recent overview of case studies on migration and inequality across Central America, Eastern Europe, West Africa and South Asia demonstrates how the mutual causality between migration and inequality varies both between and within regions, and emphasizes the need for defining which kind of migration and which kind of inequality are being analysed (Black et al. 2005).
To a considerable extent, “measuring” the impact of migration and remittances on inequality is an ambiguous and normative affair. For instance, conclusions on the “severity” of inequality partly depend on the weight attached to incomes of households at different points in the income distribution when calculating indices of inequality (Stark et al. 1988:309). There is also no objective, scientific yardstick with which to judge a situation in which inequality has increased, but in which the majority of migrant and non-migrant households are better off and poverty has decreased. This scenario exemplifies the ambiguities involved in attaching relative weights to distributional versus absolute income objectives.

**Remittance expenditure, investment and regional development**

**Migration, remittance expenditure and investments**

Perhaps the most common reason for scepticism on migration and development has been the widespread belief that migrants rarely invest their money in productive enterprises, but instead spend it on consumption or non-productive investments. This belief—which also formed the cornerstone of structuralist and dependency-inspired visions that claimed that migration and remittances do not lead to, or can even undermine, development—is remarkably persistent, particularly in the policy literature. A recent report commissioned by the European Investment Bank concluded that “remittances remain primarily used for daily expenses and therefore do not have large developmental impact” (European Investment Bank/Facility for Euro-Mediterranean Investment and Partnership 2006:136). Such views usually underpin ideas that governments should develop policies to “channel” remittances into productive investment (Zarate-Hoyos 2004; European Commission 2005).

However, the common idea that migrants do not use their money “productively” tends to have rather weak empirical foundations. Much of the research that has generated these ideas has been criticized for their serious deficiencies in methodological design (Özden and Schiff 2005). Migration impact studies also tend to neglect the fungibility of remittances with other sources of household income, which means that it is generally not possible to “earmark” migrant remittances to specific expenditures (Taylor 1999).

Since the 1990s, an increasing number of studies have emerged that challenge the dim views that migrants would fritter away their remittance earnings on personal consumption (Adams 1991:719). Most studies seem to suggest that households receiving international remittances have a higher propensity to invest than non-migrant households when controlling for income and other relevant household variables. Rapoport and Docquier (2005:2) cited several studies indicating that there is considerable evidence that remittances promote access to self-employment and increase investment in small businesses.

As with poverty and inequality, the impact of remittances on investments and economic growth in migrant-sending communities tends to change over time. In a study of the effects of temporary labour migration from five African countries to South Africa’s mines on agricultural production in the countries of origin, Lucas (1987:313) concluded that migration diminishes domestic crop production in the short run, but enhances crop productivity and cattle accumulation through invested remittances and increased domestic plantation wages in the long run. A recent study of Turkish remittances shows that whereas consumption smoothing is an effective short-run motive for sending remittances, the investment motive is important in the long run (Alper and Neyapti 2006). Also, Taylor (1994:100) found village economy-wide evidence that the combination of lost-labour effects and positive remittances effects may negatively affect production in migrant-staging areas initially, but eventually have a positive effect.

Activities, expenditure and investment patterns are likely to change over the course of migration and household lifecycles (Conway and Cohen 1998:32). Based on household data from southern Morocco, de Haas (2003) identified a sequence in which housing investments

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occur relatively early in the migration cycle and peak five to 14 years after initial migration, stabilizing at a high level. Most agricultural investments occurred from 15 to 24 years after migration, and investments in non-agricultural private businesses peaked from 25 to 29 years after migration.

The short-term effects of migration on livelihoods and household production in sending communities are often negative due to the immediate lost-labour effect. It is often only at a later stage—when the migrant has more or less settled at the destination, found relatively secure employment and the most basic needs of the household “back home” are fulfilled (such as food, health, clothing, primary education, basic household amenities, paying off debts and so on)—that there is more room for investments. In the meantime, households and communities have had the chance to readjust local (agricultural and non-agricultural) production systems (including labour allocation, intrahousehold task divisions) to the absence of migrants. It is only at these later stages that migrants tend to invest their money in commercial enterprises such as agriculture, large-scale housing, commerce and so on. However, the extent to which they will invest at all depends on more general investment conditions.

It is, therefore, unrealistic to expect that the full development effects of migration and remittances will materialize within the first or second decade following the onset of large-scale migration. Table 2 summarizes this hypothesized relationship between the household migration stage (related to the family lifecycle) and consumption and investment patterns of households that receive remittances. To a considerable extent, this household-level dynamic model can be applied at the community or even regional levels, taking into account the fact that migration is rarely an isolated act by one individual or household, but that the migration experience tends to diffuse throughout communities once localities and regions become linked to the outside world.

From this, one could hypothesize that communities and regions as a whole tend to go through different migration stages, characterized by the “innovators” stage (first pioneering migrants leave), “early adopter” stage (migration spreads throughout the community, aided by network effects) and the “late adopter” stage (migration stabilizes, and may eventually decrease) (Jones 1998b). On the basis of this model, one could further hypothesize that the full developmental effects of migration can only materialize in the second and, in particular, third stages of migration, when the majority of migrant households have been involved in migration for several decades.

The accumulated empirical evidence has refuted the hypothesis that migration automatically puts a drain on sending communities and countries and reinforces the centre-periphery gap. The counterflow of remittances and investments can partly or even more than compensate for this negative effect. However, this is not to say that the migration optimists were right. The extent to which money is remitted, and how and where remittances are spent, fundamentally depends on the migrants’ social and economic position at the destination as well as on the investment conditions in the countries of origin. This explains why remittances impact so differently on different countries and communities. Whereas in some cases remittances have enabled migrants to invest in land and cattle, in other cases remittances have generally not been dedicated to agricultural improvements and instead are overwhelmingly invested in housing and land (Jokisch 2002).

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18 For instance, the income and remittances of internal and international migrant households may differ significantly.

19 Taylor et al. 2006; VanWey 2005; de Haas 2006.
Table 2: Relation between household migration stage, consumption and investments

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Stage</th>
<th>Migration</th>
<th>Consumption and investment patterns by migration households</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I</td>
<td>Migrant is in the process of settling</td>
<td>Most urgent needs are filled if possible: food, health, debt repayment, education of children.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II</td>
<td>Migrant is settled and has more or less stable work</td>
<td>Housing construction, land purchase, basic household amenities, continued education.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IIIa</td>
<td>Ongoing stay</td>
<td>(Higher) education of children. Diverse investments: commercial housing and land, shops, craft industries, agriculture. Magnitude, spatial and sectoral allocation depending on household income, macro and local development/investment context.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IIIb</td>
<td>Return</td>
<td>Continuing investments (as IIIa) if the household has access to external income (for example, pensions, savings or creation of businesses).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IIIc</td>
<td>Family reunification</td>
<td>Traditional view: no significant investments besides help to family/community members; this view is challenged by evidence that more and more migrants seem to adopt transnational lives and identities, which may be associated with continued home country engagement and/or investments.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Author’s analysis.

While in some cases most remittance-driven investments have remained within the sending region (de Haas 2006), in others cases migrants prefer to invest in more distant (urban) areas outside the migrant-sending region (McCormick and Wahba 2003). This particularly seems to be the case when sending regions lack adequate infrastructure, agricultural resources and urban centres that provide opportunities to allocate such investments. Interestingly, internal migration is associated more often with rural and agricultural stagnation or even decline (Regmi and Tisdell 2002; de Haas 1998) than with international migration to wealthy countries, where much higher remittances enable households to substitute the lost labour and to actually invest in agricultural and other sectors.

The indirect economic effects of remittances on migrant-sending communities

Most migration impact studies have focused only on the direct social and economic effects of migration, that is, the impact on migrants and their households. However, remittances may also have significant impacts on non-migrant households, and hence may reshape sending communities as a whole (Taylor 1999:65). Such indirect effects are usually not captured by remittance-use studies. For instance, research has tended to negatively evaluate consumptive expenses as non-developmental. However, consumptive expenses, provided that they occur locally, can have positive impacts by providing non-migrants with labour and income. This is confirmed by empirical evidence that consumption by migrant households can lead, via multiplier effects, to higher incomes for non-migrant households (Adelman et al. 1988; Durand et al. 1996a).

The same holds true for so-called “non-productive” investments. For example, academics and policy makers have almost universally bemoaned the high amounts of money that migrants tend to spend on housing. This is partly because such “diatribes by academics and policy makers against migrants for their profligate and unproductive ways” (Taylor et al. 1996:411) reflect common elitist views on the irrational spending behaviour of lower classes, which in any case have a weak or absent empirical basis.

Various empirical studies have reported that construction activities can generate considerable employment and income for non-migrants (Taylor et al. 1996). This also applies to many other expenses such as feasts and funerals (Mazzucato et al. 2006). In this way, the benefits of remittances might accrue to households other than the ones that directly receive them (Taylor...
These expenses increase consumption levels that may—by easing capital and risk constraints on local production—in turn facilitate local investments by migrants and non-migrants alike (Stark 1980; Stark and Bloom 1985). In this way, expenditure on housing and consumption may have significant multiplier effects in the wider economy.20

Emigration and remittance expenditure also have the tendency to increase wages in sending regions and countries.21 In a Moroccan oasis, for instance, the price of agricultural labour has considerably increased, partly as a result of out-migration and increased demand for agricultural labour. While, traditionally, sharecroppers used to retain one-fifth of the yield, at the time of the study they retained on average 41 per cent of the harvest (de Haas 2006). Dependency and structuralist views have usually evaluated such wage increases as negative. However, if such wage increases occur, they reflect neoclassical predictions of factor price equalization. Although (migrant) entrepreneurs might view increasing local wage levels as negative, this is obviously to the benefit of non-migrants and immigrants living in such regions.

Narrow and arbitrary definitions of investments

Besides ignoring the indirect ways in which consumptive expenses and “non-productive investments” can contribute to economic growth and employment, conventional views on migration and development also tend to rest on rather arbitrary definitions of what actually constitutes productive investments (Conway and Cohen 1998:42). Expenditure in areas such as education, health, food, medicines and investments in housing as well as community projects for education, health and recreational facilities (Nwajiuba 2005) can enhance people’s well-being and ability to lead the lives they have reason to value. From a capabilities perspective on development as proposed by Sen (1999), such improvements should be considered as “developmental”.

There is evidence that international remittances have a positive influence on infant health and decrease infant mortality in migrant-sending communities (Frank and Hummer 2002; Kanaiaupuni and Donato 1999). Housing almost universally occupies the highest rank after consumption on the list of migrants’ expenditures, and migrants have consistently been criticized for this preference. We have already seen that construction activities can have positive impacts on local and regional economies. A more fundamental argument to counter the idea that housing is “non-developmental” is that the quest to have a clean, safe and spacious house is a universal aspect of human well-being.

Criticism of migrants’ “unproductive” or “irrational” expenditure behaviour also unveils an apparent inability to comprehend the difficult social, economic, legal and political conditions that often prevail in migrant-sending countries. In such insecure contexts, spending money on relatively safe assets such as houses can be a rational strategy toward securing, diversifying and improving livelihoods. In his study on the use and impact of international remittances in a rural region in Egypt, Adams made an a priori distinction between consumption, durables and investments; however, based on his fieldwork, he concluded that “on a practical level the difference between these three types of expenditures becomes blurred…from the standpoint of the individual, housing expenses should be classified as an ‘investment’, since new and improved housing offers possible future economic returns to the individual” (1991:705).

Adams concluded that, considering the surge in land prices throughout Egypt, the high rate of inflation and the lower or even negative returns on other investments, land purchase represented a good investment from the standpoint of the individual migrant. In the same vein, Taylor (1994:101) argued that “land, housing, and other speculative investments, for which migrant families often are criticised, are a rational response to the uncertain, inflationary environments created by misguided macro-economic policies and sectoral policies that

20 Djajic 1986; Russell 1992; Taylor et al. 1996.
discriminate against small-scale production activities that might be within reach of migrant families”.

The distinction between consumption and investments is, therefore, often blurred and the outcome of evaluations on the relative merits of such expenditure partly depends on value judgements. In fact, by suggesting that people should stay in their “mud brick houses”, social scientists and policy makers risk applying different standards to others than they would to themselves. Expenditure on items such as land, housing, education, transport and jewellery can be rational, as they frequently offer better rates of return or are safer stores of value than high-risk investments in, for instance, agriculture or industry (Russell 1992). In Morocco, de Haas (2006) found that migrants consider house ownership as an important life insurance.

**Migration, remittances, community structures and care arrangements**

The pivotal role of migration and remittances in the social and economic reproduction of sending communities has been widely acknowledged. Only in a minority of cases has international migration provoked a proverbial rural exodus in the sense of an absolute population decline. Such processes, if they occur, instead seem to be linked to internal migration. International migration and remittances, on the contrary, enable other household and community members to continue to live in rural areas (Klooster 2005; Heinemeijer et al. 1977). Remittances have been ascribed an essential role in assuring the survival and reproduction of households and their maintenance in origin countries. This is why Heinemeijer et al. (1977) interpreted migration from the Moroccan countryside to Europe as a livelihood strategy of partir pour rester (to go away in order to stay), which corroborates the NELM and livelihood view of migration and development. This perspective not only challenges neoclassical migration theory that views migration as an income maximizing endeavour by individuals, but it also counters structuralist and dependency theories that see migration as a drain on migrant-sending communities.

While often maintaining the social and economic reproduction of communities, remittances also tend to transform social structures and care arrangements. As with the issue of migration, remittances and inequality, it is important not to automatically interpret as negative any form of change from a real or imagined stable and traditional past. On the one hand, migration can disrupt traditional care arrangements for children and the elderly; on the other hand, remittances may enable households to improve their livelihoods and to substitute family carers for paid carers. Although the social and psychological costs of separation often remain high, this gives reason to counter simplistic views on the supposedly devastating effects of migration and remittances on family life.

Despite the difficulties created by the migration of household members, people tend to adapt to these new situations, which almost inevitably implies social change. For instance, King and Vullnetari (2006) contended that massive internal and international out-migration from rural Albania since 1990 has disrupted traditional social and kinship systems and has made elderly people particularly vulnerable. Although remittances cushion their social isolation, the loss of children and grandchildren through emigration has undermined elderly people’s self-respect and raison d’être in Albanian family life. One of their coping mechanisms has been to follow their children abroad to care for the grandchildren, enabling both parents of the children to engage in paid work (King and Vullnetari 2006).

On the basis of his study of transnational family life in New York among Ecuadorian migrants from the Azuayo-Canari highlands, Pribilsky (2004) countered the commonly held view that male migration to the United States often leads to spousal abandonment. He found that, despite the tensions and problems faced by young couples starting to form their own autonomous transnational households, such couples often state that their relationship improved after migration. A study by Parrado (2004) of the relation between labour migration and the marriage rates of men in 43 communities in western Mexico highlighted the importance of distinguishing different scales of analysis and duration of stay when assessing the impact of migration on
family life and social reproduction of families. Although at the individual level, international migration deterred marriage while migrants were abroad, after returning to their home community the remittances and savings accumulated by Mexican migrants facilitated the purchase of housing, businesses and land and as such helped them to accumulate the necessary capital to marry and start a family (Parrado 2004).

Evaluating “the” effect of migration and remittances on wider community structures and traditional institutions is an equally ambiguous and potentially value-laden affair. In Moroccan oases, for instance, migration and the concomitant partial emancipation of formerly subordinate groups of black sharecroppers has undermined the functioning of tradition village institutions that regulate the maintenance of collectively managed irrigation systems. This process contributed to the decline of these irrigation systems and diminishing water flows. On the other hand, the influx of international remittances has enabled households to pump this water through individual pumping and even to start new farms in the desert (de Haas 2006, 1998).

In an indigenous Oaxacan village in Mexico, it was found that villagers regard migration as necessary, yet problematic. Although migration provides income for families, it is said to undercut traditions of community service (Mutersbaugh 2002). On the other hand, also in rural Oaxaca, it was found that some communities can use the organizational capacity of traditional governance systems to access remittances from migrants for the benefit of the community as a whole. Instead of communal labour requirements, communities can require payment from migrants and may directly solicit remittances from migrants for community projects. However, the extent to which communities can enforce these requests depends on the existing organizational strength in the community (VanWey et al. 2005).

All in all, migration and remittances seem to be a transformative rather than a disruptive force. It is also clear that the sociocultural and economic impacts of migration and remittances are notoriously difficult to disentangle from more general processes of social change. Migration is a constituent part of a complex set of social, cultural and economic transformations that integrate emigrant communities into global social, economic and migratory systems as well as an independent factor in perpetuating and intensifying, magnifying and accelerating these processes at the local and regional levels.

**Migration, remittances and gender**

The selectivity and impacts of migration and remittances are unlikely to be gender neutral. It is often taken for granted that female migration from “patriarchal” societies forms part of household strategies such as family reunification and family formation (Chant and Radcliffe 1992; Salih 2001). When women migrate alone, they are typically portrayed as passive *victims* of smugglers or traffickers, working under exploitative conditions in service sector jobs or prostitution, thereby denying them the power of agency that men are stereotypically ascribed. However, a high and increasing number of independent migrants are in fact women (de Haan et al. 2000). Even in “patriarchal” societies, such as Mexico and Morocco, female migration is no longer exclusively a corollary to labour migration by men, if this was ever the case at all.22

The literature on the *impacts* of migration and remittances on sending societies also tends to ignore the gender dimension. This gender blindness has also been the major critique on the household approaches advocated by NELM, which may represent households as monolithic, internally altruistic units making unanimous decisions to the advantage of the whole group. Feminist researchers, in particular, have argued that this generalization masks intrahousehold power inequalities and rules out both individual decision making and the influence of non-household members (Rodenburg 1997:4–5).

Gender inequality is likely to affect migration and remittance access and use as well as have a significant impact on the intrafamily allocation of social and financial remittances, making it

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22 Salih 2001; Fadloullah et al. 2000; Organista et al. 1998.
questionable whether migration and remittances automatically enable people to challenge established gender roles. It is sometimes assumed that the migration of men encourages the emancipation of women who stay behind since in their husbands’ absence, women’s responsibilities, autonomy and power would increase (see, for instance, Fadloullah et al. 2000), while remittances enable these women to assert this newly acquired independence. However, the limited empirical evidence suggests that migration and remittances do not necessarily have a structural impact on changing traditional gender roles, and may actually serve to reproduce them.

A study by Van Rooij (2000) of wives of non-migrants and migrants in Morocco challenged the hypothesis that migration contributes to changing gender roles. The lives of migrants’ wives remained largely confined to housekeeping, child rearing and agricultural work. Although they tended to have more control over the use of their husbands’ earnings and in child rearing, this gain in authority was mainly temporary, since migrants resume their position as patriarchs as soon as they return. Empirical research in Albania (King et al. 2006), Burkina Faso (Hampshire 2006), Egypt (Taylor 1984), Turkey (Day and Içduygu 1997) and Yemen (Myntti 1984) yielded similar conclusions that migration and remittances do not lead to a permanent shift in the patriarchal family structure.

In addition, changes in gender roles are not necessarily positive. In case studies of Egyptian and Yemeni migrant-sending communities, Taylor (1984) and Myntti (1984) even suggested that the position of women might have worsened due to the growing influence of conservative interpretations of Islam that some return migrants bring back. Nyberg-Sørensen (2004:10) cited evidence from Morocco indicating that if women take over traditional “male” tasks such as harvesting as a result of migration, some of the younger men may refuse to work in what has now come to be dubbed “women’s work”.

Furthermore, the emotional burden of the increased responsibilities can be high. For Morocco, both Hajjarabi (1995) and Van Rooij (2000) showed that women do not necessarily appreciate the sudden increase in responsibilities and tasks, which were not theirs within the normative context of traditional society and to which they do not always aspire. As this new role is generally not assumed out of free choice, it should not be equated with emancipation in the sense of making independent and conscious choices against prevailing norms of gender roles (de Haas 2007a). However, Gammage (2004) found that, through migration and remittances, Haitian women have been able to change the political landscape of Haiti and have challenged traditional gender roles. What might play a role here is that Haiti is a predominantly matrifocal society as opposed to most European, Middle Eastern and North African societies.

Also, in the case of women who migrate, it should not be assumed that they automatically adopt the receiving country’s societal norms of gender relations. A study conducted in North Carolina of four Mexican migrant-sending communities challenged the expectation that migrant women easily incorporate the behaviour patterns and cultural values of United States’ society. Rather, the authors observed a process of selective assimilation in which gender relations were reconstructed within the family at the place of destination. Some elements brought from communities of origin are discarded, others are modified and others are reinforced in this process (Parrado and Flippen 2005).

It is important to disentangle the effects of migration and remittances from more general processes of social and cultural change affecting migrant-sending communities. The latter are often more important, although migration may play an accelerating or reinforcing role in such processes. In particular, in the long term there may be (intergenerational) gains for women. For instance, international migration and remittances can have a distinct positive influence on the educational participation of younger women. In Albania and Morocco, it has been suggested that transformations of patriarchal power structures are more likely to be generational (King et al. 2006; de Haas 2007a).
Based on their research in four Guatemalan sending communities, Taylor et al. (2006) concluded that migration and social remittances may permit a gradual erosion of traditional gender and ethnic roles, but that such changes are gradual because migrants, despite their increased earnings and awareness, run into a social structure that resists rapid change. In the Moroccan Rif, Crivello (2003) demonstrated that, by working abroad, women might enhance their roles as economic providers to the families left behind, which tends to diminish the potential stigma attached to female migration.

Both Courbage (1996) and Fargues (2006) hypothesized that—besides factors such as older age of marriage, increased female labour force participation and improved education—migration from North African to European countries has contributed to the diffusion and adoption of European marriage patterns and small family norms, and so has played an accelerating role in the demographic transition. In the case of Egyptian migration to conservative Gulf countries, the effect would be the reverse.

It has also been argued that female migrants show a deeper commitment than male migrants to providing more economic support to households that are left behind. 23 Blue (2004) found that females were positively associated with remittance behaviour among Cuban emigrants. However, some empirical studies have reached opposite conclusions. For instance, Semyonov and Gorodzeisky (2005) argued that Filipino men remit more money than female migrants do, even when controlling for income differentials between men and women.

**Remittances and human capital formation: Brain drain versus brain gain**

Perhaps the most commonly used argument against migration as a potential source of development is that it deprives poor countries of their valuable human resources. Structuralist and dependency theorists have pointed to this brain drain to underpin their argument that migration undermines rather than stimulates development in origin countries, and reinforces rather than alleviates global inequalities. In recent years, this brain drain hypothesis has been increasingly questioned, allowing for a much more nuanced picture.

First, not all migrants are highly skilled. Second, the brain drain seems to be only truly massive in a minority of countries. In a quantitative assessment of the brain drain, Adams (2003) concluded that international migration does not tend to involve a very high proportion of the best educated. In two-thirds of the 33 large labour-exporting countries he surveyed, less than 10 per cent of the best-educated (that is, tertiary) population had migrated. The emigration of highly educated migrants seems to be truly massive only in a limited number of smaller countries, such as various island states in the Caribbean and the Pacific. However, even in these cases mass migration of high-skilled workers should primarily be seen as a symptom of development failure rather than the cause of this failure as such (Lowell and Findlay 2002:30–31).

For instance, the migration of health workers is often claimed to be extremely harmful for sending countries, and is said to have created labour shortages in the health sectors in countries such as Ghana and South Africa. However, there is limited data available to underpin such claims. On the contrary, a recent study using a new database of health worker emigration from Africa suggested that Africa’s generally low health staffing levels and poor public health conditions are the result of factors entirely unrelated to international movements of highly trained health professionals. Such factors include unattractive working conditions in the public health sector and the failure to provide basic health services, 24 which do not require highly trained personnel to deliver (Clemens 2007). This corroborates another study that concluded that migration is a symptom, not a cause, for failing health systems, and that most elite health workers would not provide basic health care to those most in need if they had stayed (Development Research Centre on Migration, Globalisation and Poverty 2006).

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24 For instance, prevention of oral dehydration during diarrhoea, a lack of malaria prophylaxis and a lack of basic primary treatment for acute respiratory infections (Clemens 2007).
Third, labour tends to be much more productive in wealthy countries, which may, therefore, increase the capabilities of migrants and their families to improve their livelihood. Moreover, many developing countries now face mass unemployment among the highly skilled, which is often the partial result of misguided education policies (Development Research Centre on Migration, Globalisation and Poverty 2006), which do not reflect the true skill and knowledge needs of developing economies. In other words, there is often overinvestment in higher education and underinvestment in primary and secondary education and vocational training. This all casts some doubt on the assumption that the emigration of the highly skilled would automatically represent a loss. In many cases, the long-term individual and collective gains may effectively outweigh the immediate costs of migration. In fact, many governments consider skilled labourers to be an export product and thus willingly create surpluses of certain categories of the highly skilled. For instance, the Philippines educates some categories of professionals, such as nurses, for the explicit purpose of generating remittances from abroad (de Haas 2005).

Fourth, as in the case of remittance impacts, it is important to distinguish the negative short-term effects from the often more positive, long-term effects of the emigration of the highly skilled. Depending on the social, economic and political conditions in origin countries, the departure of the highly skilled may have beneficial effects in the form of a counterflow of remittances, investments, trade relations, skills, knowledge, innovations, attitudes and information in the long run. Migrants have played an important role as innovating and transnationally operating entrepreneurs and investors in countries such as India, the Republic of Korea and Taiwan. It has become increasingly clear that migrants’ contribution to development is not conditional upon their return, and that many migrants live transnational lives, combining activities in origin and destination countries. This corroborates evidence on the potential durability of remittances, countering pessimistic views that equate migrants’ settlement and integration with an inevitable “loss” for origin countries. On the contrary, well-integrated migrants seem to have an increased capacity to contribute to development. The extent to which they do so, however, crucially depends on general economic and political conditions in origin countries.

Finally, a “brain drain” can be accompanied by a significant “brain gain” (Lowell and Findlay 2002; Stark et al. 1997), because the prospect of moving abroad may stimulate the incentive to pursue education among stay-behinds (World Bank 2005:68). This situation might explain how a country may end up with more educated workers (a brain gain) despite the existence of a brain drain and the “educated unemployment” prevalent in a number of developing countries.25

A recent study in the Philippines shows that educational expenditure in origin households increased with remittances (Yang 2004). In El Salvador, remittances tend to reduce the likelihood of children leaving school (Cox Edwards and Ureta 2003). Another survey shows that Mexican children in migrant households completed their schooling significantly more often, with the largest impact for girls in households where the mother has a low level of schooling (Hanson and Woodruff 2002, cited in Rapoport and Docquier 2005). Based on an analysis of nationally representative household data in Guatemala, Adams (2006) found that, at the margin, households receiving internal and international remittances spend 45.2 per cent and 58.1 per cent more, respectively, on education than do households that do not receive remittances.

Analysing data from El Salvador, Edwards and Ureta (2003) found that remittances have a large, significant effect on school retention. In urban areas, the effect of remittances was at least 10 times greater than the effect of other income. In rural areas, the effect of remittances was about 2.6 times that of other income. Two surveys conducted in Morocco equally suggest that

remittances enable migrants’ children, and particularly daughters, to go to school (Bencherifa 1996; de Haas 2003). In a case study in Nepal, Thieme and Wyss (2005) similarly concluded that international migration and remittances have a positive effect on the education of children.

Besides remittance-enabled investment in physical capital, investment in human capital is likely to be important for the long-term growth prospects of developing countries (Özden and Schiff 2005:8). Thinking of it from a capabilities perspective on development (Sen 1999), spending on the education of children counts as a long-term productive investment and as an income assurance strategy for households and families. Such investments in their children’s education are especially important for people without access to formal social security arrangements. However, whether skills and knowledge acquired through education will be deployed locally or abroad, that is, through migration, ultimately depends on the political climate, economic growth and the structure of labour markets in sending countries.

On the other hand, there is evidence that under certain circumstances migration might also create negative incentives for education. If the opportunity to migrate decreases the return to education, individuals may be discouraged to invest in education. This seems specifically to be the case in migration systems predominated by low-skilled and often undocumented migration, where few if any positive externalities of education can be expected. For instance, a Mexican or a Moroccan cleaner with a university education in Spain or the United States is unlikely to earn significantly more than a colleague with only a primary education. There is indeed some evidence from Mexican household surveys indicating that international migrations have a negative effect on the level of schooling of children (McKenzie 2006). This finding corroborates others who suggested that schooling has no effect on incentives for international migration from rural Mexico, whereas schooling has positive effects on internal migration incentives (Mora and Taylor 2006; Özden 2006). In other words, the wage gain is higher for less-educated Mexicans who migrate to the United States rather than internally (Özden and Schiff 2006).

Migration and remittances can thus both encourage and discourage education of non-migrants. Depending on the specific incentive structures, remittances and the opportunity to work in cities or abroad give individuals and their households the choice either to invest in or to disengage from education. Confirming this hypothesis, the empirical evidence is indeed mixed, although a majority of studies seem to support the NELM hypothesis that remittances have positive effects on school attendance and educational achievement. A point often ignored is that improved education is not only a potential result of migration and remittances, but also that the desire to obtain more education is often one of the very reasons for rural-to-urban (de Haas 1998) and international (Bauer and Zimmermann 1998; McCormick and Wahba 2001) migration, and successful skilled international migrants may indeed stimulate other people to follow their path.

**Migration, remittances and political reform**

Migration and remittances also affect social and political life in countries of origin in a broader sense. Sending countries have often had ambiguous attitudes toward emigrants. Many states have considered migration as a safety valve to reduce unemployment, poverty and political unrest and saw migration as a direct way to get rid of political dissidents (Gammage 2006; de Haas 2007b). It has, therefore, been argued that emigration could diminish pressure for domestic reforms (Kireyev 2006). On the other hand, there are strong long-term economic incentives for emigration states to strengthen ties with their absent citizens (Barry 2006). Many sending states have become dependent on remittances to cover trade deficits and to maintain domestic stability, a situation that seems to have increased their willingness to engage with emigrant populations and increase their voice in internal political affairs. Over the past decade, many sending states have, therefore, embarked upon more inclusive diaspora engagement policies through extending special political and economic rights to emigrants and allowing dual citizenship (Østergaard-Nielsen 2003; Gamlen 2006).

Migrants often play a significant role in the societal and political debate and civil society in countries of origin. Their involvement underscores the fact that the developmental effects of
migration are not limited to remittances and investments, but also include important sociopolitical dimensions. Migrants and their organizations often take an active stance in shaping their new role in the national life of their home countries. Migrants' considerable weight can eventually create a push for political and economic reforms, democratization, increasing political and bureaucratic transparency and the emancipation of minority groups in sending states.26

Although migrants have recently been celebrated for their ability to stimulate social, political and economic reform in origin countries, it is important to remember that migrants, through remittances and other factors, may also contribute to sustained conflicts, for instance, by providing support for warring parties (Van Hear 2004; Nyberg-Sorensen et al. 2002). Furthermore, migrants are often from middle-class or elite groups (see Guarnizo et al. 2003) and, therefore, might not necessarily represent the view of the poor and the oppressed, but instead effectively sustain oppressive political systems. Again, this scenario exemplifies the difficulty of generalizing about the social, economic and cultural effects of migration and remittances. The direct effect of skilled emigration needs to be evaluated on a case-by-case basis (Lowell and Findlay 2002). Furthermore, such analyses tend to be value laden. This is particularly evident when assessing migrants' political influence. Migrants encompass all possible political colours. And, clearly, there is no objective, scientific yardstick for determining which direction of political change is ultimately desirable.

**Remittances and national economic growth**

Whereas views on the impact of international remittances on social and economic development in migrant-sending societies have recently inclined toward the positive side, the impact of remittances on national economic growth and employment are rather unclear (World Bank 2006:xiii). The consequences of remittances on long-term economic development are not well understood (Kapur 2003:vii). There seems to be no conclusive evidence to sustain either neoclassical or dependency theory, because relevant studies have yielded contradictory findings.

In a recent analysis of the effect of remittances on employment performance for Central and East European economies, Leon-Ledesma and Piracha (2004) found that the impact of remittances on national economic growth and employment are rather uncertain (World Bank 2006:xiii). The consequences of remittances on long-term economic development are not well understood (Kapur 2003:vii). There seems to be no conclusive evidence to sustain either neoclassical or dependency theory, because relevant studies have yielded contradictory findings.

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Other studies are less upbeat and mention the potentially adverse effects of remittances in that they create a strong disincentive for domestic savings and support private consumption of (imported) goods instead of financing investment, which can potentially hamper competitiveness and increase trade deficits (Kireyev 2006). Chami et al. (2005) questioned the whole assumption that remittances play the same role in economic development as foreign direct investment and other capital flows. Empirical tests of a model in which remittances were assumed not to be profit driven, but rather compensatory transfers, yielded a negative correlation between remittances and GDP growth. This finding suggests that remittances may not be a source of capital for economic development. It has also been commonly argued that large remittance inflows can contribute to currency appreciation (Dutch disease). However, there is little empirical evidence sustaining this hypothesis. A recent study claimed that Dutch disease is less likely to occur with remittances than with natural resource booms, primarily because remittances are distributed more widely and may avoid the sorts of exacerbating strains on institutional capacity that are often associated with natural resource booms (World Bank 2006:xiv).

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These apparently contradictory empirical findings on the macroeconomic impact of remittances do not necessarily conflict on a theoretical level. First, as with issues of inequality and development on the community and regional levels, the positive impacts of remittances on national development are likely to materialize only in the long term (Russell 1995). Second, their impact is disparate across countries and is ultimately contingent on the social relations and economic structures in which the foreign currency becomes embedded (Eckstein 2004).

Can remittances alone trigger economic growth? Probably not. Although remittances play an increasingly vital role in securing and actually improving the livelihoods of millions of people in the developing world, it would be naive to expect that remittances alone could solve more structural development obstacles such as an unstable political environment, misguided macroeconomic policies, lack of security, bureaucracy, corruption or deficient infrastructure. Also, legal insecurity of property tends to have devastating effects on people’s ability and willingness to invest (see De Soto 2000).

If states fail to implement effective political and economic reform, migration and remittances are also unlikely to contribute to nation-wide sustainable development (Taylor et al. 2006; Gammage 2006). However, if development in origin countries takes a positive turn, if countries stabilize politically and economic growth starts to take off, then migrants are likely to be among the first to join in and recognize such new opportunities, reinforcing these positive trends through investing, circulating and returning to their origin countries. This sort of investment has happened in the past few decades with several former emigration countries as diverse as the Republic of Korea, Spain and Taiwan Province of China, and might be currently happening in a country like Turkey, where many Turks living in Germany and elsewhere in Europe play a significant role as transnational entrepreneurs in Turkey’s economic growth.

4. Conclusion

This paper presents ample evidence that migration and remittances are often part of risk-spreading and co-insurance livelihood strategies pursued by households and other family groups. This evidence generally corroborates the new economics of labour migration theory and livelihoods approaches that point to the development potential of migration and remittances. Remittances have the proven capacity to protect people from income shocks and lifecycle risks. They may also enable significant increases in income and improvements in living conditions, education, health and welfare in sending communities. In the absence of well-functioning credit markets, remittances can also provide migrants and their families with the financial resources to invest in enterprises. For national accounts, remittances have gained increasing importance as a relatively stable source of foreign currency.

Although the direct poverty-alleviating impact of remittances is limited because migration is a selective process, remittances do have a substantial potential to reduce poverty indirectly through multiplier effects generated by remittance expenditure and investment. The impacts of migration and remittances on social, economic and gender inequality as well as on community cohesion are much more ambiguous. The specific nature of such impacts partly depends on migration selectivity and temporal and spatial scales as well as value judgements. This analysis also exemplifies that the developmental impacts of migration and remittances tend to change over the different stages of household- and community-level migration cycles.

However, it is important to emphasize that we are dealing with developmental potential rather than a predetermined impact, and that we need to conceptualize migration as an endogenous variable, that is, as an integral part of wider development processes. The extent to which migration and remittances can contribute to sustainable development fundamentally depends on more general development conditions in migrant-sending societies. Because of this conditionality, neither the views of neoclassical nor the structuralist theories can be taken as
axiomatic. Both views are too deterministic to deal with the complex realities of migration-development interactions.

This conditionality of migration and remittance impacts on more general development conditions also indicates that the margin to manoeuvre for targeted policies toward improving the developmental impact of migration and remittances is fundamentally limited. Much of the debate on migration and development policies has focused on facilitating remittance flows through official channels by fostering cheaper, faster and more secure ways to send remittances. Also, the creation of more legal channels for international migration or recruitment could increase the access of the relatively poor to international migration, which could enhance the equity-increasing potential of remittances. In addition, emigration states can foster links with emigrants and encourage them to direct financial resources homeland, in the form of remittances, taxes and investment.

However, the scope and effect of such targeted policies are fundamentally limited. For instance, it is often argued that governments should “channel” remittances into productive investment (see, for instance, Zarate-Hoyos 2004; European Commission 2005) or “mobilize” remittances for national development (Athukorala 1993). To expect that this is really possible is rather naive as long as the general political and economic conditions in sending countries remain unfavourable. Moreover, such ideas imply that states should and can “tap” individuals’ remittances and assume (rather paternalistically) that states know better than individuals how to use income for welfare improvement. The extent to which remittances can and do contribute to development depends on the institutional environment of particular countries. Thus, the best policies for optimizing remittance impacts are general development policies aimed at restoring political trust, creating a stable investment climate and offering social protection to people.

After a long period of pessimism and near neglect, the recent rediscovery of remittances is a remarkable phenomenon, to say the least. However, against the background of the existing body of research stressing the fundamental complexity and heterogeneous character of migration-remittances-development interactions, any remittance euphoria should raise considerable suspicion. The current interest and belief in remittances also have a strong ideological dimension, as remittances fit very well into (neo)liberal political philosophies. On a critical note, Kapur (2003), therefore, wondered whether remittances are the newest “development mantra”. He argued that remittances strike the right cognitive chords because they fit in with a communitarian, “third way” approach and stress the principle of self-help. Soaring remittances fuel the impression or wish that “immigrants, rather than governments, then become the biggest provider of ‘foreign aid’” (Kapur 2003:10).

This discussion also raises the more fundamental question of whether the more optimistic tone of the debate over recent years reflects a veritable change in migration impacts, the use of better or other methodological and analytical tools or is the deductive echo of a general paradigm shift away from dependency to neoclassical and neodevelopmentalist views on migration and development. It appears that all of these factors have at least some explanatory value.

First, there is indeed evidence that the impacts of migration and remittances on development change over time, and that the positive effects tend to become more apparent as migration matures. Second, the overall quality of empirical research has certainly improved over the past few decades. Third, structuralist theory has become increasingly discredited, and this might have led to less negative interpretations of (remittance) dependency and a more positive value being attributed to the global incorporation and capitalization of regions and countries in the developing world, a process of which migration is an integral part. This latter shift cannot be dissociated from ideological shifts from state-centrist to (neo)liberal visions. Such shifts are also likely to have affected our interpretation of (even similar) empirical findings.

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There is a real danger that amnesia regarding a rich body of research will lead to naive, uninformed optimism reminiscent of earlier developmentalist beliefs. The significant empirical and theoretical advances that have been made over the past several decades stress the fundamentally heterogeneous nature of migration-remittance-development interactions as well as their contingency on spatial and temporal scales of analysis. This heterogeneity should forestall any blanket assertions on the issue. Notwithstanding their often considerable blessings for individuals, households and communities, migration and remittances are no panacea for solving more structural development problems.

If states fail to implement more general political and economic reform, migration and remittances are unlikely to contribute to nation-wide sustainable development. To a considerable extent, migration and remittances are a response to failing markets, institutions, nepotism and lack of meritocratic incentive structures, which tend to exclude non-elite groups from upward social and economic mobility. Migration is, to a considerable degree, a quest to overcome this lack of opportunities. Migration and remittances, if anything, are an investment in social security by households and families. However, migration and remittances are too limited in scale and too fragmented to remove more general development constraints. The lesson to be retained from structuralist views is that migration and remittances do not automatically lead to development under unfavourable general development conditions. Unattractive economic and political conditions might prevent migrants from investing. After all, remittance earnings not only enable migrants to invest, but also give them and their families the freedom to disengage from societies of origin.

Although the positive impacts of remittances (such as mitigating income risks, improving housing, education and health, financing investments and the collective financing by hometown associations of infrastructure including schools, roads and wells) tend to be celebrated, they also ironically point to the failure of states to provide basic public services and functioning markets. If states would improve their social policies and create a less risky and more reliable institutional environment, people would not be compelled to spend so many remittances on securing their livelihoods. This would set free a larger part of remittance income for investment, instead of being spent on income insurance.

Migrants and remittances can neither be blamed for a lack of development nor be expected to trigger take-off development in generally unattractive investment environments. Paradoxically, development in migrant-sending countries is a prerequisite for social and economic investment by migrants rather than a consequence of migration. Therefore, policies aimed at increasing people’s welfare, creating functioning markets and improving social security and public services, such as health and education, are also likely to enhance the contribution that migration and remittances can make to development.
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