

INTRODUCTION: PLACE, PERSPECTIVE, AND POWER— INTERPRETING SEPTEMBER 11

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During the weeks and months after September 11, commentators from across the political spectrum declared that the terrorist attacks marked a turning point in history. September 11 was unprecedented, of such magnitude and significance that it could only be compared to such events as the two world wars and the end of the Cold War. A book published before the year was out proclaimed that the world had entered an “Age of Terror.”¹ September 11, it has been repeatedly asserted, was either the end or the beginning of something momentous—a watershed event of world-historical importance. What all such pronouncements have in common is the assumption that the United States is the epicenter of global transformation: if the United States would never be the same again after September 11, such reasoning implies, neither would the rest of the world. This line of thought bears examination, for it reveals crucial aspects of the events themselves, and of the diversity of responses that they have elicited, both inside the United States and beyond.

There is no disputing that the underlying significance of September 11 can only be comprehended when placed in its full context, yet the boundaries of that context are themselves hotly contested. For some observers, the frightening shock of that day is the consequence of actions taken by followers of a charismatic religious fanatic, Osama bin Laden, whose peculiar brand of Islamic fascism has taken hold of the imagination of a growing number of people exposed to his message of resentment in the streets and mosques of Muslim communities around the world. Failing to recognize the severity of the threat—or failing to suppress it sufficiently—Western governments and various states in the Middle East and South Asia are now paying the high price of inadequate vigilance, according to this interpretation.² Whether categorized as atrocious crimes or as politico-military acts, the attacks carried out by the hijackers, like those undertaken by bin Laden’s associates over the past decade against a variety of U.S. targets in the Middle East and Africa, are in this view a matter calling for prosecution and eradication. The perpetrators must be sought out and eliminated, at which point the immediate problem (though not necessarily all possibilities of terrorism) will have been resolved.

One alternative perspective is also based on the conviction that the most immediate policy response to the September 11 attacks must be to eradicate bin Laden's network through improved policing. But it attributes the origins of his rise and appeal to the shortcomings of numerous political regimes in the Islamic world and/or to misguided foreign policies pursued by Western governments. For these observers, bin Laden is but a symptom of a deeper malaise affecting the Muslim world, and attenuation of this malaise is seen as a *sine qua non* for minimizing the likelihood of additional and perhaps even worse tragedies during the years to come. Of course, advocates of such positions differ notably in their identification of the relevant political problems at hand.³ Frequent candidates for blame include the exclusionary and/or fundamentalist nature of the Saudi monarchy and similar (mostly oil-exporting) states in the Middle East, the short-sighted decision of the United States and its allies to arm religious extremists as part of their campaign against the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, or the enduring conflict between Israel and the legitimate aspirations of the Palestinian people for a fully sovereign state of their own.

Still other observers of today's global landscape perceive September 11 as a different sort of wake-up call, one that interrogates fundamental underpinnings of the geopolitical and security order of the post–World War II period, particularly since the end of the Cold War. According to this view, the realist conception of international relations, which held that states should structure foreign policies and alliances on the basis of their power and influence relative to other states, must now give way to the realization that nonstate actors can wield power and inflict damage on a scale that was formerly the sole province of states.⁴ These observers predict that U.S. unilateralism will necessarily yield to a more multilateral and cooperative foreign policy, even if, as is likely, U.S. military superiority remains unchallenged for the foreseeable future.

One can certainly make a compelling argument that the virtually unrivaled position of the United States in the international system of power and exchange is unique in world history. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the global reach and unilateral freedom of action of the lone remaining superpower has grown far beyond that of previous world powers. No Roman caesar or British monarch could have imagined the scope of U.S. influence. That this “empire” is not constituted in formally territorial terms in the manner of previous imperial systems—whether Greek, Roman, Byzantine, Ottoman, Spanish, Dutch, or British—diminishes neither the force of its military authority nor its economic and cultural influence. To say that the United States is an “imperial” power is not to take an ideological, polemical, or controversial position; it is simply to state a

fact. How one interprets this reality is an entirely different matter, however, and has everything to do with where one sits—politically and geographically.

The sheer facticity of American supremacy is impressive enough in its own right, but one of the things September 11 made clear is that the United States wields more than just historically unprecedented power. It is, after all, the “City on a Hill,”⁵ and as such holds extraordinary symbolic significance; this is one reason why the attacks had such a profound emotional impact abroad. But this status is double-edged. Many people around the world look to the United States as a place where achievement trumps ascription, where religious and cultural diversity is tolerated, where economic opportunity is available to all, and where the positive achievements of modernity have reached their apogee. For others, however, the United States embodies the evils of globalization, the gross disparity in wealth and power between the West and the developing world, and the reckless use of military force. Surely we knew this already: around the world, McDonald’s restaurants are routinely sacked when angry crowds gather to demonstrate against some perceived American wrong. But September 11 brought home with renewed force the importance of the United States as symbol. The World Trade Center and the Pentagon represented more than *American* economic and military dominance. They also symbolized the global economic, military, and cultural ascendancy of the West, and the comparative marginalization of much of the rest of the world. As the terrorists of September 11 knew and many others have since learned, to attack the symbols is to strike at the heart of power. Here again, brute geopolitical facts give way to questions of perspective, of interpretation, of geography—and of ideology. If one’s geographic perspective is from the margins and one’s interpretive schema reflects this position, how does one respond to Western preeminence differently than if one is at home in the core?

Just as the extraordinary violence of September 11 was interpreted in a few much-publicized instances as an appropriate and righteous response to the violence of American global supremacy, so too the sheer symbolic force of the attacks rivaled the symbolic stature of the targets. The United States was suddenly no longer invulnerable, its power no longer unassailable. One important lesson to be learned from this clash of symbols is that American “hegemony” has never been truly hegemonic. As William Wallace points out in his contribution to this volume, a crucial and usually overlooked aspect of hegemony is the element of *consent*: a hegemonic power maintains its position of dominance not simply by force but also by the willingness of those in subordinate positions to accept the hegemon’s leadership. The German sociologist Max Weber called this aspect of rule “belief,” and asked “upon what inner justifications and upon what external

means does domination rest?”⁶ Without some element of consent, of belief—in other words, of legitimacy—hegemony can deteriorate into coercion and domination. The events and aftermath of September 11 graphically demonstrated that the U.S. position as the world’s sole superpower hardly rests upon the consent of all of the world’s countries and populations. The authors of most of the chapters in this volume attempt in various ways to address this crucial issue.

Even in the absence of legitimacy, the most common response to Western pre-eminence, at least at the level of international relations, is accommodation: most of the world has tried to come to terms, either willingly or grudgingly, with the contemporary global order. Especially since the end of the Cold War, many countries have had to adjust their economies and their political facades in order to satisfy the West and the international financial institutions that govern the world economy and control the flow of Western largesse. Accommodation, however, is no guarantee of success, as demonstrated by recent economic crises in countries from South Korea to Argentina. And of course some countries are so profoundly marginalized—their economies and their polities so completely undone—that accommodation is not an option. This is the case in most of sub-Saharan Africa and Central Asia, and much of the Middle East.

But the attacks of September 11 were not perpetrated by states disgruntled by their weakness vis-à-vis the West. Moreover, the small group of men who planned the attacks and flew the planes were not the products of refugee camps. To the contrary, they were the sons of relative privilege, well educated and widely traveled. Their worldviews, however, appear to have been shaped by a profound sense of powerlessness and resentment. Even if they acted as individuals or as isolated groups, these men and their actions cannot be disentangled from the broader configurations of international power touched upon above. For if September 11 was indeed a watershed of historical significance, if what happened in New York and Washington really did change the world, then we had best try to understand the international context in which the events took place. We should, furthermore, bring a diverse range of analyses to bear on the political, economic, and cultural factors which shaped that broad context.

This book is about September 11, but it is also about analytic perspective, about how the position one occupies in the world, geographically, ideologically, and/or interpretively, affects how one tries to make sense of what has happened. That the kinds of questions one asks upon being confronted with events of profound significance are influenced by perspective may seem an obvious or even trivial point, yet it deserves to be reiterated in the present context, when so many in the United States follow President Bush’s lead in saying, “You’re either with us or against us.” This book offers a sampling of interpretations of contemporary

trends from leading intellectuals around the world, whose vision is shaped in part by the locations from which they live their lives and engage the world of scholarship and civic affairs. Obviously, neither geography nor ideology nor analytic method defines exclusively how one thinks about the world, but in this book we seek to illustrate how each of these dimensions matters. Our contributors span a range of academic disciplines, from anthropology, economics, and history to political science and sociology. The points they choose to emphasize as crucial are strikingly different, as are the historical and conceptual referents to which they turn in an effort to make sense of complex and troubling phenomena. This is as we intended: we did not aspire to present each and every view of the issues, from each and every place on the intellectual or geographic map, but we have endeavored to elicit contributions from a diverse group of leading scholars.⁷

THEMATIC EMPHASES

An adequate assessment of the consequences of the changed reality for different parts of the world must encompass several interrelated but potentially distinguishable clusters of issues. Operating on multiple levels—global, regional, and national—these include security-related concerns, a variety of significant shifts in the landscapes of economies and polities across much of the globe, and the threat posed by terrorism to liberal democratic norms.

SECURITY

Clearly, the security implications of September 11 include but go well beyond the increasingly assertive U.S. stance toward terrorists in the Middle East or Afghanistan, or toward those who seek to target Western interests. Indeed, a variety of global and regional security arrangements not directly related to the September attacks are being reshaped by responses to those attacks. The winds of change issue not only from the United States but also from other governments, as evidenced by India's renewed assertiveness in its tense relationship with Pakistan (particularly over Kashmir) and by the growing confidence of the Putin administration in Russia's ability to impose its objectives in Chechnya. As is typical of national security emergencies everywhere, in each of these cases decisiveness in the battle against external threats has become a more potent currency in domestic political affairs than was the case prior to September 11. The aggressive American response to the September attacks has lent a veneer of legitimacy to crackdowns on domestic "subversive" opponents both past and present. In China, for example, there have been signs of increased repression of secessionist Muslim groups in the western hinterlands.⁸ Likewise, former Uruguayan military leaders have

reemerged after many years of silence to justify the repression carried out during the 1970s “dirty war” against internal opposition.

It is perhaps in part for this reason that six months after the attacks in the United States, the predominant trend in American policy is clearly in the direction of increasingly unilateral rather than multilateral approaches to conflict resolution and governance. American righteousness is affecting the international behavior not only of the United States itself, but of many of its allies as well. It is widely believed, for example, that the increasing polarization of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict owes much to the Sharon government’s confidence that it can count on unambiguous support from Washington, regardless of European misgivings. Analogous cases are cropping up in such distant contexts as Colombia, as analyzed in Chapter 10 of this volume. Despite concerns among Colombia’s neighbors and United Nations agencies, the beleaguered Pastrana government abandoned peace negotiations in February 2002 and resumed attacks against Colombian guerrillas. Pastrana’s decision was triggered by a guerrilla kidnapping of a senator seized from a hijacked civilian airplane, and was consistent with growing antiguerrilla sentiment within Colombian public opinion, but it also reflected the preferences of his American allies.

The political fallout from post-September 11 American unilateralism is nowhere more apparent than in western Europe, where NATO, the world’s preeminent multilateral military alliance, has been relegated to the shadows by American distaste for consultation. Indeed, the support of mainstream European politicians for U.S. policy in the months after September 11 masked potentially profound and long-term repercussions for both transatlantic relations and European politics, and was often at odds with European public opinion, which clearly differentiated between sympathy for the United States and criticism of its response in Afghanistan. In Britain, Tony Blair gambled his political future on unstinting support for American policy, for which he faced ferocious domestic criticism. In France, where even official support was somewhat more muted than elsewhere on the continent, responses to U.S. policy grew more strident as the war in Afghanistan progressed, and as the Bush administration kept upping the rhetorical ante.⁹ And in Germany, the governing alliance between the Social Democrats and the Green Party was deeply shaken by disagreement about whether and to what extent Germany should support the war in Afghanistan, the conduct of which they would not be able to influence. For the traditionally anti-war Greens, most of whose legislators Chancellor Gerhard Schröder ultimately pressured into supporting the American war campaign, a deep rift has opened between politicians and their electoral base, as a result of which the next federal

elections may see the Greens fall beneath the 5 percent threshold needed to gain parliamentary representation.

Over the medium term, however, many observers think that the Americans' need to secure allies in the war on terrorism is likely to encourage greater flexibility in Washington, and perhaps even a significant degree of multilateralism. Substantial concessions have been granted already to Pakistan, to cite but the most striking example, and it is reasonable to expect this sort of scenario to become more frequent over time. Further down the road, presumably with a different U.S. administration in office, it is conceivable that we will see a full-fledged shift toward multilateralism. Some of the key incentives for an eventual move in that direction are laid out by Luiz Carlos Bresser Pereira in his contribution to this volume (Chapter 6), which emphasizes the increasingly nonstate and transnational character of threats to security, as well as the imperative to reorient understandings of security to encompass social and economic as well as military factors.

Colombia is but one of numerous instances where the significance of the label "terrorist" has taken on renewed force in the aftermath of the September attacks. The boundaries between those whose grievances may be considered legitimate and those who must be neutralized at all costs have shifted accordingly in locations as distant as Kashmir and Northern Ireland, with long-term consequences that remain highly uncertain. Similarly, as U.S. officials, most notably President Bush himself, defined an increasingly broad range of threats as analogous to terrorism—in his State of the Union speech Bush referred to Iran, Iraq, and North Korea as an "axis of Evil" and accused these countries of undermining efforts to contain weapons of mass destruction—prospects diminished for avoiding open hostilities with numerous established governments with which the United States had until that point coexisted with varying degrees of discomfort.

That the terrorist label is not solely a matter of semantics is evident in the case of American intervention in the war against Islamic rebels in the Philippines. Jungle warfare between the Philippine state and guerrilla organizations has gone on intermittently for decades, but not since the late days of the Cold War has there been even a remote suggestion that it was appropriate for the U.S. government to become involved in such conflicts. That changed after September, and presumably not only in the Philippines but also in other faraway locations where proscribed Islamic organizations are said to make up part of the Al Qaeda network that carried out the September 11 attacks.

GLOBALIZATION AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

The months that followed the terrorist attacks also triggered a series of important shifts in the economic landscape and, more generally, in the climate of debates concerning economic globalization. For the American public, a sharp (though brief) decline in stock markets and in the pace of economic activity reinforced a climate of pessimism about future prospects for growth. Reeling from the shock of the attacks themselves, Americans could no longer harbor any doubt that the boom years of the 1990s had ended.¹⁰ October witnessed a sharp surge in unemployment, particularly in New York City and in the low-skill, underpaid segments of the labor market. The impact on hotel and restaurant workers reverberated far beyond the city, and indeed beyond the country's borders: many of those left jobless were undocumented migrants whose families had remained in their countries of origin, and who now needed to make do without the remittances to which they had grown accustomed.

As signs of deepening recession dampened U.S. confidence in the inexorable expansion of market capitalism, they also influenced perceptions around the world concerning the inevitability of continuing economic globalization. Ironically, evidence that supported many of the claims of globalization's skeptics—declining consumer and enterprise demand, rising unemployment and protectionism, decreasing flows of investment and trade—did not necessarily empower antiglobalization activists. For the latter, dramatic acts of protest against the symbols of worldwide capitalist domination became far riskier in the aftermath of the attacks on the World Trade Center. The biggest international news story during the summer of 2001 concerned the bloody July demonstrations in Genoa against globalization, which drew some 150,000 people. The absence of more than sporadic and peaceful demonstrations on the occasion of the World Economic Forum meetings in New York City six months later testified to how much had changed for globalization's foes, as well as for its champions.

Meanwhile, in Washington policy circles the attacks transformed debates on fundamental questions of domestic economic affairs. The partisan battle was no longer about how to spend the surplus, for the surplus was no more, and a bewildered nation was treated to a return of Reagan era military Keynesianism. Arriving in New York a week after the attacks, President Bush abandoned his anti-big government rhetoric, pledging to spend "as much as it takes" to rebuild the damaged city and coughing up an initial \$20 billion, to the surprise of the state's two Democratic Senators.¹¹ The federal budget put forth for the coming fiscal year contained even greater increases for security-related expenditures than had been anticipated by the hawkish administration.¹²

Republican reticence about big government proved less intractable than one might have expected. Reacting to the prospect of widespread anthrax contamination, the Bush administration moved quickly to strongarm the multinational pharmaceutical company Bayer to slash prices of the antibiotic Cipro on the grounds that the United States faced a public health emergency. Yet, as Norman Girvan, the distinguished Caribbean economist, pointed out, how one interpreted the significance of this policy shift hinged on one's location in the world.¹³ For him, as for many other developing country leaders, the contrast was with U.S. intransigence regarding price breaks on pharmaceutical products to treat devastating tropical diseases in countries that lacked resources to pay market prices. It turned out that some were more equal than others when it came to the inviolability of free market principles.

The willingness to suspend economic orthodoxy in the interest of the war against terrorism extended beyond the U.S. borders: billions of dollars of Pakistan's debt were rescheduled during the last months of 2001, and hundreds of millions more were simply forgiven. Of course, if in Islamabad it seemed that a new day had dawned—in the economy as well as in many other respects analyzed by Kamran Asdar Ali in Chapter 8—the picture changed in quite different ways in such places as Argentina, where security considerations were not in play. To be sure, the Washington consensus was never applied equally to all developing countries, but that longstanding practice was all the more evident in the wake of September 11: depending on where one stood, orthodoxy was being demanded with new vigor, or flexibility took on unprecedented dimensions.

Economic expectations and preferences were affected in other ways as well, as governments of developing countries recalculated—in different directions, depending on their geographic location and strategic significance to the alliance-building strategies of Western countries—expectations for economic growth and for flows of private capital and development assistance. Some observers speculated that proximity to developed-country markets would take on renewed significance in an international environment in which goods would physically cross borders less seamlessly than was the case prior to September 11. The notion that mobility would be constrained significantly in a new world order in which security is paramount directly undermines a fundamental pillar of the hyperflexible capitalism that advocates of globalization had deemed irreversible in light of technological, organizational, and political transformations of the late twentieth century. Ironically, if this scenario proved even partially plausible, history would conclude that the apogee of global capitalism had been brought to earth by an equally transnational antagonist. In this case the victors would be a small band of ideological extremists, similarly dispersed around the world and organized in

technologically enabled, virtually invisible networks, rather than the high-flying investors and traders who spearheaded the 1990s boom.¹⁴

TERRORISM AND PUBLIC LIFE

Globalization is also about movements of people across borders, and one of the frightening aspects of the September 11 attacks was the ease with which the perpetrators had moved around the world during the years, months, and days leading up to their operation. Many of the hijackers had lived in the United States for long periods. This fact, combined with the Middle Eastern origins of the terrorists and a pervasive climate of fear in the United States after the attacks, led to an extraordinary and discriminatory use of law enforcement prerogative in rounding up “foreign” suspects, a move that to many observers seemed to undermine American standards of judicial fairness.¹⁵ Others have asked whether the space of diversity and individual freedom that distinguishes liberal democracies from the values of their antagonists might not be reasonably contracted in the hopes of securing that space against terrorism.¹⁶ How much tolerance can be allowed at this juncture, when fanatics who regard tolerance itself as an evil possess the means to inflict mass violence and are willing to deploy it against the liberal democracies in which they themselves often live? This raises a vexing problem: even if one accepts certain restrictions on the civil liberties of noncitizens, on the assumption that the threat is “external,” what of “internal” enemies? Lest we forget, prior to September 11 the most lethal act of terrorism in U.S. history, the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing, was perpetrated by an American.¹⁷ Sources of terror and violent extremism reside within as well as without. The logic of suspecting noncitizens of terrorist intentions implies that such a threat would disappear upon naturalization.

Even though it has become increasingly difficult to monitor and control flows of people across national borders, many countries nevertheless have reflexively sought to restrict these flows in the aftermath of the attacks. And as in the United States, some of these actions raise troubling questions. A powerful example of the backlash effects of the violence of September 11 on liberal democratic states can be found in Europe. Seyla Benhabib has argued that the manner in which liberal democracies deal with questions of immigration is a fundamental test of their core values, that these policies are the “pivotal social practices through which the normative complexities of human rights and sovereignty can be most acutely observed.”¹⁸ Prior to September 11, with some variation among states, European social policy and immigration statutes were arguably more inclusive than in any other part of the world; even Germany was making moves to liberalize its naturalization laws. Now, it seems, hopes for an inclusive form of transnational citi-

zenship are being dashed on the ground of rising popular fears and new restrictions on immigration. Extreme right-wing parties, which base their appeal in large part on anti-immigration rhetoric, are gaining in popularity throughout western Europe, even in the famously tolerant societies of Scandinavia and the Netherlands.¹⁹ As with the other clusters of issues discussed above, existing trends were exacerbated after September. In Germany, for example, the notion that “foreigners” should accept the “leading ideas” of German culture (*Leitkultur*), a sentiment that was formerly expressed only on the fringes of political discourse, is now finding its way into respectable public discourse. Moreover, anti-immigrant polemics that before September 11 were limited primarily to extreme right-wing circles are now influencing policy formation, under the guise of combating terrorism.²⁰

Some observers ask whether it might not be more productive to examine the norms of inclusion and their impact on public life in liberal democracies, as Tariq Modood does in Chapter 11, than to exclude from full incorporation into society persons and practices regarded as foreign. The ways in which religious diversity finds expression in the public sphere is a key indicator of how societies define themselves. We often speak of the “core values” of liberal democracies, one of which is secularism—the separation of religion from state functions, combined with private freedom of worship. One of the “core values” of Islam, in contrast, is the public and indeed state incorporation of faith. How can these two seemingly opposing standards coexist, particularly in multicultural societies? What, if any, modifications should be made to secularism in the West, given increasing religious diversity? Should Muslims who live in the West, for example, be forced to accept secular norms, or might a new form of secularism be instituted that is less hostile to political religion? These questions have become crucial, given the nature of the grievances that motivate bin Laden and his followers.

Modernity has long been equated directly with post-Enlightenment notions of secularism. It was also seen as culturally nonspecific: though a construct of the West, modernity, it has been supposed, would look largely the same wherever it occurred. Weber defined the modern state as binding together the principles of territoriality, a monopoly on military power, and the legitimate use of violence. Modernity, he argued, combines this aggrandizement of state power with a structural differentiation of society that separates religion from politics. When states fall apart, when the integrity of state functions decays (as has been the case in many parts of the developing world), these guiding principles of stateness no longer obtain. And in many of these decaying states, fundamentalist religious movements gain a foothold.

But the persistent penetration of the public sphere by religion even in nomi-

nally quite secular countries, such as the United States,²¹ has precipitated a shift in interpretations of the relationship among modernity, religion, and politics. Secularization theory predicted that religion would become increasingly marginalized in society with the advance of modernity, but this theory has been called into question by the seemingly paradoxical fact that economic development and religious fundamentalism have been advancing hand in hand in much of the developing world. In parts of the “advanced” world, meanwhile, the religious right has gained ascendancy during the latest wave of globalization. Recent research (including that reported by Wang Gungwu in this volume) suggests, moreover, that neither modernity nor secularism is a uniform construct.²²

All of these developments highlight the need to reexamine the animating principles of liberal democracies with an eye both to dealing with the very real threat that terrorism poses and to continuing to uphold the norms that have guided public life. It has been widely asserted since September 11 that the West is distinguished from those who revile and attack it by its embrace of tolerance and individual freedoms. This constitutes an ethic of public practice, the sternest tests of which come at times like these, when this ethic finds itself directly under attack.

ORGANIZATION OF THE VOLUME

The thematic clusters sketched out above correspond loosely to the organization of the book. Part I is devoted to interpretations of the relationship between terrorism, security, and social values. Without diminishing the horrors of events in the United States last September, the chapters by Vanaik and Mamdani point to the all too frequent tendency of Western observers to overlook the waves of terror that have been visited on colonized people for decades, and that account in part for their sometimes jaded reaction to America’s post–September 11 cries for exceptional sympathy. Indeed, the fact that terrorism is a routine aspect of life in many parts of the world is part of what leads to fundamentally different understandings of the world. Values of respect for human rights—particularly that most fundamental of human rights, the right to live (free from fear of sudden and arbitrary attack)—emerges for both Achin Vanaik and Mahmood Mamdani as a common ground in reading relationships between terror and security, wherever one happens to be looking.

Both contributors write from the perspective of the global South, and share an underlying premise that the United States has, through acts of both commission and omission, had a hand in creating the political and economic conditions that can nourish terrorism. Many American readers will be shocked by this un-

spectacular claim, though it is a common assumption in many parts of the world. It is a misreading to jump to the conclusion, as many commentators have done since September 11, that those who share this point of view “blame” the United States for what happened last September. What is at stake, rather, is coming to terms with the global context in which these attacks took place. Addressing the political and historical context, Mamdani argues that the presumed equivalence between Islam and terrorism that has been so prevalent in public discourse since September 2001 is based not only on an ethnocentric and polemical interpretation of religion, but also on a highly selective memory of the post–World War II history of terrorism. He reminds us that much of the terrorism of this period had nothing to do with religious, or “cultural,” battles, and that the United States itself has supported terrorist political organizations in many parts of the world in an effort to further its strategic and political agenda. Vanaik, too, is concerned with terrorism as a political phenomenon, but suggests that we must understand its ethics and its efficacy, as well as apply strict limits to how we define it. Only by arriving at an evaluatively neutral definition that distinguishes the diverse political uses to which terrorism has been put, Vanaik says, can we begin to comprehend the “singularity” of September 11.

The question of human rights and their relationship to the changing security climate is a common theme of the contributions by Luis Rubio and Didier Bigo (discussed also by Kanishka Jayasuriya in Part II). Writing from Mexico and France, respectively, both authors consider it appropriate for Western allies to support the U.S. counterterrorism effort. However, they emphasize the need to continue to privilege civil liberties that, in Rubio’s view, are precisely those features of Western civilization that the attackers are most determined to destroy and that must be protected if democratic societies are to emerge as the victors in the struggle against terrorism. The legacy of September 11, he argues, will be determined in large part by whether and how notions of democracy in the U.S. evolve as a result of the attacks. Echoing concern with these principles, Bigo notes that the presence of substantial Muslim minorities, citizens and noncitizens alike, in France and in Europe as a whole dictates that Western states exercise extreme caution in adopting measures that would single out such groups for repressive actions. He suggests that the United States, less accustomed than European countries to dealing with the real threat of terror on its soil, has exhibited signs of naiveté in its response to the attacks, both in exaggerating its capacity to do away with terrorism altogether and in downplaying the costs of combating it without adequate intelligence.²³ Security responses that are not appropriate to the actual danger faced, he argues, can be counterproductive, and have the potential to increase the public sense of insecurity.

Part II, addressing the changing configuration of the world after September 11, begins with a chapter by the British international relations scholar William Wallace, whose concerns about the temptation toward U.S. unilateralism resonate with those of his colleague across the Channel, Didier Bigo. Wallace does not question basic European solidarity with the United States, whether with regard to the attacks themselves, the need for a credible response to them, or the broader governance of the international order. But he is concerned that the more the United States opts to act on its own, the more fragile the European-American coalition will become. The grounds for potential dispute include the willingness or capacity of the United States to act as a genuine partner in a coalition with the Europeans, rather than play the role of unilateral sovereign imposing decisions on members of a bloc in which it seeks outright domination. Europe's dilemma, from this perspective, is how to calibrate the imperative for continued transatlantic cooperation in the economic realm against Europe's increasing uneasiness with the growing unilateralism of U.S. foreign policy. Wallace insists, however, that the future of the transatlantic alliance is not one in which Europe is the only partner that must make adjustments. The United States, too, must come to realize that its own economic and political interests, both within the alliance and beyond it, lie in cooperating with Europe in a "liberal democratic"-led world order.

For Luiz Carlos Bresser-Pereira, the long-term prospects for international cooperation are highly promising: absent an institutional environment conducive to transnational cooperation in the management of many sorts of issues, the process of economic globalization under way in recent decades would be imperiled. And, Bresser-Pereira points out, most of the developing world is as committed as are the Western powers to avoiding that outcome. He cautions, however, that for this global consensus to hold, markets must be governed and regulated: the possibility of economic development with justice operates simultaneously as a source of political legitimacy. These twin factors reinforce the need to develop new and predominantly nonstate mechanisms for articulating consensus around issues relating to the governance of global transactions and at the same time to strengthen existing international institutions. In this regard, while the "war against terrorism" in Afghanistan is an appropriate and legitimate response by the American state to an attack on its soil, Bresser-Pereira considers it an outlier in an environment in which states will have to give way increasingly to what he labels "globalization's politics." For Bresser-Pereira, as for several other contributors to the volume, the future international order ought to be defined by cooperation, with states articulating their concerns with others through the work of multilateral organizations and,

presumably, new transnational organizations of various kinds. Contributors vary, however, in their degree of confidence that such change is likely to come about.

Kanishka Jayasuriya engages several themes from Part I, especially the balance between security and liberty, but analyzes them in the context of an international order that he regards as excessively dominated by security concerns and by widespread fear of truly open political structures. This fear is pervasive, he claims, and global in its reach. Terrorists fear the contestation that is essential to liberal democracy, yet the Western response accelerates a process already apparent prior to September 11: we see restrictions being imposed, under the guise of security, on the civil liberties and free flow of ideas without which liberal democracies lose their core values. Even if extraordinary events do sometimes necessitate extraordinary responses, Jayasuriya argues, these conditions of “exception” must be carefully delimited and subject to the constraints of liberalism’s key political institutions—legislative approval, judicial scrutiny, and public debate.

Part III contains three chapters in which the implications of September 11 are analyzed from various regional perspectives. We begin with the part of the world that was, along with the United States, most directly affected by the events, namely Afghanistan and Pakistan. It is worth noting that many estimates of Afghan civilian casualties since the U.S.-led bombing campaign began are now roughly the same as estimates of lives lost in the collapse of the Twin Towers and the attack on the Pentagon. The long-term impacts of this assault, on both Afghanistan and its neighbors (Iran, Uzbekistan, Tadjikistan, and especially Pakistan), will go a long way toward determining how this significant loss of life is remembered by historians and others.²⁴

Kamran Asdar Ali provides a cogent assessment of the history of Pakistan’s political and military place in the region. At least since the Afghan war against the Soviet Union, he demonstrates, Pakistan has been the key geopolitical player in the region, and a proxy for the United States in its Cold War efforts against the USSR. The Afghan-Soviet war and the American money that funded it, as both Ali and Mamdani document, created the mujahideen as a transnational fighting force; the war was both the political and the military launching pad for Osama bin Laden’s jihad. September 2001 inaugurated another watershed moment in Pakistani history, in which the state once again faced an international environment that had the potential to redirect Pakistani domestic politics in constructive or pernicious directions. Ali’s case study is a textbook example of how distant the effects of those airplanes have been.

For Said Amir Arjomand, who viewed the horror of the Trade Center collapse on a television screen in Beirut, that impact was also direct and enduring, and

was fundamentally shaped by his location. In the Middle East, the events of September 11 are seen through the prism of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Indeed, as Arjomand shows, since at least 1998 bin Laden has cited this conflict, and the American support for Israel that many Muslims think perpetuates it, as one of two central points that justify his “holy war” against the United States. The “taboo” referred to in the title of the chapter—“Can Rational Analysis Break a Taboo?”—is the unwillingness of virtually all politicians, policy makers, and members of the mainstream media in the United States to question the virtually unconditional support that the United States provides Israel, or to examine the role that support may have played in the events of September 11. Arjomand argues that neither the religious nor the nonreligious motivations of the terrorists can be comprehended without acknowledging the crucial importance of the Palestinian question. Nor, in his view, can the United States hope to win its “war” against terrorism without assessing the costs of its policies in Israel and elsewhere in the Middle East.

Finally, we shift our gaze beyond parts of the world conventionally thought of as directly touched by either the attacks themselves or the war against terror, and inquire into the consequences of September 11 for a variety of issues in contemporary Latin America. Francisco Gutiérrez Sanín, Eric Hershberg, and Monica Hirst make clear that the consequences of September are not entirely new, but rather have dovetailed with and intensified several trends that were already under way. In a part of the world where terrorism and counterterrorism have long been a part of everyday life, and where the effects of narcotics trafficking, political and economic instability, and U.S. intervention in intensely bloody conflicts have characterized the political landscape for decades, September 11 both complicates and exacerbates extant problems. In Chile, to cite the most powerful symbolic example, September 11 happens to be the highly charged anniversary of the U.S.-supported coup that overthrew the democratically elected government of Salvador Allende in 1973 and installed General Augusto Pinochet in power. Gutiérrez, Hershberg, and Hirst consider Colombia to be the Latin American country in which the stakes of September 11 may prove highest, and they devote a substantial portion of the chapter to assessing the pre- and post-September 11 situation in that beleaguered country.

The concluding section of the book directly engages concerns that have been touched on throughout earlier chapters, namely the relationship between religion and politics. Tariq Modood writes from Britain, where there is a large Muslim population and where the politics of Islam was a crucial public issue long before September 11. Modood argues that how societies nominally committed to political pluralism and racial, ethnic, and religious diversity deal with crises that

threaten these core principles is crucial for their identity. To assert, furthermore, that Muslims represent a culturally and politically “alien” presence in the West (as many commentators have since September 11, including some Muslims themselves) is not only to derogate liberal democracies’ essential values, but also to ignore the central contribution that Muslims in Britain have made to the expansion and strengthening of those very ideals. Modood shows that Muslims have been at the center of efforts in Britain to redress “racial” and religious discrimination, to extend to Muslim schools the public funding that was already available to Christian and Jewish schools, and in general to give religious and other markers of cultural difference full expression in the public sphere. This positive role that Muslims have played in Britain, Modood concludes, can be extended in the effort to bridge the widening gap between the West and the Islamic world.

Riva Kastoryano also addresses the role Muslims play in European and international politics. Drawing on transnationalism, a key concept from contemporary social science work on immigration, she examines the network of social, economic, and political ties that Muslims in Europe have established at multiple levels: between countries in Europe, between these countries and the European Union, with their countries of origin, and with Islamic states in the Middle East and elsewhere in the Islamic world. The phenomenon of transnationalism, moreover, helps us understand networks such as Al Qaeda, which is constituted and operates across national borders, and takes advantage of the increasingly fluid structure of interstate relations in western Europe.

Finally, Wang Gungwu takes up the question of Islamic fundamentalism by way of a deep comparative historical analysis of the relationship between different forms of secularism, modernization, and political action. Many commentators, in both the West and the Islamic world, have argued that Islamic states have failed to modernize in part because they have failed to accept Western standards of secularism. This old and contentious debate has received renewed and wider attention since September 11. Yet, from his vantage point in East Asia, Wang suggests that all of the key terms deployed in the dispute, especially the word “secular” itself, are historically contingent and ideologically loaded. The West has no monopoly on secularism, which has a much longer history in China and South Asia. The highly charged contemporary relationship between Islam and the West, Wang argues, issues not only from enormous differences in power and wealth but also from the failure of the West to acknowledge that the form of secularism it is pushing on the developing world as a prerequisite for “modernization” is itself a form of fundamentalism and faith. In the Islamic world, the long history of opposition to Western notions of modernization and secularism has

recently found virulent forms of expression among extremists who have turned this disagreement into a holy war.

CONCLUSION

Isolationism is a longstanding feature of American political culture, and contrary to conventional wisdom, and to many commentators assessing change during the initial year of the Bush administration, the projection of U.S. military power to faraway corners of the earth does not contradict the underlying impulse upon which isolationism depends. The September 11 terrorist attack provoked renewed U.S. awareness of the importance of the world beyond its borders, and indeed a willingness to attempt to influence events elsewhere, but it did not necessarily occasion fundamental reflection about the quality of American interactions abroad. The renewed emphasis on foreign policy has not been occasioned by concern about security in the world as a whole but rather by the understandable desire to achieve “homeland” security. A stance that appears proactive on the surface is thus fundamentally defensive in its underlying psychology, if not in its methods or consequences.

While this book is written primarily by analysts who are not from the United States, it aims to speak to debates that are very much about the ways in which the United States engages the world and the importance for humankind of the Americans’ getting it right, as it were. One consequence of the enormous power wielded by the United States at this moment of world history is that the costs of its adopting fundamentalist postures, in Wang’s sense of the term, are potentially enormous, even more so than was the case during the Cold War era.

The contributors to this volume come from many different places and perspectives, and their views do not always converge. But they share an aspiration for a less violent world, a world in which transnational communities can coexist peacefully, diverse religious and ethnic groups tolerate (and even learn from) one another, and individuals are protected and empowered by states, rather than oppressed by them. To forge such a world, Western powers will have to cooperate with one another, and they will have to do so in ways that take into account the impact of their actions on nations that lack the resources that historically have been associated with the capacity to influence events beyond their borders (and sometimes, within those very borders). They will also need to act judiciously, to avoid trampling on individual and collective rights, and indeed to recognize the legitimate aspirations of different peoples and states to seek their own paths. Consistent with the future envisioned by writers such as Bresser Pereira, they will

have to coalesce, however reluctantly, behind an international order in which “globalization’s politics” can flourish.

The key question for our time is whether the United States will elect to pursue this course into the future, or whether instead it will in effect remain isolationist, focused on its own narrow interests even while it exercises influence over the life chances of peoples far beyond its borders. Contributors to this collection may differ in the degree to which they are hopeful about the American capacity to play this role—one that would be highly unusual for a superpower—yet if this book serves to foster reflexive debates within the United States, it will have made a minor contribution to that end. That is what we believe is needed in order to create the conditions for a substantial reduction in terror, wherever and however it might take place.