SCIENCE RESEARCH COUNCIL / AFTER SEPT. 11
Before, After, and In Between
Der Derian, Research Professor of International
Relations, Brown University; Professor of Political Science,
University of Massachusetts, Amherst
9.11 and after 9.11: all
social scientists, save perhaps the most recalcitrant
positivists waiting for more data points to come in, must
now survey international as well as domestic politics by
this temporal rift. Yet
we seem stuck, it is uncertain for how long, in a dangerous
interim that thwarts scholarly inquiry. After terrorist
hijackers transformed three commercial jetliners into highly
explosive kinetic weapons, toppled the twin towers of the
World Trade Center, substantially damaged the Pentagon,
killed over five thousand people, and triggered a state of
emergency - and before the dead are fully grieved, Osama bin
Ladenâs head is brought on a platter, justice is perceived
as done, and information is no longer a subsidiary of war -
there is very little about 9-11 that is safe
to say. Unless
one is firmly situated in a patriotic, ideological, or
religious position (which at home and abroad are
increasingly one and the same), it is intellectually
difficult and even politically dangerous to assess the
meaning of a conflict that phase-shifts with every news
cycle, from âTerror Attackâ to âAmerica Fights
Backâ; from a âcrusadeâ to a âcounter-terror
campaignâ; from âthe first war of the 21st
centuryâ to a fairly conventional combination of
humanitarian intervention and remote killing; from infowar
to real war; from kinetic terror to bioterror.
such conditions, I believe the immediate task of the social
scientist and all concerned individuals is to uncover what
is dangerous to
think and say. Or
as Walter Benjamin put it best, âin times of terror, when
everyone is something of a conspirator, everybody will be in
a situation where he has to play detective.â
work and some courage is needed because questions about the
root causes or political intentions of the terrorist act
have been either silenced by charges of âmoral equivalencyâ, or, rendered moot by claims that the
exceptional nature of the act does not require explanation.
It quickly became accepted wisdom, from President
Bush on down, that evil was to blame, and that the
appropriate political and intellectual focus should be on
how best to eradicate evil. Even sophisticated analysts like
Michael Ignatieff downplayed the significance of social or
political inquiry by declaiming the exceptionality of the
we are up against is apocalyptic nihilism. The nihilism of
their means - the indifference to human costs - takes their
actions not only out of the realm of politics, but even out
of the realm of war itself. The apocalyptic nature of their
goals makes it absurd to believe they are making political
demands at all. They are seeking the violent transformation
of an irremediably sinful and unjust world. Terror does not
express a politics, but a metaphysics, a desire to give
ultimate meaning to time and history through ever-escalating
acts of violence which culminate in a final battle between
good and evil.1
funneling the experience through the image of American
exceptionalism, 9.11 quickly took on an exceptional ahistoricity. For
the most part, history was only invoked - mainly in the sepia tones of the Second World War - to
prepare America for the sacrifice and suffering that lay
influential conservative George Will wrote that there were
now only two time zones left for the United States:
whose birth was mid-wived by a war and whose history has
been punctuated by many more, is the bearer of great
responsibilities and the focus of myriad resentments.
Which is why for America, there are only two kinds of
years, the war years and the interwar years.2
such forced circumstances, of being beyond experience,
outside of history, and between wars, 9.11 does not easily
yield to philosophical, political or social inquiry.
I believe the best the academician can do is to
thickly describe, robustly interrogate, and directly
challenge the authorized truths and official actions of all
parties who are positing a world view of absolute
differences in need of final solutions.
I do so here by first challenging the now common
assumption that 9.11 is an exceptional event beyond history
and theory, especially those theories tainted, as Edward
Rothstein claimed in the New
York Times, by
âpostmodernismâ and âpost-colonialismâ.3
Second, I examine the representations, technologies,
and strategies of network wars that have eluded mainstream
journalism and traditional social science.
I finish by uncovering what I consider to be the main
dangers presented by the counter/terror of 9-11.
An Exceptional Act?
the question of exceptionalism, consider a few testimonials,
the first from an editorial in The
New York Times:
the attack against the World Trade Center proves anything it
is that our offices, factories, transportation and
communication networks and infrastructures are relatively
vulnerable to skilled terroristsâŠAmong the rewards for our
attempts to provide the leadership needed in a fragmented,
crisis-prone world will be as yet unimagined terrorists and
other socio-paths determined to settle scores with us.4
from a cover story of Newsweek:
explosion shook more than the building: it rattled the smug
illusion that Americans were immune, somehow, to the plague
of terrorism that torments so many countries.5
finally, one from the London Sunday
began the day as a clerk working for the Dean Witter
brokerage on the 74th floor of the World Trade
Center in New York and ended it as an extra in a real-life
sequel to Towering InfernoâŠ6
might surprise some to learn that these are all quotes taken
from 1993, the first and much less deadly terrorist attack
on the World Trade Center.
They are presented here as a caution, against reading
terrorism only in the light - the often-blinding light - of
the events of September 11.
Obviously the two WTC events differ in the scale of
the devastation as well as the nature of the attack.
9-11/WTC defied the public imagination of the real
â not to mention, as just about every public official and
media authority is loathe to admit, the official imagination
and pre-emptive capacity of the intelligence community,
federal law enforcement, airport security, military, and
other governmental agencies.
Shock and surprise produced an immediate and nearly
uniform reading of
the event that was limited to discourses of condemnation,
retribution, and counterterror.
But surely it is a public responsibility to place
9.11 in an historical context and interpretive field that
reaches beyond the immediacy of personal tragedy and
official injury. Otherwise
9-11 will be remembered not for the attack itself but for
the increasing cycles of violence that follow.
is not wholly new, what is it?
We have a better sense of what it is not than what it
is: from the
President and Secretary of Defense and on down the
food-chain of the national security hierarchy, we have heard
that this will not be a war of states against states; it
will not be the Gulf War or Kosovo; and it will not be
Vietnam or Mogadishu. And
theyâre probably right â certainly more right than
commentators from both the Right (itâs Pearl Harbor) and
Left (itâs an anti-imperialist struggle) who have relied
on sloppy ideological analogies to understand the event.
In my view 9-11 is a combination of new and old forms
of conflict, including:
the rhetoric of holy war from both sides; a virtual
network war in the media and on the internet; a high-tech
surveillance war overseas but also in our airports, our
cities, and even our homes; and a dirty war of
counter-terrorism and counter-insurgency, using an air
campaign and limited special operations to kill the
leadership and to intimidate the supporters of al Qaeda and
call this new hybrid conflict, virtuous
It has evolved from the battlefield technologies of
the Gulf War and the aerial campaigns of Bosnia and Kosovo;
it draws on just war doctrine (when possible) and holy war
(when necessary); it clones the infowar of global
surveillance and the networked war of multiple media. In
the name of the holy trinity of international order â
global free markets, democratic sovereign states, and
limited humanitarian interventions - the U.S. has led the
way in a revolution in military
affairs (RMA) which underlies virtuous war. At the
heart as well as the muscle of this transformation is the
technical capability and ethical imperative to threaten and,
if necessary, actualize violence from a distance â but
again, with minimal casualties when possible.
networked information, global surveillance, and virtual
technologies to bring âthereâ here in near real-time and
with near-verisimilitude, virtuous war emerged before 9-11.
But it now looks to be the ultimate means by which the U.S.
intends to re-secure its borders, maintain its hegemony, and
bring a modicum of order if not justice back to
The difference after 9-11 is that we now have an
enemy with a face; with 22 faces in fact, all of them
available on the FBIâs new website of most-wanted
the start, it was apparent that 9-11 was and would continue
to be a war of networks.
Whether terrorist, internet, or primetime, most of
the networks seemed equally adept at the propagation of
violence, fear, and disinformation. For a prolonged moment
there was no detached point of observation:
we were immersed in a network of tragic images of
destruction and loss, looped in 24/7 cycles, which induced a
state of emergency and trauma at all levels of society. It
was as if the American political culture experienced a
collective Freudian trauma, which could be re-enacted
(endlessly on cable) but not understood at the moment of
shock. This is
what Michael Herr meant when he wrote about his own
experience with the trauma of Vietnam: "It took the war
to teach it, that you were as responsible for everything you
saw as you were for everything you did. The problem was that
you didnât always know what you were seeing until later,
maybe years later, that a lot of it never made it in at all,
it just stayed stored there in your eyes."
New York: Avon Books, p. 20).
And in a state of emergency, as in war, the first
images stick. There
was no initial attempt by the media or the government to
transform these images of horror into responsible discourses
of reflection and action.
Moving at the speed of the news cycle and in a rush
to judgment there was little time for deliberation, for
understanding the motivations of the attackers, or for
assessing the potential consequences, intended as well as
unintended, of a military response.
are not merely nodes connected by wiring of one sort of
another. They convey, mimic, and in some cases generate
human attributes and intentions, as suggested by Wired
founding editor Kevin Kelly, who defined a network as
âorganic behavior in a technological matrixâ.
But 9-11 knocked akilter this always problematical
relationship between meat and wire.
Technologically-driven events outpaced organic modes
of comprehension, and human actions, whether out of trauma
or information overload, seemed increasingly to resemble
machinic reflexes. Indeed,
the first reaction by most onlookers and television
reporters was to deem the event an accident.
The second attack destroyed the accidental thesis,
and as well, it seemed, our ability to cognitively map the
Instead, into the void left by the collapse of the
WTC towers and the absence of detached analysis, there
rushed a host of metaphors, analogies, and metonyms,
dominated by denial (âItâs a movie), history (âItâs
Pearl Harborâ), and non-specific horror (âItâs the end
of the world as we have known itâ).
our public culture, it is increasingly the media networks
rather than the family, the community, or the government
that provide the first, and, by its very speed and
pervasiveness, most powerful response to a crisis.
Questions of utility, responsibility, and
accountability inevitably arose, and as one would expect,
the mediaâs pull-down menu was not mapped for the
twin-towered collapse of American invulnerability.
Primetime networks did
their best (Peter Jennings of ABC better than the rest) to
keep up with the realtime crises.
But fear, white noise, and technical glitches kept
intruding, creating a cognitive lag so profound between
event and interpretation that I wondered if string theory
had been proven right, that one of the 10 other dimensions
that make up the universe had suddenly intruded upon our
own, formerly ordered one, exposing the chaos beneath.
after the looped footage of the collapse of the towers began
to take on the feeling of dĂ©jĂ vu, I seriously wondered if
the reality principle itself had not taken a fatal blow.
Like Ignatieff, I discerned a nihilism at work, but of a
different kind, of the sort vividly on display in the movie,
It first appears when some punky-looking customers in
search of bootleg virtual reality software come to see Neo,
the protagonist played by Keanu Reeves. He pulls from a shelf a green leather-bound book, the title
of which is briefly identifiable as Jean Baudrillardâs Simulacra and Simulation. When
he opens the hollowed-out book to retrieve the software, the
first page of the last chapter appears: âOn Nihilismâ.
Clearly an homage by the two directors, the Wachowsky
brothers, it all happens very quickly, too quickly to read
the original words of Baudrillard, but here they are:
no longer wears the dark, Wagnerian, Spenglerian, fuliginous
colors of the end of the century.
It no longer comes from a weltanshauung of decadence
nor from a metaphysical radicality born of the death of God
and of all the consequences that must be taken from this
nihilism is one of transparency, this irresolution is
indissolubly that of the system, and that of all the theory
that still pretends to analyze it.10
the toppling of WTC a core belief was destroyed: it could
not happen here. Into
this void the networks rushed, to provide transparency
without depth, a simulacrum of horror, a much purer form of
nihilism than imagined by moralist commentators like
Ignatieff or Rothstein. In
official circles, there was a concerted effort to fence off
the void: the
critical use of language, imagination, even humor was
tightly delimited by moral sanctions and government
first-strike against critical thought took the peculiar form
of a semantic debate over the meaning of âcowardâ.
In the New
Yorker and on Politically
Incorrect, the question was raised whether it is more
cowardly to commandeer a commercial airliner and pilot it
into the World Trade Center, bomb Serbians from 15,000 feet,
or direct a cruise missile attack against bin Laden from
several thousand miles away.
The official response was swift, with advertisements
yanked, talk-show condemnations, and Ari Fleischer, White
House press secretary, saying people like Bill Maher of Politically Incorrect âshould watch what they say, watch what they
zones of language quickly began to take shape. When Reuters
news agency questioned the abuse-into-meaningless of the
term âterrorismâ, George Will on ABC Sunday News
(September 30), retaliated by advocating a boycott of
and laughter were permitted in some places, not in others.
At a Defense Department press conference Secretary of
Defense Rumsfeld could ridicule, and effectively disarm, a
reporter who dared to ask if anyone in the Department of
Defense will be authorized to lie to the news media.11
President Bush was given room to joke in a
morale-boosting visit to the CIA, saying heâs âspending
a lot of quality time latelyâ with George Tenet, the
director of the CIA. And
then there was New
York Times reporter Edward Rothstein, taking his
opportunistic shot at postmodernists and postcolonialists,
claiming that their irony and relativism is âethically
perverseâ and produces a âguilty passivityâ.
Some of us were left wondering, where would that view
place fervent truth-seekers and serious enemies of
relativism and irony like bin Laden?
Terrorist foe but epistemological ally?
Mimetic War of Images
air war started with a split-screen war of images: in one
box, a desolate Kabul seen through a nightscope camera lens,
in grainy-green pixels except for the occasional white arc
of anti-aircraft fire followed by the flash of an explosion;
in the other, a rotating cast of characters, beginning with
President Bush, followed over the course of the day and the
next by Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld, Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs, General Meyers, and Attorney General John Ashcroft,
then progressively down the media food chain of war
reporters, beltway pundits, and recently retired generals.
On the one side we witnessed images of embodied
resolve in high resolution; on the other, nighttime shadows
with nobody in sight.
binaries were also legion in President Bushâs war
statement, incongruously delivered from the Treaty Room of
the White House: âas
we strike military targets, we will also drop foodâ; the
United States is âa friend to the Afghan peopleâ and
âan enemy of those who aid terrorists';
âthe only way to pursue peace is to pursue those
who threaten it.â And
once more, the ultimate either/or was issued:
âEvery nation has a choice to make.
In this conflict there is no neutral ground.â
the war programming was interrupted by the media-savvy bin
after the air strikes began, he appeared on Qatarâs al-Jazeera
television network (âthe Arab worldâs CNNâ) in a
pre-taped statement that was cannily delivered as a counter
air-strike to the U.S.
Kitted out in turban and battle fatigues, bin Laden
presented his own bipolar view of the world:
âthese events have divided the world into two
camps, the camp of the faithful and the camp of infidels.â
But if opposition constituted his worldview, it was
an historical mimic battle that sanctioned the
counter-violence: "America has been filled with horror
from north to south and east to west, and thanks be to God
what America is tasting now is only a copy of what we have
falling into the trap of âmoral equivalencyâ, one can
discern striking similarities. Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld and others have made much of
the âasymmetricalâ war being waged by the terrorists. And it is indeed a canny and even diabolical use of
asymmetrical tactics as well as strategies when terrorists
commandeer commercial aircraft and transform them into
kinetic weapons of indiscriminate violence, and then deploy
commercial media to counter the military strikes that
follow. Yet, a fearful symmetry is also at work, at an
unconscious, possibly pathological level, a war of
escalating and competing and imitative oppositions, a mimetic
war of images.
mimetic war is a battle of imitation and representation, in
which the relationship of who we are and who they are is
played out along a wide spectrum of familiarity and
friendliness, indifference and tolerance, estrangement and
can result in appreciation or denigration, accommodation or
separation, assimilation or extermination.
It draws physical boundaries between peoples, as well
as metaphysical boundaries between life and the most radical
other of life, death. It
separates human from god. It builds the fence that makes
good neighbors; it
builds the wall that confines a whole people.
And it sanctions just about every kind of violence.
than a rational calculation of interests takes us to war.
People go to war because of how they see, perceive,
picture, imagine, and speak of
is, how they construct the difference of others as well as
the sameness of themselves through representations.
From Greek tragedy and Roman gladiatorial spectacles
to futurist art and fascist rallies, the mimetic mix of
image and violence has proven to be more powerful than the
most rational discourse.
Indeed, the medical definition of mimesis is âthe
appearance, often caused by hysteria, of symptoms of a
disease not actually present.â
Before one can diagnose a cure, one must study the
symptoms â or, as it was once known in medical science,
was not long before morbid symptoms began to surface from an
array of terror and counter-terror networks. Al Qaeda
members reportedly used encrypted email to communicate;
hide encoded messages in web images (including pornography);
Kinkoâs and public library computers to send messages;
underground banking networks called hawala
to transfer untraceable funds; 24/7 cable networks like al-Jazeera
and CNN to get the word out; and, in their preparations for
9-11, a host of other information technologies like rented
cell phones, online travel agencies, and flight simulators.
In general, networks â from television primetime to
internet realtime â delivered events with an alacrity and
celerity that left not only viewers but decision-makers
racing to keep up.
information as the life-blood and speed as the killer
variable of networks, getting inside the decision-making as
well the image-making loop of the opponent became the
central strategy of network warfare. This was not lost on
the U.S. national security team as it struggled after the
initial attack to get ahead of the network curve.
Sluggish reactions were followed by quicker
pre-emptive actions on multiple networks.
The Senate passed the Uniting and Strengthening
America (USA) Act, which allowed for âroving wiretapsâ
of multiple telephones, easier surveillance of e-mail and
Internet traffic, and the divulgence of grand jury and
wiretap transcripts to intelligence agencies. National
Security adviser Condoleeza Rice made personal calls to
heads of the television networks, asking them to pre-screen
and to consider editing Al Qaeda videos for possible coded
about the air campaign as well as the unfolding ground
interventions were heavily filtered by the Pentagon.
Information flows slowed to a trickle from the White
House and the Defense Department after harsh words and tough
restrictions were imposed against leaks.
Psychological operations were piggy-backed onto
humanitarian interventions by the dropping of propaganda
leaflets and food packs.
The Voice of America began broadcasting anti-Taliban
messages in Pashto. After the 22 âMost Wanted
Terroristsâ were featured on the FBIâs website, the
popular TV program âAmericaâs Most Wantedâ ran an
extended program on their individual cases.
of the most powerful networks are often the least visible,
but when you add Hollywood to the mix, itâs hard to keep a
entertainment industry journal
Variety first broke the news about a meeting between
White House officials and Hollywood executives. The stated
intention was ominous enough, to âenlist Hollywood in the
White House is asking Hollywood to rally 'round the flag in
a style reminiscent of the early days of World War II.
Network heads and studio chiefs heard that message Wednesday
in a closed-door meeting with emissaries from the Bush
administration in Beverly Hills, and committed themselves to
new initiatives in support of the war on terrorism. These
initiatives would stress efforts to enhance the perception
of America around the world, to "get out the
message" on the fight against terrorism and to mobilize
existing resources, such as satellites and cable, to foster
better global understanding.12
some big media picked up this aspect of the story, none
except for Newsweek took
note of an earlier meeting organized by the military and the
University of Southern Californiaâs Institute for Creative
I knew about the ICT because I had covered its
opening for Wired back
in 1999, when the Army ponied up $43 million to bring
together the simulation talents of Hollywood, Silicon
Valley, and the U.S. military.14
Now it seemed that they were gathering top talent to
help coordinate a new virtual war effort:
a reversal of roles, government intelligence specialists
have been secretly soliciting terrorist scenarios from top
Hollywood filmmakers and writers. A
unique ad hoc working group convened at USC just last week
at the behest of the U.S. Army. The goal was to brainstorm
about possible terrorist targets and schemes in America and
to offer solutions to those threats, in light of the twin
assaults on the Pentagon and the World Trade Center. Among
those in the working group based at USC's Institute for
Creative Technology are those with obvious connections to
the terrorist pic milieu, like "Die Hard"
screenwriter Steven E. De Souza, TV writer David Engelbach
("MacGyver") and helmer Joseph Zito, who directed
the features "Delta Force One," "Missing in
Action" and "The Abduction."
But the list also includes more mainstream suspense
helmers like David Fincher ("Fight Club"), Spike
Jonze ("Being John Malkovich"), Randal Kleiser
("Grease") and Mary Lambert ("The In
Crowd") as well as feature screenwriters Paul De Meo
and Danny Bilson ("The Rocketeer").15
would appear that 9-11 christened a new network: the
media-entertainment network (MIME-NET).
If Vietnam was a war waged in the living-rooms of
America, the first and most likely the last battles of the
counter/terror war are going to be waged on global networks
that reach much more widely and deeply into our everyday
lies ahead? In
the spirit of the season, I think the best statement about
what might follow 9-11 comes from that great philosopher and
ballplayer, Yogi Bera, who famously said âthe future isn't
what it used to beâ. (He actually said âainât what it
used to beâ; it was the French poet Paul Valery who said
âisnâtâ, but Yogi wasnât very big on footnotes).
The point is made all the clearer by the ambiguity of
the statement: itâs hard to maintain let alone imagine a
link between a happy past and a rosy future after a
disaster, especially one in which terrorist technologies of
mass destruction are force-multiplied by media technologies
of mass distraction.
My greatest concern is not so much the future as how
past futures become reproduced, that is, how we seem unable
to escape the feed-back loops of bad intelligence,
bureaucratic thinking, and failed imagination.
my own academic experience, when confronted by the
complexity and speed of networks, the fields of political
science and international relations are not much if at all
disciplines of thought they are just too narrow, too slow,
leaves another intellectual void, into which policy-makers
and military planners are always ready to rush.
Currently the RMA-mantra among the techno-optimists
is to engage in their own form of
As first formulated by Vice Admiral Arthur Cebrowski
of the Naval War College and putatively picked by Defense
Secretary Rumsfeld to head-up the Pentagonâs military
transformation), network-centric war is fought by getting
inside the decision-making loop of the adversaryâs
network, and disrupting or destroying it before it can do
the same to yours. In
the rush to harden and to accelerate networks, all kinds of
checks and balances are left behind. There seems to be
little concern for what organizational theorists see as the
negative synergy operating in tightly coupled systems, in
which unintended consequences produce cascading effects and
normal accidents, in which the very complexity and supposed
redundancy of the network produce unforeseen but built-in
Three Mile Island in a pre-1914 diplomatic-military milieu.
Think Paul Virilioâs âintegral accidentâ.
My second concern is that social scientific theories are
unsuited for the kind of political investigation demanded by
the emergence of a military-industrial-media-entertainment
Eisenhower in his 1961 farewell address famously warned the
US of the emergence of a âmilitary-industrial complexâ,
and of what might happen should
âpublic policy be captured by a scientific and
Now that Silicon Valley and Hollywood have been added
to the mix, the dangers have morphed and multiplied.
Think Wag the
The Matrix. Think of C.Wright Millâs power elite with much better gear
to reproduce reality.
for the near future, I believe virtuous war as played out by
the military-industrial-media-entertainment network will be
our daily bread and nightly circus.
Some would see us staying there, suspended
perpetually, in between wars of terror and counterterror.
How to break out of the often self-prophesying
circles? Are there theoretical approaches that can
critically respond without falling into the trap of the
that can escape the nullity of thought which equates the
desire to comprehend with a willingness to condone
use of sloppy analogies of resistance, as well as petty
infighting (pace [Christopher] Hitchens, [Noam] Chomsky and their polarized
supporters) on the left does not give one much hope of a
unified anti-war movement. For
the moment, we need to acknowledge that the majority of
Americans, whether out of patriotism, trauma or apathy,
think it best to leave matters in the hands of the experts. I think for the immediate future the task will be to
distinguish new from old dangers, real from virtual effects,
and terror from counterterror in the network wars.
the last word might well come from the first words I heard
of the last war the U.S. fought.
Ten years ago I was circling over Chicago OâHare
airport when the captain came on the PA, informing us that
the bombing of Iraq had just begun.
In the taxi on the way to my hotel, I heard the first
radio reports of stealth aircraft, smart bombs, and low
casualty rates. But what stuck from that evening were the
last and only words of my cab driver.
In the thickest Russian accent, in a terribly
war-weary voice, without the benefit of any context but the
over-excitement of the radio reports, he said:
âThey told us we would be in Afghanistan for ten
weeks. We were there for ten years.â
Der Derian is Professor of Political Science at the
University of Massachusetts at Amherst and Research
Professor of International Relations at the Watson Institute
for International Studies at Brown University, where he
directs the Information Technology, War and Peace Project.
His articles on war and technology have appeared in Wired,
the Nation, and The Washington Quarterly. His most recent
book is Virtuous
War: Mapping the Military-Industrial-Media-Entertainment
essay draws from earlier postings at www.infopeace.org
Michael Ignatieff, âIt's war - but it doesn't have to be
October 1, 2001.
George Will, âOn the Health of
the Stateâ, Newsweek,
October 1, 2001, p. 70.
Edward Rothstein, âAttacks on
U.S. Challenge the Perspectives of Postmodern True
Believers,â September 22, 2001, p.A17.
Edington, New York
Times, (2 March 1993).
5Newsweek, (8 March
1993), p. 22.
6Sunday Times, (28
February 1993), p. 10.
These quotes are drawn from an earlier work of mine that
called for new approaches to IR after the first
WTC bombing. See
âA Reinterpretation of Realism: Genealogy, Semiology,
Theory: Critical Investigations (London: Macmillan,
1995), pp. 363-396.
8See James Der
War: Mapping the Military-Industrial-Media-Entertainment
Network (Boulder, CO and Oxford,UK: Westview/Perseus,
and Simulation, trans. Sheila Glaser (Ann Arbor, MI:
1994), p. 159.
I provided the information to them.
14See âVirtuous War Goes to Hollywoodâ, Virtuous War, pp. 153-178.
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