

Migration, Urbanization and Development

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Over the last tumultuous century, the world has been transformed in many ways, politically, economically and socially. These shifts have not been evenly distributed and some parts of the world have been transformed in ways that have brought greater prosperity to their citizens. This brief essay will limit the scope of the discussion to what can be classified as three transitions:

- A demographic transition.
- An urban transition.
- A migration transition.

These three transitions have to be set against the most basic transition of all, a development or economic transition. The world has seen the accelerating creation of wealth and consumption, and also increasing inequalities across states, with some emerging as rapidly growing, wealthy economies while others have been left behind at low levels of income and stagnant, even declining, growth. The difference between the richest and the poorest country in the world about 250 years ago was about 5:1; by the end of the twentieth century it was in the region of 400:1 (Landes 1998). In 1900, global consumption was around US\$1.5 trillion. By 1950, it had reached US\$4 trillion and, by 1998, US\$24 trillion (*New Internationalist*, January 1999, issue 309). More people in more parts of the world have become relatively wealthy over recent decades and although wealth differences within countries have grown, they have fluctuated and "virtually all the observed rise in world inequality has been driven by widening gaps between nations" (Lindert and Williamson 2003: 227). In this transition, some states have increasingly been left behind (Collier 2007).

That economic growth has driven the other transitions is axiomatic, even if not in any neat or necessarily systematic way. Nevertheless, no highly developed economy has high levels of either fertility or mortality or has most of its population living in rural areas. In 1900, global fertility was probably around six children per woman, expectation of life at birth was around 30 years, and about 13 per cent of the world's population lived in cities. By 2000, global fertility had declined to 2.7, expectation of life at birth was over 65 years of age, and some 46.7 per cent of the world's population lived in urban areas (United Nations 2007). The data presented in table 1 show the trends in fertility, mortality and urbanization across the major regions of the world from 1950 through to 2030. Although considerable variation exists within

each of the major regions listed, the universality of a trend towards low fertility, low mortality and urban society is apparent.

Table 1. Basic variables in the demographic and urban transitions, 1950-2025, world and major regions

	1950-55			1975-80			2000-05			2025-30		
	TFR	e ⁰	Urban									
World	5.02	46.4	29.0	3.92	60.2	37.2	2.65	66.0	46.7	2.21	71.9	57.5
Africa	6.75	38.5	14.7	6.61	48.7	25.4	4.98	51.6	36.2	3.30	59.8	47.9
Asia	5.87	41.0	16.8	4.19	59.1	23.3	2.47	67.5	40.4	2.01	74.1	59.3
Europe	2.66	65.6	50.5	1.97	71.3	65.6	1.41	73.8	71.7	1.61	78.2	76.6
Latin and Caribbean	5.88	51.4	42.0	4.48	63.0	61.2	2.52	72.0	75.4	1.97	77.1	83.1
North America	3.46	68.8	63.9	1.78	73.4	73.8	1.99	78.5	79.1	1.83	80.9	85.7
Oceania	3.87	60.4	62.0	2.73	67.9	71.5	2.37	74.4	70.5	2.08	78.4	73.0

Note: Total fertility rates (TFR) and expectation of life at birth (e⁰) are given as averages for the five-year period indicated. Urbanization (urban) levels are given for the start year.

Source: United Nations, *World Population Prospects: The 2006 Revision*, New York, Population Division, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, 2007; United Nations, *World Urbanization Prospects: The 2005 Revision*, New York, Population Division, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, 2006.

The role of migration in these transitions is more problematic and no migration transition can be reduced to a few statistics as new destinations and sources of population movement have emerged and declined over the decades. At the highest level of generalization, a transition from economies of net emigration to economies of net immigration has been observed from countries in Europe to economies in East Asia, even if the data are often less than entirely convincing (see United Nations 2004). Clearly, too, the settler societies of the Americas and Australasia have pursued different paths. For long, their population growth rates were built upon international migration, but, there too, transitions occurred. In South America, international migrations essentially had dried up by the middle of the last century; in North America and Australasia, international migrations have persisted as sources of growth as absolute numbers of migrants increased and fertility declined. The proportion of the foreign-born increased in the United States from 7.9 per cent in 1990 to 12.5 per cent in 2006, representing a virtual doubling in the total number of foreign-born over the period to 37.5 million,

for example. However, emigration from those countries, too, is also important and the United States and Australia are significant, and probably increasing, sources of migrants to other parts of the world (Hugo 2006)

Yet, national patterns in these transitions are deceptive. Large cities as the centres of power, innovation and transnational trade are both the key expression and the drivers of these transitions. This brief paper will attempt to map how transitions in migration have been related to shifts in vital rates, urbanization and economic development.

The first urban transition

In pre-modern economies, when most people lived in rural areas and mortality was high, the populations of towns were sustained through migration. It was perhaps not until the end of the eighteenth century that towns in England became self-sustaining and contributors to, rather than consumers of, population growth (Chambers 1972). In the pre-industrial city, mortality among the generally young and unmarried migrant populations of towns was significant. That population was not reproducing itself and the urban sector was essentially reducing the rural populations. Where migration from surrounding rural areas was not sufficient to maintain urban populations, elites in the larger cities resorted to importing labour, often as slaves from more distant parts. These unfree workers, together with traders from other cities and perhaps soldiers recruited from marginal areas, created the multi-ethnic populations of early cities (McNeill 1986: 14).

The decline of mortality began in towns and urban growth began to increase, powered by three components: natural increase, or the excess of births over deaths; net migration, or the balance of people coming in to the city over those going out; and the expansion of urban boundaries, part of the reclassification of rural to urban areas. The relative balance of these components shifts over time, with the volume of migration as well as urban growth ultimately a function of fertility and mortality. By far the most problematic of the components is reclassification, which is normally included with net migration as there is normally no easy way to calculate the number of people added to a city during any period through the extension of urban boundaries. As will be seen in the conclusion, political units, cities and states expand their access to labour through extending their borders. In table 2, reclassification is included with net migration.

Table 2. Components of urban growth, 1960s to 1980s, selected regions and countries, mean values in percentages

Region/ country	1960s		1970s		1980s	
	Natural increase	Net migration	Natural increase	Net migratio n	Natural increase	Net migratio n
Africa	54.5	45.6	59.3	40.7	59.9	40.1
Asia	55.1	44.9	56.1	44.0	44.7	55.3
Latin America	61.9	38.1	62.1	37.9	66.5	33.5
Total	58.8	41.3	59.4	40.6	59.1	40.9
Korea	39.7	60.3	43.7	56.3	45.0	55.0
Thailand	n.a.	n.a.	42.2	57.8	55.5	44.5
Brazil	51.7	48.3	52.8	47.2	62.5	37.5

Source: United Nations, *The Components of Urban Growth in Developing Countries*, New York, Population Division, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, 2001, p. 30.

Amongst the present developing countries, the average contribution of migration to urban growth has remained constant at around 41 per cent, although considerable variation exists among regions and countries. In Africa, for example, the contribution of net migration declined over the two decades as high fertility contributed to the urban growth. In Asia, as fertility has declined markedly, especially in China, and economic growth accelerated attracting migrants to cities, the contribution of net migration increased. In Latin America, a gradual increase in the contribution of natural increase is observed over the two decades. These broad trends observed from the data have to be treated with a great deal of caution as inter-country variation, relative rates of urban growth and the absolute size of the populations involved all need to be taken into consideration. For example, it can be seen that Korea experienced a very significant contribution from migration during the 1960s when its urban population was growing at over 6 per cent per annum. Numbers employed in manufacturing in Seoul metropolitan area quadrupled during the 1960s, with household income in Seoul tripling between 1965 to 1970 alone (Mills and Song 1979). The population of Seoul increased from 2.4 million in 1960 to 5.3 million in 1970, 8.2 million in 1980 and 9.9 million in 2000. The contribution made by net migration to Seoul's growth was between 74 and 78 per cent in the decade of the 1960s, declining to 54 to 60 per cent during the period 1970-85 (Kim, Kim and Son, 1991: 11). By the 1970s, the population of the rural areas of Korea was declining by -1.45 per cent per annum, a decline that accelerated to -3.63 per cent per annum in the 1980s. Hence, the reduction of the contribution of net migration to urban growth in the case of Korea could be expected even in the face of sharply declining fertility from 5.63 in the early 1960s through 4.3 in the

early 1970s to 2.2 in the early 1980s and 1.7 in the early 1990s.

Although the data for Korea appear logical, the figures for other countries might seem contradictory. For example, the contribution that migration makes to Thailand's urban growth is shown to have declined from the decade of the 1970s to the 1980s at exactly the time that Bangkok was growing rapidly with GNP per capita more than doubling between 1985 and 1995 and numbers employed in manufacturing increasing by over half (Phongpaichit and Baker 1996: 3). This anomaly can be explained by the underbounding of Thailand's urban places, and Bangkok in particular. Most of the migration to Bangkok associated with the economic boom took place to areas on the periphery of the urban area that were still classified as rural and hence the basic data for urban Thailand cannot capture the real relative contributions of migration and natural increase. Fertility in Thailand declined from 6.4 in the early 1960s through 5.0 in the early 1970s, 2.9 in the early 1980s to 2.0 in the early 1990s, almost mirroring the decline in Korea but a few years later.

Guided by the available if inadequate data, and speculating far beyond their capability, a simple model of a first urban transition can be proposed. Initially, when urban populations are small compared with the number of rural dwellers, the growth of cities is dominated by high mortality and net migration, and particularly the migration of young men. As mortality declines and with increasing participation of women in internal migration flows, the reproductive capability of cities expands and the contribution of natural increase rises. The earlier internal migrations of women tend to be to accompany or follow spouses or other close family members but as service activities expand and light, labour-intensive industries become established, the migration of women independent of husbands, brothers or fathers gathers importance. The incorporation of women into education and the labour force acts to lower fertility in urban areas, and urban fertility is generally lower than rural fertility. The contribution of net migration to urban growth rises, although it is only in the fastest growing economies that it dominates as a component of urban growth. As the proportion of the urban population in any country increases, so, too, does the proportion of the migration that originates in the urban sector. Internal migrations within a country become mainly within the urban sector, leaving natural increase as the dominant component, as seems to be the case in Latin America at present. At the global level, the faster than anticipated decline in fertility from the 1970s onwards must have been a major factor in explaining why projections for many city populations that were made from the mid-1970s to the late 1980s consistently overestimated the actual 2000 populations (Satterthwaite 2007: 67-69).

The second urban transition

Once the proportion urban in any population is in excess of 70 per cent, the first urban transition can be said to be over. Nevertheless, this situation does not imply some indefinite stasis; the process of change continues but in directions that are still largely unknown and with elements that make the process of change different from that which occurred before. The qualitative and quantitative differences may justify the term "second urban transition". Coleman (2006) has argued for a "third demographic transition" to describe the processes currently being experienced by the most developed countries of the world. The first demographic transition is from high to low mortality and fertility, which brings about a phase of rapid population growth because of the lag between the onset of fertility compared to the onset of mortality decline. The second demographic transition (van de Kaa 1987) characterizes those societies that have reached very low levels of fertility and mortality, have ageing populations and are entering a phase of population decline. For example, as early as 1998, the United Nations listed 33 countries that were projected to decline in population between 2000 and 2050 from 796 million to 669 million people. On the other hand, the United Nations also listed 15 countries, overwhelmingly in sub-Saharan Africa and covering 182 million people in 2000, that had not embarked upon the first demographic transition by 2000.

The third demographic transition, according to Coleman, is based upon persistent low fertility and leads to high immigration from distant areas, which itself leads to the ethnic diversification of the population. The transition can be said to begin when the once majority group in any population declines to below 50 per cent of that population. While Coleman nuances his provocative argument in several ways, a dimension missing from the discussion is the role of the city: Coleman examines only national data. However, it is argued in this paper that the cities are the driving force of this transition and the relative roles of internal and international migration to cities may provide a better benchmark for the onset for the transition. Hence, the idea of a second urban transition better captures the nature of the processes of change, but it also adds weight to the transition that Coleman describes.

In the United Kingdom, the 2001 census showed that 45.7 per cent of the ethnic minority population was concentrated in London, where 29 per cent of the population, or some 2.2 million people, was made up of minorities (UK 2002). Of the social and linguistic groups that could be identified in London as non-indigenous, some fifty communities had populations of 10,000 or more and over 300 languages were identified as spoken by the residents of the city. The proportion of the foreign-born, as opposed to ethnic groups, living in London, according to the 2001 census was 27.1 per cent, with 40 per cent of

the UK's foreign-born living in the Metropolitan London Area (MPI 2008b). The second most important concentration of the foreign-born in the UK was the West Midlands, which contains the city of Birmingham, with 13.9 per cent of its population foreign-born. In comparison, some 36 per cent of New York's population was foreign-born in 2000, representing 2.9 million people, again with a high degree of diversity in origin (New York 2004). Tokyo, another so-called "global city" (Sassen 1991) may only have about 2.4 per cent of its population foreign-born (Benton-Short and Price 2005).

This is certainly not to say that international migrants are to be found solely in metropolitan areas. In the United States, those states showing the most rapid increase in the number of foreign born are far from major metropolitan areas, states such as South Carolina, Nevada or Georgia (MPI 2008a). Agricultural workers in many parts of the United States and those employed in certain activities such as Chinese restaurants in the UK, for example (Baker 1994), are found in rural areas and small towns, but the vast majority of immigrants are concentrated in the main cities. Here, the clear distinction between the settler societies in the Americas and Australasia needs to be drawn. In Europe, international migration was not entirely absent during the first urban transition but it tended to be relatively small compared with the number of internal migrants to the major cities and was weighted towards either a transnational elite or selected groups fleeing persecution. In the settler societies, international migration always played an important role and, at times, the dominant role in urban growth. Yet, the differences can be overdrawn. As cities in Europe relied on migrants from within the state, the settler societies drew on sources constrained by history and policy to very particular international origins. The fundamental characteristic of the international flows in the second transition that applies to both settler and non-settler societies alike is their heterogeneity. The second urban transition appears to be returning the city to the "poly-ethnic norm", as described by McNeill (1986) for pre-modern cities.

Table 3. Japan, total population, selected age distribution and numbers of internal migrants, 1970-2005

	Total population (in 000s)	Population 20-34 years (in 000s)	Percentage of age group 20-34 years	Internal migrants	
				Intra-prefectural	Inter-prefectural
1970	103,720	28,121	27.1	4,037,503	4,235,008
1980	117,060	27,654	23.6	3,710,931	3,356,377
1990	123,611	24,659	19.9	3,350,450	3,168,335
1995	125,570	26,809	21.3	3,582,529	3,049,567
2000	126,926	26,988	21.3	3,333,206	2,813,464
2005	127,768	25,386	19.9	2,999,912	2,601,588

Source: *Japan Statistical Yearbook, 1970-2008*, Tokyo, Statistics Bureau and Statistical Research and Training Institute, www.stat.go.jp/English

The second urban transition is driven by very low levels of fertility that would ultimately lead to the decline of the native urban populations. In addition, however, there is the draining of the pool of potential rural-to-urban migrants in the rural sector that supplied the cities with labour, in the case of Europe, and of the pool of potential migrants in Europe itself, in the cases of the Americas and Australasia. In these areas of origin, the demographic transition had progressed to very low levels of fertility where the populations were not replacing themselves.

The development associated with urbanization has shifted populations from rural to urban. To take Japan as an example, between 1947 and 1990 some 28 million new jobs in industrial areas were created but 13 million in agriculture and forestry were lost (Totman 2000: 472). Over this period, the rural population of Japan had been drained to the extent that virtually half of the total land area was classified as "severely depopulating" by the 1990s (figure 1). Some 40 per cent of Japan's rural population and over 60 per cent of its farmers are currently over 65 years of age. Japan's fertility had fallen below replacement level by 1960 and the number of young adults, who are those most likely to migrate, has been declining since 1970. Nationally, the number of young adults 20-34 years old in 2005 was almost 10 per cent fewer than in 1970. The number of internal migrants in Japan has also steadily decreased over recent decades, from 4.0 million intra-prefectural migrants in 1970 to just under 3 million in 2005. The number of interprefectural migrants fell even more sharply from 4.2 million interprefectural migrants in 1970 to 2.6 million in 2005. In 2005, more migrants moved within prefectures than between prefectures, suggesting that internal migration in Japan is increasingly made up of residential shifts within metropolitan areas. The similar draining of Korea's rural population can be seen in the extension of the severely depopulating rural areas in the 1980s compared with the 1970s (figures 2 and 3).

The conclusion seems inescapable: the supply of that "ultimate resource", population, from internal sources is decreasing and, if the cities are to maintain their growth and demographic dynamism, other strategies will be required. Of course, a reduction in population may not necessarily be negative for the urban future but, in a competitive globalizing world, labour shortages, and specifically skilled labour shortages, appear to characterize the global city. A central part of any second urban transition is the extension of the migration fields overseas and the substitution of internal migration and natural increase with international migration. Yet, both Japan and Korea have resisted pressures to import large numbers of foreign workers, even if the numbers in Korea have virtually doubled from 217,384 in 1999 to 423,597 in 2004, although the increase for Japan was much more modest from 670,000 to 800,000 foreign workers (Skeldon 2006b). No Asian economy currently allows large numbers of immigrants to settle. Hence, the second urban transition, unlike the first, is subject to much more policy intervention and likely to take divergent forms. A critical dimension in the process will be the role of metropolitan government relative to national government. Immigration is a national concern but authorities providing services for immigrants and those areas requiring labour are likely to be local.

The second urban transition is the urban counterpart of the "migration turnaround", in which countries shift from being economies of net emigration to economies of net immigration (Abella 1994). In southern Europe, Spain, Portugal, Italy and Greece have all gone through this shift from emigration to immigration in recent decades and, in Asia, Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and increasingly Malaysia and Thailand, appear to be following suit though often not in a neat and tidy way. For example, see the results of some of the work summarized in Skeldon (2006b), and also Fielding (2004) and King, Fielding and Black (1997). A shift from net emigration to net immigration does not imply that outmigration from a country ceases. In fact, theoretically, outmigration could increase in tandem with the greater increases in immigration. The outmigration continues as skilled nationals move overseas as part of global corporate expansion, governmental and non-governmental development aid programmes or simply to compete in global markets. For example, the United Kingdom has a similar proportion of its population overseas to countries more commonly associated with emigration such as Mexico or the Philippines, even if the types of emigrants are quite different (see Sriskandarajah and Drew 2006). In absolute terms, the United Kingdom has more skilled workers overseas than any other country (Docquier and Marfouk 2006: 175). Much of this global movement is circular, of longer or shorter duration, and originates in the largest cities of the countries of origin.

Perhaps the most critical question relates to how far the second urban

transition will go. The first demographic transition does appear to be a universal pattern, even if pathways through the transition vary. However, it does seem unlikely that the second urban transition can come to be universally diffused, although all areas will be linked in one way or another to one or more metropolitan centres. Global cities will only evolve at relatively few points in a global urban hierarchy: some areas will emerge as points of global and regional attraction and other areas will depopulate. Any boundary between "developed" and "developing" is constantly changing towards an enlargement in the number of the former and a reduction in the number in the latter category. Those countries most likely to experience a second urban transition are likely to be found in Asia, such as China, India, Malaysia or Thailand, but can be expected in other parts of the world, too, perhaps South Africa, Brazil or Mexico. Hence, cities at specific locations in the developing world are likely to emerge as labour-deficit. It might seem strange to argue that the demographic giant, China, might experience labour shortages. Nevertheless, two million job vacancies have already been reported in the southeast coastal region of China in 2004 (*Economist*, 9-15 October 2004) and labour shortages spread north into the Yangtze River and the north coastal region in 2005 (Wang, Cai and Gao 2005). To an extent, these shortages reflect bottlenecks in the internal labour market within China for certain types of labour, but more recent evidence suggests that the shortages may be as much structural as cyclical.

China's accession to the World Trade Organization and programmes to diffuse development more widely into the interior have created opportunities closer to the areas of origin of internal migrants. The result has been severe labour shortages in coastal regions and increases of around 25 per cent in the basic wage in Shenzhen, for example (*International Herald Tribune*, 3 March 2006). China will not yet be seeking to import workers from overseas, but already the era of cheap labour in China appears to be ending. China, like the other developed economies in Asia, has seen a precipitous decline in fertility from 4.9 children per woman in the early 1970s to 1.7 in the period 2000 to 2005, and United Nations (2007) projections envisage China's population starting to decline after 2030. That decline will ultimately lead to a slower growth in labour force and, if China follows the Japanese pattern, to a slowing in internal migration. The possibility that rural areas will be drained of their population might seem far-fetched given current levels of unemployment and underemployment in rural China. Nevertheless, the speed of economic growth and social transformation in that vast country has been astonishing and, if the current growth continues, and that in itself is a big if, it is surely not inconceivable that pressures to import labour may emerge in certain cities within a generation.

However, clearly, not all cities or countries in the developing world will

necessarily follow one pattern. Although a case has been made for a second urban transition in East Asia, with the exception of Singapore where the proportion of migrants parallels those of London and New York, no economy even remotely approaches these levels. Tokyo and Seoul in the most advanced economies in the region, have around 2 per cent of their populations foreign-born (GUM 2008). Multiculturalism in these countries, despite some trends in that direction (Douglass and Roberts 2000; Douglass and Kim 1997), appears to have a long way to go and not one "hyperdiverse" city yet exists outside Europe or North America (Price and Benton Short 2007). Nevertheless, it cannot be discounted that the decline in urban and rural fertility in East Asia observed above will act as a driver through a second urban transition in Asia too.

It is much more difficult is to envisage a second transition in parts of the world less developed than Asia and there the pathways will indeed be different. Where towns were introduced as administrative centres by external powers with linkages back to metropolitan areas that were stronger than to their immediate hinterlands, different patterns are likely to emerge. The fragility of post-independence economies in Africa, for example, has not allowed many of the urban areas to develop a strong production base and they remain mainly centres of extraction or administration. The economic and political crises of the 1970s and early 1980s saw rural-urban income differences contract, migration to the cities slowed and a significant number of migrants returned to rural areas in countries such as Ghana (Songsore 2003:112; Potts 1995). Nevertheless, in Ghana, high rates of natural increase in the towns, together with the reduced migration, still brought about a slow increase in the level of urbanization through this period. It rose from 29 per cent in 1970 to 32.9 per cent in 1985. In recent years, improving economic performance in Ghana saw annual GDP growth per capita increase. The average for the period 1975 to 2003 was only 0.4 per cent per annum, whereas that increased to an average of 1.8 per cent per annum for the last part of that period, in 1990-2003 (UNDP 2005: 268). Ghana's level of urbanization was estimated to have reached 47.8 per cent by 2005 (United Nations 2006) and its fertility had declined to 4.39 children per woman by that year. This figure was high by Asian standards, but it was down by some 34 per cent since the mid-1970s and it was less than the average for Africa of 4.97.

With fertility still high throughout Africa, but urbanization levels also increasing, the question must be the extent to which the continued concentration of population in towns is sustainable in the context of levels of economic growth that are low at best. The annual average growth in per capita GDP between 1990 and 2003 for sub-Saharan countries as a whole was 0.1 per cent, and for the period 1975-2003 was negative at -0.7 per cent

(UNDP 2005). In this context, Ghana is one of the better performers, but for many countries the urbanization is based on very weak foundations. A reversal of migration in a period of economic downturn, as seen in the 1980s, is certainly a possibility, with any continued growth of towns largely based on natural increase. Political difficulties in Somalia and Zimbabwe have contributed to declines in the populations of Mogadisho and Harare. However, given the demand for labour in other parts of the world as discussed above, it is possible, given the fragility of the migration fields in many of these countries, that the internal movements develop into international movements. While this conclusion is purely speculative at this stage, such an outcome would represent the origin side of the migration equation in the second urban transition.

These migrations need not be primarily directed towards the cities in the present most developed parts of the world, although some will be, but they will also be targeted at the new centres emerging in Asia, the Middle East and in parts of Africa itself. Again, international migration substitutes for internal migration. Any such transition in migration need not simply be from the towns to destinations in other countries, that is, internal migrants moving into unemployment in local towns and then moving on to seek jobs in another country in a stepwise progression. Some movements will evolve directly from rural origins to international destinations, as observed in some countries in Asia (Skeldon 2006a). In this way, many towns in the periphery of the developing world may become short-circuited from their hinterland in the second urban transition and enter a period of stagnant growth, particularly as fertility declines.

The simple model sketched above was based primarily on the Eurasian experiences in areas of long-established urban and rural settlement. Variants of the scenarios were suggested for those areas of European settlement. There, long-distance, rural-to-urban and urban-to-urban migrations to cities in distant lands were typical. These migrations were international even though many occurred within colonial structures. The cities in destination areas were essentially conduits for the migration. Many migrants remained within these cities themselves but many others transited through to smaller towns or rural areas. Hence, in such cases, a simple transition from internal to international migrations is inappropriate and more complex shifts among international, internal and international movements that are closely linked and in which the changing ethnic composition of the flows is significant need to be developed. More measured reflection will also surely allow the revelation of other pathways through the urban transitions but this discussion should have highlighted the importance of examining shifts between internal and international flows over time that are related to the universal shifts towards lower fertility and mortality and towards more

urban societies.

Conclusion

This paper has argued for a major shift in the patterns of urban growth since about 1990 that have come about, not just through changes in fertility but in patterns of migration that make up what has been called a second urban transition. The catchment areas of the largest cities in the developed world have expanded outwards: international migration has substituted for internal migration as domestic sources have disappeared. The populations of cities have returned to a poly-ethnic pattern because of the more diverse origins of the migrants. This does not mean that, over the long term, international migration will be able to sustain the continued demographic growth of the cities. Persistent low fertility is likely to ensure slow, or even gradually declining, population growth of even the largest cities. As in the case of states as a whole, replacement migration for births averted implies too large a number of immigrants over the long term to be socially or politically acceptable (United Nations 2001).

Perhaps a more efficient way to facilitate migration, akin to the extension of urban boundaries that is such a methodological problem in the components of urban growth and discussed earlier in the paper, is to expand the catchment area for internal migration across international boundaries. In this case, what would have been international migration becomes de facto internal migration, further blurring any meaningful distinction between internal and international migration. The expansion of the European Union is perhaps the most notable example. Net migration into the EU in 2003 was around 950,000 per annum (Salt 2005: 26). On 1 May 2004, the EU accepted 10 new accession states, with a combined population of some 70 million who became international migrants to Europe without having to move. Not all will want to move domestically within the EU, but all, sooner or later, will be free to do so as internal migrants, and many will migrate to the most dynamic cities in Europe. However, these states themselves are well into the second demographic transition and cannot be expected to supply labour indefinitely. Some, such as Poland, are already importing labour from countries further east, thus diffusing the transition further outwards. More widely, we may expect to see similar enlargements in other parts of the world in which new political geographies emerge that facilitate the movement of peoples to the most dynamic urban centres.

All the transitions discussed, demographic, urban and migration, were part of the economic development that began in Europe from the mid-eighteenth century and have diffused to other parts of the world. The spatial extension and pathways through the transitions have been highly variable and not all

areas will be uniformly affected. In particular, only a relatively few areas will emerge as major destinations of migration and these will be the major metropolitan cities. The number of cities of 10 million inhabitants or more increased from two in 1950 to 20 in 2005 but is projected to add only another two by 2015 (United Nations 2006). While multi-polar, extended metropolitan regions or corridors are likely to be more prevalent than single large urban centres, these regions of attraction are, nevertheless, likely to be limited in number, although the majority will be in the developing world. Seventeen of the 22 cities with populations of 10 million or more projected for 2015 will be in the area presently defined as the developing world. However, large parts of the developing world, too, as well as whole swathes of the rural areas of the present developed economies, will enter a phase of long-term demographic decline with the virtual depopulation of large areas. Not all the present states will remain viable, demographically or economically, through the twenty-first century.

Global migration since World War II has been characterized by movements governed much more by policy than the migrations that preceded that time (Hatton and Williamson 2005). As we move through the second urban transition, that policy may become as concerned with the creation of spaces in which people can move freely as with those policies that regulate migration from one political space to another. The role of metropolitan as well as national and multi-state governments will be central to this development. Quite what form the linkages will take, or which new political spaces will emerge, remains an important area for research that brings together demographic, economic and political development.

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